Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2015

The Dialectics of Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: The Case
of Said Nursi
Zubeyir Nisanci
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
Nisanci, Zubeyir, "The Dialectics of Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: The Case of Said Nursi" (2015).
Dissertations. 1482.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1482

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2015 Zubeyir Nisanci

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

THE DIALECTICS OF SECULARISM AND REVIVALISM IN TURKEY: THE CASE
OF SAID NURSI

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN SOCIOLOGY

BY
ZUBEYIR NISANCI
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MAY 2015

Copyright by Zubeyir Nisanci, 2015
All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am deeply grateful to Dr. Rhys H. Williams who chaired this dissertation
project. His theoretical and methodological suggestions and advice guided me in
formulating and writing this dissertation. It is because of his guidance that this study
proved to be a very fruitful academic research and theoretical learning experience for
myself. My gratitude also goes to the other members of the committee, Drs. Michael
Agliardo, Laureen Langman and Marcia Hermansen for their suggestions and advice.
I should also mention other faculty members from the department of sociology
at Loyola University Chicago who were not in the committee. I am thankful to Drs.
Marilyn Krogh, Judith Wittner and Anne Figert for the support and guidance they
provided me during my studies at Loyola University Chicago.
I would like thank my dearest parents İbrahim and Ayşe Nişancı who have
loved and cared for me and given me all that they can since the earliest days of my life.
I am thankful to God for making them my parents. I also thank my late grandmother
Mediha Nişancı who adorned my childhood with love and compassion. My older
brother and my first mentor Şükrü Nişancı who planted in my mind the seeds of
analytical thinking deserves gratitude as well. It was him who handed me the first book
I read in my life and it was again him who introduced me to sociology and history.

iii

I cannot adequately thank my beloved wife and friend Aslıhan for the
emotional and intellectual support she gave me especially during the writing of this
dissertation. Our children Mediha and İbrahim have also been sources of joy and
inspiration for me. I wrote the entire dissertation at home and I excelled in making
maneuverable paper planes for them from the print outs of this work. Thusly, the
writing of the dissertation became a connecting point for us rather than disconnecting
us.
Last but not least, my thanks go out to my friend and neighbor Muhammed
Ali Asil who helped me in printing and submitting the finalized hardcopies of this
dissertation to the graduate school as I was overseas during this process.

iv

To my family

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ xi
Abbreviations Used in Bibliographic Citations .............................................................. xi
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... xiii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1
Ontology, Moral Philosophy and Political Philosophy in the Sociological Context ....... 5
Significance of the Study ............................................................................................... 16
Methods and Content Outline ........................................................................................ 29
Data ............................................................................................................................. 32
Content Outline ........................................................................................................... 34
CHAPTER II: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SECULARIZATION DEBATES ................41
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 41
The Secularization Theory: The Same Old Story or the Same Old Question? .............. 44
The Rational Choice Theory: A Reductionist Fallacy? ................................................. 61
Alternative Perspectives: Human Agency and Secularization as a Socially
Constructed Meaning System ..................................................................................... 75
CHAPTER III: THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF
SECULARISM IN TURKEY .......................................................................................103
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 103
Reforming the Army, Saving the Empire: The First Wave of Modernization
Reforms (1779-1839) ................................................................................................ 107
Reforms in the Tanzimat Era: Centralization and the Rise of the New
Bureaucracy .............................................................................................................. 115
Reactions to the First Wave of Reforms (1779-1839) and the Tanzimat
(1839-1876)............................................................................................................ 121
Did Secularization Start During the First Wave of Reforms and the Tanzimat? ...... 128
Between the Two Worlds: The Young Ottomans and Westernization ........................ 140
Declaration of the First Constitution (1876) ............................................................. 169
Secularism on the Rise: The Young Turks and the Committee of Union and
Progress ..................................................................................................................... 172
The Committee of Union and Progress, and Nationalism ........................................ 178
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Counterrevolution of 1909 ............... 193
Science and Secularization in the Late Ottoman Society ......................................... 201
The Turkish Republic: Top-down Secularization ........................................................ 244
The Turkish War of Independence and the Rise of Mustafa Kemal ......................... 244
vi

Ideological Backgrounds of Mustafa Kemal ............................................................ 252
Establishment of the Turkish Republic: Secularism as a State Ideology.................. 259
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 268
CHAPTER IV: THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF SAID
NURSI’S REVIVALIST DISCOURSE .......................................................................282
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 282
The Reformist Discourse of Said Nursi Until 1910 ..................................................... 284
Back in the East: Conversations with the Kurdish Tribesmen and
the Sermon in Damascus ........................................................................................ 297
Transition from Reformist Discourse to Religious Renewal: Publication of
Muhakemat ............................................................................................................. 298
Qur’an as the Absolute Source of Guidance: Publication of İşarat-ul icaz .............. 304
Said Nursi’s Revivalist Discourse after the Establishment of the Turkish
Republic .................................................................................................................... 310
The Elementary Dialectics of Religious vs. Secularist Moral Philosophy and
Ontology in Said Nursi’s Revivalist Writings ....................................................... 311
Religious Responses to the Secularist Conception of Human Perfectibility ............ 341
God or Nature?: Responses to the Ontological Foundations of Secularism ............. 350
Why Not Political Struggle? ..................................................................................... 356
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 358
CHAPTER V: THE NUR MOVEMENT’S MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES .............364
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 364
The State, Civil Society, Religion and Religious Movements in the Recent
History of Turkey...................................................................................................... 365
The Special Mission of the Nur Movement: ‘Jihad of the Pen’ .................................. 373
The Nur Movement’s Encounters with the Secularist Establishment ......................... 400
Discussions and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 414
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................424
APPENDIX A: THE BIOGRAPHY OF SAID NURSI ..................................................446
Childhood and First Encounters with the Madrasa Education..................................... 447
First Step into Politics: Young Said and İttihad-ı İslam .............................................. 453
The Dream of a University .......................................................................................... 460
Reformist Activism in Istanbul .................................................................................... 464
One Step Closer to the University Dream.................................................................... 471
War, Captivity and Return to Istanbul ......................................................................... 473
Life after the Establishment of the Turkish Republic .................................................. 475
APPENDIX B: AN EXCERPT FROM THE TENTH WORD (EVIDENCES
FOR RESURRECTION AND HEREAFTER) ............................................................479

vii

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................483
Primary Sources ........................................................................................................... 483
Secondary Sources ....................................................................................................... 487
VITA ...............................................................................................................................517

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. İbrahim Şinasi ................................................................................................ 148
Figure 2. Namık Kemal................................................................................................. 150
Figure 3. The first page of the newspaper Hürriyet (Liberty) including an article
titled “The love of motherland is part of faith” by Namık Kemal (London,
June 29, 1868) ............................................................................................................ 158
Figure 4. Ahmet Rıza Bey ............................................................................................ 182
Figure 5. Prince Sabahaddin ......................................................................................... 182
Figure 6. Yusuf Akçura................................................................................................. 187
Figure 7. Ziya Gökalp ................................................................................................... 190
Figure 8. Prisoners of the 31 March Incident ............................................................... 199
Figure 9. The first page of the table of contents of the first issue of
Mecmua-i Funun (The Journal of Sciences) (1860) .................................................. 204
Figure 10. The first page of the French version of the newspaper Meşveret
(Mechveret) including an article about public education in Turkey.
January 15, 1896. Published in Paris. ........................................................................ 212
Figure 11. The emblem of the journal Funun ve Sanayi (Science and Industry) ......... 229
Figure 12. Abdullah Cevdet .......................................................................................... 242
Figure 13. Mustafa Kemal (center-front) during the opening ceremony of the
Grand National Assembly, 23 April 1920. ................................................................ 249
Figure 14. Map of Turkey ............................................................................................. 376

ix

Figure 15. A page of the Risale-i Nur handwritten by Hafız Ali in Arabic
(Ottoman) script (c. 1930-1940) ............................................................................... 391
Figure 16. Hulusi Yahyagil (c. 1930) ........................................................................... 395
Figure 17. Abdullah Kula (c. 1980) .............................................................................. 395
Figure 18. A memorandum (about Said Nursi) which was sent by the interior
ministry to the gubernatorial office in Isparta (July 7, 1934) .................................... 401
Figure 19. Ottoman archival document recording the secret message (şifre) sent
to the authorities in Van (19 July 1908)..................................................................... 468
Figure 20. Said Nursi during WWI in Eastern Anatolia (1916) ................................... 474
Figure 21. Said Nursi’s picture taken by the German authorities enroute from
the war camp in Kostroma (Russia) to Istanbul (1918). ............................................ 474
Figure 22. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (right) in Istanbul with his nephew
Abdurrahman in their traditional local dress (c. 1918-1919). .................................... 475
Figure 23. Said Nursi with his followers in Ankara (1959) .......................................... 477

x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CUP

The Committee of Union and Progress

Trans.

Translated by

ZN

Zubeyir Nisanci
Abbreviations Used in Bibliographic Citations

B

Barla Lahikası [Letters of Barla], by Said Nursi, (1995i [1926-1935]).

E

Emirdağ Lahikası - I [Letters of Emirdağ I], by Said Nursi (1995j [19441947]).

EL

Epitomes of Light [Mesnev-i Nuriye] by Said Nursi (2004c [1922-1926])

EM

Emirdağ Lahikası - II [Letters of Emirdağ II] by Said Nursi. (1995k
[1949-1960])

F

The Flashes [Lemalar] by Said Nursi (2004e [1932-1936])

HŞ

Hutbe-i Şamiye [The Damascus Sermon] by Said Nursi (2004f [1911])

İ

İşarat-ul İcaz [Signs of Miraculousness] by Said Nursi. (1995b [19141915])

K

Kastamonu Lahikası [Letters of Kastamonu] by Said Nursi (1995l [19361943])

L

Lemalar [The Flashes] by Said Nursi (1995f [1932-1936]).

LT

The Letters [Mektubat] by Said Nursi (2004d [1929-1934])

M

Mektubat [The Letters] by Said Nursi (1995e [1929-1934])

MN

Mesnev-i Nuriye [Epitomes of Light] by Said Nursi (1995c [1922-1926])

xi

MUH

Muhakemat [Reasonings] by Said Nursi (1995a [1910])

NİK

Nurun İlk Kapısı [The First Gate of the Risale-i Nur] by Said Nursi
(1995m [1926])

R

The Rays [Şualar] by Said Nursi (2004f [1936-1949])

RES

Reasonings [Muhakemat] by said Nursi (2008 [1910])

S

Sözler [The Words] by Said Nursi (1995d [1927-1930])

Ş

Şualar [The Rays] by Said Nursi (1995g [1936-1949])

SIG

Signs of Miraculousness [İşarat-ul İcaz] by Said Nursi (2004b [19141915])

T

Tarihçe-i Hayat: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi [The Life of
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi] by Said Nursi (1995h [1959])

W

The Words [Sözler] by Said Nursi (2004a [1927-1930])

Note on abbreviated references: Two types of in-text abbreviated
bibliographic reference are used when citing the writings of Said Nursi in the fourth
and the fifth chapters of this dissertation. These are (1) reference to a specific page in a
specific book and (2) reference to a specific chapter in a specific book. Abbreviated
references with colon (:) are references to a specific page and abbreviated references
without a colon refer to a specific chapter. For example, (W:25) refers to page 25 in the
book The Words. However, (W25) refers to Chapter 25 in the same book.

xii

ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes Said Nursi’s revivalist discourse and mobilization
strategies in the context of the development of secularism in Turkey. This study starts
with the exploration of the development of the secularist movement and its discourse
with regard to philosophical foundations of (1) the construction of reality, (2) the self
and (3) the society. This is followed by the analysis of Said Nursi's discourse of
revivalism before and after the establishment of the Turkish Republic with respect to
these three areas and by the exploration of the discourse and mobilization strategies of
the Nur Movement (established by Said Nursi) vis-à-vis the mobilization strategies of
the secularist establishment.
This study is based on discourse analysis of the texts produced by the secularist
movement, and the texts produced by Said Nursi and the letters he exchanged with his
followers. I also analyze material and non-material mobilization strategies of these two
movements.
One of the main conclusions of this dissertation is that secularism and
revivalism do not have fixed boundaries and natures. Sociopolitical contexts, socioeconomic and educational backgrounds and ideological orientations of actors, their
relationships with the state, with religious forces played significant roles in the
emergence of substantial variations in the discourse and mobilization of the secularist
movement. Said Nursi’s approach to religious revival, too, showed considerable
xiii

variations. Although he first advocated macro level societal reform for reversing the
decline of the Muslim World, Said Nursi started developing a dialectic approach to
religious revival after the introduction of explicitly secularist ideas (e.g., materialism
and naturalism). Following the establishment of the secularist Turkish Republic, Said
Nursi started writing treatises with the purpose of challenging the philosophical
foundations of secularism rather than directly engaging the secularist establishment. In
so doing, he embraced a micro-level mobilization strategy which aimed at appealing to
and transforming individuals. By challenging its philosophical bases and not
developing a politically intonated discourse against secularism, Said Nursi and the Nur
Movement embraced an effective mobilization strategy of “simultaneously engaging
and disengaging” the secularist establishment.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation project is to systematically study socially
organized responses to secularization in the Muslim World by focusing on the revivalist
ideas of Said Nursi and the development of the Nur Movement in Turkey.
Having taught a sociology course on Islamic Movements in which I covered
major revivalist movements around the Muslim World, I realized that there is a
considerable amount of variation in the responses of religious revivalist movements to
secularization in the Muslim World depending on their analyses of the challenges posed
by secularization and by the dynamics of the contexts in which these movements
emerged. However, one of the questions which puzzled me the most was that, the
response of Said Nursi was different from other revivalist movements in the sense that
his response to the philosophical aspects of secularization dealing with (1) the
ontological foundations of the construction of reality, and (2) moral philosophical
foundations of the construction of the self was more central in his writings. And, unlike
the other Islamic revivalist thinkers and movements, his response to the secularist (3)
political philosophy regarding the construction of the society was much more peripheral
in his revivalist writings. Said Nursi, as part of his response the rise of modern
secularist paradigm, formed the Nur Movement which has been one of the oldest and
largest revivalist movements in the Muslim World.
1
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I believe that a systematic sociological investigation of how and why Said Nursi
and the Nur Movement responded to secularization would contribute significantly not
only to the social scientific studies of revivalist movements in the Muslim World but
also to the broader spectrum of secularization debates.
As I endeavored to sociologically explore Said Nursi’s and the Nur Movement’s
response, I realized that sociological debates heretofore have not adequately addressed
sociological implications of the ontological and moral philosophical aspects of
secularization which concern the construction of reality and the self respectively. The
same is true for the studies of revivalist movements as well. Social scientific studies
hitherto focused almost exclusively on responses to the sociopolitical dimensions of
secularization. However, socially organized responses to the ontological and moral
philosophical aspects of secularism have not been adequately studied which, I argue, is
related to the inadequate conceptualizations and theorizations of secularization.
One of the main arguments of this project is that studying ontological and moral
philosophical aspects of any social action, both at individual and structural levels, in
addition to its sociopolitical aspects, is critical in terms of comprehending the nature of
social interactions, societal organizations and socio-historical transformations. Hence,
sociological studies should account for the ontological and moral philosophical
dimensions of secularization in addition to its socio-political aspects. One of the main
goals of this project is to offer such formulations as a prerequisite for studying Said
Nursi’s and the Nur Movement’s responses to secularization.
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As I discuss in further detail below, I argue that secularization can not be fully
undertood without reference to the ideology of secularism. I also argue that secularism
and revivalism are always mutually constructed and that thorough understanding of one
of these categories requires the comprehension of the other. Similarly, I suggest that
studying either side (secularism or revivalism) contributes directly to the understanding
of the same core question of secularization. Therefore, I propose that studying the
response of Said Nursi and the Nur Movement to secularization in this dissertation
project would simultaneously be a significant contribution to the social scientific
studies of both secularization and revivalism.
The next chapter of this dissertation consists of a critical review of sociological
debates about secularization and in the meantime the development of a theoretical
framework of how this dissertation approaches these issues. The main argument of such
a review will be that we need broader definitions and conceptualizations of
secularization which involves deeply rooted fundamental changes in the meaning
systems of modern societies.
I maintain, in this regard, that we need to inquire into the underlying
philosophical implications of every major sociological issue we explore in the context
of secularization. I uphold that secularization cannot be fully understood without
reference to secularism as an ideology. By definition, ideologies are about meanings,
worldviews and ideals.
A comprehensive analysis of an ideology like secularism which has far-reaching
implications in the meaning systems of modern societies requires deciphering its
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underlying philosophical positions with regard to the construction of reality, the self
and the society1.
Another implication of perceiving secularism and revivalism as mutually
constructed categories for the purpose of this dissertation is that we need to take into
consideration the collective action side of the construction of secularization and
revivalism. This entails looking at collective mobilization and counter-mobilization
dynamics of secularization which is based on the idea that secularization should be
studied from the movement-countermovement perspectives. In order to address these
issues in a comprehensive way, I will study sociological implications of the ontological,
moral philosophical and political philosophical bases of how Nursi and the Nur
movement problematized the construction of reality, the self and the society vis-a-vis
the contestations and mobilization of the secularist movement in these areas.
The secularist movement has been a broad movement at the international and
national levels. This dissertation narrows down its focus on secularism to the ideas and
mobilization of the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements of late Ottoman
Era and to the founding cadres of the Turkish Republic such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
I explore the development of secularization and the secularist movement in Turkey in
the third chapter of this dissertation. However, I also discuss, albeit briefly, the
development of secularist ideas in the late Ottoman society with regard to and in the
context of the development of similar ideas in the West. The revivalist discourse of

1

An explanation of what I understand from the philosophical foundations of the construction of
reality (ontology), the self (moral philosophy) and the society (political philosophy) and how I
will employ these concepts for the purpose of this dissertation project is provided below.

5
Said Nursi before and after the establishment of Turkey and the mobilization strategies
of the Nur Movement are investigated in the fourth and the fifth chapters respectively.
Ontology, Moral Philosophy and Political Philosophy in the Sociological Context
In my understanding, there are three major components of social action. The
first is about the ontological foundations of the construction of reality, the second is the
moral philosophical aspects of the constructions of the self and the third is about the
political philosophical bases of the construction of the society. This leads me to suggest
that social scientific studies should also inquire into the socially organized ontological
(reality) and moral philosophical (self) dimensions of secularization in addition to its
widely studied political dimensions.
Sociology offers a wide variety of methodological tools and concepts for
studying the society. Nevertheless, sociologists also find it imperative to incorporate
methodological tools of other disciplines to their sociological inquiries as they deem it
necessary. The entire rational choice theory literature is only one example of such
interdisciplinary borrowing in sociology. The theory was originally developed within
the discipline of economics to explain economic behavior at individual (micro) level
but it was adopted by a considerable number of sociologists and by academicians from
other social scientific disciplines (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997; Satz & Ferejohn, 1994).
Because of its broader implications, secularization has already been studied
from the perspectives of different social scientific disciplines including sociology,
political science, history and philosophy and from multidisciplinary approaches. By the
same token, I will incorporate the concepts of ontology, moral philosophy and political

6
philosophy to sociological study of secularization with regard to the construction of
reality, the self and the society.
Before borrowing methodological tools and concepts from other disciplines, it is
imperative to justify why already existing sociological lexicon available to us are not
sufficient for the study of our sociological questions. The closest sociological
formulations of what I understand from ontology and moral philosophy were offered by
sociologist Peter Berger (1966). He argued that societies construct a set of worldviews
of how things work and convince their members that it is the unchangeable objective
truth. He called these sets of worldviews Nomos. For Peter Berger, societies also
construct a set of values which he called Ethos. He contended that Nomos and Ethos are
(or should be) consistent. His conceptualizations of Nomos and Ethos are similar but
narrower forms of what I understand from ontology and moral philosophy respectively.
As I understand it, any conscious human action and as a result any societal
organization is guided through some sort of implicit or explicit reference to meaning
which has various dimensions. One of these dimensions is about answers given to the
ontological questions such as “what is existence?”, “what is the source of existence?”,
“what is the source of the attributes of a given object?”, “why does something exist?”
and “what are the actual mechanism by which things exist and interact with each
other?.” These ontological questions are also related to the epistemological questions
such as “what is (true) knowledge?,” “how is knowledge acquired?” and “what is the
justification for (the truthfulness of) knowledge?”
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It is not hard to say that most of the actions of human beings, be it individual or
collective, are conscious actions which involve intentional or unintentional thinking
processes. Thinking is, among other things, about processes of construction of meaning
which leads to or is supported by an established (constructed) form of knowledge.
Human beings are without any doubt social beings. Their (collective) action do not only
include the production and exchange of material things but also the construction and
exchange of meaning and knowledge. Therefore, we can conclude, one of the core
dimensions of social action is about the construction of reality and production of
knowledge. This side of human action can also be traced back to certain ontological
positions with regard to the implicit or explicit answers provided to the aforementioned
questions.
It is generally understood, in the context of secularization debates that, religion
was to a greater extent the institution which dominated the dynamics of the production
of meaning and knowledge in pre-modern times. Science and secular art replaced the
dominant role of religion in modern societies in these areas.
If we were to use Berger’s conceptualization of Nomos, it would be difficult to
construct exclusive definitions of religion and (positivist) secular science. If the
fundamental question, as it is presented in Berger’s use of the concept of Nomos, was
about “how things are,” then both religion and positivist science would be in agreement
in many areas. For example, a religious individual’s and a secular scientist’s
descriptions of how biological mechanisms of our bodies work can be very similar.
However, their explanation of where our bodies came from and about the ontological
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nature of the relationship between causes and effects, including the ones in our bodies,
might be very different. For this reason, I chose to use the concept of ontology instead
of using Nomos to refer to the sociological dynamics of the construction of reality and
the production of meaning and knowledge.
A second dimension, of social actions, which in my understanding is a major
one, is about answers given to the questions about the nature and purpose of human
beings and their actions including the questions of “what are human beings?2” “what is
or what should be the goal and purpose of their actions?” and “what makes them
happy?” (or what is the most desirable human state?). All of these questions can be
summarized into the moral philosophical question of “what is the good?”
Social organizations produce material and immaterial goods depending on their
understanding of what human beings are, what the purpose of their actions should be
and ultimately depending on their definition of what is “the good?” (in the moral
philosophical sense). Therefore, the second dimension of social action is about the
construction of the self and about the definition and production of “good(s)” in both
moral and economic meanings of the word.
I also think that the dynamics of moral philosophical side of social actions are
related to their ontological dimensions. The ontological idea that things do not exist by
and in and of themselves supports the moral philosophical idea that things do not exist

The questions of “what are human beings?” and “what their nature is like?” are questions about
the ontology of human beings. However, I consider these questions as part of moral philosophy
because these issues are specific to human beings (the self) and because they are closely linked
to other moral philosophical questions.
2
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for themselves but for the purposes intended by their source of existence. Thereupon, the
measure of the good, for this type of a worldview becomes serving the purposes intended
by the source of their existence (i.e., God). This, I believe, has been generally the
viewpoint of religion or, to put it in another way, such perspectives are called religious.
However, the idea that things do not exist by an external source but by
themselves supports the idea that things exist for themselves and thus, the measure of
the good becomes the degree to which things including social relations produce
“goods” (utility) for the things themselves and when the society is concerned, it
becomes the production of utility exclusively for the society and for individuals living
in it or by it. This, I believe, is the opposite of what is generally understood as religion
and thus can be called the general ideology of secularist moral philosophy. Any form of
division of labor or organization of means of production which produces material and
immaterial “goods” (utility) based on this moral philosophical position can be taken as
one of the foundational cornerstones of the secularist paradigm. Capitalism and
socialism are two outcomes of such a secularist moral philosophy. The first focuses
more on the production of utility for individuals whereas the latter focuses more on
providing utility to the society as a whole. Perhaps, this is the reason why private
property and private enterprise has been the backbone of capitalism and communal
property and state enterprises dominated socialist economies to varying degrees.
Materialized dynamics of capitalism and socialism are not at the center of this
project’s definition of moral philosophy. Capitalism and socialism are outcomes of
utilitarian moral philosophies and they are mechanisms of producing utility (good)
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depending on their moral philosophical understanding of “what is the good?” and “what
is the most desirable condition of human existence?”. One of the contentions of this
project is that we need to look deeper into the moral philosophical implications
underlying these and other social systems especially when we study such concepts in
the context of secularization.
Similarly, sociological explanations of “values” and “norms” are generally
limited to outcomes without referring to the moral philosophical underpinnings behind
modes of thinking and action which are called as values and norms. When Berger says
that societies construct a system of values which he calls Ethos, he is referring only to
the external outcomes, not to the moral philosophical implications of such value
systems. Among other things, secularization is about a fundamental paradigm shift in
the meaning systems of contemporary modern societies. Therefore, transformations in
the fundamentals of value systems should be included in the list of issues to be
considered in sociological debates about the question of secularization and
modernization. This is the reason why I decided to use the concept of moral philosophy
instead of using narrower descriptions like Berger’s Ethos in order to study differences
and interactions between religious and secular moral philosophies.
Although I think that religious and secular moral philosophies are exclusive in
theory, I don’t think that they have always been radically exclusive in practice. We
need exclusive definitions for our analytical formulations but this does not mean that
such things are fully separated from each other in social relations. The issue in these
debates is about whether religion lost its dominant power over other societal institutions
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and in the lives of individuals. If religious forces are dominant over other societal
organizations including the production relations, such a society is generally considered
to be a religious society. Secularization is generally understood as the process by which
religion has had a declining influence over these institutions. In order to be able
determine to which direction the society is going, we need to have exclusive definitions
of these two opposite sides. Therefore, I argue that we can compare religious and
secular moral philosophies as dichotomous categories although they are not necessarily
mutually exclusive at all times in practice in the society.
I also think that there is a third major dimension of social systems which is
related to the first two (i.e., ontology/reality and moral philosophy/self) dimensions.
The third dimension of social action, in my understanding, is about the question of
“who and under which principles will regulate the production, exchange and
distribution of meanings and goods and who will have the monopoly over the use and
abuse of coercive power in terms protecting this entire system from dysfunction?”.
Establishment and protection of such a system involves regulative -in some cases
physically coercive- power and control over societal institutions including politics,
education, health, military, economy and judiciary. This is what I take as the political
philosophical foundations of the construction of the society.
In the way I see it, the first two dimensions of social action, namely the
ontological bases of the construction of reality and moral philosophical foundations of
the construction of the self are mostly, if not exclusively, related to micro level
sociological processes whereas the third, (controlling institutions) is mostly related to
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macro level dynamics. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the first two aspects are
independent from the third. In many cases, micro processes of the construction of
reality and the self are facilitated, managed or determined by macro social forces
including societal institutions.
It is also worthwhile to note that the employment of the concepts of ontology,
moral philosophy and political philosophy in this dissertation will be confined to their
sociological connotations relating to the construction of reality, the self and the society.
I should also mention that I do not see ontology to be the same thing as the social
construction of reality, and moral philosophy as the social construction of the self, etc.
They are different but related concepts in my understanding. For example, the
sociological concept of the self has various aspects such as its relationship with
socialization and with power (Callero, 2003) but I only look at the moral philosophical
dimensions of the construction of the self in this study. Reality and the society have
multiple dimensions as well, but this dissertation only inquires into the ontological
foundations of the construction of reality and the political philosophical foundations of
the constructions of the society in the context of secularization.
The main reason why this project proposes the addition of ontological and
moral philosophical aspects of secularization to the equation is to better understand the
dynamics and dialectics of the social construction of (1) reality, (2) the self and (3) the
society in modern times. The secularization theory’s descriptions of disenchantment
and demystification of the world (Weber, 2012; Wilson, 1969; Bruce, 2000; Berger,
1967; Martin, 1978) imply changes in the way reality of the world is understood and
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presented. Proponents of the secularization theory described disenchantment and
demystification as the removal of “the sacred canopy” from the face of the world and as
the process through which objective reality of the world started to be seen without any
ideological bias.
As it was suggested by Charles Taylor (1989), Giddens (1991) and Bennett
(1987), the culture of (secular) modernity involves the reconstruction and reorientation
of the self towards alternative definitions and articulations of the good 3. Therefore, it is
essential to construe and account for the moral philosophical underpinnings of how
secularism envisioned the reconstruction of the self. Focusing only on the interactions
between institutions might obscure our perceptions of what secularization is and
weaken the methodologies of how it should be studied.
There is no doubt that the investigation of the development and transformation
of institutions and conflicts over controlling them are crucial for studying macrosocial
processes including secularization. This dissertation will dedicate a great deal of
attention to such issues as well. However, it is equally important to look at micro level
dynamics such as the reconstruction of reality and the self especially when we
investigate transformations in the meaning systems of societies. Such transformations
are not only about suppressing and marginalizing groups with opposing worldviews,
they are also about transforming and reorienting them and others as individuals. For
example, conflicts over controlling educational institutions are not only for establishing

3

Giddens and Bennett acknowledge that modernity transforms the self but they, unlike Taylor,
did not discuss this issue with regard to the concept of the good.
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a monopoly for exploiting resources and opportunities of these institutions but also for
controlling one of the commanding heights of educating members of the society which
involves the reorientation of individuals towards specific goals and the transformation
of their worldviews. Such transformations include changes in the moral philosophical
orientation of the self and ontological aspects of the construction of reality especially
when a conflict between the secularist and the religious is concerned.
As I describe below, the Nur Movement I study in this dissertation was
established around a body of discourse presented in the works of Said Nursi whose
writings include ample reference, albeit indirectly in most cases, to the ontological and
moral philosophical foundations of the construction of reality and the self. In addition
to studying the interaction of the religious and secular paradigms at the institutional
level, I also discuss the dynamics of the construction of reality and the self when I
explore the response of this movement to secularization.
Studying the dynamics of the development of reality and the self might also be
instrumental for exploring mobilization strategies of religious movements not only in
the Muslim World but also around the world at large. In the absence of control over
major societal institutions, interest groups including social and religious movements
might develop alternative non-institutionalized strategies of mobilization seeking
change through other forms of action (e.g., individual level). It is possible that, some
movements might find it more feasible and effective to engage the individual even
when they are not denied of institutional channels (Kniss & Numrich, 2007). In this
regard, I analyze and discuss if and how Said Nursi’s methodology of the construction
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of reality and the self had changed when the characteristics of the institutional settings
of the society was transformed after the establishment of the secularist nation state in
Turkey.
This dissertation looks at secularization in the context of the development and
transformation of a broad historical social movement mobilized by the ideology of
secularism and therefore it theorizes secularization as a paradigm consisting of
alternative forms of socially constructed ontology, moral philosophy and political
philosophy. In addition, this dissertation aims at studying the processes of
secularization in the context of movement-countermovement dynamics by viewing
secularization as a dynamic process involving often conflicting interests and maneuvers
of the secular(ist) institutions and religious responses to different dimensions of this
movement. However, this study is based on the argument that secularization is
generally described by the proponents of the secularization theory (Wilson, 1969;
Bruce, 2000) as a one way natural process of emancipation from religious forces (ideas,
values, norms, practices and social classes) and not as a broad historical social
movement characterized by the conception of alternative ontological, moral
philosophical and political ideologies. Moreover, this study emphasizes that
sociological studies mostly focused on religious responses to the sociopolitical and, to a
very limited degree, to the moral philosophical aspects of secularization. Socially
organized responses to the ontological dimensions of secularism have been largely
ignored which is an area this study aims to significantly contribute to.
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Significance of the Study
As it has been observed by many (e.g., Davison, 1998; Yavuz & Esposito, 2003;
Kuru, 2009; Baran, 2010) one of the battlegrounds of secularist and religious social
forces in modern times has been Turkey which was established as a secularist nation
state after the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Secularization processes in the Muslim
World, including the territories controlled by the Ottomans, started before the decline
of the Empire but since the inception of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, the divide
between the secularist and religious forces started to become more visible as the newly
established Turkish nation state continued introducing top down secularist reforms in a
wide range of areas. Similar trends of secularization emerged in the other parts of the
Muslim World including Iran and Egypt in the twentieth century. At the same time,
socially organized responses to secularization started to emerge in these societies in the
form of revivalist religious movements. One of the earliest socially organized responses
to secularization in Turkey and in the Muslim World was the revivalist movement
established by Said Nursi who wrote extensively, among other things, about the
underpinnings of the challenges posed by what he broadly called “the [atheistic]
philosophy” and criticized the ontological, moral philosophical and to a limited extent
sociopolitical aspects of this philosophy.
Said Nursi’s ideas were not confined to mere philosophical or theological
discourses as he also formed a large movement (the Nur Movement) organized around
reading and distributing the texts (The Risale-i Nur Collection) he produced. Perhaps
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this was the reason why, he, was prosecuted and why his writings were banned for
several decades by the secularist establishment in Turkey. After the death of Said Nursi
in 1960, the Nur movement grew into several branches (e.g., Okuyucular, Yazıcılar,
Zehra, Yeni Asya and Yeni Nesil movements) (Yavuz, 2003) which are mobilized
around different interpretations of Said Nursi’s ideas. These movements have been at
the center of the movement-countermovement dynamics of the secularization processes
in Turkey and to a certain extent in the Muslim World.
In the final analysis, this dissertation project aims at contributing to the
sociological discussions about secularization and religious revivalist movements in
several ways. The first of these goals is to contribute to the conceptualizations of
secularization by employing the concepts of ontology, moral philosophy and political
philosophy in a comprehensive approach and thus by studying secularization with
regard to the social construction of reality, the self and the society.
Although the assumptions of the secularization theory, which for decades
dominated social scientific studies of religion, have been challenged on grounds of
contrary empirical evidence, methodological inconsistencies and theoretical fallacies, I
think that the concepts of secularism and secularization are still relevant in
contemporary societies. Even if we assume that secularization is not as triumphant as it
has been described by the proponents of the secularization theory, we still need to
understand the theoretical and practical implications of secularization as a process of
social change and secularism as an ideological force. By looking at secularization
within the framework of a broadly organized social movement mobilized around an
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ideology, this research postulates that secularization cannot be truly understood apart
from secularism as an ideology and as a movement. Regardless of whether
secularization is real or not, the ideology and the movement of secularism, which I
believe has been one of the largest social movements in the contemporary world, is
worthy of thorough investigation.
It might be argued that secularization is already an overstudied subject and it is
time for recycling it into the dustbin of intellectual history. My contention is that
sociological perceptions of secularization thus far have mostly been influenced by the
ideologically laden narratives of the secularization theory. The same theory’s and the
same movement’s depictions influenced sociological descriptions of religion as well.
To put it differently, the secularist movement constructed and in some ways dictated its
own theory of the secular and the religious. Validity of the assumptions of this theory
has been highly contested in the last several decades but theoretically informed postsecularization theory articulations of the secular and the religious and their interactions
are yet to be produced.
Although not a sociologist per se, Taylor (1992 and 2007) provided a promising
approach by contending that secularization was a result of a committed movement and
by emphasizing the need for analyzing moral philosophical foundations of the self in
this movement. Casanova (1994), too, acknowledged that secularism had its peculiar
epistemological positions. Nevertheless, neither Taylor nor others provided adequate
articulations of the discursive and material mobilization strategies of the secularist visà-vis the religious movements. That is why I think that contemporary descriptions, with
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the exception of a few like Taylor, have not gone far beyond classical views of religion
as enchantment, sentimentalism and communalism even in the thinking of those who
criticized the secularization theory and those who somewhat recognized that
secularization was related to the emergence and domination of alternative ontological
and moral philosophical perspectives.
I argue that theoretically and methodologically consistent conceptualizations of
both the religious and the secularist can only be articulated when these two terms are
conceptualized with regard to common parameters of comparisons. I also contend that
these parameters should include and explore how the religious and the secularist differ
in their ontologies, moral philosophies and political philosophies and therefore in the
ways they envision the construction of reality, the self and the society.
I am aware that not every religious perspective are exactly the same nor are
their secularist counterparts. As I argued above, we need exclusive definitions, at least
at the analytical level, of the religious and the secularist in order to be able to discuss
the direction or lack thereof of social change especially when we are dealing with the
question of secularization. Therefore, I argue, we need to distinguish the secularist from
the religious on the bases of common parameters of comparison primarily including the
construction of reality, the self and the society. Such a comparison, in my opinion, can
better be done by looking at secularization or religious revival in the context of
movement-countermovement dynamics which I believe would enable us to see how the
two sides defined their positions vis-à-vis the other and how they were mobilized
accordingly.
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I believe that studying the response of Said Nursi and the Nur movement to
secularization might reveal much in this regard for since this movement did not only
produce a body of textual discourse including implicit and explicit responses to various
aspects of secularization, it was also mobilized around these ideas as one of the largest
and most influential revivalist movements in the Muslim World. Therefore, such a
study would provide an opportunity to explore understudied aspects of secularization
within the discipline of sociology such as the ontological and moral philosophical
dimensions together with its political aspects. It is important to note that the purpose of
this dissertation is not to answer the question of whether religion has been losing its
social significance or not as it has been extensively debated around the arguments of
the secularization theory but to broaden the scope of secularization debates by
employing these concepts.
It might be asked about how secularization could be better understood by
studying a revivalist movement. One of the departure points of this dissertation project
is that we need to look at secularization (or modernization) from a broader and more
comprehensive perspective by exploring its philosophical aspects with regard to the
construction of reality, the self and the society. Second, I suggest that we can and
should look at secularization with regard to secularism as a social movement. Even if
we do not attribute it totally to social movement dynamics, I see studies of
secularization and modernization ignoring social movement dynamics as inadequate.
Much of what we understand from the concept of modernity even today is pretty much
a reflection of the Enlightenment philosophy (Bennet, 1987). There is a vast amount of
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literature in other social scientific disciplines (History, Political Science, Philosophy
and Literature) which describe and study the Enlightenment as a movement (Bennet,
1987). Although limited in number, there are studies in sociology which approach
modernization and secularization from the social movement perspectives as well. Third,
following Casanova (2011), Chavez (2004) and Asad (2003), I suggest that religion
(revivalism in particular) and secularism are always mutually constructed.
Understanding of one of these sides requires the study of the other at the same time. In
other words, I suggest that we study these issues from the movement-counter
movement perspective. Similarly, I suggest that studying a revivalist movement against
secularization (and or modernity) would contribute significantly not only to the studies
of revivalist movements but also to secularization. However, I don't suggest that
focusing only on the revivalist movement would be enough for a sociological study
about secularization. We also need to look at the secularist side simultaneously.
Otherwise, this would not be a study relating to secularization; at best, it would be a
limited and inadequate study of a revivalist movement.
In short, there are three core areas of investigation in this dissertation: (1)
philosophy (discourse), (2) mobilization (social movements), (3) counter-mobilization
(movement-countermovement dynamics). I cover these three areas in different stages,
in some cases in different chapters, of this dissertation.
Starting from the first step, the Nur Movement has been a discursive movement
and their core practice has been reading the works of Said Nursi and distributing them.
I understand that all social movements have some sort of discourse but the movement I
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will study is mostly based on a textual discourse widely read and circulated among its
members. Just like studying the response of a (hypothetical) Marxist movement (to the
rise of capitalism) which is in greater part shaped by extensively reading of the works
of Marx and distributing his ideas (publishing his books, when it is forbidden
handwriting hundreds of thousands of copies of them) require in the first place an
understanding of what is in the texts produced by Karl Marx. Only if and when we and
our audience already know Marx’s ideas very well, we can skip this step. Otherwise,
we have to address it. Second, we also need to understand what kind of strategies Marx
(or any other ideologue) used in the text he/she produced to convince (or to convert)
and mobilize masses. As the third and one of the most important of these steps, we need
to understand how the movement following Marx is mobilized vis-à-vis the capitalist
establishment and what role do Marx's ideas play in their mobilization strategies. Such
an endeavor also necessitates that we understand the capitalist (system) as well,
especially if we are studying a historical Marxist movement (or a movement with a
considerably long history).
For good reason, I don't claim and I don't anticipate in any way that my study
will have the same impact but I can relate to the idea, for example, that contemporary
sociological studies of capitalism owes greatly to Marx and Marxist ideologues who
embraced emancipatory approaches against capitalism which were also turned into
social and political movements. Even if we don't agree with all of their analyses, their
conceptual tools significantly contributed to the studies of capitalism. Similarly, our
sociological understanding of patriarchal nature of societies owes much to the feminist
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movement. I see a similar potential in the analysis of the discourse of a revivalist
movement for developing certain conceptual tools and critical perspectives for a
broader and more comprehensive study of secularization. The difference, however, is
that I don't suggest borrowing concepts directly from Nursi and from the Nur
Movement but to develop or at least help contribute to the development of new
concepts and approaches to the study of secularization by focusing on the case of this
movement.
My way of saying that studying the Nur Movement's response would also
significantly contribute to the studies of secularization is similar to a sociologist of
gender relations contending that studying a major feminist movement's discourse and
mobilization strategies would not only help us in our understanding of the dynamics of
the feminist movement in question but it would also significantly contribute to the
study of patriarchal societies (or to the gender relations in general). If we consider a
scenario in which theories of gender studies were dominated by male dominant
ideologies, such a suggestion might offer some new promising opportunities. Even if it
does not do a perfect job, such a proposal might help pave the way for
methodologically stronger approaches. This is very similar to the way I approach to the
study of Nur Movement's response to secularization.
Perhaps finding a one-word description (like gender, race, inequality or class)
referring to secularist-religious relations might facilitate the presentation and the study
of these issues as part of one main problem. One might wonder, why not continue using
the concept of secularization which is as concise as the concepts of race, class and
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gender. The difference is that the concept of secularization was by and large formulated
and substantiated through the lenses of the secularist ideology. As I have argued, the
concept of secularization is two sided (secularity vs religion), but it was mostly the
secularist paradigm, as the dominant paradigm of the twentieth century, which
determined the content and the direction of the secularization debates. On the contrary,
the concepts of class, race and gender were mostly substantiated from the perspectives
of the marginalized. One of the implications of this is that these concept were more
reflexive in the sense that they have had critical approaches towards the dominant
paradigms (upper class, majority races, women etc.). That is why it was easier for the
scholars specializing in these areas to say that class, race and gender are social
constructions and they have political implications with regard to the distribution of
resources and opportunities in the society. Because of this reflexivity, studies of either
side were considered to be part of the same problem. In gender studies, for example,
explorations of the construction of femininity and masculinity are considered as part of
the same problem. Likewise, studying sociological aspects of the construction of both a
dominant race and minority races are perceived as the two sides of a unified system.
Even though secularization is a relational concept like gender, race and class,
sociological studies of secularization have not been as reflective as the studies of other
areas. That is why I suggest that studies of secularization entails the awareness of both
secularism and revivalism (religion). Studies of either side (revivalist vs. secularist) are
related to the same core question of secularization. It is for these reasons that I suggest
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that this dissertation would contribute to the studies of secularization and revivalist
movements at the same time.
At the final analysis, I am not claiming that this dissertation is exclusively about
secularization and its only main goal is to understand what secularization is. It is about
a religious movement's response to secularization. However, I claim that existing
sociological conceptualizations of secularization are inadequate in the first place. I
discuss in detail the reasons of why I think this is the case and share my suggestions in
my literature review (Chapter II). The first of these suggestions is to incorporation of
the philosophical dimensions of the construction of reality, the self and the society in
the sociological studies of secularization. Second, I argue that neither secularization nor
revivalism can truly be understood without reference to the movement and countermovement dynamics. This issue is more obvious for revivalism but not so much for
secularization (secularism) mostly because secularization is understood as an abstract
process of social change unfolding as a result of some other agentless social forces such
as modernity, rationalization, demystification, disenchantment and institutional
separation. Therefore, I believe that a systematic sociological study of the response of
Said Nursi and the Nur Movement which involves these issues (philosophy,
mobilization and counter-mobilization) would contribute not only to the studies of
revivalist movements in the Muslim World but also to the much broader spectrum of
the secularization debates.
On the other hand, this dissertation dedicates a relatively long chapter to the
study of the development of secularist ideas and the secularist movement in the history
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of the late Ottoman society and in the formative years of the modern Turkish Republic.
In doing so, this dissertation directly analyzes the secularist movement for
contextualizing the development and transformation of Said Nursi’s revivalist ideas and
the Nur Movements mobilization and countermobilization strategies.
It could also be argued that studying the response of the Nur Movement might
help us explore these issues only in the geographical context (Turkey) in which this
movement was established. Firstly, my preliminary reading of the discourse of Said
Nursi and the Nur movement indicates that this movement did not perceive the
challenges of secularism to be the product of a particular geographical entity as their
discourse contains ample reference to naturalism, positivist science and materialism
which for many are characteristics of the modern paradigm across the border. Secondly,
the scope of secularism was not confined to geographical boundaries in the first place.
In agreement with Giddens (1991), I think that the modern (secular/post-traditional)
paradigm has had a globalizing character and it has become part of the world-history.
Even though each and every modern society has its own peculiar history of
secularization, the ideology of secularism which maintained a somewhat unified
character at least as opposed to religion has been part and parcel their histories. Thirdly,
I don’t suggest that studying Said Nursi and the Nur Movement or any other movement
will answer all of the relevant questions definitively. The main goal of this study is to
meaningfully and systematically contribute to the ongoing sociological discussions
about secularization by articulating alternative directions of theoretical
conceptualizations and inquiries.

27
I also believe that the theoretical framework I developed in this dissertation for
studying the Nur Movement’s response to the ontological, moral philosophical and
political philosophical foundations of secularization -which also deal with the social
construction of reality, the self and the society- can be instrumentalized to explore the
dynamics of other revivalist movements especially the ones in the Muslim World
including the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-i Islami, Tablighi Jamaat and others. The
same framework can also be employed to explore which of the three aspects of
secularization and in what degrees a particular revivalist movement responded and how
they have done it. For example, one might argue that the Muslim Brotherhood’s
response focused more on the political and moral philosophical aspects of
secularization whereas the Nur Movement focused more on ontology and moral
philosophy.
This structure can also be used to determine in which of the three areas a
religious revivalist movement has/had conflicting or accommodating relations with
secularist regimes. When I propose the use of this framework, I don’t argue that all
religious movements necessarily have antagonistic relations with secularist
establishments in all of these three areas. Some religious movements might be
mobilized against only one of these three aspects of secularization and they might have
non-conflicting relations in other areas.
Even though its core focus is secularism and revivalism, I believe that the
conceptual framework of this dissertation would also contribute to the sociological
discussions about social movements as a side objective. Social movements are not only

28
about mobilizing resources, they also produce meaning (Casas-Cortés et al, 2008).
Indeed, Kurzman (2008) contended that meaning-making is one of the core aspects of
social movements because “they raise questions about the possibility of alternative
worldviews and alternative dispensations, and in so doing they challenge participants
and observers to re-think meanings that are too often taken for granted”(p. 6).
Nevertheless, Kurzman argued, studies of social movements have not adequately
investigated meaning-making sides of social movements. I believe that this study would
also be a response to the rightful call of Kurzman by helping develop methodological
tools for investigating the ways social movements produce meaning and challenge
alternative meaning systems.
Finally, “[Said] Nursi did not attract much attention in the West because he did
not advocate political Islam per se,” as it is observed by Abu Rabi (2005, p. xv).
Although he established one of the largest revivalist movements in the Muslim World
around a body of discourse he produced in his writings. I think that another reason why
Said Nursi’s and the Nur Movement’s response to secularization has not been
adequately studied is related to the difficulties about deciphering and contextualizing
his discourse.
I observed that Said Nursi purposefully tried to simplify some of the complex
(philosophical) points he wanted to make. For example, he sometimes compares
different perspectives (Ex: religion vs. positivist science) by using parables. He then
goes on to interpret the ontological and moral philosophical implications of the parables
he tells, without saying that he is dealing with ontology and moral philosophy.
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Although most of his writings are populist in stylistic character (Vahide, 2005, p. 193),
there are places in Said Nursi’s writings where his discourse and discussions get loaded
with theological and philosophical terminology. What is more, his writings are not
about mere philosophical or theological debates but about his understanding of
challenge posed by secularization.
Discernment of his discourse requires employing sociological and philosophical
tools together. That is why I think that studies of Said Nursi and the Nur Movement’s
response to secularization remained largely limited to descriptive studies rather than
systematic analysis of the discourse of Said Nursi and the dynamics of the movement
he established. One of the purposes of this dissertation project is to fill this gap in the
social scientific studies of revivalist movements in the Muslim World. I think that such
a study would also pave the way for theoretically informed studies of the sub-branches
of the Nur Movement which were established after the death of Said Nursi.
Methods and Content Outline
This study rests on a combination of macro and micro level sociological,
historical and to a limited degree philosophical analyses. Describing the biographies of
influential figures in both the secularist movement and the Nur Movement and
analyzing sociological and philosophical implications of their discourse constitutes the
micro level analysis. Issues relating to the sociological contexts in which these
movements grew, and the discussions regarding the mobilization and counter
mobilization strategies of these movements in conjunction with the socio-historical
transformations constitute the macro level analyses.
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As argued by Ruiz (2009) “[because] social action is guided by the meaning that
individuals attach to their actions, we must account for this meaning when attempting
to understand and explain the action”. That is why I will incorporate the methodology
of sociological discourse analysis when I analyze the discourse of major figures in the
secularist movement and when I describe and discuss the textual response of Said Nursi
and the Nur Movement to secularization. Because I contend that we should investigate
the philosophical foundations of secularism and revivalism, I also discuss philosophical
implications of the secularist and revivalist ideas I explore in this dissertation.
Obviously, the context in which a textual body of discourse is produced is
critical for exploring sociological implications of the text. As I outlined above, this
study looks at secularization from the movement-countermovement perspective. Any
sociological analysis of the dynamics of the discourse of a countermovement, by
definition, must contextualize the text and the discourse because a countermovement is
something which is against a movement external to itself. Therefore, I will
contextualize the discourse of both the secularist movement and the Nur Movement.
I also embraced a historical approach in my analysis of the development of
secularism and the secularist movement in Turkey. That is to say, I studied secularism
and the secularist movement at (five) different stages. The first is what I call the first
wave of modernization (1779-1839) in the history of Ottoman Empire in which the
Ottoman state started modernizing its army with technological improvements which
was followed by the establishment of modern educational institutions. The second is the
Tanzimat Era in which modernization was expanded into and supported by the growing
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bureaucracy. The third is the emergence of the Young Ottomans Movement (e.g.,
İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha, Ali Suavi, etc.) which embraced a
reconciliatory approach in that they supported modernization and Westernization with
religiously intonated discourse. The fourth is the development of the Young Turks
movement (e.g., Beşir Fuat, Abdullah Cevdet and Baha Tevfik) who for the first time in
the late Ottoman society started introducing and supporting explicitly secularist ideas
such as materialism and naturalism. The fifth and the last stage is the establishment of
the secularist Turkish Republic during which secularism became the official ideology
of the state. I explored the development and transformation of secularist ideas and the
secularist movement in these five subsequent historical stages. I also investigated
variations in the mobilization strategies of secularist individuals and groups in this
context.
I used a similar approach in the study of the discourse of Said Nursi. I studied
Said Nursi’s discourse of Islamic revival in two phases. The first is the contextualized
analysis of Said Nursi’s understanding of reform and Islamic revival before the
establishment of the Turkish nation state. This includes the articles he published in the
newspapers during this time. When I studied Said Nursi’s revivalist thinking before the
establishment of the Turkish nation state, I studied it in the context of socio-historical
transformations and intellectual debates of the time.
Among the issues I paid extra attention in the first part of Said Nursi’s life is his
criticism of the madrasa education and his project of establishing a university in the
Eastern provinces. I discuss if and how this project was related to Said Nursi’s
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understanding of Islamic revival and his portrayal of the challenges posed by
secularization at that time. I also explored his discourse of İttihad-i İslam (Muslims
Unity) in this context.
The second part of the same chapter (Chapter IV) of this dissertation includes
contextual and textual analysis of Said Nursi’s revivalist discourse after the rise of the
Turkish nation state. Among the sources I analyze in this context are the treatises Said
Nursi wrote during this period and the letters he exchanged with his followers. Analysis
of the discourse of Said Nursi’s articles, treatises and his Risale-i Nur Collection are at
the core of studying Nursi’s response to the ontological, moral philosophical and
political aspects of secularization.
Data
I used a combination of primary and secondary sources in my analysis of the
development of secularism and revivalism (Said Nursi and the Nur Movement) in the
history of Turkey. I used secondary sources for the exploration of the particular sociohistorical transformations and contexts in which these movements were developed. I
used secondary sources for the description of the biographies of influential figures in
both the secularist movement and the Nur Movement. However, I used primary sources
for analyzing the discourse of these figures. For example, I presented and analyzed
passages (articles, poems, interviews, letters, memoirs etc.) from newspaper and journal
articles as well as books published by the Young Ottomans, Young Turks and other
ideologues who played significant roles in the development of secularism in Turkey. I
analyzed the discourse of these texts in line with the core questions of this dissertation
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which explore ontological, moral philosophical and political philosophical dimensions
of secularism. I also analyzed the discourses of the founding cadres of the Turkish
Republic (primarily including Atatürk) with regard to similar questions.
Similarly, I used secondary sources to describe and discuss the biography of
Said Nursi and his students. However, I used primary sources in my analysis of their
discourse. These sources include the articles Said Nursi published in several Ottoman
newspapers, the treatises and the books he published before and after the establishment
of the Turkish Republic (1923) and the letters he exchanged with his students4.
The Risale-i Nur includes three volumes containing hundreds of letters
exchanged by Said Nursi and his followers as well as several hundred pages of Nursi’s
and his students statements of defense against the allegations they were prosecuted for.
Analyzing the letters of Nursi’s students and followers helped me explore how the
members of the Nur Movement perceived the ideas of Said Nursi and how they were
mobilized around these ideas.
I used a sampling strategy to determine which of the letters written by the
members of Nur Movement will be included in the analyses of this project based on
several criteria. The first is that only the letters of those whose background information
such as gender, ethnic origin, occupation and possibly approximate age at the time of
writing the letter are available. Volumes of the Risale-i Nur containing the letters were
titled according to the place of residence (exile) of Said Nursi. For example, the volume
titled as Barla Lahikası (translated as Letters of Barla) includes letters written by Said
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An extended biography of Said Nursi is provided as an appendix at the end of this dissertation.
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Nursi and his students when Said Nursi was living in the village of Barla in the Western
province of Isparta between 1926 and1935. Likewise, Kastamonu Lahikası (Letters of
Kastamonu) and Emirdağ Lahikası (Letters of Emirdağ) include letters written between
1936 and 1943 and between 1944 and 1960 during the Kastamonu and Emirdağ exiles
respectively. Letters written when Said Nursi was in prison were added to the other
volumes of the Risale-i Nur primarily including Şualar (The Rays) (Beki, 2008).
Details about the lives of the first generation of the Nur Movement members
especially the prominent students of Said Nursi were published in secondary sources by
the members of the Nur movement. For example, Necmeddin Şahiner, published a
series of books (Son Şahitler - Last Witnesses) with the aims of collecting information
about anybody whose name is mentioned in the Risale-i Nur. His books include
information about 200 people. He collected most of this information by doing in person
interviews with those who were alive and by interviewing the relatives of those who
passed away.
Content Outline
Chapter I. The first chapter sketches out the theoretical, conceptual and
methodological framework of how and why I will study the response of Said Nursi and
the Nur Movement to secularization.
Chapter II. The second chapter is dedicated to the critical review of
sociological debates around the question of secularization. A brief review of the
literature covering Islamic revivalist movements, including the Nur Movement, is
included in this chapter as well. The literature review I provided as part of the second
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chapter is also part of how I conceptualize these issues. In this section, I also discussed
some of the inadequacies I see in the existing literature and shared my suggestions of
how to better address these issues. I start with a somewhat detailed critical review of
the secularization theory. I expressed towards the end of this review that although I
criticize the theory I still think that some of the conceptual tools as analytical tools
(such as rationalization, institutional separation, privatization and disenchantment) can
be employed for the investigation of the dynamics of secularization especially at the
macro level. In addition to describing the background of the intellectual debates
pertaining to my dissertation project, my review intends to rectify the theory to clarify
how I approach these issues.
Because it has been the major front against the secularization theory, I also
presented a critical review of the rational choice theory in the second chapter. I offered
my criticism of the Rational Choice Theory as well and discussed its inadequacies in
terms of addressing the issues I raise (Ex: Social movement dynamics of secularization)
in this dissertation. In the same chapter, I also critically reviewed alternative
perspectives (Ex: Taylor, Smith, Casanova and Asad) to secularization (other than the
secularization and the rational choice theories) which I incorporated into the analytical
tools of this dissertation.
Chapter III. The development and transformation of secularism and the
secularist movement in the history of Turkey is covered -at length- in the third chapter
of this dissertation in five different stages which are described above. In this chapter, I
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also discussed philosophical implications and social movement dynamics of the
development of secularism in the history of Turkey.
Although I will be focusing on Said Nursi’s (1878-1960) revivalist discourse
and the mobilization strategies the Nur Movement he established, my investigation of
the secularist movement in Turkey will not be limited to this period. The Nur
Movement was a response to changes in the society which had already been taking
place before the emergence of this movement. Therefore, my analysis of secularization
and the secularist movement in Turkey stretches back to the second half of the
nineteenth century of the Ottoman Era in which modernization reforms were initiated.
The reason why I embark on a retrospective historical-sociological analysis of
the late Ottoman history is not only because I intend to better explore transformations
taking place in this era as a precursor to understanding the change Nursi and the Nur
Movement was responding to, but also for understanding the root paradigm of the
secularist establishment which had been the politically dominant ideological front
during the Republican Era. As historians Zürcher (2011) and Hanioğlu (2011)
observed, secularist establishment of the Republican Era was a continuum and a
reflection of some of the aspirations of the secularist movement (the Young Turks) of
the late Ottoman society.
This, however, is not to say that that the secularist movement(s) of the late
Ottoman Era and the secularist establishment of the early Republican Era did not have
their own peculiarities. Most of the cadres who established the Republican system
including Atatürk were part of the secularist elites of the Ottoman Era, too. However,
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the contexts in which these two generation of secularists operated were different. First
of all, secularists of the late Ottoman society were for the most part in opposition
especially until the Second Constitutional Era (1908-1918). Only between 1908 and
1918, The Young Turks, which had been the most influential front of the secularist
movement during the imperial times, enjoyed a considerable executive power in the
government albeit under the surveillance of the monarchical power of the Sultan.
However, the secularists of the Republican Era had enjoyed an absolutist monopoly
over the social and political institutions and over the use and abuse of coercive power.
Secondly, the first generation secularists’ perception of religion was more diverse than
that of the later generation, as Hanioğlu (2011) contends. They had mix reactions
towards the role and place of religion in the society.
Chapter IV. The fourth chapter is a discourse analysis of Said Nursi's works
with regard to modernization and secularization. I started with the analysis of the
reformist and revivalist discourse he used before the establishment of the Turkish
Republic. Among the issues I paid extra attention in the first part of Said Nursi’s life is
his criticism of the madrasa education and his project of establishing a university in the
Eastern provinces. I discuss if and how this project was related to Said Nursi’s
understanding of Islamic revival and his portrayal of the challenges posed by
secularization at that time. I also explored his discourse of İttihad-i İslam (Muslims
Unity) in this context.
In the next section of the second chapter, I investigated the sociological and
philosophical implications of Said Nursi’s revivalist ideas and his discursive strategies
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after the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923). His response to the ontological
and moral philosophical foundations of secularism constitute the main axes of my
investigation.
I have discussed above that construction of the self is (and I, following Charles
Taylor, think should be) included in the studies of secularization (and modernization). I
used this approach in my investigation of the dialects of how Nursi wanted to transform
his followers (readers) and or the individuals in the society. I also suggested above that
we look at the dynamics of the construction of reality as well. Indeed, Nursi's ideas
regarding ontology and epistemology greatly shaped the Nur Movement's discourse of
religious revival. I contended that a systematic analysis of Nursi's discourse would be
instrumental to and necessary for the understanding of the discourse of the Nur
Movement and therefore for the dialectics of secularization. That is why I also analyzed
the sociological implications of Said Nursi’s response to the ontological foundations of
secularism in the fourth chapter of this dissertation.
Chapter V. The fifth chapter investigates the formation and the development of
the Nur Movement between 1926 and 1960, starting with the exile of Nursi to the
Western provinces (Barla and Isparta) three years after the establishment of the Turkish
Republic (1923) and in the aftermath of the Şeyh Said incident (1925).
The kaleidoscope of the formation, development and transformation of social
movements is already very complex and broad. Adding meaning and ideology to the
list of primary constitutional components of social movements makes the picture even
more complicated. The enormous diversity in the social movements literature is a
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testament not only to the multiplicity of methods and theoretical approaches to social
movements in social scientific disciplines but also to the wide variety of issues
pertaining to social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 2009).
Even though issues associated with social movements are integral to it, the main
goal of this project is not about exploring social movement dynamics per se. The core
question this dissertation addresses is the relationship between secularism and religious
revivalism with regard to the construction of the reality, the self and the society by also
paying attention to how social movement dynamics play a role in such encounters.
Covering all of the major issues related to social movements is beyond the scope of any
dissertation, let alone one or two of its chapters. Especially when problems related
directly to social movements as an area of social scientific investigation is a secondary
concern in a research, contributions to the sociological studies of social movements
would hardly go beyond side benefits, which is the case with this dissertation project.
There are three core problems I will try to answer about the Nur Movement. The
first is about how this Movement interpreted Nursi’s ideas. The second, will be about
its core activities and their sociological implications. The third will be dealing with how
the movement was mobilized against the secularist establishment in Turkey.
Below is a list of questions which provide more detail about these three lines of
inquiry.
In what ways members of the movement (re)interpreted the ideas of Nursi with
regard to religious revival? If so, what are the sociological implications? Are there any
variations among the members of the movement in terms of the way they interpreted
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Nursi’s works and if so what are the correlates of these variations? What are some of
the core activities of the Nur Movement and what role do they play in terms of the
construction of reality, the self and the society? How was the movement mobilized
against the secularist establishment in Turkey? Was there any change in the nature of
these activities and mobilization strategies over time (from 1926 to 1960)?
The fifth chapter starts with the exploration of the role of the development or
lack thereof of the civil society in the in Turkey in order to understand the dynamics of
how the Nur Movement was structured and mobilized vis-à-vis the secularist
establishment.
Chapter VI. In the last chapter, I discuss the implications of the issues covered
in the previous chapters of this dissertation for the ongoing secularization as well as
revivalist movement debates and suggestions for future venues of research in similar
areas.

CHAPTER II
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SECULARIZATION DEBATES
Introduction
Changes in the production relations, meaning systems, moral standards and
sociopolitical structures of the societies in Europe during and after the industrial
revolution sparked interests in understanding and describing these transformations.
Sociology, as a discipline, was born out of the attempts at exploring wide and deep
reaching implications of such changes. Having noticed substantial differences of the
newly emerging social system from the older, the founding fathers of this discipline
sought to provide systematic accounts of what the contemporary societies were going
through.
One of the prime questions the founding fathers of sociology wanted to answer
was the changing role of religion in modern societies. Durkheim (1996), through the
lenses of functionalism, looked at religion as a source of morality and social solidarity
and, thusly, described it as something “eminently social”. In the context of social
change, Durkheim (1975) discussed if and how the gap left by the withdrawal of
religion would be filled in terms of forming new bases of morality and social cohesion
in modern industrial societies. For him, modern societies were experiencing a process
of institutional differentiation by which other social institutions such as education,
healthcare and politics became increasingly independent from religion.
41
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Thereby religion lost its social functions, which for Durkheim are the raison d'être of
the presence of religion in the society. This, according to Durkheim, leads to the decline
of religion altogether in modern industrial societies.
Functionalist descriptions of Durkheim have influenced academic studies, in a
wide range of social scientific disciplines, which investigated the role or lack thereof of
religion as a source of community building in traditional and modern societies.
However, it was Weber’s ideas which, to a much greater extent, inspired sociological
approaches to religion as a meaning system. Weber (2011) presented the Protestant
work ethic as the driving force behind the rise of capitalism. Unlike other religious
traditions which turned to sacramental magic as a road to salvation, Weber argued,
Protestants saw mundane achievements as objective measures of salvation.
One of the most indicative of these objective criteria was economic success
through profit maximization. In this sense, the Protestants’ motivation for worldly
success was not to be able to have access to their worldly desires but to accumulate
earnings as a sign of attaining salvation and the grace of God. Such efforts required
efficient organization of means of production including formally free labor and
technical utilization of scientific knowledge and thus establishing rationalized patterns
of work ethic. These religious bases of worldly asceticism, for him, not only gave birth
to capitalism but also laid the foundations of the rise of rationalization as one of the
most powerful processes of social change in history.
Such a non-metaphysical theology of salvation had two major implications. The
first is the practical rationalization of the organization of work and the second is the
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theoretical rationalization as a result of the disenchantment of the world from magic
and mystical worldviews (Carroll, 2011). While the first is about the rise of modern
capitalism, the latter is an account of the decline of religion as a parallel process. In
Weberian terms, disenchantment meant the progressive removal of the magical and
mystical elements of religious thinking from societal structures and institutions by the
growth of the idea that the environment can be manipulated directly by scientific
knowledge and technical means. Religion (magic) sees the nature as something under
the control of a transcendental power whose concessions and permissions are needed in
order to benefit from it. With the rise of disenchantment, as Weber understood it, the
idea of getting the consent from a third party is removed from the relationship between
the nature and human beings (Germain, 1993), hence the inevitable decline of the social
significance of religion.
Although Weber’s descriptions of religious thinking were based on somewhat
romanticized portrayal of pre-modern societies, he indirectly acknowledged that the
decline of the social standing of religion was related to the strengthening and
unification of an alternative cosmology in modern times (Fenn, 1969). Nevertheless, he
did not discuss if this alternative worldview was another form of enchantment or not.
He saw religion as a construct of the mind or the society which creates an unrealistic
imaginary vision of the world. Perhaps, this was the reason why he occasionally
equated religion with magic and mystery. His account of rationalization and the rise of
modernity, however, was not about an alternative form of the construction of reality. It
was in a way the bare reality of the world as it was. Religion weaved a veil of
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enchantment (mystery) over the face of the nature but the rise of rationality removed
that veil to reveal the unbiased reality of the universe.
It is also interesting that Weber’s conception of the decline of religion was a
kind of gradual process of self destruction. In other words, secularization was solely a
result of the transformation and transition of the sacred into the secular and it was not
about the expansion of the secular into the areas of life which were under the influence
of the sacred. The Protestant work ethic institutionalized rationalization which
eventually undermined the cosmology of religion as an unintended consequence.
Therefore, the fall of religion was not a result of conscious mobilization of certain
groups around ideologies and worldviews antithetical to religion (Weber, 1993 and
2011). In a way, the decline of religion was a natural and neutral outcome of the
juxtaposition, or elective affinity, of certain historical, cultural and social forces.
The Secularization Theory: The Same Old Story or the Same Old Question?
Durkheimian perceptions of institutional differentiation and Weberian
descriptions of disenchantment and rationalization constituted two major axes of
debates among subsequent generation of social scientists regarding the role and place of
religion in modern societies. Even though not all of them totally agreed with Durkheim
and Weber, many later generation academicians from various social scientific
disciplines shared similar visions about the fate of religion in modernizing societies.
The ideas of these scholars were generally called the secularization theory which is
occasionally referred to as the modernization theory. Although the assumptions of the
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secularization theory were challenged later on, the theory dominated scholarly
discussions concerning the relationship between religion and modernity until 1980’s.
The basic argument of the secularization theorists is that there are ongoing
processes of decline (1) in the importance of religion for the operation of non-religious
institutions including the state, education and economy (Wilson, 1969; Bruce, 2002;
Dobbelaere, 1981), (2) in the social standing of religious roles and institutions (Berger,
1967) and (3) in the extent to which people engage in religious beliefs and practices
parallel to the decline in the social standing of religious institutions (Bruce, 2002).
Mostly inspired by Weberian descriptions of the rise of modern rational and
bureaucratic societies, modernization and secularization theorists, (Wallace, 1966;
Lechner, 1991) generally dated the inception of these processes back to the
Reformation and they predicted a linear decline in the social standing of religion and in
the degree of individuals’ engagement with religious beliefs and practices along the
way of transition from traditional to modern societies.
Bryan R. Wilson was one of the eminent sociologists of religion whose ideas
contributed significantly to the secularization debate. Defining secularization as "a
process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lost social significance,"
Wilson focused on two major themes including (1) the explanation of the process of
secularization and (2) religious responses to it. Wilson based his arguments on the
assumptions that religion was "once great influence over societal institutions" and that
"religious values were the community values and religious institutions had dominance
over other societal institutions such as education, military, law and economics" (1969,
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p. 14). However, he contended, the dominance of religion started to decline with the
rise of modern national societies in the West. Asserting that the major function of
religion is the institutionalization of emotional gratifications, Wilson argued, parallel to
Weber, that modern societies experienced a process of demystification, which
increasingly diminished the role of the religion in providing emotional attempts in
responding the challenges of the nature. Thusly, religious consciousness was dethroned
by a more rational and empirical worldview. Religion, in return, responded, albeit
unsuccessfully, to such challenges. Ecumenism was one of these responses.
Even though he changed his position later (Berger, 2001 and 2006), Peter
Berger was among the prominent supporters of the secularization theory in midtwentieth century. In his book Sacred Canopy, he discussed how religion functioned as
a source of legitimization to social institutions “by putting them in a sacred and cosmic
frame of reference” in traditional societies (Berger, 1967, p. 33). During these times, he
said, the society as a whole used to “serve as a plausibility structure for a religious
world.” However, with rise of modernity religion lost its monopoly over the society
which started not to wholly serve as a plausibility structure for religion and traditional
meaning systems. Consequently, religion fell into a “crisis of credibility,” which
accelerated the decline of its monopoly over other social institutions (p. 127). This
resulted in a decline in the social standing of religion and therefore in a decline in the
extent individuals engage in religious beliefs and practices.
The scope of the application of the secularization theory has not been limited to
the sociological studies of the role of religion in contemporary Western nations. As
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observed by Volpi (2010) the secularization and modernization theories, heavily
informed by Weberian approaches to religion blended with Orientalist perspectives,
dominated social scientific studies of religion in the Muslim Word as well. While
studies of the West focused on describing how secularization emerged there, studies of
the Muslim World, for the most parts of the twentieth century, largely focused on
understanding the factors which prevented or delayed the development of secularity and
modernity.
Niyazi Berkes (1964) was one of the pioneers who applied the secularization
theory's conceptual tools to the social scientific study of secularization in Turkey. For
him, secularization was a self-propelled linear universal process of social change
spreading around the globe including the Muslim World. Even though the diversity of
the Muslim World in terms of ethnic origins, historical backgrounds and geographical
locations affects the scope, intensity and velocity of the expansion of secularization,
this process can be observed in all of the predominantly Muslim societies.
As an introductory note to his book The Development of Secularism in Turkey,
Berkes (1964) makes a distinction between secularization as a process of social change
and secularism as an ideology (doctrine). Although he thinks that these two are
interrelated, he does not attribute secularization to secularism and or the secularists.
Secularization, for Berkes, is a universal process unfolding because of factors which are
outside the control of individuals. However, responses to secularization are not
universal as reactions to problems arising from secularization vary greatly. These points
indicate that Berkes does not attribute, at least at the analytical level, secularization to
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human agency. Nonetheless, he sees human agency in responses (reactions) against the
development of secularization. Such is a typical approach of the secularization theory to
secularization and revivalist responses. Secularization develops independent of human
agency but counter-movements against it are results of deliberate (re)actions trying to
stop and reverse the expansion of secularization.
Another difference is the establishment of stronger associations between
modernization and secularization in the Muslim World more so than it was done in the
case of the West. That is to say the concepts of modernization and secularization are
more often used interchangeably in the Muslim World.
Of course, there is an overlap between these concepts in English and in the way
they have been used in the academia. My point is that the overlap has been much
broader in the way these two concepts are used in the Muslim World and especially in
Turkey. Indeed, the concepts of muasırlaşma, which literally means to become
contemporary or to modernize in the Ottoman Turkish, and its more contemporary
variant çağdaşlaşma refer both to modernization and secularization at the same time.
The title of Berkes’ book in Turkish and its English translation is just one example. The
original title of the book which was published in 1964 was Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma.
Only by looking at the title of this book an average reader would not be able to tell
whether it is about modernization, secularization or a combination of both. When it was
translated into English, the book was titled as The Development of Secularism in
Turkey. Only recently, -to be precise, after the decline of the secularization theory- the
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degree of the separation between the concepts of modernization and secularization was
broadened1 at the conceptual level in academic publications in Turkish.
Furthermore, difference in the application of the secularization theory or similar
perspectives to the modern history of the Muslim World as compared to the West is that
scholars were interested in the reason of why modernization and secularization was not
fully developed in the first while they presented reasons of why it was successful in the
latter. Writing in 1968, Weiker argued that the Ottomans faced the challenge of the
inevitability of modernization. However, Ottoman modernization project was not fully
successful for reasons such as the lack of commitment among the modernizing
bureaucrats. By the time they reach the ranks of power, they were already ingrained in
the traditional and religious Ottoman values. These bureaucrats were also wary of
losing their status and power which could be threatened with broad based changes of
modernization movement. Similar perspectives was shared by Ma’oz (1968) who
argued that powerful provincial households in the periphery of the Empire resisted
change with the fear of being deprived of their privileges.
Yet another distinction between the application of the secularization theory's
perspectives to the studies of religion in the Muslim World and the Western World is
the more adamant position of the theory in its prediction of the inevitable decline of
religion in the West. For the reason that those who studied the history of modernization
in the Muslim World from such perspectives were preoccupied with the reasons of the

Nişanyan etymological dictionary of Turkish language reports that the concept of secular
(seküler) was popularized starting in 1990s. Accessed at http://www.nisanyansozluk.com on
11/30/2013.
1
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failure of fuller development of modernization, they did not predict that religion will
soon lose its social significance in these societies.
Although the assumptions of the secularization theory regarding the demise of
religion in the West, particularly in the United States, were challenged by empirical
findings and lost ground within the discipline of sociology especially since 1980's,
several contemporary scholars (i.e., Lechner, 1991; and Bruce, 1992, 2002 and 2013)
argued that the secularization theory's predictions of the decline of religion are still
valid. Chaves (1994), for example, narrowed down the spectrum of the assertions of the
theory by arguing that secularization does not necessarily refer to the decline of religion
in general but to the “declining scope of religious authority.” In this sense, he argued,
secularization is still pervasive.
Steve Bruce took a more radical position and attempted to prove the validity of
the core assumptions of the secularization theory in his books God is Dead (2002) and
Secularization: In Defense of an Unfashionable Theory (2013). Bruce, like the former
secularization theorists, conceptualized secularization as a universal historical linear
process. According to him, the Protestant Reformation constituted the nucleus of the
modern secular societies by promoting rationality which is later manifested in the form
of positivist sciences and eventually in the form of modern technology. Protestant
Reformation and rationalized Protestant work ethic also gave birth to capitalism which
brought about economic growth as well as social and structural differentiation. This
facilitated the rise of social, cultural and more importantly religious diversity and the
rise of secular states and liberal democracies. Finally, religious diversity gave rise to
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relativism, compartmentalization and privatization of religion. Like Berger (1967) and
Wilson (1969) and most of the secularization theorists, Bruce argued that the processes
of privatization and compartmentalization of religion constituted one of the most
important proofs of the decline of religion and its social standing.
In my understanding, articulations of the secularization theory were mostly
characterized by idealism, progressivism, abstractionism, and ambiguity of
conceptualizations. To start from the last, supporters of the secularization theory
equated institutional differentiation with institutional autonomy. They asserted that
boundaries between different societal institutions became more explicit in modern
times. Education, economy, military, politics, religion and media emerged as distinct
institutions with clearer definitions of their functions (Berger, 1967). Through these
processes major societal institutions gained autonomy. Thence, the supporters of the
theory predicted that religion will not be influential over other institutions anymore.
Such arguments could be somewhat agreeable when they imply that religion lost
dominance over other societal institutions as a result of institutional differentiation
within a certain period of time in history. However, secularization theorists
underestimated the dominance of any other non-religious ideology and/or institution
over others. For example, the ideology of secularism, as I discuss in further detail
below, has been one of the most pervasive ideologies of modern times which by
definition bears antithetical tendencies towards religion. Moreover, nation states
emerged as the most powerful institutions in the modern world with their own agendas
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and interests especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. Most of the nation states around
the world embraced secularism as one of their foundational principles.
Nation States are unitarian by nature and they consist of centrally governed and
regulated educational, economic, military and other institutions. That is how nation
states in most cases dominated and imposed their agendas upon other institutions. It
might be argued that religion, which was previously a more powerful institution over
others, lost much of its power but it still remained as a possible competitive ideological
force against the secularist character of nation states. This might explain why many
nation states around the world, with their secularist agendas, wanted to pushed religion
to the margins and to confine it to controllable boundaries. As Koenig (2005) observed,
most of the theorists of secularization overlooked the dominant role of nation states in
the expansion of secularization.
Secondly, proponents of the theory attributed secularization to abstract
sociological phenomena without reference to human agency, as argued by Smith
(2003). For them, processes of the rise of capitalism, industrialization, rationalization,
institutional differentiation and the rise of cultural diversity were the dynamos
generating the expansion of secularization (Berger, 1967; Wilson, 1969). Steve Bruce
(2002) provided a long list of factors which gave rise to secularization as an unintended
consequence including structural differentiation, individualism, sociatization, economic
growth, science, technology and relativism without discussing the actual tangible
mechanisms by which they influence the society. In so doing, he, like the other
defenders of the secularization theory, left the question of agency unaddressed in his
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abstractionist descriptions of secularization. He did not consider whether these
processes were driven by the actions of conscious actors motivated by certain
ideological positions, political and economic interests.
Presenting the expansion of capitalism as a reason for another sociological
transformation without considering the interests of the capitalist conceals much of the
real picture. Similarly, talking about the rise of institutional differentiation apart from
the ones whose interests and agendas have influence over the operation of these
institutions disguises an important component of what needs to be included in the study
of pertinent sociological issues. Secularization of other societal institutions is no
exception.
Almost all of the prominent supporters of the theory approached secularization
from macro sociological perspectives but by way of abstractionism they avoided the
inclusion of human agency and thus social movement dynamics into their
conceptualizations of secularization. In my opinion, such an inadequacy is, among
other things, related to the appropriation of modern progressivist ideology. In the eyes
of these theorists, religion constructed its own version of reality and imposed it on the
society at large. The rise of rationalization, industrialization and institutional
differentiation ipso facto ignited the process of emancipation from religion. In Berger’s
(1967)) own words,
“[S]ecularization manifests itself in the evacuation by the Christian churches of
areas previously under their control and influence -as in the separation of church
and state, or in the expropriation of church lands or in the emancipation of
education from ecclesiastical authority” (p. 107).
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When he directly addresses the question of “what socio-cultural processes and
groups serve as vehicles or mediators of secularization”, Berger says that it is
“industrial society in itself that is secularizing” (1969, p. 109). For him, proximity to
industrial production processes and its concordant lifestyle can be a determinant of
secularization, too.
Niyazi Berkes (1964) applied similar perspectives to the study of secularization
in the Muslim World when he defined secularization “as the differentiation of social
values into the areas removed from the authority of religion, by which various sectors
of social life are freed from the domination of sacred rules” (p. 7). The first areas freed
from the domination of religion include science, technology and economy. Similar
perspectives were supported by contemporary social scientists as well. Citing Adorno
and Horkheimer, Zafirovski (2010) argued that;
[A]utonomous secular culture, notably science and education, as the constitutive
value and institution of modern Western democratic societies, including
America, derives, first and foremost, from the Enlightenment, in conjunction
with and continuation of the Renaissance, especially with respect to the
autonomy of the arts, as well as classical Greek-Roman civilization. Conversely,
there had been no such thing as independent, autonomous or free secular
science, education, art, philosophy, and culture in general in relation to
theology, religion, and church in the pre-Enlightenment. The pre-Enlightenment
specifically incorporated the medieval Christian and other religiously
overdetermined, especially Islamic, world in contrast and nihilistic opposition to
its classical “pagan,” especially ancient Greek, civilization. The latter was
characterized with relative scientific, educational, artistic, philosophical, and
other cultural and other autonomy and creativity in relation to religion and
politics. (p. 108)
In this sense, secularization was about progression from a (religiously)
constructed (enchanted) world towards a world characterized only by the
deconstruction of the religious worldview. It was not about the construction of an
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alternative world. Such a discourse also implies that secularization is a transition from
unfreedom to freedom and from abnormality to normality. By abnormality construction
of an alternative paradigm is meant and by normality deconstruction of the abnormal is
implied. In such an approach, religion is a construct but secularization is not. Perhaps,
that is the reason why, Peter Berger (1967) explicitly defined secularization as the lack
of religion. In a similar way, Wilson (1982) understood secularization as “the
abandonment of mythical, poetic and artistic interpretation of nature and society in
favor of matter-of-fact description”. Shiner (1967, p. 207-220) saw secularization as
“the desacralization of the world”. Similarly, Loen (1967) defined secularization as the
historical process of de-devinization of the world. For Collins (1998), it was the
emancipation of intellectual production from the authority of the church.
However, none of these scholars defined religion as the lack of secularization or
the secular. If secularization is the lack of something, it is not a construct, and if it is not
a construct, there is no need to look for human agency behind it. If there is no human
agency, studying secularization with regard to collective action (e.g., social
movements) is irrelevant, if we were to follow the line of thought of the secularization
theory.
As observed by Casanova (2011), there is another side of defining
secularization as the residual category after the withdrawal of religion. Such
descriptions, for him, perceive religion as the “superstructural religious addition and
sees the secular as the natural objective universal substratum (p. 55-56)." When religion
is an addition but secularization is not, there is no need to define what secularization is.
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Therefore, it is only religion which has been defined by the secularization theory but
substantive definitions of the secular has not been not elaborated. Agreeing with
Casanova, I suggest that we need post- secularization theory elaborations of the
religious and the secular. The secularization theory formulated its own understanding of
the religious in line with its modernist and progressivist ideological position. Such
perspectives were adopted and taken for granted by many other social scientists.
Another issue with the general doctrine of the secularization theory is that
supporters of the theory dated the inception of secularization within the boundaries of
modern times, the earliest of which is the Reformation (Weber, 2011; Wilson, 1982;
Bruce, 2002). By limiting the scope of secularization to the modern times, they were
able to attribute secularization solely to unprecedented factors. The rise of modernity
best exemplified in the use of technology and science was something completely new
and thus the roots of secularity were novel, too. It is not that secularism existed as an
ideology or a (body of) movement(s) before modernity and gained momentum at a
certain time in history, it rather was a byproduct (unintended consequence) of some
other newly emerging sociological transformations the world, especially the west, has
experienced in the last several centuries. Therefore, secularization, for the proponents
of the theory like Bruce (2002), was not a result of intentional mobilization, which is an
idea implicitly denying -or at least neglecting- human agency in the history of
secularization.
I am aware that everything that is social has a beginning in history and that
modern societies witnessed the birth of many things including various forms of social

57
movements. The issue here is that the theory established a causal connection between
secularization and the abstract notion of modernity which in and of itself has no agency.
These kind of abstractions are appropriations and constructions in our minds. We can
use them to describe and transmit our observations in an efficient way but to attribute
causal power to these notions without due account of human element is ambiguous and
misleading. There is no modernity without modernizing forces and there is no
modernizing force without human agency behind it. It is us who are objectifying
modernity in our minds. As such, modernity does not have executive powers per se.
Therefore, it is not logical to attribute the cause of something, in this case
secularization, exclusively to modernization.
To better illustrate such equivocations, we shall consider the case of
globalization which is a concept like modernization. Sociologists often use expressions
like “globalization increased inequalities around the world.” Such statements are not
problematic when they point to an association between globalization and other
sociological phenomena such as increasing inequalities. However, they are questionable
when they attribute causality to abstract sociological notions, in this case globalization,
which are devoid of human agency. Put differently, we might say that there is an
association between globalization and increasing inequalities and that in order to
understand the reasons of why inequalities are on the rise, we need to look at the
dynamics of globalization. This entails the investigation of the role of globalizing
forces such as the multi-national corporations and supranational organizations like IMF
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and the World Bank. All of these institutions and organizations are driven by the
interests and ideologies of those who have control over them.
However, if we were to use the same language the secularization theorists did,
for explaining the relationship between globalization and inequalities, we could say that
neoliberalism, export oriented economic growth models, the erosion of national borders
and the decline of welfare state policies are responsible for the current economic
conditions around the world. Using this ambiguous language will be omitting the role
of human agency in the expansion of globalization and the increase in inequalities.
Welfare state policies and national borders did not decline coincidentally and export
oriented developmental models did not emerge as an unintended consequence of some
other sociological phenomena. Most of what we define as part of the factors leading to
globalization including the ones listed above as examples and their consequences are
results of deliberate actions on the side of globalizing forces. Likewise, it can be
argued that there is an association between secularization and modernization and a
better understanding of secularization requires the comprehension of the dynamics of
modernity which also necessitates analyzing the role of modernizing forces.
Nevertheless, we cannot establish a direct causal relationship between different aspects
of modernization and secularization without engaging the issue of human agency.
An inconsistency in the articulations of the secularization theorists concerning
these issues is that, on the one side, they (Weber, 2011; Wilson, 1969; Bruce, 2002),
argue that modern times are characterized by rationalization which is about
calculability, efficiency and planning but when it comes to the question of
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secularization, they disregarded intentionality, planning and therefore human agency
and simply attributed secularization to abstract notions. Rationalization, as it is
described by the secularization and modernization theorists, is about increasing levels
of conscious deliberations and subsequent choices on the side of human beings,
individual or collective. In this respect, rationalization does not exist somewhere
exclusively outside the minds of human beings although it has manifestations in the
outer world. For example, rationally structured bureaucratic institutions, as we see them
in the descriptions of Weber, are, among other things, materializations of the decisions
made by the ones who decided to restructure or establish those institutions anew.
Institutions, bureaucratic or not, might have unique characteristics compared to
individuals and other social entities but they do not develop independent of human
agency. Even when there is a conflict in the establishment and operation of an
institution, human element is still present. Agreements, bargains, compromises as well
as resistances in these conflicts must involve some form of decision making by human
beings.
This is one of the reasons why this dissertation project asserts that the human
element (agency) should be an important part of the discussions regarding
secularization. And if we are studying the human element in connection with macro
social processes, we need to look at the dynamics of collective action. This is the point
where sociological study of social movements become relevant. As I outlined in the
introduction of this dissertation, I propose that studies of secularization should look at
secularization in the context of social movement dynamics.
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Another dimension of attributing secularization to abstract phenomena and
omitting human agency is the presentation of secularization as a natural universal linear
process of social change, which is a position taken by most of the supporters of the
secularization theory. If secularization is not a result of human agency, as it is implied
by this theory, then it is irreversible because human agency cannot reverse something
which is natural and not socially constructed. Once the modernization processes are
unfolded, it will naturally bring about secularization. At this point, it will be impossible
to reverse it. Perhaps that is the reason why the proponents of the theory were very
assertive and confident about their predictions of the future of religion in modern
societies.
In criticizing such aspects of the theory, I am not arguing in any way that there
is no secularization or that secularization was reversed by certain groups. What I argue
here is that there are significant problems in the ways the secularization theory
conceptualized and historicized modernization, secularization and the role of religion in
contemporary societies and that a better understanding of these issues requires critical
review of some of the concepts and notions used by the supporters of this theory. I also
argue that such inadequacies were not limited to the secularization theory alone. Even
those who systematically criticized this theory’s assumptions, including the supporters
of the rational choice theory, failed to sufficiently address these issues.
On the one hand, the secularization theorists predicted that various aspects of
modernization such as rationalization, and the rise of science and technology will
diminish the demand for religion and the rise of culturally diverse modern industrial
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societies will strip religion off its functions and therefore religion will lose its social
significance altogether. On the contrary, the supporters of the rational choice theory,
which has been the major intellectual front against the former, contended that the rise of
modern society will not eliminate the demand for religion and that certain religious
institutions will thrive in pluralistic environments (Warner, 1993).
The Rational Choice Theory: A Reductionist Fallacy?
The rational choice theory was originally formulated in the discipline of
Economics. The theory sees individuals as agents making cost and benefit calculation
and thus maximizing their utility. Core assumptions of the rational choice theory have
been borrowed by a group of social scientists to explain social behavior (Hechter and
Kanazawa, 1997; Satz and Ferejohn, 1994). Central to this theory’s assumptions is the
idea that individuals make rational calculations of costs and benefits not only in their
economic transactions but also in their social relations (Swedberg, 1990). Their
participation in religion also involves costs and benefit calculations. If the benefits of
being religious overweight the costs in the eyes of an individual, odds are higher that
this individual will be religious.
Rodney Stark’s and his colleague William Sims Bainbridge’s interpretations of
the theory for explaining participation in religious behavior played a significant role in
the development of the rational choice theory within the sub-discipline of Sociology of
Religion (Warner, 1993). According to Stark and Bainbridge (1996) “Humans seek
what they perceive to be rewards and avoid what they perceive to be costs” and because
“some rewards are limited in supply some do not exist in the physical world” they turn
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to compensators (p. 161)2. The difference between rewards and compensators is that
rewards are the things wanted and the compensators are the proposals about gaining the
rewards (in the future). Human beings always prefer rewards to compensators, but
because there is the scarcity of rewards and because some rewards such as the desire for
an eternal life cannot be attained here and now in this world, they will turn to
compensators. Although it is not the only one, religion is a powerful source of
compensators because it offers instructions of how such compensators can be obtained
in the long run. Therefore, religion appeals to all, even to those who have power
because everyone is deprived of an everlasting life in this world (Stark, 1997, p.7-8)
which is one of the main reasons why religion survived the challenges of modern times
and will survive in the future.
Proponents of the rational choice theory also asserts that the supply-side
dynamics of products in a given market affects the nature of demand for these products.
Multiplicity and availability of different variations of a product are likely to increase
the demand for it. If individuals do not like one version they might like the other, hence
the increase in demand for this product. A number of social scientists applied the
rational choice theory's understanding of supply-and-demand relationships of economic
markets to non-market realms (Becker, 1976; Friedman, 1996) including religion.
These scholars (Stark & Bainbridge, 1987; Finke & Iannaccone, 1993) argued that
availability of different religious products would increase the overall demand for
religion. In other words, they claimed that pluralism is conducive to religion because

2

Also see Stark (1997, p. 6-7) and Bainbridge (1997, p. 9).
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multiplicity of religious movements, denominations and sects will cater to different
demands of different groups of people. Religious organizations will compete with each
other to produce the best religious products in order to attract more members in
pluralist environments (Finke & Stark, 1988 and 1998; Iannaccone, 1991; Chavez &
Cann, 1992; Hamberg & Peterson, 1994; Hall & Bold, 1998). Such a competition will
yield higher numbers and better qualities of products available for the taste and demand
of individuals (Finke, 1997, p.44-64). While religious organizations which faile to
appeal to the demands of the market declined, the ones which are able to meet the
demands in the religious marketplace and the ones which carve out their own market
niches thrive. That is how and why, the theory claims, religion survived and will
survive the challenges of modern times (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985).
In addition to trying to provide a theoretical account of why religion remained
salient in contemporary societies, advocates of the rational choice theory presented
statistical findings as contrary empirical evidences in order to disprove the assumptions
of the secularization theory (Finke & Stark, 2002). Nevertheless, I don’t think that the
rational choice theory adequately identified the weaknesses of the secularization theory
in greater part because this theory was also afflicted by some of the deficiencies of the
secularization theory. Articulations of the rational choice perspective, like the
secularization theory, remained mostly at abstract theoretical levels and as Simpson
(1990) justifiably argued, the theory heavily relied on deductive thinking. The potential
of religion for providing compensators is a generalist assumption which could sound
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plausible theoretically but it needs to be substantiated with evidence to see if this
assumption holds true in practice in different contexts.
I don’t deny the rational choice theory's argument that religion can be a source
of compensators but I don’t think this necessitates that individuals will turn to religion
for compensator at all times. The theory could explain why certain groups of
individuals in a given society are more religious simply by indicating with empirical
evidence that those individuals chose to be religious for the compensators offered by
religion. Such an evidence could be an explanation for an observed case but it does not
necessitate a deterministic outcome for “the future of religion.” The best the supporters
of the theory like Stark and Bainbridge could say, I contend, is that the fact that religion
can provide compensators which cannot be provided by other things increases the
likelihood of the survival of religion but it does not and cannot guarantee “the future of
religion”.
We don’t need any data to show that not every individual is religious. Indeed,
there are societies around the world especially in Western Europe where most people
are reported not to be religious per se. It is not also difficult to say that nonreligious
people, too, fail to have access to the rewards they wish for. However, not all of them
turn to religion for compensators. This indicates that there is no such deterministic
relationship between the need for compensators for the rewards missed and turning to
religion. If not every individual is turning to religion for compensators, it is possible
that a greater proportion and perhaps the entirity or at least the vast majority of a
society could cease turning to religion in order to compensate the rewards they could
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not obtain otherwise. Then, it is possible that religion could dissolve and disappear
from the society entirely or become insignificant. This would be the conclusion if we
were to carefully follow the deductive reasoning of the rational choice theory's
hypotheses, of course when we fill in some of the gaps between the deductive axioms
of the theory.
In an attempt to defend the secularization theory, Steve Bruce (1999) wrote a
book against the counterarguments of the rational choice theory. Arguing that it is
mostly the social and cultural environment which is forcing individuals to adapt certain
religious beliefs and practices, he denied that cost and benefit calculations can be a part
of religious preferences. Although it is contestable whether or not rational choice is
involved in religious preferences, it would be simplistic to deny that socialization and
other social forces are part of the processes of the transmission and expansion of
religion. Even if we assume that rational calculations of costs and benefits are part of
religious behavior, we still need to address the issue of how individuals will get to
know what different religions has to offer. Not every individual categorically knows
what religion supplies. As the theory’s arguments about the nature of pluralistic
religious environments indicate, not every religion supplies the same products. There
needs to be mechanisms by which individuals are introduced to and convinced about
the value (truthfulness and reliability) of the “products” made available by religion(s),
or as Bruce suggests, they must be socially and culturally forced to accept the teachings
of religion. Therefore, contextual factors are part of the story either way.
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The only macro level social factor upon which rational choice theorists agreed
to be an external force with the potential of affecting the prospects of religion in a given
society is the regulation of religious markets by governments (Stark & Bainbridge,
1985; Iannaccone, 1997, p. 25). If the government regulates the religious market, it will
violate free-market dynamics and natural supply and demand relations which will
subsequently inhibit the number and quality of religious goods available for potential
demands. For the supporters of the theory, this is the primary reason why religion
flourished in America but not in Europe (Stark, 1997, p.3-24). Monopoly of centralized
religious organizations such as the Catholic Church prevented the flourishing of
religion in Europe but diversity in a deregulated religious marketplace fostered the
presence and growth of certain religious movements in the United States.
I think that establishing such a causal connection needs further inquiry and
substantiation. Coexistence of two things do not necessarily indicate a deterministic
causal relationship between them. Briefly put, coexistence of pluralism and religious
vitality in the US and the presence of regulation (as opposed to plurality) but the lack of
religious vitality in Europe does not indubitably point to the deterministic role of
pluralism. There are two ways such deterministic claims can be challenged. Firstly,
there might be other differences between the American and European societies which
could help explain differences in the levels of religiosity in these places. As an
example, it might be argued that socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic
background of Europe especially in terms of the role religion and counter-religious
forces played in these societies are significantly different from that of the United States
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which could explain the differences religiosity levels. A second argument could be that
when the cases of only Europe and the United States is compared such an explanation
might seem plausible but we should also test similar hypotheses by increasing the
number of cases compared. For example, most of the governments in the Muslim
World have been regulating religion -in some cases with a heavy hand- with a
monopolistic approach (Ex: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey), but these societies have been
considerably religious especially in terms of the number and proportion of people who
practice religion. Proponents of the rational choice theory made universalistic claims
about the nature of religion. Therefore, it should and can be tested in different contexts
to see whether the assumptions of the theory hold true across the border. If the theory
fails to explain differences when the number of comparative cases are increased, other
social factors should be investigated, which is something the the proponents of theory
has barely done.
Sherkat (1997), who has been one of prominent supporters of the theory,
admitted that the rational choice perspective underestimated the role of social forces in
its explanations about how individuals become religious. In order to address such
shortcomings of the theory, he offered an explanation of how social factors are part of
the processes through which individuals become religious. For him, individual level
religious choices are embedded in social relations and market offerings which
disseminate information about religious products. There are three different ways social
relations affect religious choices. The first is by sympathy and antipathy. Individuals’
choices might be influenced when they think that choosing a particular thing will make
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those are closer to them happy. For example, a child might chose to be religious and
follow their parents’ tradition in order to please them as a result of sympathy towards
his/her parents. It is also possible that some children will turn away from religion in
order to distance themselves from their parents and from older generations out of
antipathy for them. The second is example-setting motivations. Some people chose to
be religious in order to be a role model for others whom they want to be religious. In
support of such claims, Sherkat cites a long list of studies which show that having
children in their formative years increases religious affiliation, membership and
participation. Thirdly and most importantly, social sanctions (i.e., rewards and
punishments) play a significant role in individual’s engagement and participation in
religion. For example, individuals might choose to be religious not because of the
supernatural compensators but because of other “in process” benefits [quotation
emphasis is original] such as friendship and confirmation of social legitimacy. On the
other hand, failure of participation might lead to ridicule and exclusion from the group
and thus it might produce the consequence or the cost of defection (Sherkat, p. 65-85).
These statements indicate that Sherkat recognizes the role of social sanctions.
However, he argues that sanctions are not intrinsic to religious goods, they are only
externalities. Therefore, he claims, sanctions can only affect (religious) choices and not
preferences.
I see two major problems in these ideas of Sherkat. The first is that he looks at
the role of social sanctions only from the religious participation side. That is to say, he
only discusses the benefits of participation in religion and the costs of not participating
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but he does not look at the issue from the social costs of participation and social
benefits of defection. Although it might sound as if these two are the same, they are not.
In the way Sherkat describes it, everything is at the hands of religion or religious
establishments as they somehow can determine the benefits of participation and the
costs of defection. However, outsiders might have control over the costs of religious
participation and the benefits of defection. For example, social forces antithetical to
religion might establish stigmas that religion is dogmatic, unintellectual, unmodern,
irrational and that it feeds conflict and violence might very well hold back individuals
from being involved in religious activities because being religious in environments
where such antithetical forces are influential will not be socially desirable. This means
that the costs and benefits of being religious as well as the costs and benefits of not
being religious (or being secular) might be socially constructed in different ways.
The success and failure of the forces in a society or community establishing
(increasing) these costs and benefits might very well determine the success and failure
of religion. Talking about the issue only from the benefits of participation and the costs
of defection ignores the role of social forces (groups, institutions, etc.) antithetical to
religion. Such a misconception gives the impression that the fate of religion is in its
own hands. If religion successfully tailors and markets the value of its products and
successfully appeals to the demands of potential customers, it will survive. Such
arguments of Sherkat are in line with the general perspective of the rational choice
theory.
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The second problem I see in Sherkat’s arguments is that he looks at the effects
of social sanctions but ignores other social factors and therefore easily contends that
talking about social sanctions is not about something intrinsic to religion. Thus, he
implies that social sanctions do not alter the intrinsic qualities of “religious goods.”
That is why he says that sanctions can alter the choices individuals make but cannot
change their preferences, which, as I understand it, means that social sanction do not
affect individuals’ tendency to be religious but they might affect their choices of
whether they will engage in particular religious practices or not.
Sherkat might be right when he argues that social sanctions are not intrinsic to
religion, but his arguments are questionable when he implies that (other) social forces
cannot alter intrinsic qualities of religion. I think that Sherkat would not deny that
religious teachings (ideas, theologies, etc.) are intrinsic to religions. Religious ideas and
theologies are in most cases the defining characteristics of religions given that there is
no religion without religious teachings. Any social force which can challenge the
teachings of religions would be diminishing the value of things that are intrinsic to
religion and therefore they would pose existential challenges to it. Teachings of
religions might be challenged in such ways that they lose credibility in their truth
claims (e.g., existence of God and resurrection after death) and thus tendencies of being
religious and incentives for religious commitment might be reduced dramatically.
In distinguishing religion from magic, Stark (1997, p. 12), another prominent
Rational choice theory's supporter, acknowledged that unlike magic, religions involve
theologies which are meaning systems offering alternative truth claims. I think that it is
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for this reason that those who engage in religion are called “believers” but those who
engage in magic are not. This implies that “believing” (or having “faith”) in the reality
of certain ideas is one of the defining characteristics of religions. If the belief in the
truthfulness of these ideas are seriously challenged in the society, the capacity to which
they yield religious commitment might decrease significantly.
Secularization theorists have argued that the rise of science undermined the
teachings of religion in modern times (Loen, 1967; Wilson, 1969; Bruce, 2002). Indeed,
Stark and Bainbridge, in their book The Future of Religion (1985), agreed that some of
the teachings of religion can be challenged by science but they argued that science
cannot provide the satisfaction about the existential issues related to the purpose of
existence and the issue of death. Hence, religion, for them, will prevail in the future.
Apparently, they confused two different things at this point. The idea that science
cannot provide answers to these questions does not mean that ideologically laden
interpretations of science (e.g., scientism, positivism, naturalism and materialism)
cannot undermine the truth claims of religion and therefore weaken religion. In other
words, the idea that science cannot substitute religion in terms of providing
compensations does not mean that scientism cannot hurt the capacity to which religion
can offer compensations by challenging its core teachings. I don’t think that we need to
collect data to show that core teachings of major world eligions such as the existence of
an omnipotent God creating everything were seriously challenged by the positivist,
determinist, and naturalist interpretations of science in contemporary societies.
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Stark and Bainbridge also contend that only intellectual elites can live without
religion and that scientific rationalism will not have massive triumph over
supernaturalism (religion). There are several problematic sides of this argument. First
of all, secularist ideologies and worldviews are not confined to the upper classes or the
educated elite. Secondly, it is not only the elite who are informed about counterreligious interpretations of science. One of the characteristics of modern societies is the
growth and expansion of formal education and the mass media. It wouldn’t be
unrealistic to say that the vast majority of individuals in contemporary societies are
informed about scientist arguments against the core teachings of religion through the
formal education they receive and through their exposure to such arguments in the mass
media. Third, like the secularization theorists and other rational choice theory's
proponents, Stark and Bainbridge overlooked social movement dynamics in the
processes of secularization and thus they did not pay much attention to the collective
mobilization of the relationship between religion and secularism.
Stark and Bainbridge acknowledged and to a certain extent studied social
movement dynamics of religion especially when they discuss which religious groups
prevail and which do not. However, they did not perceive secularism as an alternative
movement against religion which might affect the prospects of religion’s survival. In
my opinion, this could be related to two misconceptions. The first is looking at
secularization as a result of abstract processes of modernization, which, as I described
above, was also done by the supporters of the secularization theory. Another reason
might be that in contrast to the presence and multiplicity of religious communities,
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movements, denomination and sects, there are not many formally organized and
institutionalized explicitly secularist movements which disguises and makes it more
difficult to be identified as a movement with its own agendas.
Based on the idea that the expansion and withdrawal of both religion and
secularization just like any other sociological phenomena are not self-propelled
processes of social change, I argue that the survival of religion is related to the success
and failure of the mobilization of religious and secular(ist) movements vis-à-vis each
other. In The Future of Religion, Stark and Bainbridge did not explain how they define
the elites but it seems like they underestimated the possibility that the secularists
including the elite will be (or they are) mobilized (as a social movement) towards the
goal of expanding secularization and marginalizing religion in the society. Therefore, I
suggest, we have to account for such contextual factors before putting forth generalist
statements about the fate of any religion. Because these contextual factors will vary
from society to society and from religion to religion, we cannot rely only on micro level
theorizations and deductive axioms of why individuals chose religion and if and how
religion has and will survive the challenges it has faced in modern times.
Going back to Steve Bruce’s (1999) point, it is rather naive (interesting) that he
accepts the idea of religion being socially and culturally forced to people but he does
not consider the possibility of secularity being socially constructed and forced by
similar forces as well. As I have discussed above, these kind of inconsistencies are
related to the ways secularization theory and secular(ist) social scientists defined
religion and secularity. That is why, I argue, we need broader and more substantive
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definitions of both secularity and religion vis-à-vis each other and reflexive discussions
of the interactions between the two. It would be meaningless to discuss whether or not
religion is declining without having exclusive definitions of both sides. The same is
also true for understanding the interactions between the religious and the secular. As I
outlined in the introduction section of this dissertation, these definitions should
encompass differences in ontology, moral philosophy and political philosophy which
correspondingly deal with the construction of reality, the self and the society. This
would also help us explore various dimensions of religiosity and secularity at the same
time.
To sum up, I argue that both the secularization and the rational choice theories
fell short of providing (1) theoretically and methodologically well-grounded
articulations (definitions) of religion and secularity and (2) systematic accounts of the
role of social forces (collective action) primarily including social movement dynamics
in their sociological studies of secularization.
Although, I criticize the secularization and the rational choice theories for their
methodological and theoretical shortcomings, I think that these two theories’ theoretical
tools could still be used to study religion and secularization in contemporary societies
in addition to other necessary conceptual and theoretical tools. I will utilize the
conceptual tools of the secularization theory especially when I explore macro level
dynamics of the development of secularization and the conceptual tools of the rational
choice theory especially I will also revisit the secularization theory's theoretical tools
when I do the contextual analysis of this movement’s articulations of the challenges
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posed by secularization. Similarly, I will consider some of the assumptions of the
rational choice theory perspective in my textual analysis of the discourse of the Nur
Movement when it tries to convince its members and audience for choosing religion
over secularity.
Throughout this chapter, I have tried to make the case for the sociological
reconsideration of the conceptualizations of secularization and religiosity. In so doing, I
don’t imply that sociologists should formulate their understanding of religion and
secularity independent of how religious and secular groups perceive their respective
positions. I rather argue that it would be constructive to explore how religious groups
define religion as opposed to secularity and (in comparison to) how the secularists
describe secularity as opposed to religion. Much of what has been put forward as
definitions of religion and secularity in the context of these debates came from the
secularization theory perspective which in general adopted the secularist modernist
worldview. Although proponents of the rational choice theory refuted the assumptions
of the secularization theory, they have not contributed significantly to the sociological
conceptualizations of religion and secularity.
Alternative Perspectives: Human Agency and Secularization as a Socially
Constructed Meaning System
Sociological perspectives regarding secularization debates are not limited to the
rational choice and the secularization theories despite the fact that these two theories
occupied a central place in the debates concerning the role and place of religion in
modern times and its prospects in the future. I will not attempt to review the entire
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literature outside these theories here. However, I will draw attention to two perspectives
presented by sociologist Christian Smith and social philosopher Charles Taylor whose
sociological ideas offer insights to the issues I raised in this and in the introduction
chapter.
Two of the major departure points of this dissertation project are that (1)
secularization should be studied with reference to human agency and collective action,
in other words, with regard to social movement dynamics and (2) that we need
substantive definitions of secularity and religion which inquire into the ontological,
moral philosophical and political philosophical dimensions of the two sides (secular
and religious). Christian Smith offered novel perspectives about the first of these
departure points while Charles Taylor presented noteworthy ideas about the second.
Christian Smith edited a volume titled The Secular Revolution: Power,
Interests, and Conflict in the Secularization of American Public Life (2003) in which he
criticized sociological approaches which ignored human element in the expansion of
secularization contending that such perspectives attributed secularization to agentless
abstract notions such as modernity. In order to draw attention to social movement
dynamics, he conceptualized the augmentation of secularization in the United States
especially towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the first several decades of
the twentieth century to a social revolution led by certain groups of like-minded
intellectuals. For him, these intellectuals were mobilized around the common goal of
overthrowing the mainline Protestant establishment. In Smith’s (2003), own words:
[This] rebel insurgency consisted of waves of networks of activists who were
largely skeptical, freethinking, agnostic, atheist, or theologically liberal; who
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were well educated and socially located mainly in knowledge-production
occupations; and who generally espoused materialism, naturalism, positivism,
and the privatization or extinction of religion. They were motivated by a
complex mix of antipathy toward the Protestant establishment's exclusivity and
perceived outdated-ness; by their own quasi-religious visions of secular
progress, prosperity, and higher civilization; and often by the material gain that
secularization promised them. (p.1)
Even though Smith’s main argument in the book he edited and in the excerpt I
quoted above is to repudiate descriptions of secularization as a byproduct of
modernization and to highlight the role of human agency (social movements) in such
processes, his descriptions implied the idea that secularization was about the
establishment and the triumph of alternative ontological and moral philosophical
worldviews against a religious one. Ontology of this worldview was shaped by
materialism, naturalism and positivism and its moral philosophy was characterized by
the secularist conception of the idea of progress and development as a means for the
establishment of a higher human civilization which would promise material gains to its
adherents and maximize their happiness in this world.
Although descriptions about the ontological and moral philosophical sides of
secularism are obscurely traceable in Smith’s analysis, he did not explicitly emphasize
philosophical differences between religion and secularism. Instead, he compared
secularist perspectives to a quasi-religious ideology. In a way, he suggested that
secularist worldview is another religious (or religion-like) perspective. However, it
would be more theoretically informed if he more eloborately compared these two
alternative worldviews along the lines of their philosophical differences. To say that
these secularist attitudes are quasi-religious values further equivocates the issue
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because such a statement still begs a comprehensive definition of what religion is. It
would be more informative if he compared (identified) religious and secular
worldviews according to common parameters of comparison instead of vaguely
suggesting that they are similar things. They might be similar in terms of their functions
in that they both serve as (alternative) worldviews but in essence they should be
differentiated. Otherwise, we would not be able to conceive religion and secularity as
different (opposing) categories.
To reiterate, Smith challenged the secularization theory for being limited to the
superficial descriptions of secularization processes and for not expounding actual
mechanisms by which secularization was promulgated. Yet, he, too, left substantial
definitions of secularization and religion unaddressed.
It might be argued that it is methodologically legitimate to omit one aspect of
this topic and to focus only on the other, in this case to the social movement dynamics
of secularization. I agree with this and I fully appreciate these remarkable perspectives
offered by Smith and his colleagues in this volume. I also hope that this work will help
reorient studies of secularization to a direction which is more reflective in terms of
understanding the human element aspects of such issues. However, when our analysis
is confined only to the question of human agency (social movement dynamics) and
authority over institutions, our conceptions of secularization will be limited only to the
study of secularization at the organizational and institutional levels. Perhaps, that is the
reason why all of the contributors of the volume edited by Smith focused on the role of
directly and indirectly controlling -and in some cases marginalizing- institutions such as
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public education (Beyerlein, 2003; Thomas, Peck, & De Haan, 2003), publication
censorship (Kemeny, 2003), the legal system (Sikkink, 2003), journalism (Flory, 2003),
science and medicine (Evans, 2003; Garrautte, 2003; Meador, 2003).
When Smith says that the secular elites “were well educated and socially
located mainly in knowledge-production occupations” he acknowledges that
secularization is, beside other things, about meaning production. Institutions such as
schools, as we see it in the descriptions of Smith and the other contributors of this
volume, are among the commanding heights of knowledge production but, in my
understanding, it is ultimately the individuals who will consciously or unconsciously
interpret the knowledge produced in these institutions. Controlling public schools, the
publication industry and journalism is about giving new directions to the education and
information of the masses which means that institutional secularization has implications
in the reorientation of individuals towards goals imagined by the secularist elite.
Therefore, we need to understand if and how the self was socially constructed through
the secularist ideology. And as I argued in the introduction chapter, deciphering the
codes of social construction of the self (moral philosophy) of any ideology entails
elucidation of the ontological foundations of this worldview. That is why we also need
to understand how the secularist movement socially constructed its own understanding
of reality. A thorough understanding of these two aspects of secularization requires
systematic analysis of the discourse of the secularists which is missing in the work of
Smith and his colleagues.
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This weakness, as I contended above, is related to and concomitant with the lack
of a comprehensive definition of secularity vis-à-vis religion. The entire volume which
includes more than 150 pages written directly by Smith hardly includes any discussion
regarding the question of what Smith and the other contributors understand from
secularization. The only place where Smith addresses these issues is when he briefly
mentions that he conceptualized secularization, following Chavez’s (1994) and
Dobbelaere’s (1981 and 2002) descriptions, as declining authority of religion over other
societal institutions.
When sociologists who did not adhere to the presuppositions of the
secularization theory in the West, especially those who studied the case of the United
States, saw that church attendance and membership rates in religious organizations
were not declining, some of them completely denied secularization (i.e., gradual
withdrawal or trivialization of religion) (Martin, 1965; Hadden, 1987; Hout & Greeley,
1987; Finke, 1992; Stark & Iannaconne, 1992; Stark, 1999) and some partially accepted
it (Chavez, 1994; Dobbelaere, 1981; Lechner, 1991). The second group mostly favored
the idea that religion lost its power over the operation of other social institutions but it
was not reflected in the secularization of the self. Smith (2003) joined the second group
and focused solely on the secularization of institutions.
I argue that persistent membership and attendance rates and even higher levels
of direct religious participation do not necessarily negate the existence of secularization
at the individual level. It is conceivable that individuals can knowingly or unknowingly
appropriate certain secularist ideals while continuing to be religiously active. For
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example, an individual might follow a religious ontology to make sense of his/her
existence and that of the universe but at the same time accord to a secularist moral
philosophy. It would not be easy to contest whether this individual is secularist or
religious. Perhaps, we might need a theoretically guided multidimensional
understanding of individual level religiosity and secularity in order to better address
these issues. Therefore, it is not an easy task to focus only on institutional
secularization -as it is done by Smith (2003)- and neglect the dynamics of social
construction of the self simply because numbers indicate that religious participation is
not declining.
Notwithstanding such weaknesses, I believe that Smith’s work is a
groundbreaking milestone in the discipline of sociology in terms of studying the role of
human agency (and social movements) in secularization. An additional strength of this
volume is approaching these issues also from the movement-countermovement
dynamics. While the volume was dedicated primarily to the exploration of the
mobilization of the secularist movement, at least one article (Evans, 2003) concentrated
on the (unsuccessful) countermovement of re-sacralization of medicine and science
after 1960’s in the United States. Being aware of its shortcomings, I will incorporate
the strengths of Smith’s approach to the general framework of this dissertation project,
especially when I study the social movement dynamics of secularization.
Another approach I will incorporate into the ways in which I conceptualize
secularization for the purposes of this dissertation will be the perspectives offered by
social-philosopher Charles Taylor who has written extensively about the philosophical
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underpinnings of the rise of modern societies. Providing a critique of the widespread
approaches to secularization in social sciences, he articulated a meticulously detailed
account of what he understood from the emergence and succession of secularity in
modern times.
Taylor identified two main approaches to secularization. The first, for him, sees
secularization as a result of the withdrawal of religion from the public space to private
realms which is what the secularization theorists called ‘the privatization of religion’.
The second type understood secularization as the decline of belief in God and a
consequential downturn in the degrees to which individuals engage in religious
practices. Taylor suggest a third way which, for him, better encapsulates the conditions
of secularity in contemporary societies. He summarized his approach in the beginning
of his book A Secular Age (2007).
[…] The change I want to define and trace is one which takes us from a society
in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith,
even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others. I may
find it inconceivable that I would abandon my faith, but there are others,
including possibly some very close to me, whose way of living I cannot in all
honesty just dismiss as depraved, or blind, or unworthy, who have no faith (at
least not in God, or the transcendent). Belief in God is no longer axiomatic.
There are alternatives. And this will also likely mean that at least in certain
milieux, it may be hard to sustain one’s faith. There will be people who feel
bound to give it up, even though they mourn its loss. This has been a
recognizable experience in our societies, at least since the mid-nineteenth
century. There will be many others to whom faith never even seems an eligible
possibility. There are certainly millions today of whom this is true. (p. 3)
In this approach, Taylor does not see secularization as the withdrawal or the
decline or religion. He rather sees it as the conditions in which religion is an alternative
option among others. In traditional societies, belief in God was not challenged and it
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was unproblematic. In modern societies, however, religion does not enjoy such levels
of comfort as there are other alternatives. The real challenge of such conditions, for
Taylor, is not about other alternatives directly undermining (challenging) religious
belief but it is the mere presence of these alternative options which makes it more
difficult to sustain a particular faith.
That is why, he suggested, the focus of studies of secularization should be
shifted to the conditions of belief, experience and search. In so doing, he criticized
approaches which see secularization as a result of science weakening religion and
forcing it to abandon spheres of life hence the unbiased, objective, rational and realistic
reading of life as it is and as it has been. Taylor (2003) called such approaches as
“subtraction [theories]" and argued that they failed to provide equitable accounts of
secularization.
I'm not satisfied with this explanation of secularism 2: science refutes and hence
crowds out religious belief. I'm dissatisfied on two, related levels. First, I don't
see the cogency of the supposed arguments from, say, the findings of Darwin to
the alleged refutations of religion. And secondly, partly for this reason, I don't
see this as an adequate explanation for why in fact people abandoned their faith,
even when they themselves articulate what happened in such terms as "Darwin
refuted the Bible", as allegedly said by a Harrow schoolboy in the 1890s. Of
course bad arguments can figure as crucial in perfectly good psychological or
historical explanations. But bad arguments like this, which leave out so many
viable possibilities between fundamentalism and atheism, cry out for some
account why these other roads were not travelled. (p. 4)
It seems that Taylor’s dismissal of the possibility of science being able to
challenge religious faith is only based on his own opinions and convictions. The fact
that he does not think certain scientific arguments cannot refute religion does not
necessarily indicate that the same thing holds true for others. As a philosopher, such
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arguments might not convince Taylor but others might be easily convinced or at least
perplexed. Personal rejections of examples of individuals -such as the extreme Harrow
schoolboy example he mentions- thinking that science refutes religion does not offer a
realistic contribution to the social scientific studies of these issues. It would be more
meaningful to systematically study how these things play out in the society. We can
only make inferences about our own lives based on our own philosophical perspectives.
Another reason why Taylor dismisses conceptualizations of secularization as a
consequence of the decline in religious belief due to the challenges from science is that
he does not think that the definition of religion should go beyond belief in the
transcendent and that it should primarily involve conceptions of human good. He
argues that,
Every person, and every society, lives with or by some conception(s) of what
human flourishing is: What constitutes a fulfilled life? What makes life really
worth living? What would we most admire people for? (Taylor, 2007, p. 16)
Taylor says that answers given to these questions can be traceable in
philosophical theories, moral codes and in religious and non-religious practices. These
codes and practices are nourished in the society and they offer individuals a moral map
of how they should lead their lives. It is about the contents and the direction of these
moral maps that distinguishes religion from secularity. Human flourishing, Taylor
(2007) contends, is the ultimate goal (human good) for non-religious (secular)
worldviews but for the world religions, such as Christianity and Buddhism, the ultimate
goal for the actions of human beings goes beyond human flourishing. Even though
there are doctrinal differences between these religions, they are similar in the sense that
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they call the believers to “break with the goals of flourishing in their own case (p. 17).”
He cautions that religions see human flourishing as “good,” too, but they don’t see it as
the ultimate goal.
For the first time in history, he says, a “purely self-sufficient humanist”
conception of human good which does not go beyond human flourishing became
available as a widely available option in modern societies which was not the case in
ancient societies. Only a small minority (elite) followed this exclusive humanism in
pre-modern times. However, the emergence of the modern paradigm is not about the
dominance of the exclusive humanism but about the condition in which there is conflict
between a religious moral philosophy which sees human fullness “outside of or beyond
human life” and a wide variety of exclusively humanist moral philosophy which places
human fullness “within human life” (Taylor, 2007, p. 15).
In this account, the secular age is characterized by the conflict of alternative
(religious vs exclusive humanist) moral philosophies. In the two major books (A
Secular Age and Sources of the Self) he wrote, Taylor has intricately various aspects of
the non-religious moral philosophy of modern times. Nonetheless, he did not
investigate the responses of the other (religious) side of the conflict. Moreover, his
discussions fell short of articulating the role of science and scientism in the expansion
of secularization although Taylor offered a meticulous analysis of the moral
philosophical backgrounds of secularization. He built a connection between “the
ontology of human beings” and “moral philosophy” and thus was able to easily leave
the relevance of what he called “science beats religion” arguments out of the equation.
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When a connection is built only between the ontology of human beings and moral
reaction, the issue is presented in a way that science, with all of its ideological
derivatives such as positivism, materialism and determinism, is excluded from the
equation. Because ontology of human beings seems to be more open to subjective
articulation and not so much to systematic (scientific) investigation. Therefore, the
ontology of human beings is not within the reach of scientific discourse, which is what
seems to be the underlying assumption of Taylor.
However, things look different when an additional and broader form of
ontology is added to the equation which is the ontology of the cosmos. I argue that the
ontology of human beings drives from or at least are related to the ontology of the
cosmos and everything therein. Science might seem to be irrelevant when a connection
is built only between the ontology of human beings and moral reaction. However, when
the ontology of the cosmos is added to the equation as a preceding and overarching
determinant, science with all of its ideological uses and implications becomes situated
at the heart of the matter because science is a form of investigating the principles that
are observed in the cosmos.
Simply put, a line of connection can be drawn from the ontology of cosmos to
the ontology of human beings and a subsequent line of relationship can be established
from the ontology of human beings to the moral philosophy. If ideologically laden
interpretations of science can confront a particular ontology of the cosmos, it bears the
potential to challenge the ontology of human beings which drives out of this particular
broader ontological position as well. It is not difficult to say that religion and science,
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as it is generally practiced and presented in modern societies, are not coming from the
same ontology of the cosmos. Then, it is possible that challenges posed by scientific
(positivist, determinist) ontological contentions to religious ontology might have
implications at the moral philosophical level, too.
The issue here is also about the question of whether construction of the self is
related to the construction of reality. Ontology of the cosmos deals with the
construction of reality but the ontology of human beings is mostly about the
construction of the self. Taylor puts the analysis of construction of the self at the center
of his analyses of the rise of modern societies. That is why his first major work which
was dedicated to the investigation of the philosophical underpinnings of secularization
was titled as “Sources of the Self.”
I argue that the investigation of the philosophical roots and the sociological
implications of the construction of reality is of equal importance not only for a
theoretically informed understanding of other philosophical aspects of secularization
but also for the systematic study of religious responses to it. Even when the
philosophical question of whether there is a relationship between the ontology of the
cosmos (construction of reality) and the ontology of human beings (construction of the
self) and how science/scientism plays role in this relationship is contested, the
sociological question of if and how secularist and religious movements produce
discourses based on their perception of science remains as a legitimate sociological
question for further inquiry. Such a question constitutes one of the core lines of
investigation for this dissertation.
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It is also important to note that the addition of the ontology of the cosmos to the
equation does not depreciate the importance of the ontology of human beings and its
implications for the development -and for the analysis- of religious and secular moral
philosophies, especially for the purpose of this research. As it has been stated several
times earlier, the analysis of the philosophical foundations of how the secularist and
religious movements perceived and wanted to construct the self is among this
dissertation’s main purposes. Socio-philosophical approach to such a question entails
paying attention to the construction of the ontology of human beings. As it is (will be)
discussed in the fifth chapter, the Risale-i Nur collection is abundant with textual
discourse dealing with the ontology of human beings. I will analyze these texts with
regard to the response of the Nur Movement to secularization.
Being aware of the shortcomings of the two perspectives I presented above, a
combination of approaches presented by Taylor (1992 and 2007) and Smith (2003) will
constitute the framework of how I conceptualize secularization for the purpose of this
dissertation. Smith, unlike other secularization theorists, emphasized the role of human
agency and collective action in the growth and expansion of secularization. Focal point
of Smith’s analysis was the exploration of how the secularist movement was mobilized
towards controlling social institutions of critical value for the production and
distribution of knowledge in the American society. This dissertation project will focus
on the role of human element (social movements), too. However, its analyses of the
secularist movement and religious responses against the mobilization of this movement
will not be limited to the study of institutions only. Folling and broadening the
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approach of Taylor, this study will also inquire into the philosophical aspects of
secularization. In so doing, it will explore the question of how the secularist and
religious movements imagined and were mobilized around their respective ideas and
methodologies for the construction of reality and the self, and the society which is to
say that this dissertation will investigate ontological, moral philosophical and political
philosophical aspects of secularity vis-à-vis religion.
Smith used a macro level approach which probes into the politics of the
encounters between the secularist and religious movements. Taylor, however, offered a
micro level perspective for the study of the fundamentals of secularity. Given the
disciplines these two scholars are coming from, it is not surprising that Smith’s
approach is more sociological and Taylor’s is more philosophical. Therefore, this study
blends a combination of micro and macro level approaches as wells an amalgamation of
sociological and philosophical perspectives in its approach to the study of the
development of secularization in the modern history of Turkey and in its study of the
response of the Nur movement to these processes. The third chapter which is dedicated
for the discussions of historical backgrounds of secularization in the Muslim world will
employ micro and macro level sociological analyses of the development of secularism
as an ideology and secularization as a process of social change.
The first part of the fourth chapter where I will analyze Said Nursi’s
understanding of religious revival before the establishment of the Turkish Republic will
also be weighted towards a macro (institutional) level sociological investigation. I will,
among other things, discuss sociological implications of Nursi’s plans of establishing a
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university with the promotion of the Ottoman sultanate and his ideas regarding İttihad-ı
İslam (pan-Islamism) in this chapter. However, the rest of the fourth chapter will
largely be concentrating on the issues pertaining to the philosophical underpinnings of
the construction of reality and the self in the Risale-i Nur collection and in the letters
exchanged by Nursi and his students. Hence the rest of the fourth chapter will mainly,
but not exclusively, be a micro level discourse analysis. Sociological anlaysis of the
discourse and mobilization of the Nur Movement against the secularist establishment
explores the macro level dyanamics of this movement in the fifth chapter.
I believe that this study would be a meaningful contribution to the academic
studies of secularization and religious movements not only in the Middle East but also
in the other parts of the world. However, it might be argued that analyses of the Nur
Movement in the context of secularization would only be relevant to the studies of
religious movements and secularization in the Muslim World because every civilization
has its unique history. That is why such a studies contribution to the studies
secularization in the west would be minimal because Western civilization has its own
unique history and sociological dynamics.
I do not agree with the contentions that the Western European secularization is
totally unique to the Christian world in Europe (Casanova, 2011). It is obvious that
every society and every civilization has its own unique history when the details are
taken into consideration. However, it is not difficult to say that different societies also
experience similar, if not exactly the same, patterns of change. Nation states were born
in Europe but it is almost impossible to find a country in the contemporary world which
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is not a nation state. Although there are variations in the ways these nation states were
established and in the ways they have been operating, they share certain characteristics
across different civilizations and continents (Opello & Rosow, 2005). Widespread
formalization of education and the development of universities, as we know it today,
were first established in Europe but they are everywhere in today’s world including the
remote parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Frankema, 2011). The structure of the (scientific)
language used in academic circles around the world is a sign of similarity across the
border as well. The idea of development through economic growth has a very recent
beginning in the entire human history and its roots are in Europe but with the exception
of a few (like Bhutan) all of the nations around the world have embraced the idea. True,
there have been different developmental models such as capitalism, socialism and
import substitution industrialization but the idea of national development does not
differ much.
Similarly, secularization, as we understand it today, has a lot to do with the
European history and its Christian past. Nevertheless, secularism together with other
heavily Western originated ideologies (e.g., developmentalism, progressivism and
scientism) were adopted, albeit in different ways, by a large number of non-European,
non-Christian societies around the world. Variations in the ways different nations
understood and adopted, or were compelled to adopt, secularism and secularity does not
negate the idea that secularization around the world has some unifying characteristics. I
argue that these similarities are more pronounced when philosophical foundations of
the religious and the secular(ist) are analytically compared.
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When I agree that secularization as it has generally been conceptualized has its
origins in the European history, I also admit that in depth studies of secularization
should take the European history into consideration which is why this dissertation
project pays a great deal of attention to the development and discussions of
secularization in the West as well. However, this is neither to mean that studies of
secularization should be limited to the geographical boundaries of the Western world
nor to say that studies of secularization outside Europe or the United states can only
help understand the dynamics of secularization outside the West. Therefore, I argue that
studying the response of the Nur Movement to secularization would significantly
contribute to the studies religion not only in the Muslim World and but also around the
globe. As I discuss in the next chapter of this dissertation, since the 19th century most
of the intellectual debates in Europe including the role of religion and science in the
society were simultaneously, in some cases subsequently, taking place in certain parts
of the Muslim world including the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Iran and India (Pakistan).
Although these societies were predominantly Muslim, challenges posed by
secularization to religion in these places were very similar to the ones faced by
Christianity in Europe.
I agree with Talal Asad (2003) when he contended that “any social scientific
discipline which aims to understand religion must also try to understand its other
(secular) (p. 22)”. I argue that the opposite is true as well. Understanding of the secular
is contingent on the understanding of its other, religion. As Chaves (2004) suggested,
the way religion is perceived determines the way secularization is studied. Casanova
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(2011), too, have argued that religion and secularity are always mutually constructed.
Understanding of one requires the study of the other at the same time. He also
contended that such reflexive approaches have not been adequately developed yet.
One of the weaknesses of studies of religion in social scientific disciplines is the
lack of comprehensive studies of how religious groups define religion and secularity as
their other as opposed to how secularist groups’ definitions. In general sociologist, like
other social scientists, relied heavily on their own inferences of what religion and
secularization are in greater part because not many religious and secularist groups
provide explicit and articulate definitions and comparisons of religion and secularity.
As I argued throughout this dissertation such conceptions were also inadequate in terms
of systematically conceptualizing and analyzing philosophical foundations how these
two alternative worldviews imagined and (if they did so) constructed reality, the self
and the society.
One of the ways of abridging such inadequacies, I believe, is directly studying
religion and secularization in the context of movement-countermovement relations and
by systematically analyzing their perceptions of themselves and their others in order to
better understand their conceptions of religion and secularity. I think that studying
revivalist movements would be a good starting point for such an endeavor. By
definition, revivalist movements are movements against challenges faced by religion.
Especially in the contemporary context, the concept of revivalist movements refers to
religious movements formed and mobilized around different ideas of responding to the
challenges posed by modernization and secularization. Doing so requires the existence
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of some sort of implicit or explicit understanding of what religion is and what
modernization and secularization are on the side of the revivalist movements. In the
absence of explicit references discourses, practices and mobilization strategies of
revivalist movements can and should be analyzed for a better understanding of the
dialectical relationships between religiosity and secularism.
As it has been observed by many (e.g., Davison, 1998; Yavuz & Esposito, 2003;
Kuru, 2009; Baran, 2010) one of the battlegrounds of secularist and religious social
forces in modern times has been Turkey which was established as a secularist nation
state after the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Secularization processes in the Muslim
World including the territories controlled by the Ottomans started before the decline of
the Empire but since the inception of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, the divide
between the secular and religious forces started to become more visible as the newly
established Turkish nation state continued introducing top down secularist reforms in a
wide range of areas. Similar trends of secularization emerged in other parts of the
Muslim World including Iran and Egypt in the twentieth century. At the same time,
socially organized responses to secularization started to be established in these societies
in the form of revivalist religious movements.
One of the earliest socially organized responses to secularization in Turkey and
in the Muslim World was the revivalist movement established by Said Nursi who wrote
extensively, among other things, about the underpinnings of the challenges posed by
what he broadly called “the [atheistic] philosophy”. The Nur Movement, which has
been one of the largest and oldest revivalist movements, and its discourse offer a rare
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opportunity for the comparative study of religion and secularization. Unlike the
majority of other revivalist movements, this movement was organized around a body
textual discourse (Risale-i Nur) which includes explicit articulations of the differences
between religious and secularist worldviews pertaining to the philosophical foundations
of the construction of reality, the self and the society. However, social scientific studies
of religion in the context of secularization have been biased towards politically oriented
religious groups especially in the Muslim World. Sayed Qutb’s and to a lesser degree
Maulana Mawdudi’s discourses, for example, has been given disproportionate attention
in the academia because of their relatively heavier political tones. However, ideas
presented by less politicized revivalist thinkers and the movements they established
have been understudied even though some of these movements have been considerably
influential in the societies they existed. Said Nursi, produced a body of intellectual
discourse which included elaborate comparisons of religion and what he called
philosophy. Although his analysis of philosophy is not limited to modern times,
challenges posed against religion in modern times by scientific paradigms such of
naturalism, determinism, materialism and humanism occupied a substantial part of his
analyses.
Ali Rahnama edited a volume titled “Pioneers of Islamic Revival”(2006) in
which scholars of Islamic revival described biographies, ideas and activisms of Muslim
revivalists including Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani (1839-1897 / Afghanistan - Iran),
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905 / Egypt), Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989 / Iran), Abul
A’la Maududi (1903-1979 / India-Pakistan), Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949 / Egypt),
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Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966 / Egypt), Musa al-Sadr (1928-1978 / Iran-Lebanon), Ali
Shariati (1933-1977 / Iran) and Muhammed Baqer as-Sadr (1935-1980 / Iraq). This list
is quite comprehensive in the sense that it covers revivalists from the Sunni and Shiite
parts of the Muslim World, from North Africa to Southeast Asia and to Middle East,
from before the establishment of nation states in the Muslim World (Ex: Afghani and
Abduh) and after (Ex: All others in the list), from the politically inclined (Ex:
Khomeini) to philosophically inclined (Ex: Ali Shariati) and from the major countries
in the Muslim World such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. Despite the fact that Said
Nursi (1876-1960) was active before and after the formation of the nation states, and
that he formed one of the largest and most influential revivalist movements not only in
Turkey but also in the Muslim World, he could not make into the list Revivalist
Rahnama covered in this volume.
Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (2000) compiled an anthology of
modernist and fundamentalist ideas presented by prominent scholars, theologians,
scholars and academics around the Muslim world from the last quarter of the nineteenth
century to the late twentieth. They included writings of more than 15 different
ideologues in this thematically organized volume which covered subjects of “Islam and
Western Civilization”, “Islam and Politics”, “Islamic Modernism” and “Jurisprudence,
Rational Sciences and Differentiation of Knowledge.” Writings of most of the pioneers
of Islamic revival included in Rahnama’s book were included in this volume as well
with the exception of Musa al-Sadr, Muhammed Baqer as-Sadr and Hasan al-Banna.
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Nursi’s writings couldn’t make into this volume either even though he had written
extensively about many of the topics investigated in this book.
Davison (1998) published a book titled Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A
Hermeneutic Reconsideration. Quite interestingly, there is no mention of Said Nursi
and the Nur Movement in the book. I think that there are several reasons of why this is
the case. The first is that compared to his contemporaries, Nursi’s and as a result the
Nur Movement’s discourse was not politically laden which makes it difficult to be
analyzed from the more fashionable power relations perspectives. The second is the
difficulty of deciphering Nursi’s multi-layered discourse which simultaneously relates
to matters pertaining to theology, philosophy and rhetoric. At the same time, Nursi, as
he admits, tries to speak to people from various intellectual backgrounds ranging from
the most learned to the simple lay people which is one of the reasons of stylistic
variations in writings. A fuller understanding of his discourse, therefore, necessitates a
command of these interdisciplinary areas as well as an expertise in the socio-historical
backgrounds of the contexts in which this discourse was produced. Another reason why
academic studies of Nursi was delayed, especially in Turkey, is the secularist
establishment’s strict censorship of the publication of Nursi’s works as well as its
censorship of academic works covering this movement.
The first serious social scientific study of Said Nursi and the Nur Movement
came almost three decades after the death of Said Nursi in 1960. Şerif Mardin provided
the first (and to my knowledge the only) systematic sociological account of Said Nursi
and the Nur Movement in his book Religion Social Change in Modern Turkey: The
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Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi published by the State University of New York Press
in 19893. As a historical sociologist specialized in the late Ottoman history and in the
history of modernization in Turkey, Mardin started his book with extensive descriptions
of the socio-historical transformations in the last century of the Ottoman Empire and
the first years of the Turkish Republic with the aim of contextualizing Said Nursi’s
ideas and the emergence of the Nur Movement.
Mardin does a fairly good job in terms of providing such a background.
However, his analysis of the actual discourse of Said Nursi gets lost in his deterministic
reductionism when he to a much greater extent focuses on descriptions of the context as
precursor to understanding the emergence of this movement while depending on brief
analyses of the discourse of Nursi and the Nur Movement. An indication of such an
approach is that direct analysis of the discourse of Nursi can hardly be found in
Mardin’s book with the exception of several quotations and sporadic anecdotal notes.
Thus, Mardin embraced a methodological approach which heavily relies on a causal
path from the context to the text where the first is the determinant of the latter. I argue
that such cases (like that of the Nur Movement) should be studied from both directions:
from the context to the text and from the text to the context. If our methodology is
biased towards one of these directions, we would be imposing our own reading either to
the context or to the text. Mardin’s book is heavily biased towards the first (context)
and widely ignores the second (text).

3

Although Mardin published his book abroad (U.S.), he was stripped of his membership from
the Turkish Sociological Association on grounds that he popularized one of the enemies of the
secular Republic.
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What is more, philosophical implications of Nursi’s discourse especially his
understanding of modern science are mostly misunderstood by Mardin. In the only
chapter of the book dedicated for the study of philosophical discourse of Nursi (chapter
titled “the Machinery of Nature”) Mardin claims that Nursi appropriated the Newtonian
mechanistic paradigm and that in a way Nursi championed modern science and
technology. In so doing, Mardin overlooked the dialectical nature of Nursi’s approach
to the rise of modern science which I think is because Mardin did not understand that
Nursi’s broad conceptualization of Philosophy includes modern positivist sciences as
well. In his writings, Nursi presents his criticism of modern positivist science when he
criticizes what he broadly class philosophy. Second, Mardin’s discussions of Nursi’s
ethics are rather superficial as they are limited to explicit moral codes such as
respecting the elderly and being truthful. Such issues are scarcely found in about 6,000
pages of Nursi’s writings, not because Nursi doesn’t think they are not important but
because Nursi was more concerned about the root causes of deviation in the moral
philosophy dealing with existential questions such the purpose of existence and the
source of human happiness.
As I describe in the fourth chapter, Nursi’s writings include a great deal of
moral philosophical discourse which do not contain direct mention of explicit moral
norms. I think that such issues are much more central to Nursi’s revivalist methodology
and they should be investigated first. In his discussions of Nursi’s ethics, Mardin
mostly relied on secondary commentaries of Said Nursi (e.g., Mürsel, 1976; Şahiner,
1979) in his formulation of Nursi's ethics rather than analyzing moral philosophical
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implications of Nursi’s revivalist discourse vis-à-vis the development of secularist
moral philosophy and his discursive strategies of reorienting the self towards religious
definitions of the good.
In the excerpt below Mardin (1989) discusses why Nursi’s ethics appealed to
the rural periphery.
[Said Nursi’s] stress on the personalistic element provided the rural population
which flocked to him with a map of social relations that Kemalism had
neglected. Kemalist ideology was long on views concerning the virtues of
Turks, the benefit of secular republicanism for personality expansion, and the
contribution of universal education to progress. It was short on methods that
would enable individuals to tackle issues arising in the family circle. It did not
answer queries relating to the authority of the father or as to what the new place
of women in society would be after republican secularization and the adoption
of Swiss Civil Code in anything approaching the detail of the most
commonplace Islamic “catechism” with rural diffusion. Neither did the
Kemalists have a view of rituals that would give meaning to life-stations such as
birth, adolescence, marriage and death. Anyone who has had the occasion to
witness the groping attempts of brides, bridegrooms and their families to infuse
some color and warmth into the bleak process of Turkish civil marriages will
know what I mean. The superficiality and lack of organic linkages with society,
of Kemalism — which was successful in many other ways, as we have seen —
appeared in such lacunae. Said Nursi's teachings filled this gap by providing
such a map of family norms, in particular the respect to be shown to the father
and to elders. (p. 169)
The excerpt above is but one example of how Mardin moved from the context
to text4. He was preoccupied with the question of how is it that these religious elements
still existed in a modern paradigm. The main point of Mardin throughout the book
revolves around the idea of how the Nur Movement filled the void left by the
inadequacy of the new regime in terms of conquering all areas of life. For such reasons,
he did not do an in depth analysis of the text and the discourse it contains. Due in

4

Mardin shared similar observations elsewhere (See, Mardin, 2003).
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greater part to these inadequacies, Mardin was not able to see the dialectical nature of
Nursi’s discourse with regard to the construction of reality, the self and to a lesser
degree the construction of the society. The most important implication of such
inadequacy is Mardin’s conclusion that Nursi’s and the Nur Movement’s discourse
were part of modernizing forces instead of being contentious towards them.
Besides contributing to the academic debates regarding the question of
secularization and the development of the secularist movement in Turkey, this
dissertation project aims at significantly contributing to the study of revivalist
ideologues such as Said Nursi and religious movements not only in Turkey but also
around the Muslim World by suggesting a systematic inquiry into the ways in which
revivalist movements were mobilized against secularist conceptions of reality, the self
and the society.
I also believe that the theoretical framework I will be developing in this
dissertation to study the Nur Movement’s response to the ontological, moral
philosophical and political philosophical foundations of secularization -which also deal
with the social construction of reality, the self and the society- can be instrumentalized
to explore the dynamics of other revivalist movements especially the ones in the
Muslim World including the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-i Islami, Tablighi Jamaat
and others. The same framework can be employed to understand to which of the three
aspects of secularization and in what degrees a particular revivalist movement
responded and how they have done it. For example, one might argue that the Muslim
Brotherhood’s response focused more on the political and moral philosophical aspects
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of secularization whereas the Nur Movement focused more on ontology and moral
philosophy.
This structure can also be used to determine in which of the three areas (i.e.,
reality, the self and the society) a religious revivalist movement has/had conflicting or
accommodating relations with secular regimes. When I propose the use of this
framework, I don’t argue that all religious movements have antagonistic relations with
the secular establishments in all of these three areas. Some religious movements are
mobilized against only one or two of these three aspects of secularization and they have
non-conflicting relations in other areas. For example, one might observe that some
religious movements in the Muslim World have tried to maintain a non-conflicting
relationship with the nationalist ideology of the political establishments as they, too,
instrumentalized nationalism in their resource mobilization strategies while they had
conflicting (in ontology) and somewhat conflicting (moral philosophy) relationships
with other aspects of the secularist socio-political systems.

CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY
Introduction
Determining exactly when secularization started in the Ottoman Empire and in
its successor Turkey is not an easy task as this question begs a precise definition of
what secularization is and as such, requires meticulous historical research. However,
historians and sociologists generally contend that the emergence of secularization in
the Ottoman Empire coincides with the state-led reforms towards the end of the
eighteenth century (e.g., Berkes, 1964; Mardin, 1981), which were undertaken with the
aim of preventing the decline of the Empire in the face of external threats such as the
emergence of (militarily) overpowering nation states of Europe (Shaw, 1970; Levy,
1982; Davison, 1990; Hanioğlu, 1995), the growth and expansion of European
commerce in the Middle East, and internal challenges like the decreasing central
authority of the sultan over institutions such as the Janissaries and over peripheral
territories and the local valley lords (e.g., derebeys and a’yans) (Karpat, 1972; Zürcher,
2004; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).
In this chapter, I will trace the historical background of the genesis of
secularization and the secularist movement by focusing on five subsequent stages of
reform and modernization in the history of Turkey. The first step will be the description
of the first wave of institutional modernization during the reigns of Sultan Selim III and
103
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Sultan Mahmud II comprising the years between 1779 and 1839. As I describe in detail
below, modernization during this period was in the form of reformation of
governmental institutions, primarily including the army and education, administered
and sponsored by the Sultanate. I will mostly rely on secondary resources in my
descriptions and analyses of the reforms undertaken during this first stage of
modernization. The second step will be the socio-historical analysis of the Tanzimat
Era (1839-1876) in which modernization and Westernization further intensified and
expanded in the Ottoman society, not only by the will of the Sultan but also by the
efforts of a new group of reformist bureaucratic elite. I will use a combination of
primary and secondary sources for the study of this period. I will use secondary sources
to trace significant developments and key figures of modernization in this era of
intensified socio-historical change. Primary resource will include excerpts from the
declerations of reform such as the Tanzimat Fermanı and the Islahat Fermanı.
As the third step, I will explore and analyze the emergence of the first
generation of oppositional reformist movement, the Young Ottomans such as İbrahim
Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha, and Ali Suavi. I will analyze their discourse by
reading some of the texts produced by them. Secondary sources will help contextualize
the discourse of the reformist intellectuals in the Young Ottomans Movement.
Prominent figures in the Young Ottomans were also the pioneers who introduced ideas
like constitutionalism, liberty, justice and democracy they were acquainted with
through their interactions with Western civilization. I will analyze passages and
excerpts from the writings of the Young Ottomans and discuss their implications with
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regard to secularization. Mobilization strategies of this intellectual movement and its
legacy of reform and modernization will also be discussed in conjunction with the
transformation of the Ottoman society vis-à-vis the developments in the West. I will
also discuss if and how certain intellectual movements and ideologues in Europe
affected the discourse of the Young Ottoman thinkers.
The fourth step will be the examination of what some historians (Karpat, 2002;
Cleveland & Bunton, 2009) call the Young Turk Era, starting with the declaration of
the First Constitutional Government in 1876 and ending with the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks Movement was a very broad based opposition
movement mobilized against the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II with the demand of the
reinstitution of the constitution and the reopening of the Ottoman Parliament, which
were suspended by him shortly after their enactment in 1876. Although they were
united against the Sultan, the Young Turks movement was composed of various, in
some cases conflicting, ideological factions, including centralists and decentralists,
liberals and conservatives, nationalists and multi-culturalists, positivists, materialists,
and atheists as well as traditionalists, conservatives, devout Muslims and the reformist
ulama. In addition, there were several major organizations such as the Committee of
Union and Progress and The League of Private Enterprise and Decentralization, which
were established by different factions of the Young Turks Movement.
Investigating all aspects and every ideological block of the Young Turks
Movement is far beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I will focus on the
question of if and how ideas promoted by the Young Turks, their organizations and
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mobilization strategies contributed to the development of secularization and the
secularist movement in the late Ottoman Society and in the formative years of the
modern Turkish Republic. I will use a combination of primary and secondary sources
for this purpose. Secondary historical sources will help contextualize the emergence the
Young Turks Movement and significant developments in its history, while reading and
analyzing texts produced by prominent members of the Young Turks (e.g., Beşir Fuad,
Ahmet Rıza, Yusuf Akçura, Abdullah Cevdet and Baha Tevfik) will be part of the
discussions regarding the development of secularist ideologies such as scientism,
positivism, progressivism, materialism and naturalism. Focusing on the development of
these ideologies in the secularist movement will be a major step towards investigating
ontological, moral philosophical, and political philosophical implications of the
discourse of this movement, which pertain to the construction of reality, the self, and
the society.
As I described in the previous chapters, such philosophical questions and their
sociological implications constitute one of the two core axes of the ways in which this
dissertation project proposes to study secularization and revivalism—the other axis is
social movement dynamics. In similar ways to my study of the Young Ottomans, I will
also investigate if and how ideas and intellectual movements developed in the West
influenced the ideology of the Young Turks.
Exploration of secularization after the establishment of the modern Turkish
Republic and until the end of one party rule in 1950 will be the fifth and the final step. I
will continue using a combination of primary and secondary sources at this stage as
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well. One of the issues discussed in this section will be the question of if and how the
Young Turk Movement, including the Committee of Union and Progress, and their
discourse, ideology, and mobilization strategies played a role in the development of the
secularist regime in modern Turkey. I will also describe and analyze the discourse and
mobilization strategies of the secularist establishment in this period.
Because this dissertation emphasizes the importance of studying secularization
by paying attention to movement countermovement dynamics, I will also occasionally
discuss reactions to reforms, other socio-political transformations, and ideas promoted
in each of these five stages. I will conclude by describing major findings of the
investigation of the development of secularization in the history of the Ottoman Empire
and Turkey and by briefly discussing the implications of these developments in the
context of secularization as a precursor for the final analysis. Analytical study of the
response of Said Nursi and the Nur Movement to secularization, which is the main
subject of this dissertation, will be in the following fourth and the fifth chapters.
Reforming the Army, Saving the Empire: The First Wave of Modernization
Reforms (1779-1839)
It was in 1792 that the Ottomans lost decisively a war against the Russians, a
newly emerging military might in Europe. When the war ended with the Peace of Jassy,
Selim III initiated a series reforms called Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order) purported to
increase the power of the state through disciplining the army and the state bureaucracy
and “restoring these institutions along their traditional principles” (Levy, 1982). As the
primary focus of the reforms, Selim III sought to restore the integrity of the army, the
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Janissaries in particular, in the image of the prime times of the Ottoman army of the
fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries.
When he realized that transforming the army from within will render
ineffective, Selim III established a new army independent of the traditional corps of
Janissaries and Sipahis (Zürcher, 2004). Thus, the state-led reforms which started in
late eighteenth century were transformed from restorative to innovative character as the
Empire from now on aspired to establish strong military power in the like of the
European armies.
One of the steps in this direction was acquiring and implementing the military
technology of the Europeans (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009) through translating military
books1 (Hanioğlu, 2008) and bringing in European technicians for the design and
improvement of the military technology (Berkes, 1964, Zürcher, 2004), which were
followed by establishing domestic military technical schools. Mühendishane-i Bahr-i
Hümâyûn (Royall Naval Engineering School) and Mühendishane-i Berr-i Hümâyûn
(Royal Military Engineering School) were opened in 1773 and 1795 respectively
(Somel, 2001) both of which were imitations of French military academies (Hanioğlu,
1995). With the purpose of educating physicians for the army Tersane Tibbiyesi
(Shipyard Medical School) was opened in 1806 as an auxiliary medical institutions to
the army (İhsanoğlu, 2009, p. 201).

İhsanoğlu (2011, p. 153-154) and Kılınç (2006, p. 254) report that translation of European texts
in other areas (e.g., astronomy, atlases) started as early as mid-seventeenth century.
1

109
Opening military schools and their ancillaries continued during rule of Mahmud
II. Harbiye Mektebi (The War School) was established in 1831 to educate soldiers for
the reformed army after the abolishment of the Janissaries five years earlier. With the
purpose of educating doctors and surgeons mostly to serve in the army, Tıbhane-i
Amire (Royal Medical Academy) and Cerrahhane-i Amire (Royal Academy of
Surgery) were opened in 1827 and 1832 (Aydüz, 2007). To meet the needs of military
veterinarians, Baytar Mektebi (The school of Veterinary Medicine) was opened in 1848
(İhsanoğlu, 2004). These schools were not only the first military technical schools, they
were also the first modern high schools in the history of the Empire (Mikaberidze,
2011). All of these schools like the other newly established bureaucratic institutions
were based in or around the city of Istanbul which at the time was the capital (Weiker,
1969) and the faculty were comprised of European, mostly French, British, Prussian
and Swedish as well as Ottoman instructors (Berkes, 1964; İhsanoğlu 2004; Cleveland
& Bunton, 2009).
Obviously, military reforms were not peculiar to the Ottomans for the fact that
armies in Europe had been going through transformative reforms starting around the
end of the seventeenth century. It was mostly because of these reforms -which showed
its impact in the battlefield- that the Ottomans felt the need to transform their own. At
this point, it is noteworthy to remember Andre Corvisier’s (1979) caveat that military
reforms in Europe should be understood as part of a much broader framework of sociopolitical transformation (quoted in Levy, 1982). During the emergence of the nation
states, the army played to a pivotal role for the establishment of sovereign authority
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through which other governmental operations and institutions were unified under the
monopoly of a highly centralized state machinery in this process. Other sociopolitical
institutions were transformed, too, alongside the transformation of the army.
The issue here is not that such transformations were merely the result of the
changes in the structuring of the army. The argument is that the reformation of the army
played a central role, perhaps an instrumental one, in the structural transformation of
the European societies especially during the earlier phases of the major historical
transformations in the modern history. This was the case in the Ottoman Empire as well
(Levy, 1982). Modernization reforms started in the military with the intention of
reclaiming the undisputed sovereign authority of the sultanate but to be expanded into
other areas later (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).
As Zürcher (2004) puts it, reforms under the rule of Selim III were a mixture of
trying to revive the older system and emulating structural and technical aspects of
Euorpean armies and their military academies. Reforms undertaken during the reign of
his successor Mahmud II were much broader and more innovative in character. Stateled reforms which started in the army and military schools were extended into the civil
bureaucracy as he transformed older Ottoman institutions in line of modern institutions
of the contemporary European states (Findley, 1972, Cleveland & Bunton, 2009)
including the establishment of modern municipal administration during his rule (Shaw
& Shaw, 1977). These reforms were done in two major areas. The first was the
transformation the governmental institutions and second was the transformation of
school system. Sultan Mahmud II established ministerial offices for the first time in the
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history of the Empire (Sevim, 1978). Sultan Selim III had sent the first permanent
representatives in 1793 to major Europeans capitals (e.g., London, Berlin, Paris, Vienna
and Madrid) (Berkes, 1964) not only because the Ottomans wanted to be informed
about new developments but also because diplomatic relations with European powers
was much needed to avert new military catastrophes (Hanioğlu, 1995). However, it was
Sultan Mahmud II who transformed foreign relations administration by establishing the
centralized office of the Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezareti) in 1836 which played a
significant role on the transformation of the civil bureaucracy at large. Interior Ministry
(Dahiliye Nezareti) was established around the same time (Findley, 1970, 1972 and
1980). With the suggestion of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Dar-ı Şurayı Bab-ı Ali serving as
the Council of Ministers and Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam-ı Adliye as the Supreme Council
of Judicial Ordinances to provide consultancy in legal matters and to function as a
legislative body, were established in 1837 (Mardin, 1962; Shaw & Shaw, 1977).
Codification of the legal system in a modern sense mainly including the penal
code had started by Mahmud II as well (Findley, 1980). In addition, publication of the
first newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events) started in 1831 in order to inform
the bureaucrats, the statesmen and to a limited degree the public about the policies of
the center (Hanioğlu, 1995). The first modern postal system was also inaugurated
around the same time (Palmer, 2011).
Major transformations in education included, among other things, the
establishment of civil vocational schools. As the number of newly established
bureaucratic offices increased so did the number of qualified workforce needed to fill
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these positions. In order to prepare the required workforce, the Empire introduced
broader reforms in the area of education. Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye (Royal Educational
School of Justice) was the first modern school established during the reign of Mahmud
II, in year 1836, for training students, exclusively men, to work in civil bureaucratic
positions (Findley, 1972). Yet another necessity was the lack of qualified teachers to be
employed in these academies. As a response, Mekteb-i Maarifi Edebiyye (The School
of Literary Education) was established in the same year for educating teachers who
received instructions in French, Arabic, history, political science, geography,
astronomy and mathematics (Berkes, 1964; Shaw & Shaw, 1977).
Reformation of the educational system in the first half of the nineteenth century
Ottoman society started at the post elementary level with the opening of the
aforementioned military technical schools and continued with schools established for
educating bureaucrats and teachers. Vocational training at the post elementary level
were not overlapping much with other forms of education in the Ottoman society.
However, the state felt the need to educate its workforce at earlier ages because
education only at these vocational schools were not sufficient for preparing the modern
bureaucrats. The first elementary level school outside madrasas was established for the
first time again by Mahmud II. The Sultan did not close madrasas which were
providing religious education at the elementary level to young pupils. He only
established a parallel intermediate level non-religious school system perhaps because
he didn’t want to involve in an open conflict with the religious elite (ulema) (Shaw &
Shaw, 1977) who had supported him in the abolishment of the Janissaries a few year
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back. Nonetheless, reforming the educational system and expanding it into the
intermediate level indirectly limited the power of the madrasas and the ulema in favor
of the already centralizing authority of the sultan and the state (Gökçek, 2001).
Mahmud II also brought the administration of Evkaf (Religious and Civil Foundations)
under government control with the establishment of the Ministry of Religious
Endowments (Evkaf Nezareti). Such a move further undermined the power of the
religious establishment (Züchrer, 2004; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).
One of the common attributes of the reforms during the times of Mahmud II
was their Westernized characteristics. All of the military, bureaucratic and educational
institutions reformed or newly established in this period were meant to emulate similar
institutions in Europe. As a whole, these transformations constituted the nucleus of the
development of a centralized nation state in comparable ways in which nation states
were emerging in the West. The sultan implemented a new dress code for the civilian
officers by replacing the turban with the fez. What is more, he was the first Ottoman
Sultan to wear the European style trousers and to have his portraits hung in state
offices. Such practices earned him the epithet of “Gavur Padişah” (Sevim, 1978;
Altındal, 1993; Arığ, 2007; Gürler, 2010) which is translated into English as “the nonMuslim Sultan” or “the infidel Sultan”.
Another major step in the transformation of the educational system of the
Ottoman Empire during Mahmud II’s reign was sending students to Europe, starting in
1834, so that they study at European academies and bring back the science and the
know-how to be utilized and implemented in the reformation of the state and to be

114
taught in the newly opened technical academies and schools (Somel, 2001). These
students were sent almost exclusively to Paris (Hanioğlu, 1995) because of the
friendlier relationships between the Ottomans and the French at that time (Cleveland &
Bunton, 2009) and as Berkes (1964) suggested because of Selim III’s admiration for the
French civilization. As I discuss in further detail below, these students played
significant roles in the expansion of the processes of modernization and secularization
in the Empire and subsequently in the path towards the establishment of the modern
Turkish Republic.
Reforms in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were
predominantly state-led programs sponsored directly by the sultans with the purpose of
facilitating the transformation of military and bureaucratic institutions. These reforms
were implemented with the coercive power of the state especially during Mahmud II’s
time (Hanioğlu, 1995).
Even though these reformed institutions did not stop the decline of the Empire,
they significantly transformed the structure of the bureaucracy and the educational
system. Not surprisingly, changes brought about by such reforms were not limited to
these areas only. Bringing in foreign military engineers and instructors as well as
sending students and permanent diplomatic missions to major capitals in the Europe
during this period started to intensify direct interactions with the Europeans and thus
the impact of Western world on the Ottoman society began to be observed in other
areas. Borrowing words into academic and subsequently into everyday use from the
Western languages mainly from French started as early as late eighteenth century
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(Hanioğlu, 1995). As I discuss in further detail below, these structural adjustments also
planted the seeds of the transformation of the class structure of the entire society. These
reforms gave rise to a new class of modernizing bureaucratic elites and thusly paved the
way for broader social, cultural and political changes.
Reforms in the Tanzimat Era: Centralization and the Rise of the New
Bureaucracy
A new era was ushered in 1839 in the history of the modernization reforms in
the Ottoman Empire with the proclamation of Tanzimat Fermanı (Imperial Decree of
Reorganization) under the leadership of Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Pasha several
months after the ascension of Abdulmecit I to the throne in succession of his father
Mahmud II. A declaration, put together by the efforts of the Foreign Minister Mustafa
Reşit Pasha who had previously served as the Ottoman Ambassador to London and
Paris and sealed by Sultan Abdulmecit I, was read in the presence of a group of
Ottoman notables, foreign dignitaries, community leaders, representatives of guilds in
front of the royal palace. This decleration announced a series of social reforms to be
implemented thereafter (Hanioğlu, 1995; Ufford, 2007; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).
Hence, reforms implemented after the declaration of this decree in the following
several decades leading up to the beginning of the short lived first constitutional era in
1876 are referred to as the Tanzimat Era2.
Reforms undertaken during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II were
implemented with the intention of rejuvenating the Empire by transforming the state
2

Tanzimat is the plural of the word tanzim which means reordering and reorganization.
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apparatus. As it is described above, those reforms mostly addressed technical and
practical matters at the administrative level. Tanzimat represented a turning point in the
Ottoman and Turkish history as it, for the first time, addressed issues pertaining to
social justice and civil liberties in addition to promising the abolishment of tax farming
(tımar), fighting with corruption and standardizing the compulsory military recruitment
(Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). The declaration announced new laws (kavanin-i cedide)
guaranteeing life, property and honor. Signed directly by the Sultan who took an oath to
abide by these new rules, the Tanzimat established that the new laws would be
applicable not only to Muslims but also to all including other minority millet
communities. The idea that new laws will be made in the Council of Judicial
Ordinances (Meclis-i Valayi Ahkam-ı Adliye) in which members are guaranteed to
express their opinions freely was included in the declaration (Berkes, 1964; Hanioğlu,
1995). Below are excerpts from the Tanzimat declaration.
Thus, full of confidence in the help of the Most High and certain of the support
of our Prophet, we deem it necessary and important from now on to introduce
new legislation to achieve effective administration of the Ottoman Government
and Provinces. Thus the principles of the requisite legislation are three:
1. The guarantees promising to our subjects perfect security for life, honor, and
property.
2. A regular system of assessing taxes
3. An equally regular system for the conscription of requisite troops and the
duration of their service.
Indeed, there is nothing more precious in this world than life and honor. What
man, however much his character may be against violence, can prevent himself
from having recourse to it, and thereby injure the government and the country,
if his life and honor are endangered? If, on the contrary, he enjoys perfect
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security, it is clear that he will not depart from ways of loyalty and all his
actions will contribute to the welfare of the government and of the people.
[...].
As for the other points, decisions must be taken by majority vote. To this end,
the members of the Council of Judicial Ordinances [Mejlis-i Ahkam-i Adliyye],
enlarged by new members as may be found necessary, to whom will be joined
on certain days we shall determine our Ministers and the high officials of the
Empire, will assemble for the purpose of framing laws to regulate the security
of life and property and the assessment of taxes. Everyone participating in the
Council will express his ideas and give his advice freely. (Hurewitz, 1975, as
quoted in Khater, 2010, p-12-14)
Some (e.g., Jung, 2001: Toprak, 2007: Hekimoğlu, 2010) saw Tanzimat as the
first constitutional document and as a significant milestone in the development of
constitutional forces in the Ottoman Empire and in the Muslim World, because the
Tanzimat limited the power of the Sultan, established the notion of consultation in
making laws and proposed to guarantee individual rights. What is more, some
considered Tanzimat as a further step towards secularization in the Ottoman Empire for
the reason that it undermined the power of religion in judicial matters even if it didn't
fully restrain it (Berkes, 1964) and that Tanzimat expedited the decline of the religion
based millet system (Taşpınar, 2005, Kösebalaban, 2011). Millets (religious
communities) were not seen as independent religious entities anymore in the eyes of the
new governmental system. All of them were theoretically united under the banner of
Ottomans instead of being Muslims, Christians and Jews. They were now Ottoman
Muslims, Ottoman Christians and Ottoman Jews. For Sohrabi (2012) and James and
Goetze (2001) such a shift was an indication of the transformation in the identity of the
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Empire as it signaled the birth of nationalism and patriotism which have been one of
the core components of nation-states.
The opening of the declaration included a statement attributing the decline of
the Empire to the neglect of the Qur’an and it maintained that Sharia would be
protected. However, some scholars cautiously approach the presence of such statements
in the declaration. For Berkes (1964), the fact that the declaration did not make it
necessary for the new laws to be approved with the fatwa (religious ruling) of the
Şeyhülislam (Shaykh al-Islām) undermined the power of religious forces even though
traditional qadis would remain as the judicial practitioners. Because the first draft of the
declaration included fewer number of such references, Hanioğlu (1995) suggests that
adding such a statement to the declaration can be seen as a symbolic gesture to the
religious forces (ulema) whose resistance could hinder the implementation of Tanzimat.
There is an agreement within the scholarly circles that Tanzimat especially
including the reforms it initiated in the area of minorities did not come into existence
only because of internal dynamics, it was also a result of external pressures (Hanioğlu,
1995; Levy, 2002; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). The Ottomans needed to form alliances
with Western powers against threats such as the expansion of Russians into Eastern
Europe and the movement of Egypt’s Mehmed Ali Pasha into the southern provinces of
the Empire. There was some reluctance and resistance in those nations for forming
alliances with the Muslim Ottomans who have long been seen and portrayed as the
religious other in European history. Ottoman statesmen might have felt the need for
underplaying the Empire’s Muslim identity by ascribing equal status to Muslims and
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Non-Muslims in legal and governmental matters in order to appeal to pro-Christian
sentiments of Europeans and by presenting the Ottoman Empire from a non-religious
perspective. For Cleveland and Bunton (2009), there was another practical reason in
gradually abolishing the millet system and transforming the identity of the Empire.
Ottoman bureaucrats were concerned about growing nationalist sentiments in postFrench Revolution political climate and they were desperate to produce policies to keep
minorities especially those in European provinces loyal to the Empire. Offering them
equal status including job opportunities in state offices with Muslims in Tanzimat was
part of the new bureaucracy’s response to this challenge.
However, these developments do not mean that reformists of the Tanzimat Era
fully rejected the centrality of Islam. In matters of legitimization, at least at the explicit
levels, reference to Islam remained as a major factor, if not as the absolute one in the
beginning of the Tanzimat (Berkes, 1964; Hanioğlu, 1995). In this sense, Tanzimat
appears to be a blend of both religious and secularist ideas.
On the other hand, however, Westernization of the state and the bureaucracy
continued in other areas. Codification of the legal system in the modern sense started in
the aftermath of the decleration of the Tanzimat. French Penal Code, Commercial
Code, Maritime Commerce Code and the Imperial Land Code were adopted in this era
(Griffel, 2007; Salim, 2008; Hallaq, 2009). The first modern civilian courts Nizamiye
were established in 1850 (Starr, 1992). The first civil code which was a blend of Hanafi
Fiqh and the French Civil Code of 1804 (Hanioğlu, 1995) was compiled three decades
later to take effect in 1877. The first Bank was opened in 1840’s by Europeans
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(Howard, 2001). The economy was also becoming more centralized with the
introduction of regulated modern monetary system based on liberalist principles
(Hanioğlu, 2012).
Tanzimat reforms which started in Istanbul, the capital of the Empire, were
being extended into the periphery by means of establishing provincial councils made up
of non-ulema and through the development of modern municipal administration
(Mardin, 1962, Lampe & Jackson, 1982; Commins 1990). To further facilitate the
implementation and the expansion of the modernization reforms, to address new
changes in this direction and to please European superpowers with the aim of
convincing them to support the Ottoman Empire against the Russians during the
Crimean War, another declaration, Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict), was announced in
1856 which was similar to the Tanzimat declaration (Karpat, 2001; Hekimoğlu, 2010;
Bulut, 2009).
Formal education was further expanded into the elementary and secondary
levels during the Tanzimat Era (Evered, 2012). In addition Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye
and Mekteb-i Ulum-u Edebiye, a new system of secondary schools, Mulkiye Mektebi,
Rüşdiye Mektepleri, were opened both in the center and in the provincial periphery with
the aim of educating the civilian bureaucrats and expanding the scope of the new
reforms (Findley, 2012, p. 159, and p.838-839; Mardin, 1989, p. 108; Zürcher, 1984, p.
12). Around 30 rüşdiyes were opened by 1848, of which 7 were outside the capital. The
first rüşdiye school for girls was opened in 1849 in Istanbul. In 1868, 31 new rüşdiye
schools were opened in the periphery (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 838-840). A decree was issued
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in 1869 requiring all towns with a population of more than 500 households to have at
least one rüşdiye (Nohl, p. 20). By 1876, there were a total of 423 rüşdiye schools
housing around 20,000 students (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 838-840).
The spread of modern education provided in the schools established during this
period gave rise to what Berkes (1964) called the bifurcation of education in which two
parallel educational establishments existed side by side, and independent of and
disconnected from each other. On the one hand was the traditional madrasas and on the
other was the modern educational institutions. The first (madrasa) provided instructions
of ‘ilm, in other words the knowledge pertaining to God, to man’s duties to Him, and to
the relationships among men in terms of these duties. Those who received these
instructions were ‘alim, the learned (ulema is the plural of ‘alim). The second schooling
system gave technical and modern scientific instructions. This type of knowledge was
called fen. Muteffennin were those who acquired knowledge in these areas (Berkes,
1964, p. 100). The structure and the areas of instructions in these two camps were so
different from each other that the two sides could hardly understand the language and
the rhetoric of the other. Parallel to this disconnection was the growing hostility
between the two camps (Berkes, 1964, p. 177).
Reactions to the First Wave of Reforms (1779-1839) and the Tanzimat (1839-1876)
Historians identified three major groups who had unwelcoming reactions to the
first wave of reforms implemented under the rule of sultans Selim III and Mahmud II.
These three groups were the Janissaries, the local notables (ayans) and the religious
ulema. Janissaries were the most belligerent establishment to have resisted change,
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understandably so, because reforms in this era focused chiefly on the transformation of
the army, at the center of which stood the Janissaries. Disorganization and corruption of
this central military force of the Ottomans were blamed for consecutive losses in wars
against the Europeans especially the Russians and for the declining power of the state.
Reforms implemented under the banner of Nizam-i Cedid during the rule of Selim III
which included the establishment of new military corps were designed to discipline and
control the power of the Janissaries whose dissent gradually increased over the years. In
return, the Janissaries dethroned Selim III and replaced him with Mustafa V who
pledged not to interfere in their establishment (Hanioğlu, 1995; Cleveland & Bunton,
2009).
After Mustafa IV’s short lived reign of several months, Mahmud II ascended to
the throne with the help of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Encouraged by the efforts of
Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, Mahmud II was more adamant about the reforms and about
curbing the Janissaries. However, the Janissaries, in 1808, raided the residence of the
grand Vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha who was a supporter of reforms. The raid resulted
in the death of the Grand Vizier and hundreds of Janissaries because of the explosion of
the large amount of gun powder stored in the basement of the Grand Vizier’s residence.
It is believed that the gun powder was put on fire by the helpless Grand Vizier (Yıldız,
2014, p. 41).
In 1826, Mahmud II was able to abolish the institution of Janissaries by force.
As the Janissaries were preparing to depose Mahmud II, the sultan was able to forge a
frontier of public and official support against the Janissaries. A large crowd including
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thousands of madrasa students attacked barracks of the Janissaries and pursued those
who escaped in the streets of Istanbul. As a result, thousands of Janissaries were killed
in an event called Vakay-ı Hayriye (the Beneficial Event) on 15 June 1826 (Shaw &
Shaw, 1977, Nicolle, 1998, Üstün, 2002). Thus the longstanding corps of Janissaries
were disbanded forever which paved the way for the advancement of reforms especially
during the Tanzimat Era as it increased the power of the civilian side of the state, the
newly emerging bureaucracy in particular (Şakul, 2009; Rubin, 2011).
The second group which resisted change during the first wave of reforms were
the ayans, the local provincial notables who were influential people of diverse origins.
Ayans included Ottoman governors with somewhat independent local power, wealthy
merchants, landowners and religious dignitaries (Züchrer, 2004). Traditionally, ayans
recognized the sovereignty of the Ottoman dynasty and provided economic and military
resources through taxation and by sending soldiers for military campaigns to the center.
However, they gradually formed their own base of power in the periphery over time
(Sugar, 1977; Çevikel, 2009; White, 2011). Centralizing dimensions of the first wave
reforms gave rise to resentment among the ayan. In an attempt to curb their power and
to expedite the process of change the Sultan signed a charter of alliance (Sened-i İttifak)
in 1808 with ayans, thanks to the efforts of Grand Vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha
(1755-1908) who was a former ayan of Ruse (in todays Bulgaria). The charter
established the agreement that the ayans will continue recognizing the sovereignty of
the sultan and that the sultan will recognize the legitimacy of the ayans. The two parties
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also reached an agreement to respect and protect each other’s safety. The 5th article of
the Sened-i İttifak included this statement:
As we all guarantee and undertake to protect the sultan’s imperial person, the
sultanate’s power, and the state’s order, let all the local notable houses,
notables, ministers, high officials, and dignitaries who participated in this
agreement, alike guarantee and undertake each other’s personal safety and that
of their families, because it is clear fact that the local notable houses and chief
men in the provinces must have confidence in the Sublime State, that the trust
between the high officials and dignitaries of the state in the capital is utmost
importance, and that security and tranquility of mind may only be acquired
through the union and mutual agreement of all and through their joint guarantee
and pledge for each other. (Trans. Akyıldız & Hanioğlu, 2006, p. 27)
Ayans pledge that they will support the Sultan in case of a Janissary rebellion
was inscribed in the agreement document as well. Another point of agreement was that
both the sultan and the ayans will rule justly. The center would set the standards of
taxes justly and the ayans would hold true to the principle of justice when they collect
these taxes (the 7th article). The charter also maintained that (1) the ayans will support
the reforms and the establishment of a new army, (2) that the grand vizier will be
regarded as the representative of the sultan, and (3) that “all affairs would be submitted
to the Sultan and authorization must be asked from him” (the 4th article). Sened-i İttifak
did not diminish the power of the ayans and as historians (Ex: Shaw & Shaw, 1977,
Züchrer, 2004) noted, it rather legitimized their status. Nonetheless, this agreement
increased the confidence of the sultan and the grand vizier to carry out their
modernization reforms including the abolishment of the Janissaries.
The third group which showed resistance to the first wave of reforms was some
of the ulema (Voll, 1982; Heyd, 1993; Züchrer, 2004). Consisting of religious teachers,
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preachers, shari'a law experts and judges, the ulema in some cases held governmental
positions “in public policy, diplomacy and politics” in the Ottoman Empire (Heyd,
1993; Davison, 1990, p. 166). As Bein (2011) reports, the ulema is generally portrayed
as “the other” of the Westernized and modernized elite in the modern history of Turkey
and the Ottoman Empire. He also observed that the ulema is generally portrayed as “a
uniform socioreligious group”. Heyd (1993) suggests that at least in terms of the ways
in which they responded to the first generation of modernization reforms, they were not
a uniform entity. Even though a group of scholars such as Züchrer (2004) argued that
the ulema during this time openly sided with the coalition of Janissaries and the ayans
and thus opposed to reforms, Heyd (1993) contends that some of the highest ulema
from the beginning supported the reforms. The Şeyhülislam, as the highest religious
authority, officially approved the use of the printing press. The highest ulema together
with Şeyhülislam Ahmed Esad Efendi actively supported the reforms of Sultan Selim
III as well. Their help in terms of providing legitimization and mobilization of the
madrasa students in the day of Vakay-ı Hayriye played a critical role in the abolishment
of the Janissaries by Sultan Mahmud II. The highest ulema, Heyd states, even backed
the modernization of the army and the state. One of them, Tatarcık Abdullah, Heyd
reports, “demanded the adoption of Western military science, translation of Western
technical works as well as employing foreign experts and instructors” (p. 30). Mehmed
Munib Efendi, an alim, supported the establishment of the army of Nizam-i Cedid
(Mardin, 1962, p. 217). Miller (1964) provides another account that the same person
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proposed the abolishment of tax farming and developing mining and manufacturers
through special constructors.
Tatarcık Abdullah was not the only supporter of reform within the ulema. Even
a generation later, individuals such as Keçecizade Mehmed İzzet and Şeyhülislam Arif
Hikmet Bey supported and proposed various modernization reforms (Heyd, 1993;
Mardin, 1962, p. 217-218). Mehmed Esad, a notable molla, ardently backed Mahmud
II’s reforms, too. Several prominent public preachers surprisingly supported the
introduction of the use of fez in public offices which earned the epithet of “the nonMuslim Sultan” to Mahmud II. Another a’lim, Mustafa Behçet, was actively involved
in the development of the first military medical school in which he worked as the chief
physician. Interestingly, the ulema also supported the establishment of rüşdiyes (middle
schools) which were not religious schools (Heyd, 1993). Parizade, an alim who was
teaching at one of the newly established military academies, ordered experimental
equipment from France for the school (Mardin, 1962, p. 217).
On the other hand, however, Heyd’s study (1993) reports that the response of
the above mentioned ulema was not the typical response of their class. A group of
ulema including the Şeyhülislam, Mehmed Ataullah, and the qadi of Istanbul,
Muradzade Mehmed Murad blamed Nizam-i Cedid reforms of Selim III as the
imitations of the infidels. Sultan Mahmud was able control and suppress their dissent
and marginalize them. However, the ulema successfully resisted him when he wanted
to make the ulema wear the fez like other state officials. Yet, they had to comply with
many of the Sultan’s policies.
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Being cautious of his conclusions due to the lack of reliable documentation to
substantiate the findings, Heyd says that the lower rank ulema, remained much more
hostile towards the Westernization reforms in this era. Ralston (1996) maintains without any substantive evidence- that most of the lower rank ulema were Bektaşis (the
Sufi order most Janissaries belonged to) and therefore they staunchly opposed reforms
just as the Janissaries did.
Another religious group against reforms were madrasa students (softas) who
already fostered resentment towards government officials and higher rank ulema
because of corruption in practices of employment. Heyd’s (1993) contention is that
softas were categorically against modernization reforms because of their religious
beliefs and economic interests.
According to Hanioğlu (1995) and Heyd (1993) non-Muslim clerics and millet
(non-Muslim community) leaders did not welcome the reforms either. The Orthodox
Greeks enjoyed a relatively superior position in comparison to the other minority millet
communities because of their closer ties with the traditional establishment. The new
order especially after the Tanzimat threatened their relative superiority and made them
equal to other millets. What is more, Mardin (1962, p. 19) argues that when the Empire
announced with the decleration of Tanzimat that it will discontinue the system of
recognizing minorities by their religious affiliation, non-Muslim clerics lost their power
in their communities because lay people outside the clerical circles started to compete
for the leadership. This might be another reason why Tanzimat was not welcomed by
the millet leaders.
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The response of general public to the first wave of modernization reforms and
the Tanzimat is not well known. Besides the Ottoman historian Ahmet Cevdet’s (1891)
note that the public were utterly distasteful of Westernized character of the reforms
(cited in Hanioğlu, 1995), the reaction of the common people is not well documented.
Hourani (1993) offers an explanation of why this is the case. For him, common people
didn’t really understand what was going on at that time. That is probably why we don’t
have detailed accounts of the response of the general public. Given that these reforms
did not have considerable impact in the lives of the common people especially those
who were living outside Istanbul, Hourani’s description seems to offer a plausible
explanation.
Did Secularization Start During the First Wave of Reforms and the Tanzimat?
Classical secularization theorists would possibly assert that the first wave of
reforms and the Tanzimat planted the seeds of secularization in the Ottoman Empire
because these reforms especially the centralization of government through the
establishment of an efficient bureaucracy started the processes of rationalization and
thus gradually undermined the validity of religion. They could also argue that
institutional autonomy of nonreligious institutions started during this era, which would
eventually make religion socially insignificant in the future. A third classical narrative
of the secularization theory would be that the decline of the two categorically
dichotomous realms of the sacred and the secular which might have happened during
this time because of religious establishments’ and religious individuals’ exposure to
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secular elements which became more widespread and visible in the society as a result
of these institutional reforms.
As for the first argument, centralization of government in a bureaucratic sense
in the Ottoman Empire did not start with these reforms. Historian Bernard Lewis (2002)
observed that the Ottomans had already established a “meticulous, conscientious, and
strikingly efficient bureaucratic government” as early as the sixteenth century (p. 23).
This has never been considered as a question of secularization. The development of
efficiency did not ignite a linear process of social change and this did not transform
other societal institutions either. Such an efficient system declined in the next centuries.
It was a historical condition with a beginning and an end.
The second core argument of secularization theory which contends that
secularization was a result of institutional separation through which other societal
institutions became more autonomous and independent from religion. Sociohistorical
account provided by Niyazi Berkes (1964) who was one of the prominent pioneers of
the documentation of secularization in Turkey resonates with this argument of
institutional autonomy.
Berkes agrees with the historical narrative that the state and religion in the premodern history of the Muslim World were inseparable twins3 which were part and
parcel of each other (Sariyannis, 2013). These two twins, in the formulation of Berkes,
were best represented in the institutions of Sadrazam (the Grand Vizier) and

Berkes doesn’t use the concept of twin establishment but the descriptions he provided resonates
with this notion. See Yüksel (2009) and Shaked (1984) for more details about the conception of
religion and the state as twin establishments.
3
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Şeyhülislam. The Sultan stood above them as the combination of both of these supreme
institutions as the Sultan-Caliph. Mahmud II marginalized Sadrazam with the
establishment of ministries and substantially decreased the power of the office of
Şeyhülislam by degrading its status to the level of the leaders of other religious
communities (millets).
The real separation started when one of the twins (the state) started to
disassociate itself from the other (religion). This was when the Sultan (Mahmud II)
took part in a negotiation with his subjects during the declaration of the Sened-i İttifak
which opened a new chapter in the history of Turkey and of the Muslim World as the
Sultan, for the first time, sought legitimization from the people as opposed to relying on
an uncontested God-given authority. In so doing, Berkes asserts, Mahmud II put off the
religious cloak and thus he triggered the sprout of the seeds of the separation of the
state and religion. Therefore, the eminent twins started to be alienated from each other.
Berkes also emphasized the role of the first modern schools in secularization.
For him, the establishment of these schools started to emancipate education from the
influence of traditional forces such as the madrasas and the religious elite running these
institutions, namely the ulema. Teaching of non-religious content (maarif) in and of
itself was a sign of secularization in education. Such a formulation of secularization is
reminiscent of what Charles Taylor called the subtraction perspective. Secularization in
this perspective is defined as the process through which new spaces and meaning
systems emerged as the leftover category after the withdrawal of religion. These points
are indications that Berkes, who provided perhaps the first systematic and
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comprehensive account of secularization in Turkey, understood secularization mostly in
terms of institutional transformation.
For such reasons, I think that the institutional separation and institutional
autonomy arguments in secularization debates do not have explanatory power in the
case of the Muslim World especially including the Ottoman Empire. The modern
history begins or at least coincides with the centralization of government comprising
military, political, economic, educational and medical institutions in continental Europe
and its neighbors including the Ottoman Empire. To say that these institutions were
emancipated from religion (the church in Europe) does not necessarily mean that they
remained autonomous afterwards. These institutions became more powerful with the
centralization of governments (i.e., the rise of nation states). However, when
proponents of the secularization and modernization theories observed the emergence of
more powerful institutions, they naively attributed this power to the decline of the
church. They failed to see that the power of these institutions that they observed was
not coming from their autonomy. It was rather coming from their integration into a
more powerful and more centralized form of governance; the nation states. This
monopolistic system enabled the modern states to penetrate into the lives of their
subjects more than ever before. As Levy (1982) observed, Ottoman reforms were not
significantly different from their European counterparts in this regard. Reformed and
newly established institutions in the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire
expended the hand of the state into the areas of the society which had hitherto remained
relatively autonomous.
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The third classical narrative within the secularization theory is the decline of the
two categorically dichotomous realms of the sacred and the secular because of religions
movement into the secular realm thus becoming secularized by including material
conditions of life in the core aspects of religion as it was described by Weber. In his
account, defining salvation through worldly (economic) success in Protestantism
gradually turned or moved religion into the secular. As Berkes (1964), who shared most
of the secularization theory’s assumptions, contended, such categorical distinctions
such as the sacred vs the secular or the sacred vs the temporal in the establishment of
institutional authority does not apply to case of the Ottoman Empire because such
distinctions never existed in pre-modern history of Muslim societies. The existence of a
religious establishment (the Church) in its own rights somewhat independent of the
secular authority, as it is also argued by Berkes (1964), is peculiar to Christianity and it
doesn’t apply to (the history of) other religions.
Owing to unique historical circumstances, the establishment of a church above,
or subordinate to, or parallel with, the state was peculiar to Christianity; it
constituted an exception rather than the rule in relations between the state and
religion. [...] The basic conflict in [the] secularism [in the Muslim World] is not
necessarily between religion and the world, as was the case in Christian
experience. The conflict is between the forces of tradition, which tend to
promote the domination of religion and sacred law, and the forces of change.
(p.6).
Finally, I think that it is hard to decide whether the processes of secularization
had started during the first wave of secularization. In the previous chapters, I argued
that ontological and moral philosophical aspects of secularization should be
investigated alongside its political philosophical dimensions. I have not found any
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secondary sources hinting that alternative ontological or moral philosophical
worldviews started to develop in the Ottoman Empire during this period. The only thing
about secularization in these areas that can be traceable back to this period is
reformation of institutions in the direction of Westernization which started in the
military and expanded into education. I have not found any substantial information
about the curriculums of the first modern schools except that they provided technical
(military and vocational) instructions in addition to language education and basic
sciences such as mathematics and algebra.
It is more obvious that the development of a new political structure with a new
institutional arrangement was set in motion in the beginning of the nineteenth century.
At the beginning, the population, even including the educated segments, did not fully
understand the nature of these reforms (Hourani, 1993). However, these first wave of
reforms constituted the beginning of the centralized state’s expansion into the daily
lives of its subjects at unprecedented and ever increasing levels starting with the
establishment of modern4 institutions, schools in particular (Cleveland & Bunton,
2009). In the old system, the periphery maintained more autonomy in their lives
including their educational systems. Madrasas or the schools of other millets5 were

4

I use the term modern here to refer to a new historical condition (e.g., new vs. old) rather than
an analytical one (e.g., modern vs. traditional). Modern schools in this sense refer to the practise
of centralized and state controlled educational system which constituted one of the defining
characteristics of nation states.
5

Each religious community (Muslim, Jewish, Christian, etc.) was recognized as a millet in the
Ottoman Empire, and the whole system is called by modern historians as the millet System.
Millets maintained considerable level of local autonomy in their educational system. (Şahin,
2012)
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neither funded nor administered by the central state (Chambers, 1972). Moreover,
millets implemented their own laws within their own communities (Şahin, 2012).
Reforms during the first wave gradually helped the central state expand its hands into
these areas and forced them integrate into a centrally organized sociopolitical system
through the establishment of various governmental institutions.
The sponsors of these reforms in the higher echelons of the state machinery, in
certain cases including the sultan (e.g., Mahmud II), pursued to phase out traditional
intermediaries between the state and the citizenry, such as the ulema and the leaders of
minority millet communities, in order to facilitate the expansion of the modernization
projects (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). These developments produced opportunity
spaces, including the ones opened by marginalization of religious education, for any
ideological movement to further their agenda should they control the state apparatus.
We will see in the following sections of this chapter that these opportunity spaces will
be gradually controlled by a new group of elites who were becoming increasingly
secularist.
Similar processes of centralization was emerging in the other parts of the
Muslim World around mid-nineteenth century. Muhammad Ali Pasha, a former
Ottoman governor who established his autonomous rule in Egypt, pursued institutional
modernization similar to -in some cases more intensely than- the Ottomans (SayyidMarsot, 1984; Russell, 2013). Iran, too, had its own modernization movement in the
form of centralization in the nineteenth century (Lambton, 1993).
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Reforms in this era largely remained at the governmental level sponsored and
administered by the Sultan with the aim of preventing the decline of the Empire. As
such, developments in this part of the Ottoman history were mostly about the
restructuring of the institutional framework of the center. Therefore, transformation of
the traditional (pre-modern) system started at the institutional (political) level.
However, there is a scarcity of documented discourse developed for or against this
transformation. The only textual discourse I could find in secondary sources was the
excerpt below published by one of the consultative boards of the state in the official
newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi in Dhu’l-Qa’da 21, 1254 (1839) which outlines the
rationale for the reforms in the area of education.
All arts and trades are products of science. Religious knowledge serve salvation
in the world to come, but science serves perfection of man in this world.
Astronomy, for example, serves the progress of navigation and the development
of commerce. The mathematical sciences lead to the orderly conduct of warfare
as well as military administration. Innumerable new and useful inventions, like
the use of steam, came into existence in this manner. Several new facilities exist
in the arts and trades thanks to the growth and spread of the known sciences and
the rise of several new sciences. Through science, one man can now do the
work of a hundred. Trade and profit have become difficult in countries where
the people are ignorant of these sciences. Without science, the people cannot
know the meaning of love for the state and the fatherland (vatan). It is evident
that the acquisition of science and skill comes above all other aims and
aspirations of a state. The Ottoman commonwealth had schools and scholars,
but they disappeared. Later, military, naval, engineering, and medical schools
were opened with great effort, but the students entering these schools lacked
even ordinary knowledge for the proper reading of Turkish books. This was
because of the defectiveness of the primary schools. In discussing every project
for the recovery of agriculture, commerce, and industry, the Board has found
that nothing can be done without the acquisition of science and that the means
of acquiring science and remedying education lie in giving a new order to the
schools. (As cited in Berkes, 1964, p. 105)
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The text explicitly discusses the reason why reform is needed in the area of
education and why already existing institutions -which in the language of the text
already became dysfunctional- are not sufficient for the proposed reforms. It also
makes a distinction between religious knowledge and science but not in an explicitly
diametrical fashion. According to the author(s) of this text, religious knowledge deals
with the necessities of the hereafter while science helps with the affairs of this world.
Although it is not openly suggested as such, there is room for seeing religious
knowledge and science as complementary rather than substitutive elements of each
other from the way the discourse of this excerpt is constructed. We don’t have enough
evidence to decide whether the author(s) actually saw religion and science as
complementary elements or they used such a sensitive language because they wanted to
avoid criticism and backlash.
Another noteworthy point is that the text does not legitimize the need for
acquiring sciences as a service to the ummah or to the religion of Islam. It rather
proposes that it will help the fatherland (vatan) and it will foster the love for it. The
concept of vatan and the love for it in the sense when it refers to the motherland or to
the country is very modern and it is reminiscent of political discourse in the context of
the development of nation states and nationalism. Such a language signals the birth of a
discourse which implicitly deals with the orientation of the self, in this case it is not the
individualistic self but the patriotic self. Therefore this excerpt, despite being a rarity of
its kind, is a testament to the birth of elementary forms of scientism and nationalism as
a political ideology and as a moral philosophical transformation.
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The timing of this discourse is critical. This text was produced shortly before
the end of Mahmud II’s reign and only months before the declaration of Tanzimat in
1839. That is why I think that it should be considered as part of the Tanzimat Era. I will
explore discourses similar to the one presented in this text when I analyze the
development of secularism during the Tanzimat. Nevertheless, this text gives many
hints in terms of the direction of reforms in the years and perhaps centuries to come and
the content of discourse surrounding these issues with regard to the development of
secularism in Turkey.
A more plausible argument would be that perhaps secularization in history of
the Muslim World particularly in Turkey started as an unintended consequence of the
reforms undertaken during the first wave of reforms and in the following periods. It
doesn’t seem like sultans Selim III and Mahmud III initiated these reforms with the
intention of secularizing the society, and perhaps not even with the genuine purpose of
marginalizing the ulema. They faced existential threats amidst the unstoppable advance
of European armies especially the Russians into the Ottoman lands by defeating their
army resulting in heavy territorial losses with massive numbers of casualties; and in the
increasing autonomy of provincial notables (ayans). Then, if the roots of secularization
are to be found in these reforms whose purpose was to save the Empire, secularization
in the history of Turkey is an unintended consequence.
I partly and cautiously agree with the unintended consequence argument. It does
not look like secularization was the intention behind the first wave of reforms in the
Ottoman Empire. However, I think that a better formulation of what happened is that
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the unintended consequence of Tanzimat reforms was not secularization per se, it rather
was the birth of a secularist movement which I think was not predicted.
Even if we assume that the beginning of secularization is an unintended
consequence and therefore it cannot be attributed to a secularist movement, the survival
and continuity of secularization and its expansion into the rest of the society would not
be possible without such a movement. In my understanding, there are two main reasons
for why this is the case. First, any kind of conscious human activity implicitly or
explicitly involves meaning. Because human beings live with other conscious human
beings their actions involve legitimization in the eyes of the other. Especially when
fundamental changes in the ways in which things work out in the society are concerned,
addressing the question of legitimization becomes almost inevitable. Secularization in
the Muslim World started with institutional reforms which, too, necessitates
legitimization and therefore the establishment of an ideology of change and the
existence of individuals and groups who will produce and maintain such an ideology.
Secondly, secularization is a relative concept and it refers to the idea of religion
losing its social, cultural, institutional and political significance. Therefore by definition
we accept the idea that secularization does not develop in a vacuum. Put differently,
there would not be the notion of secularization if religion did not exist. This is also to
say that secularization is by definition a dialectical process and it is something which
develops at the expense of, or against, religion. If this is the case, it is highly likely that
secularization would be contested and tried to be reverted. As the mere existence of
revivalist movements and other forms of resistance to such processes attests,
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secularization does not go uncontested. We have seen one example of this in the case of
the response of the ulema and other religious groups to secularizing characteristics of
modernization reforms in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Ottoman
society. Accordingly, in order for secularization to survive, it needs to be protected in
the face of these contestations which will require conscious mobilization at material
and discursive levels. Furthermore, the scope of the notion of secularization is broad as
the existence of a marginalized socially insignificant secularized institution would not
be considered secularization per se. Many such secular, if not secularist, institutions in
the East and in the West existed in pre-modern times. As the etymological root of
secularization which is a verb (secularize) suggest secularization is about the expansion
of the secular. Such an expansion in the face of contestations can only be possible with
collective action.
As a result, I argue, secularization cannot be fully understood without reference
to human action even if we accept that the beginnings of these processes can be
attributed to unintended consequences of other socio-historical transformations. This
applies to the secularization processes in the Ottoman Empire, too. It started as an
unintended consequence but eventually and inevitably it prepared the conditions for the
birth of a secularist ideology and a secularist movement which I describe in further
detail below. Therefore, I argue that the birth of a secularist movement was the
unintended consequence of the earliest modernization reforms without which social and
political institutions would not be able to advance and maintain their secularist
characters.
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Between the Two Worlds: The Young Ottomans and Westernization
One of the major transformations during the Tanzimat reforms was the shift in
the power structure within the Empire. Pre-Tanzimat reforms were largely undertaken
with the incentives of the Sultans (e.g., Selim III and Mahmud II) while Tanzimat was
mostly designed and implemented by the new bureaucrats who were growing in
number and executive power who were educated in the newly established modern
technical schools in Europe and schools established in their image in the center of the
Empire. The growth of the new bureaucracy was reflected in the emergence of Bab-i
Ali (Sublime Porte) an area in the vicinity of the royal Topkapı Palace housing newly
established offices filled by the new class of bureaucratic elites (Findley, 1980). Some
of these bureaucrats also served as ambassadors in European capitals, London and Paris
in particular (Hanioğlu, 1995; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Chief among them were
Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. All three men served as Foreign
Ministers and Grand Viziers and they led the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in
successive terms (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Midhat Pasha was another Grand Vizier
who led the Tanzimat Era reforms (Weiker, 1968). Although Midhat Pasha did not
serve as an ambassador in European capitals, he stayed albeit briefly in Europe for
travelling and studying.
One of the common characteristics of these bureaucrats was their admiration for
European culture and their desire for westernizing the Ottoman society. They acquired
most of these ideas through their exposure to the Western culture when they were
students in Europe (almost exclusively in Paris) and when they were students in
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Westernized educational institutions at home. The Ottoman state took measures to
minimize the Ottoman students’ exposure to revolutionary ideas during their stay in
Paris. For example these students were required to stay only with fellow Ottoman
students and to speak only Turkish and Arabic among themselves (Hanioğlu, 1986, p.
12-13). Nonetheless, these students gradually became more interested in cultural and
political matters more so than the technical instructions for which they were recruited.
Some of these students did not shy away from engaging in sociopolitical debates in the
contemporary French society. Turning back to Istanbul, some of these students were
more revolutionist than expected by their reformist sponsors in the bureaucracy. These
students were increasingly becoming critical of the bureaucracy in addition to the
shared criticism of the traditional forces.
One of these students was İbrahim Şinasi (1826-1971), son of an artillery
sergeant (Özdalga, 2013, p.4). Following his high school education and serving as an
office clerk in the new bureaucracy, Şinasi was sent to Paris in his early twenties by
Mustafa Reşit Pasha to study public finance and literature. Before going to Paris, Şinasi
had already learned French from a French renegade (Brummet, 2000, p. 78) in addition
to Arabic and Persian he had learned previously. In his four-years-long stay in Paris he
was able to mix with the post-revolutionary intellectuals, poets, libertarian ideologues
such as Alphonse de Lamartine (Ersoy, 2006, Mardin, 1962, p. 252-253) and with
orientalists including Ernest Renan (Özdalga, 2013, p.4). Returning to Istanbul in 1853,
he had a short tenure in Meclis-i Maarif (Council of Education). Şinasi left his position
in the bureaucracy and chose to continue in the area of literature and journalism. With
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his friend Agah Efendi, he started the publication of the first civilian newspaper
Tercuman-ı Ahval (Interpreter of Events) in 1860 (Somel, 2010). One year later, Şinasi
started publishing his own newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar (Representation of Opinions) in
1862 leaving Tercuman-i Ahval to Agah Efendi (Zürcher, 2004, p.68). Tasvir-i Efkar
proved to be a success for Şinasi as it reached a circulation of about 24,000 copies
(Karpat, 1973, p. 47). As a strong proponent of Westernization, Şinasi published his
ideas and literary works in his writings. He also published the works of other Ottoman
literati and the translations of Post-Enlightenment ideas of European intellectuals in in
Tasvir-i Efkar. Thusly he became one of the first civilian prominent intellectuals
outside the bureaucracy who supported westernization (Mardin, 1962, p. 254-255;
Ersoy, 2006).
His ideas were a mixture of idealization of Western notions and practices and
criticism of the problems in the Ottoman society including the bureaucracy. Like many
other reformist intellectuals of his time, Şinasi did not criticize the religion of Islam.
Indeed, some (Ex: Mardin, 1962, p. 268) consider him to be a religious person.
However, his literary works reveals that ideas nourished by the Enlightenment
including humanism, rationalism and to a lesser degree materialism were ingrained in
his thinking. Below are excerpts from a poem he wrote in 1856 in appraisal of the
reformist Mustafa Reşid Pasha.

ODE
[…]
Good and evil are discerned by the light of reason
As colors are revealed by the sun’s radiance
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[…]
A fact: Constant struggle reigns among the natural powers of the living
The strong vanquishes the weak by sheer oppression and force
To ward off oppression, human reason has installed the laws
That, in their power, represent truth and justice
Some men of wisdom say truth and justice comprise religion
That they shackle the carnal mind and all its terrible vice
The pen and the sword, safeguards against man
Who, himself, is the chief enemy of truth and justice
The pen and the sword: the scribe and executioner of reason
One marks out, and the other spells riddance
[…]
Is it too much to call you the prophet of civilization?
Fanaticism menaced by your astounding presence
[…]
O, president of the republic of virtuous people
Tell me, do I deserve to remain enslaved by men of ignorance?
(İbrahim Şinasi, 1862. Trans. Ersoy, 2006, p. 192)
Given that Şinasi was educated in France and interacted with the
contemporary French intelligentsia, it is not difficult to trace the philosophical and
ideological underpinnings of his discourse to the ideas of the French Enlightenment.
That is why I think that Şinasi’s exaltation of reason in this poem as the criterion for
discerning good and evil can better be understood as part and as a consequence of the
intellectual trend of rationalism which emerged in the Enlightenment movement and
prevailed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in European societies.
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In the descriptions of Redwood (1976, p. 199), reason was “eulogized,
apostrophized, invoked and venerated as the means by which human beings can make
sense of the true nature of the world around them and solve their problems. As such,
reason was a powerful tool that could lead human beings to truth and light.” The
emphasis on reason as the ultimate means for knowing the truth and for the
legitimization of individual and social action, according to Himmelfarb (2005, p.
152), was stronger in the French Enlightenment, more so than it was in the
Enlightenment of other Western societies including the British and the American.
Such an emphasis on reason had dialectical, emancipatory and revolutionary
dimensions. Exaltation of reason in the Enlightenment, for Himmelfarb, was related
to the Enlightenment movement’s distaste for the authoritarian (Catholic) Church.
The use of reason unrestrained by the doctrinal and political forces of the Church
represented emancipation from the restrains of this establishment.
The enlightenment's dialectical approach to reason was epitomized in the
discourse of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his article What
is Enlightenment, Kant (1954) contended that,
[…] [E]nlightenment requires nothing but freedom--and the most innocent of all
that may be called "freedom": freedom to make public use of one's reason in all
matters. Now I hear the cry from all sides: "Do not argue!" The officer says:
"Do not argue--drill!" The tax collector: "Do not argue--pay!" The pastor: "Do
not argue--believe!" Only one ruler in the world says: "Argue as much as you
please, but obey!" We find restrictions on freedom everywhere. But which
restriction is harmful to enlightenment? Which restriction is innocent, and
which advances enlightenment? I reply: the public use of one's reason must be
free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment to mankind. (p. 1072)
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Şinasi did not explicitly criticize the religion of Islam as a force against the
public use of reason. His explicit discourse regarding this matter was that the Western
civilization was based on reason (intelligence) and the religion of Islam, too, is based
on reason. However, the reasonable side of this religion was curtailed over time by
false beliefs, traditions and customs (Aydın, 2005) which, for him, gave rise to
ignorance, as he implied in another poem he wrote in 1857 and published in 1862 in
praise of Mustafa Reşid Pasha who was one of the major architects of the Tanzimat.
[...]
In the universe, the gift of life has been bequeathed with equity
For humankind, knowledge and reason bestow honor and dignity
Life, honor and property; the candles of our heart undimmed
As your justice is a globe, shielding it against tyranny’s wind
You liberated us, who were enslaved by oppression
Around our necks, ignorance weighed like an iron chain
A declaration of freedom for humanity, your law
It lets the sultan know his place, your law
[...] (Şinasi (1960 [1862], p. 25-29. Trans. Ersoy, 2006, p. 193)
The verses above are obviously a testament to his dislike of the traditional
establishment. Şinasi explicitly directs his criticism to the Sultan and praises Mustafa
Reşid Pasha for limiting the Sultan’s authority starting with the declaration of
Tanzimat. Şinasi is not that much explicit in terms of criticizing religion but he
suffices to say that the reforms of Mustafa Reşit Pasha brought emancipation from the
iron chains of ignorance. This sounds to be as a criticism of traditional religious
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thinking which I think drives from the Enlightenment movement, albeit in an
apologetic way.
Hints of the materialist side of the Enlightenment are also present in these
poems, especially when he refers to the idea of constant struggle among the forces of
life in nature. In this regards, Şinasi was among the pioneers of Ottoman intellectuals
who started using ontological and scientific concepts such as natural laws in the
modernist sense. Obviously, the influence of post-French Revolution ideals such as
liberty, equality, justice, life, honor and dignity are present in these poems, too.
Although not present in the verses quoted above, the concept of “nation” (millet) with
its post-French revolution connotations was used for the first time by Şinasi
according to Berkes (1964, p. 198). Berkes also considers Şinasi to be the father of
the constitutionalist movement in the Ottoman Empire (1964, p. 198).
Another idea presented in these poems which is worthy of consideration is the
conception of human civilization. Şinasi, in a poetical way, regards Mustafa Reşid
Pasha as the prophet of civilization who, in the way I see in Şinasi’s words, opened the
path of perfection in the conditions of life pertaining to this world. Therefore, I see in
these poems a glimpse of the idea of progress which had been nourished in the
Enlightenment movement. We will see in the following sections that the impact of the
Enlightenment and the French revolution was not limited to Şinasi. Most of the
intellectuals of the nineteenth century who shared similar backgrounds in modern
education in the Ottoman Empire shared similar perspectives.
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İbrahim Şinasi was also one of the pioneers of Westernization in literature and
arts (Aydın, 2000). The first modern theatrical play Şair Evlenmesi (The Wedding of a
Poet) was written by him and published in 1860 (Halman, 2008, p. xviii). Şair
Evlenmesi was a satirical criticism of both traditional practices (i.e., marriage) and the
arrogance and ostentatiousness of the new elite. Publication of Şair Evlenmesi was one
of major milestones in the transition E. J. W. Gibb (1905) observed from Persianism to
Westernism which started with the first wave of modernization reforms (cited in
Berkes, 1964, p.26). Western ideas and Western social and political materials,
according to Demircioğlu (2009, p.137-138) were spread into the society at large with
this shift from Persianism to Westernism in both content and style. Translation of
European literary and philosophical works which grew significantly during this period
also played a similar role parallel to the increase in the number of newspapers, journals
and books published (Demircioğlu, 2009, p. 137-139).
In addition to his contributions to the introduction of Western ideas and literary
styles into the Ottoman society, Şinasi also played a significant role in the emergence
of a new class of literary modernizers and political activists. Some of these activists
such as Namık Kemal started publishing their ideas in Şinasi’s newspaper Tasvir-i
Efkar. As a response, Grand Vizier Ali Pasha implemented Nizamname-i Ali a code
giving him the authority to apply censorship over the press (Mardin, 1962, p. 20). Wary
of persecution after publishing articles criticizing government policies and the
authoritarian bureaucrats (Somel, 2010, p. 127) and because of his involvement in a
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plot against Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, Şinasi escaped to Paris in 1865 (Mardin, 1962, p.
12).

Figure 1. İbrahim Şinasi
Şinasi left the editorship of the newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar to Namık Kemal
(1840-1888) who would later become one of the leading ideologues and reformists in
the history of the Ottoman Empire. Namık Kemal was born in 1840 in the city of
Tekirdağ, one of the closest cities to Istanbul (Özdoğru, 2002, p. 598). Unlike like
Şinasi and many other Ottoman reformists in the nineteenth century, he did not receive
education in Europe. Indeed, Namık Kemal received very little formal education as he
stayed with his grandfather who served as a government officers in different parts of
the Empire. While they were in the Eastern province of Kars, Namık Kemal studied
Sufism. In Sofia, he learned Arabic and Persian (Hanioğlu, 2002, p. 145). It is not
known how he learned French but he started working at the official Translation Office
(Tercume Odası) in 1863 with the influence of Mustafa Reşid Pasha (Shaw & Shaw,
1977, p. 131).
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As Czygan (2008, p. 43) described, well-educated young men who worked at
this newly established office (Tercume Odası) had the opportunity to observe foreign
affairs of the state and, more importantly, they were able to acquaint themselves with
the intellectuals of French enlightenment such as Montesquieu, Fenelon and Rousseau6.
It was Namık Kemal, for example, who during his work at this office, translated
Montesquieu’s L’Espirit des lois (The Spirit of Laws) (Czygan, 2008, p. 43), a book of
political theory which discusses, among other things, the nature of different political
systems (e.g., republican, monarchical and despotic), political liberties and the laws
regarding religion (Montesquieu, 2002).
At the same time, Namık Kemal got acquainted with İbrahim Şinasi who was
publishing the newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar. He started writing articles in Tasvir-i Efkar
mostly about social problems including women's education (Hanioğlu, 2002). In this
respect, Namık Kemal was the first Ottoman intellectual who wrote an article about
education of women (Türesay, 2013, p. 232). When Şinasi fled to Paris in 1865, Namık
Kemal assumed the position of the editor for this newspaper through which he
criticized corruption, authoritarianism and other arbitrary practices of the
administration (Somel, 2003, p. 210). He also publicized his criticisms of the
bureaucratic elite for the superficiality of their reforms, their negligence of the real
civilization and progress and for their blind imitation of the Western culture (Aydın,
2013, p. 36).

6

See Berkes (1962, p. 199).
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Figure 2. Namık Kemal
There were intellectuals other than Namık Kemal who publicly criticized the
political establishment for similar reasons. Some of these dissidents including Mehmed
Bey, Nuri Bey, Reşad Bey, Ayetullah Bey and Refik Bey in addition to Namık Kemal
met in a picnic in the summer of 1865. According to Mardin (1962, p. 11), almost all of
these men had at some point in their lives worked at The Translation Office (Tercume
Odası) and all of them were “nurtured in the ways of the West”. Although Namık
Kemal was already famous because of his literary works, the leading figure among
them was Mehmet Bey who was educated in Paris. When Mehmet Bey returned to
Istanbul, he became a strong proponent of constitutionalism and democratic
representation (Mardin, 1962, p. 12). Davison (1963, p. 189) suggest that Mehmet Bey
was also the organizer of the picnic as they gathered in his father’s villa.
In this picnic, these six men decided to secretly establish the society of İttifak-ı
Hamiyet (the Patriotic Alliance) with the goal of transforming the absolutist rule to a
constitutional one (Mardin, 1962, p. 11-24; Berkes, 1964, p. 264; Ergil, 1987, p. 29).
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Their criticism of absolutism in the Empire was not directed only towards the rule of
the Sultan but also to the higher echelons of the Sublime Porte bureaucracy including
the Grand Vizier who at that time was Ali Pasha. In order to study and utilize as a guide
for the development and operation of their own organization, one of these six men,
Ayetullah Bey, brought with him books about the Italian Carbonari secret revolutionary
societies of the early nineteenth century (Mardin, 1962, p. 11-21) which influenced
other revolutionary movements in France, Spain and Portugal (Galt, 1994). Not much is
known about the rest of the details of how this secret society (İttifak-ı Hamiyet) started
its mobilization but we know that it started growing in number and influence the
months following its establishment. In about two years, several hundred people
including Prince Hamit and the crown prince Murat, the two nephews of the Sultan, had
connections with the secret society (Zürcher, 2004, p. 69). For Lewis (1963, p. 190),
this might be because Prince Murat’s acquaintance with Namık Kemal.
Despite its growth, İttifak-ı Hamiyet was not the only frontier of opposition.
There were influential figures in the oppositional movement who were not directly
involved in the İttifak-ı Hamiyet. Ziya Bey7 (who later became known as Ziya Pasha)
(1825-1880) and Ali Suavi8 (1838–1878) were among them. Ali Suavi was the editor of
the newspaper Muhbir (Reporter) which started its publication in January 1867.
Through this newspaper, Ali Suavi openly criticized the government especially about
its response to the rebellion in the Isle of Crete (Reider, 2010, p. 29). Ziya Bey also

7

Lewis (1963, p. 190) suggest that Ziya Pasha may have been part of the Ittifak-ı Hamiyet.

8

Mardin (1962, p 25) reports that Ali Suavi cooperated with Ittifak-ı Hamiyet.
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regularly published articles in Muhbir. Like Ali Suavi he openly and harshly criticized
the government (Göçgün, 1987, p. 6).
Mustafa Fazıl Pasha (1830-1875), one of the brothers of the Egyptian Khedive
and a grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, was also part of the opposition who allegedly
joined the ranks of dissidents because the Ottoman state challenged his right to rule in
case his brother died before him (Zürcher, 2004, p. 69). Mustafa Fazıl Pasha left for
Paris, where he was educated during his formative years, and wrote an open letter to the
Sultan about his analysis of the reasons of the decline of the Empire and his suggestions
of how to stop it (Mardin, 1962, p. 276-282; Zürcher, 1984, p. 6)9. In this letter, he
emphasized the importance of the protection of human rights and liberty adding that it
is not religion which will establish these principles. For Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, the
function of religion is limited to spiritual matters and salvation in the hereafter.
Religion rules over the spirit, and promises other worldly benefits. But that
which determines and delimits the laws of the nation is not religion. If religion
does not remain in the position of eternal truths, in other words, if it descends
into interference with worldly affairs, it becomes a destroyer of all as well as its
own. (As cited in Berkes, 1964, p. 208-209)
Namık Kemal and his friends translated the letter and printed 50,000 copies at
the shop of a French printer and clandestinely distributed them in Istanbul (Mardin,
1962, p. 39). They also published this letter in newspapers Muhbir and Tasvir-i Efkar
(Davison, 1963, p. 207).

9

Ebuzziya Tevfik (1973, p. 21) alleged that the letter was written with the help of a Greek man
named Revelaki.
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The tension between the political establishment and the opposition including the
members of the İttifak-ı Hamiyet further escalated in the aftermath of the publication of
the letter. Around the same time, Tasvir-i Efkar was closed together with Muhbir by the
order of Ali Pasha after the publication of an article by Namık Kemal criticizing the
involvement of foreign powers in Cretan Affair. The leadership in the Sublime Porte
decided to exile Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Ali Suavi to remote provinces in the
Empire. When Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, a man of considerable wealth who at that time was
in self-imposed exile in Paris, heard about the ruling, he secretly invited the three men
to join him in France to continue their fight against “the dangers threatening the state.”
Below is an excerpt from Mustafa Fazıl’s letter.
It is high time now for working hard with your pens towards the salvation and
prosperity of the nation in the broad area of freedom. I am inviting you to Paris
to embark upon this duty together with you. I am hopeful because of your
patriotic sentiments that this invitation will be accepted.
Because I am sure that it will not be misinterpreted at all, I am confidently
informing you that I have enough money ready to support you until we reach
our goals and for other writers you would like to bring with you. (Ebuzziya
Tevfik, 1973, p. 65. Trans. ZN)
Namık Kemal and his friends escaped with a French steamer soon after
receiving the invitation and reached Paris at the end of May 1867 to join Mustafa Fazıl
Pasha (Lewis, 2001, p. 154) whose residence in Paris was a meeting point for the critics
of the Ottoman Empire starting from 1866 (Davison, 1963, p. 190). The other members
of the secret society of İttifak-ı Hamiyet who remained in Istanbul conspired to topple
the government of Ali Pasha in June 1867 under the leadership of Mehmet Bey. When

154
the plot was discovered, Mehmet Bey, Nuri Bey and Reşad Bey, too, fled to Paris
(Rieder, 2010, p. 29).
On August 10, 1867, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, Ziya Bey (Ziya Pasha), Namık
Kemal, Nuri Bey, Ali Suavi, Mehmed Bey, Reşad Bey and Rıfat Bey established the
society of Yeni Osmanlılar (the Young Ottomans) (Mardin, 1962, p.44). They called
themselves La Jeune Turquie in French (Mardin, 2006, p. 165) which later became
known as Jeunes Turcs in France (Zürcher, 2004, p. 70). Ziya Bey was chosen as the
leader because he was the eldest (Reider, 2010, p.34). The group adopted the principles
presented in Mustafa Fazıl Pasha’s famous letter to the Sultan as the program of their
newly established society. The group also decided to revive the Newspaper Muhbir
(Mardin, 1962, p. 44). Mustafa Fazıl Pasha provided the financial support to the society
of the Young Ottomans including the payment of monthly stipends to the group
members (Mardin, 1962, p. 47-48; Karpat, 2001, p. 127).
One of the first things the Young Ottomans did was to revive the newspaper
Muhbir. Ali Suavi was sent to London for this task because of the stricter regulations
and censorships in France (Reider, 2010, p.34). Soon after, members of this society
were forced to move to London when Sultan Abdulaziz made an official visit to France
(Somel, 2003, p.328). In London, they also started bringing out the broadsheet Hürriyet
(Liberty) in addition to Muhbir. Copies of these papers were smuggled or mailed to
Istanbul where they (especially Hürriyet) were widely read (Mardin, 1962, p. 51; Çelik,
1994, p. 162-177).
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For the most part, Muhbir was under the control of Ali Suavi with whom Namık
Kemal and Ziya Bey had some disagreements10 (Mardin, 1962, p. 362, Karpat, 2001, p.
127). Hürriyet remained with Namık Kemal and the other members of the Young
Ottomans. In Hürriyet, they published their reformist ideas and their criticisms of the
political establishment in the Ottoman Empire including the Sultan (Ansari, 2004, p.
30; Andrews, 1996, p. 230). Chief among the writers of Hürriyet was Namık Kemal
whose writings in exile mainly consisted of contemporary French ideals of
constitutionalism and liberty which were supported by references to the tradition of
Islam. Below is an excerpt from an article he published in Hürriyet in 1868 in London.
[J]ust as all individuals have the natural right to exercise their own power, so
too conjoined powers naturally belong to all individuals as a whole, and
consequently in every society the right to sovereignty belongs to the public.
A shar' [religious law] proof of this claim is the following legal rule:
If the people of a town gathered and appointed someone as qadi [judge] over
themselves to judge cases arising among them, the judicial activity of this
person could not be valid; judicial authority would still belong to the qadi
appointed by the state because jurisdiction is a right of the government. But if
the people of a town gathered and pledged allegiance to someone for the
sultanate or caliphate, this person would [indeed] become sultan or caliph, while
the previous sultan or caliph would retain no authority whatever, because the
imamate is a right of the umma [the Islamic community].
[...] There are two major means to keep the state within the limits of justice. The
first is to emancipate the fundamental principles of the administration from the
10

These three men had good relations in the beginning. Mustafa Fazıl Pasha accepted the peace
offer proposed by the Sultan during his visit to France (Mardin, 1962, 45-46), returned to Istanbul
and accepted to take a ministerial position in the government. Ali Suavi stopped taking the
monthly stipend from Mustafa Fazıl. He also criticized Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey and
questioned their political integrity because they didn’t join him in his protest. In return, Namık
Kemal and Ziya Bey harshly criticized Ali Suavi for being an unstable troublemaker and for
being arrogant (Karpat, 2001, p. 127).
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domain of implicit interpretations and to make them public. [...] The second is
the method of consultation, which takes the legislative power out of the hands
of the members of the government.
[...] the right of the sultan … is to govern on the basis of the will of the people
and the principles of freedom. His title is "one charged with kingship" [sahib almulk], not "owner of kingship" [malik al-mulk, a title reserved for God in the
Qur'an, [3: 26]. His Imperial Majesty the sultan is heir to the esteemed Ottoman
dynasty, which established its state by protecting religion.
It was thanks to this fact that the [Ottoman sultan] became the cynosure of the
people and the caliph of Islam. The religion of Muhammad rejects the absolutist
claim to outright ownership [of the state] in the incontrovertible verse [Qur'an,
40:16]: "Whose is the kingdom today? God's, the One, the Omnipotent."
(Namık Kemal, July 20, 1868, p. 1-4. Trans. Hanioğlu, 2002, p. 144-148).
I think that this text very well demonstrates Namık Kemal’s attempts at
bridging the perspectives such as the ideas of sovereignty of the people,
constitutionalism, representation, consultation, equality and justice he might have
developed from reading French thinkers like Montesquieu and Rousseau with the
Islamic tradition he was acquainted with. It seems here as though that he was
presenting the latter as a source of legitimization for the realization of the first. The
ideas he presents sound very much like the Western ideals of democracy and human
rights but the references he makes are to the tradition of Islam including the Quran.
However, one might argue that perhaps Namık Kemal was sincere in his religious
defense of these principles and that he took an apologetic position here just as he
defended Islam in Renan Mudafaanamesi,11 a rebuttal he wrote against orientalist

11

An introductory note by M. Fuad Köprülü in the 1962 publication of Renan Mudafaanamesi
from Milli Kültür Yayınları claims that this rebuttal was not published during Namık Kemal’s
life (d. 1888). It appeared in the press for the first time in 1910 and was quickly sold out.
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Ernest Renan who in a lecture he gave at La Sorbonne in 1883 argued that the
religion of Islam is antithetical to rational thinking, scientific development and
progress (See, Renan, 2011).
Namık Kemal is also considered as one of the pioneers of the development of
nationalism in the Ottoman Empire (Özkan, 2012, p. 39). In the development and the
use of the concept vatan (fatherland) as a territorial entity, he was one of the leading
intellectuals, perhaps the most influential one, in the history of Turkey. He abundantly
used the concept of vatan adorned with patriotic sentiments in his literary works which
earned him the epithet of Vatan Şairi (The Poet of Fatherland). Below is an example
from his poem Vatan Türküsü (The Song of the Fatherland).
The honor of the fatherland and the protection of the pious,
Are strengthening the bayonets in our hands.
Will you make the nation despair and hopeless?
March, you the brave ones, to protect the fatherland!.
(Namık Kemal, 2004 [1872], p. 97. Trans. ZN)
Namık Kemal’s use of the concept vatan (fatherland) was not purely
nationalistic in the modern secularist sense. He employed the notion of vatan side by
side religious notions as we see in the verses quoted above (i.e., “protection of the
pious”). In this sense, Namık Kemal can be considered as a pan-Islamist who saw the
Ottoman Empire and the Turks as a representative of the religion of Islam. In other
words, his Ottomanism was a kind of pan-Islamism. Like other pan-Islamist Ottoman
intellectuals who came after him, Namık Kemal sought to contribute to the unity of
Muslims under the leadership of the Ottoman Empire (Qureshi, 1999, p.22; Farsoun,
2013, p. 67; Keddie, 1983, p.22; Keddie 2005, p. 11; Karpat, 2001, p.18). Below is an
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excerpt from the article “The love of the fatherland is part of faith” Namık Kemal
(1868) published in Hürriyet which also attests to the mixture of his Pan-Islamism and
Pan-Ottomanism and to a limited degree ethnically defined Turkish nationalism.

Figure 3. The first page of the newspaper Hürriyet (Liberty) including an article titled
“The love of fatherland is part of faith” by Namık Kemal, (London, June 29, 1868)12

12

I am thankful to Ercument Asil for sharing his archive of electronic copies of the newspaper
Hürriyet including this image.
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Let us look once to see how strong a state we were and how great an ummah
[the community of Muslims] we were.
[...]
Aren’t the Turks the nation (millet) that once had the madrasas in which
scholars like Al-Farabi [Alpharabius], Ibn Sina [Avicenna], Al-Ghazali and
Zamakhshari13 disseminated knowledge? A land which once enjoyed the status
of the world capital (payitaht-ı alem) is now trembling under the pressure of a
few communities of bandits. And an ummah which once gained the status of the
teachers of the world (muallim-i alem) are now [ironically] astonished as if they
have seen a miracle by seeing the most basic outcomes of education (marifet).
This is telling us the degree of the lack of zest and motivation on the side of
those who are keeping our leadership under their dictatorships. (Namık Kemal,
June 29, 1868, p. 1-2. Trans. ZN)
Karpat (2001, p. 329) contends that the emphasis on territory (i.e., fatherland) in
the construction of nationhood as it was exemplified in the poems and other works of
Namık Kemal had implications with regard to secularization because such an
accentuation is an indication of the worldly character of the nation. Governments,
never before in the history of the Muslim World, emphasized attachment to a territorial
unity (Karpat, 2001) even though territorial categorizations such as Dar al-Harb (the
Abode of War) vs Dar al- Islam (The Abode of Islam) were used in matters pertaining
to jurisdiction and politics (Özkan, 2012). Lewis (2004, p. 88) suggests that such a shift
towards the promotion of attachment to a territorial unity could be explained by
pragmatic purposes. The Empire was facing the threat of falling apart with the rise of
nationalism in post-French revolution era, therefore, the Ottomans could only use the
territorial reference which was the only common denominator of all living in the

13

All of these Muslim scholars were of ethnic origins other than Turkish.
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Empire as a source of loyalty. For Lewis, Namık Kemal’s Vatan Yahut Silistre can be
read from this perspective.
In short, Namık Kemal’s ideology was a combination of religious nationalism
(Pan-Islamism), participatory democracy, parliamentarism, constitutionalism,
individual liberty and progress (Berkes, 1964, p. 214-215; Ismael & Ismael, 2011, p.
82; Grigoriadis, 2012, p. 53) based on his synthesis of the modern Western and
traditional Islamic discourse. Some of these ideas which were perceived as threats to
the political establishment. After returning to Istanbul from exile in 1870, Namık
Kemal started bringing out the Newspaper İbret (The Moral) (Hanioğlu, 2002b, p. 144)
and published romantic, patriotic and historic plays (Halman, 2008, p. xx) which
proved successful in mobilizing masses. Vatan Yahut Silistre (The Fatherland or
Silistre) was a poetical play written by him glorifying patriotism, love of the fatherland
and martyrdom. The play was staged for the first time on 1 April 1873 in a theatre in
Istanbul after which the audience in applause took to the streets chanting slogans like
“Long Live Kemal, Long Live the Nation!” This was repeated in the next two stagings
of the play. The play was banned and the newspaper Namık Kemal was publishing
(İbret) was closed down apparently because the administration including the Sultan
(Abdulaziz - ruled from 1861 to 1876) interpreted these developments as a movement
against them. Namık Kemal and his journalist friends were exiled to remote areas in the
Empire. The Island of Cyprus was Namık Kemal’s destination. (Halman, 2007, p. 105)
He was freed by Sultan Abdulhamid II (ruled 1876-1908) and appointed to the
commission preparing the first Constitution in 1876. When Abdulhamit II turned
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against constitutionalism in the following year, Namık Kemal was exiled again
(Hanioğlu, 2002, p. 144) with an administrative duty to Mytilene, a remote island city
the Aegean Sea. He died in exile in 1888.
One of the greatest achievements of Namık Kemal’s legacy was that he was
among the strongest voices in the 1860’s and 1870’s in support of constitutionalism
and parliamentary democracy. Just as Sultan’s Selim III and Mahmud II saw
institutional reform as the way for preventing the demise of the Ottoman Empire,
Namık Kemal defended the establishment of a constitutional system as a necessary
step for reversing decline of the Empire.
Although they were not as articulate and influential as him, Ziya Pasha (18251880) and Ali Suavi (1838-1878) shared similar ideals with Namık Kemal. Ziya Pasha
was born in 1825 in the city of Istanbul to a family of a lower rank customs officer
(Kurgan, 1963, p. 3). Having studied at one of the academies (Mekteb-i İrfan)
established by reformist Mustafa Reşid Pasha, young Ziya started working at the
Translation Office. Until the death of Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha in 1858, Ziya
also held high rank bureaucratic posts such as the secretary of the Royal Palace and as a
governor which earned him the title Pasha. During his bureaucratic work, Ziya Pasha
also learned French and involved in the translation of Viardot’s History of the Arabs
and Moors of Spain and Lavellee’s History of the Inquisitions of Italy, Spain, and
Portugal (from their French translation) and Rousseau's Emile (Mardin, 1962, p. 338339) and Moliere’s Tartuffe. (Kaplan, 2006, p. 4).
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Like İbrahim Şinasi, Ziya Pasha praised modernization efforts of Grand Vizier
Mustafa Reşid Pasha in his poems (Mardin, 1962, p. 338). During his bureaucratic
work, he also promoted Westernization in administration, literature and arts. He was
also critical of some of the traditional practices in the Ottoman society. He, for
example, refused to preside over rain prayers during droughts unlike preceding
governors and he suggested building dams and irrigation systems instead (Kaplan,
2006, p. 3).
Ziya Pasha was gradually sidelined by Mustafa Reşit Pasha’s succeeding rival
Grand Vizier Ali Pasha. This lead him to join in the ranks of the prominent members of
the Young Ottomans (Mardin, 1962, p. 338-339) and he escaped with them to Paris and
eventually to London. He regularly published articles and literary works in the Young
Ottomans’ newspapers Hürriyet and Muhbir. Like Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha sought to
produce a synthesis of Islam and contemporary European ideals such as equality,
justice and constitutional government. As Mardin (1962, p. 337-359) observed, he was
not as consistent and balanced as Namık Kemal in this endeavor. At times, he exalted
Westernization and at times he was against it. For example, at one once he defended
Westernization in literary forms but he later criticized it. Yet, he until the end of his life
he, like Namık Kemal and the other members of the Young Ottomans movement,
remained a supporter of constitutionalism and parliamentary system of legislation and
administration even though there were nuances in the ways in which they imagined a
constitutional system for the Ottoman Empire.
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Ali Suavi (1838-1878) was another prominent member of the Young Ottomans
movement who was with Namık Kemal and others in exile. Born to a family of a paper
merchant in the year Tanzimat was declared (1839), Ali Suavi studied at a rüşdiye in
Istanbul and started working as a civil servant at around the age of 13 or 14. Already
well-versed in Arabic, he traveled to Mecca for pilgrimage at the age of 17 just before
publishing his first book which was about Hanafi jurisprudence. After serving as a
madrasa teacher in the town of Simav, Ali Suavi worked as a teacher at a rüşdiye in the
city of Bursa. During his stay in Bursa he was also teaching hadith at the Ulu Cami
which was the biggest mosque in Bursa. A few years later, Ali Suavi served as the head
of the commercial court in Sofia. Upon his return to Istanbul in 1866, he started
preaching at one of the central mosques (Şehzade Camii) of Istanbul. Suavi was not an
ordinary preacher as he fervently talked about political issues and attracted an audience
from the literati (Çelik, 1994, p. 41-65). He was invited by Filip Efendi, an Armenian
living in Istanbul, to write in his newspaper Muhbir. Ali Suavi accepted the offer and
soon he became the sole contributor of Muhbir. In his articles, Ali Suavi mostly talked
about educational reform and criticized the government by the use of western political
terminology. In so doing, Ali Suavi caught the attention of the central administration
which banished him to peripheral provinces. As a result, he joined the members of the
opposition which would form the society of the Young Ottomans in Paris.
Ali Suavi’s collaboration with the Young Ottomans in exile did not last long.
Because of his disagreements with the other members of the Young Ottomans like
Namık Kemal, he started publishing his own newspapers (e.g., Ulum Gazetesi / Journal
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of Sciences) (Çelik, 1994, p. 200-207). After returning from exile with the pardon of
Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1876, he served as the director of the Galatasaray Lycee
(Çelik, 1994, p. 310-334). Still voicing his revolutionary ideas and criticizing the
ministry of education, he was dismissed from the lycee. The pressure of the British on
the Ottoman Empire because of Ali Suavi’s heavy criticism of them also played a role
in Ali Suavi’s dismissal (Çelik, 1994, p. 353).
Scholars have agreed about the lack of a coherent system of thought produced
by Ali Suavi (Mardin, 1962, p. 360-384) but he is known to be the first to have directly
used the concept of democracy in his discourse of reform. He, like his contemporaries
such as Namık Kemal, defended Western political ideals like democracy and
constitutionalism with reference to the Islamic tradition and history. However, he also
argued that true democratic and constitutionalist ideals can only emerge in the society
of the God-fearing, faithful and morally responsible individuals. The first Muslim
community in history, for him, was a truly democratic community but contemporary
Muslims societies were far from those ideal times.
Below are excerpts from the article Democracy: Government by the People,
Equality (Demokrasi: Hukumet-i Halk, Musavat) written by Ali Suavi in 1870 while he
was in France.
As is known, the forms of government are monarchy (sultanate), aristocracy
(government of notables), and democracy (government by the people, equality).
During the early days of Islam, the form of government was democracy. That is
to say, there was no sultanate, sultan, or king, but rather equality. [...]
They had no fear other than the fear of God, they had no work other than
serving God, they had no institutions (tanzimat) other than good morals, in sum
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they were men of God. The system of equality that Plato had merely imagined
became a reality in their time.
Now a French party, which has been growing day-by-day in the name of
freedom and equality, wants to annihilate the monarchy and create equality in a
democratic system. But they do not have men of God among them—that is to
say, they do not have an overpowering force in their hearts such as fear of God.
[...]
Question: Should the administration in Istanbul remain as it is now?
Answer: No, it should not. What should be done?
The parliamentary [form of government should be adopted], that is to say
government based upon the principle of consultation—the form which France
has adopted this method in this very year 1870 A.D. What is the relevance of
this method for us? In essence, our High Council [of Reforms] (Meclis-i Ali-i
[Tanzimat]) should be enlarged, a chamber of deputies elected by the people
should be opened, and the ministers should be held accountable. The
accountability of ministers means that their conduct of policy is discussed in the
chamber of deputies. The members examine and question it, and the ministers
respond. In the end, if the majority of the deputies give their approval with a
majority of votes, the ministers keep their offices. And if the majority vote turns
out to be against the conduct of policy by the ministers, then they leave office.
(Ali Suavi, May 17, 1870, p. 1083-1107. Tans. Hanioğlu, 2002, p. 138-143).
Ali Suavi was perhaps the most adamant about bringing parliamentary
democracy and constitutionalism to the Ottoman Empire. He strived in his writings to
convince the Ottoman elite for such a transition. Nonetheless, he did not shy away from
directly attempting to change the political system of the Empire from atop. He
organized an uprising with the intention of replacing Sultan Abdulhamid II with his
nephew Murad V who seemed Ali Suavi to be more supportive of constitutionalism.
With several hundred supporters, mostly immigrants from the Balkans, he invaded the
place in May 1878 and reached the inner circle of the Sultan Abdulhamid’s residence.
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By that time, police chief Hasan Pasha and his troops reached the palace and circled Ali
Suavi and his men. Ali Suavi was killed in the unsuccessful coup attempt (Çelik, 1994,
p. 382).
The Young Ottomans was a journalistic movement (Mardin, 1962, p. 80). What
united them was their opposition to the heavy handed rule of the Sublime Porte under
the grip of grand viziers Ali and Fuad Pashas (Davison, 1963, p. 173) and more
importantly their demand for constitutional government and administration (Berkes,
1964, p. 205). In this regard, the Young Ottomans constituted the nucleus of a civil
reformist movement in the late Ottoman society supporting the idea of the transition to
a constitutional government by blending contemporary Western ideals with traditional
Islamic notions. However, they lacked a consistent strategy of mobilization for the
realization of their goals. Confession of Nuri Bey, one of the prominent members of the
Young Ottomans, attests to the incoherence and disorganization of the movement.
I had fallen into much doubt as to the possibility of realizing the aims for which
we were working when I began to ponder the fact that a country would not
easily change on the wishes of a few men. Realizing that without education the
finding of truth would be impossible, I began to consider myself a student who
should take this opportunity of going to Paris to study. Mehmed believed that
the true establishment of the liberal regime in our country would only be
possible with the support of a national movement. Ziya, on the other hand,
believed that the realization of our aims would depend our aims would depend
upon gaining power by reconciliation with the Sultan. Agah thought that in
order to arrive at key positions in the furtherance of our aims, we should try to
reach reconciliation with the government. As for [Namik] Kemal, he was
convinced that “the Ottoman nation was loyal to its Ottoman rulers ; with us
nothing was done unless the Padişah really wanted it … and therefore the ways
of the opinion that there was no means other than . . . bringing to the throne a
Padişah determined to enforce the desired reforms. Rifat . . . insisted that any
attempt should be carried out according to law: Reşad … was conscious of the
fact that we were in an insoluble dilemma, and, without making any
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recommendation, found the most useful course of action in the enrichment of
his knowledge through as much study as possible. [Ali] Suavi's craziness, his
moral faults, and his selfish aims, were known to all of us, and one of our
concerns was to treat him tactfully to prevent him from any kind of action that
would create bad impressions against all of us. (As quoted in Berkes, 1964, p.
207-208)
Even though they introduced secular notions such as nationalism, the idea of
progress and the emphasis on the supremacy of reason into the sociopolitical lexicon of
the late Ottoman society, it is not easy to say that the society of the Young Ottomans
was a secularist movement. In fact, some among the Young Ottomans like Ali Suavi
were explicitly religious. Namık Kemal openly defended Islam against Ernest Renan’s
orientalist claims. Therefore, it is not plausible to say that the Young Ottomans formed
a secularist movement and that they had an agenda of secularizing the society. It is also
not easy to argue that the reformist discourse and efforts of the society of Young
Ottomans secularized the late Ottoman society. They did not voice the need for
secularization and in many cases they defended the idea of returning to “true Islam.”
However, the Young Ottomans advocated Westernization, albeit not in a
wholesale fashion, of major institutions primarily including the government, legislation
and education. Therefore, it is safe to say that they, perhaps unintentionally, took part in
the expansion of secularist notions and ideas and thusly prepared the conceptual and
discursive tools and other necessary conditions for the development of a secularist
movement. As I discuss in more detail below, secularist ideas and activists were more
prevelant in the subsequent generations of reformists primarily including members of
the Young Turks Movement and the Committee of Union and Progress.
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The role of the Young Ottomans’ publications in the spread of their ideas and in
their mobilization strategies was indispensable. Reformist ideas of the Young Ottomans
reached the new bureaucratic elite and the students in modern educational institutions
with the help of their publications (Züchrer, 2010; Çelik, p. 1994, 162-177; Kasaba,
2006, p. 210). In so doing, they played a major role in setting the agenda of public
debate in the society and aspired other reformists. Perhaps the most influential change
inspired largely by the Young Ottomans was the birth of the loosely organized
constitutionalist movement which, according to Hanioğlu (2008, p. 112), consisted of
“conservatives and liberals, ulema and the secularists, Muslims and Non-Muslims,
bureaucrats and their opponents”. The constitutionalist movement succeeded in the
promulgation of the first constitution (Kanun-i Esasi - Basic Law) and in the
establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1876. Members of the Young Ottoman
society such as Namık Kemal were directly involved in the drafting of the constitution.
Although he was not among the founding its founding fathers, it was Ahmet
Şefik Midhat Pasha, commonly known as Midhat Pasha (1822-1884) who brought
momentum to the Young Ottomans movement and to their constitutionalist ideas by
giving them a strong footing within the ranks of the government. Born into a family of
religious scholars in 1822, Ahmet Şefik Midhat received traditional education in private
and at a madrasa (Somel, 2010, p. 188). Starting his civil service at an early age as an
apprentice at bureaucratic offices (Masters, 2009, p. 378) including the secretariat of
the grand vizier (Houtsma, 1993, p. 481), Ahmet Midhat rose to prominence after
successfully giving an end to the disruptive activities of robber bands in the Balkans in
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his early thirties (Somel, 2010, p. 188; Houtsma, 1993, p. 481). He spent six months in
1858 traveling for study in European capitals such as London, Paris, Brussels and
Vienna. Three years later, he was given the title of Vizier and appointed as the
governor of Niš. His extraordinary contributions to the development of the newly
established Danube province (in today’s Bulgaria) further increased his fame (Master,
2009, p. 378). When his policies attracted the hostility of the Russians, Ahmet Midhat
Pasha was recalled to Istanbul where he met the adversity of Grand Vizier Ali Pasha.
Consequently he was sent to the peripheral province of Baghdad (Houtsma, 1993, p.
481; Masters, 2009, p. 378).
The fortune of Ahmet Mithad changed especially after the deaths of Grand
Viziers Fuad Pasha (1814-1869) and Ali Pasha (1815-1871) who dominated the
Sublime Porte and gained ascendancy over Sultan Abdulaziz (Mithat, 1903, p. 62).
Ahmet Midhat Pasha became the grand vizier for the first time in 1873. During his
gubernatorial work, Mithad Pasha also took initiatives in administrative and legal
reforms (Somel, 2010, p. 188) and became strongly interested and involved in the
constitutionalist movement. Thus, he emerged as one of the most prominent and
politically strongest leaders in the constitutionalist movement and became a champion
of constitutionalism (Karpat, 2002, p. 505).
Declaration of the First Constitution (1876)
Sultan Abdulaziz was dethroned in 1876 in a coup d’état largely organized by
Midhat Pasha, Hüseyin Avni Pasha (War Minister), Şeyhülislam Hayrullah Efendi and
Süleyman Pasha (the director of the Military Academy). He was replaced with his
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nephew, Sultan Murat V, who promised the establishment of a constitutional
parliamentary system (Zürcher, 2004, p. 73) Murat V was closer to the constitutionalist
movement including the society of the Young Ottomans and he seemed sympathetic to
the establishment of a constitutional regime (Berkes 1964, p. 223). A few days after
Murat V’s ascension to the throne, Abdulaziz was found dead in his cell because of the
cuts in his ankles which remains as a contested issues as to whether it was a suicide or a
murder. Two weeks later, an army captain named Hasan killed Hüseyin Avni Pasha
during a cabinet meeting because of his personal grievances with him. He also killed
several other members of the cabinet during the incident. All of these turbulences
further deteriorated the mental state of Murat V who started showing strong signs of a
nervous breakdown (Zürcher, 2004, p. 73). In addition, the slower pace of efforts for
drafting the constitution under his rule worried the constitutionalist movement.
Eventually, he was dethroned three months after his ascension and replaced by his
younger brother Abdulhamid II who promised the establishment of a constitutional
system. Thus, the Hamidian Era, the 33 years long period (1876 to 1908) in which
Abdulhamid II reigned had started.
Soon after Abdulhamid II’s ascension to the throne, a commission was
established for drafting the constitution. The commission consisted of 28 members (16
bureaucrats, 10 ulema and 2 members of the military). Midhat Pasha served as the head
of the commission (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 174) which also included several Young
Ottomans (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 116) such as Namık Kemal (Mardin, 1962, p. 339).
Declared in December 1876, Kanun-i Esasi (The Basic Law), the first constitution of
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the Ottoman Empire, established a bicameral parliamentary system in which the Sultan
remained as the sovereign. The lower house of the parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan (The
Chamber of Deputies) consisted of elected representatives of Ottoman provinces. The
upper house, Meclis-i Ayan, included notables directly elected by the Sultan.
The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire which was inimical of the Belgian
Constitution of 1831 stated that,
All subjects of the Empire are called Ottomans, without distinction whatever
faith they profess; the status of an Ottoman is acquired and lost according to
conditions specified by law. (Article 8)
and that;
All Ottomans are equal in the eyes of the law. They have the same rights, and
owe the same duties towards their country, without prejudice to religion.
(Article 17). (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 386)
Non-Muslim minorities also had representatives in the parliamentary system.
There were 44 non-Muslim deputies in the parliament who were elected from the
majority Christian provinces and 4 Jewish deputies in the lower house of the
parliament. A total of 71 deputies were Muslims. Christian minorities were over
represented in the lower house when adjusted for the respective size of the Christian
population in comparison to the size of the Muslim and Jewish communities. The
Sultan appointed 26 members to the upper house and 5 of them were non-Muslims
(Shaw & Shaw, 1971, p. 182).
The ulema had a mixed reaction to the enactment of the first constitution and
the establishment of the parliamentary monarchy. On the one hand, they agreed that
consultation in administration was the Qur’anic teachings but on the other hand they
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asserted that consultation was limited to Muslims alone. Thus, they showed their
disapproval of non-Muslims’ participation in the new parliamentary system (Hanioğlu,
2008, p. 116).
According to the 7th article, the Sultan had the right to summon and dissolve
both chambers of the parliament if he so willed. When a group of members of the
parliament started openly criticizing the government especially its war efforts against
the Russian expansion from the West and the North East during the infamous 18771878 war, the Sultan dissolved the parliament in early 1878 which ended what is called
the First Constitutional Era in the history of the Ottoman Empire (Shaw & Shaw, 1971,
p. 187). This was ensued by a three decades long reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II which
is called as the Hamidian Era.

Secularism on the Rise: The Young Turks and the Committee of Union and
Progress
Hamidian Era was a continuum (Howard, 2001, p. 69) and, for some, it was the
climax and culmination of the legal, administrative and educational reforms of the
Tanzimat (Lewis, 1961, p. 174-5; Jung & Piccoli, 2001, p. 47). Centralization of the
government was further accelerated in this era with the help of the expansion of the
telegraph lines and more importantly with the expansion of the modern school system
and into the central and peripheral provinces of the Empire (Davison, 1990, p. 137138). For the first time in the Ottoman History, teaching Ottoman Turkish was made
mandatory in both Muslim and Non-Muslim schools (Evered, 2012, p. 86). More than
1000 kilometers of railroads were also constructed during the Hamidian Era (Bilmez,
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2008, p.188). All of these developments contributed to growth of the central authority
of the state and to the authority of the Sultan. In addition, Sultan Abdulhamid II
emphasized his title as the Caliph of Muslims which theretofore remained as a
symbolic title in the Ottoman dynasty since the sixteenth century (Howard, 2001, p. 69;
Brown, 2013 p. 36).
Hamidian Era was also characterized by the Sultan’s diplomatic maneuvers
such as forming strategic alliances in the increasingly hostile international arena and by
secretive and authoritarian policies in domestic affairs. Literary censorship, for
example, was one the ways in which Sultan Abdulhamid II wanted to maintain his
authority especially against the subversive power of the opposition (Ertürk, 2011, p.
36). The growth of the centralizing authority of the Sultan and his attempts at
controlling the opposition facilitated the transformation of the nature of reformist
discourse in the Ottoman Empire. Criticism of the reformists before the rule of
Abdulhamid II were mostly, if not exclusively, directed at the bureaucratic elite of the
Sublime Porte. The authority and policies of the Sultan were not strongly criticized and
challenged. The growing power of the Sultan in the Hamidian Era partially and
gradually marginalized the power of the Sublime Porte bureaucracy (Hanioğlu, 1995, p.
123-129). Concomitant with the rise of the power of the Sultan, a new frontier of
opposition in the Ottoman Empire was formed against the rule of Abdulhamid II. This
movement is generally known as the Young Turks Movement14 (Jön Türkler) most of

14

Not to be confused with the Young Ottomans
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which was united under the banner of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve
Terakki Cemiyeti).
Their attitudes towards the Sultan was not the only distinct character of the
Young Turks Movement and the Committee of Union and Progress, which led the
revolution of 1908. Previous proponents of reform the Young Ottomans such as
İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha advocated selective borrowing of
Western values and institutions which they argued were included in the original
teachings of the religion of Islam. Being a broad movement of reform and opposition,
the Young Turks, however, included a new group of activists who advocated a fullscale borrowing of Western ideals (e.g., enlightenment, progress, and development),
culture, science, technology and social and political institutions. As Hanioğlu (1995b,
p. 18) observed, this new elite were not concerned about reconciling Western
civilization with Islam at all. They rather propagated the replacement of religion with
science. Henceforth, there was a major shift in the discourse of the new generation of
reformists, the Young Turks.
It is relatively easier to trace back the origins of the establishment and
development of the Young Ottomans Movement. However, drawing a clear picture of
the history and social movement dynamics of the Young Turks movement is not an
easy task even though the Young Turks movement had a much greater direct impact in
the political life of the late Ottoman society as it gave birth to the Committee of Union
and Progress which dominated the political life of the ottoman society in the aftermath
of the Young Turks revolution of 1908.
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This complexity can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, this movement
emerged in the Hamidian Era which was characterized by the Sultan’s close
surveillance and scrutiny of the oppositional movements and their publications. Being
afraid of persecution, many of the Young Turks especially those who established the
Committee of Union and Progress acted clandestinely especially in the formative years
of the movement. Secondly, the Young Turks movement was a very broad and loosely
organized intellectual oppositional movement composed of different, and in some cases
conflicting, ideological fractions dispersed around the center and the periphery of the
Empire as well as in different parts of Europe in exile. All of these complexities make
putting the pieces of the puzzle together a challenging task.
Even though there were variations in the Young Turks’ attitudes towards
religion, Islam in particular, some of the prominent figures in the Young Turks
movement especially those who established the Committee of Union and Progress were
not hesitant to directly or indirectly criticize religion especially the religious
establishment.
What united the broad movement of the Young Turks, including the religious
and secularists among them was their call for reform in the face of the growth and
expansion of the Europeans and the material and immaterial aspects of their culture.
Their demand for a constitutional system in the context of the growing power of Sultan
Abdulhamid II was also a unifying element within the Young Turks movement. What
divided the Young Turks was about (1) their analysis of the reasons of the decline of
the Muslim civilization and the Ottoman Empire in particular in the face of the
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expansion of Western civilization and issues regarding (2) the structure of political
system (centralist vs. decentralist) to be established, (3) the character of the revolution
(violent vs. nonviolent), (4) the role and place of religion in their analysis of the
problem and in their proposed solutions and (5) the political identity (Pan-Ottomanism
vs. Pan-Islamism vs. Pan-Turkism) drew the lines of the axis of separation and in some
cases conflicts within the Young Turks movement.
As observed by Hanioğlu (1995b, p. 13-16), three groups emerged along the
lines of issues pertaining to the role and place of religion. The first of these two groups
were those who unapologetically advocated the development and application of
Western ideas and institutions in the Ottoman Empire. This group was not concerned
about the protection of religious and cultural heritage of the Muslims. As we will see
later, some among them saw religion as the reason of the decline of Muslims and as an
obstacle to the modernist conceptions of progress and development. The second group
was at the opposite end of the spectrum which openly rejected the adoption of Western
culture and institutions altogether based on the idea that they were alien to the teachings
of the religion of Islam. This second group was perhaps the least influential segment in
the Young Turks movement both in terms of its size and socio-political impact. The
third group which was in the middle of the spectrum was the politically liberal and
religiously conservative group which rejected the idea of wholesale borrowing from the
West but favorably looked at borrowing some of the Western societies’ culture
especially including democratic institutions such as the parliament, constitutionalism
and modern technology. This third group’s ideology was similar to the reformist ideas
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of the Young Ottomans. As such, the Young Turks movement can also be considered,
at least partially, as a continuum of the Young Ottomans movement. That is probably
why some scholars have considered the Young Ottoman and the Young Turks
movement as one single movement (e.g., Yavuz, 1972).
The fact that the Young Turks movement included various fractions does not
necessarily mean that each side were equally dominant. There is an agreement among
the scholars who specialized in the study of the Young Turks movement that the
secularist side was the most dominant and the most influential fraction (Ex: Hanioğlu,
1995b, p.13-16). Şerif Mardin, for example, in his famous book “Jön Turklerin Siyasi
Fikirleri, 1895-1908” (Political Ideas of the Young Turks, 1895-1908) (1983)15 focused
on secularist figures of the Young Turks Movement such as Beşir Fuat, Ahmet Rıza
Bey and Abdullah Cevdet.
Being aware of the complexity of studying the Young Turks Movement, I think
that paying greater attention for the exploration of the secularist side, -of course without
losing sight of the more conservative sides- of the Young Turks Movement would be
more appropriate for the purpose of this dissertation and especially for this chapter
which is dedicated to the study of the development of secularist movement in the late
Ottoman society and subsequently in the formative years of the Turkish Republic.

This book was translated into English and published with the title “Religion, Society and
Modernity in Turkey” (Syracuse University Press, 2006).
15
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The Committee of Union and Progress and Nationalism
In 1887 six students in the Military Medical Academy established a small
society called İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress) which
did not survive long. In May 21st of 1889 which was the centennial year of the French
Revolution, another small group of students (less than 15) from the same school
including İbrahim Temo (1865-1939), Abdullah Cevdet (1868-1935) and Mehmed
Reşid (1872-1919) established the secret society of Ittihad-i Osmani (the Ottoman
Union) against the repressive policies of Sultan Abdulhamid and with the goal of
restoring the constitution (and expanding freedom (Gawrych, 2006, p. 141; Muradoğlu,
2001 p. 93; Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 256; Bleda, 1979, p. 59). The society grew steadily
in various types of modern schools in Istanbul. They eventually established connections
with the prominent members of the Ottoman opposition in Europe. Chief among them
was Ahmet Rıza (Nezir-Akmeşe, 2005, p. 33), the positivist ideologue who had been
publishing the journal Meşveret since 1895 (Shissler, 2003, p. 86). These students
asked Ahmet Rıza to be the leader of their political movement which he accepted.
Ahmet Rıza suggested Nizam ve Terakki (Order and progress) for the name of their
society but the young students slightly modified it and made it İtttihat ve Terakki which
is translated as the Union and Progress (Kuran, 1956, p. 136). Thenceforth, the
committee changed its name to İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Committee of Union
and Progress). Eventually Ahmet Rıza became the leader of the committee which held
its first congress in exile in France in 1902.
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The name of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)
was a reflection of how different ideas and historical developments in Europe affected
the Ottoman society. The notion of “unity” as it appeared in the name of the Committee
of Union and Progress was an indication of being influenced by the rise of centralized
nation states and the rise of nationalism after the French Revolution of 1789. The
notion of “progress”, however, is a testament to the influence of ideas (e.g., positivism
and materialism) nurtured by the Enlightenment movement among the intelligentsia
and reformist circles of the late Ottoman society. As it is described above, Ahmet Rıza
initially insisted on keeping the name of the society “The Committee of Order and
Progress” instead of making it “The Committee of Unity and Progress” perhaps
because he wanted to remain loyal to the positivist principles which he thought was key
for the progress of the Ottoman Empire.
I see a sequential difference between the notion of “unity” and the notion of
“order” in this context. It seems to me that the first (unity) was about preserving the
integrity of the Empire against immediate internal threats such separatism and ethnic
nationalism and against the pressure of expanding powers of European nations
including Russia. The second notion (order), however, is about the reorganization of
the society to prepare it for survival, development and prosperity in the long run. It
seems that those who insisted on having “unity” instead of “order” in the name of their
organization prioritized immediate threats over long term projects. Another reason
might be that they saw a greater potential in the notion of “unity” for mobilizing
masses. I also see a difference between these two notions in terms of the formation of a

180
basis of identity and the constructions of an ideology. The suggestion of including the
notion of “unity” instead of “order” in the name of this reformist (or revolutionary)
movement is related to prioritization of issues relating to the formation of a basis of
identity over the formation of an ideology regarding the nature of social, economic and
political change. Despite these nuanced differences, the notions of “unity” and “order”
converge at a point where both of them emphasize the significance of the nation and
especially of the centralized state. That is why it is not surprising to see that besides
being one of the pioneers of positivism16, Ahmet Rıza was also a pioneering intellectual
in support of centralism and Turkish nationalism.
Another indication of how the formation of the Committee of Union and
Progress was strongly influenced by ideas and ideologies developed in the West was
this organization’s appropriation of “Hürriyet, musavat, uhuvvet, adalet” (Liberty,
equality, brotherhood and justice) as their motto. Apparently, in making this motto, the
founding fathers of the Committee of Union and Progress [hereinafter referred to as the
CUP] added the concept of justice (adalet) to the slogan of the French Revolution
“Liberté, égalité, fraternité” which gave them the inspiration.
As the Young Turks movement grew, so did the number of perspectives
regarding the character of proposed solutions to save the Empire from decline. There
were two major frontlines of competing perspectives within the Young Turks
movement. One of them was the liberalist and decentralist fraction organized around
the ideas of Prince Sabahaddin (1877-1948), a nephew of Sultan Abdulhamid II whose
16

See the next section of this chapter for a detailed description of Ahmet Rıza’s postitivism.
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father escaped with his family to Paris as a result of personal grievances with the Sultan
(Somel, 2003, p. 235). Prince Sabahaddin, who became one of the leading figures in
exile, proposed the development of (1) private enterprise including foreign investment
and (2) political decentralization which was supported by Ottomanism as an
overarching multi-religious and multi-ethnic identity (Ersoy, 2010, p. 333). Such ideas
of Prince Sabahaddin were mostly welcomed by minorities such as the Armenians in
the political opposition circles. Prince Sabahaddin’s liberalist ideas which were
influenced by French sociologist Frederic Le Play’s disciple Edmond Demolins
(Berkes, 1964, p. 309-310; Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 82) were confronted with the centralist
and nationalist ideas which were proposed by Ahmet Rıza and other “unionists”.
Ahmet Rıza’s side denounced foreign investment in support of a nationalist and statist
development and modernization project (Howard, 2001, p. 73-74). Prince Sabahaddin,
together with the Armenian participants of the congress in 1902, favorably looked at
foreign intervention and violent action for the purpose of dethroning Sultan
Abdulhamid II. Ahmet Rıza’s side rejected these ideas fearing that they might threaten
the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher, 2004, p. 88).
The rift between the two fractions became more apparent in the first congress of
the Young Turks in 1902 in Paris (Ramsaur, 1965, p. 65-75). Although neither side
came out of the congress triumphantly, it was Ahmet Rıza’s positivist, nationalist and
secularist side which dominated the agenda of the Ottoman opposition in the long run
and led the 1908 coup d’état (Zürcher, 1984, p. 17-18).
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Figure 4. Ahmet Rıza Bey

Figure 5. Prince Sabahaddin

After the congress, Prince Sabahaddin established the society of Teşebbüsü
Şahsi ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (The League of Private Enterprise and
Decentralization) (Tütengül, 1954, p. 26) and started publishing the newspaper Terakki
(Progress) in Paris (Tökin, 1965, p. 34). There were several other similar committees
established for the promotion of Prince Sabahaddin’s ideas as well (Aksoy, 2008, p.
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82). On the other hand, Ahmet Rıza and his friends slightly modified the name of the
CUP and founded Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti (The Ottoman Committee of
Progress and Unity) in response to Prince Sabahaddin’s side (Kabasakal, 1991, p. 33).
Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti (The Ottoman Society of Liberty), another
oppositional organization, which was established in in 1906 in Salonica by the future
leaders of the CUP including Talat Bey who at the time was a telegraph officer and
army majors Enver Bey and Niyazi Bey (Howard, 2001, p. 74). Having included a large
group of officers who were based in the Ottoman Army around the vicinity of Salonica
established communications with Ali Riza whom they favored over Prince Sabahaddin.
They merged with Ali Riza’s Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti and the name was
reverted to İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti in the Spring of 1907 (Zürcher, 2004, p. 90;
Sohrabi, 2011, p. 90).
In late 1907, the Young Turks held a second congress in Paris in order to
establish cooperation between various fractions of the opposition. This congress was
presided by the unionist Ahmet Rıza, the liberalist Prince Sabahaddin and K.
Maloumian who represented Dashnaks which was an Armenian revolutionary
organization. The congress failed to unite all sides under one framework of leadership
although the final statement declared that Sultan Abdulhamid II had to be dethroned by
any means necessary including the use of force. Thus, the second congress was a step
further in the sense that it made it easier for the majority to accept the need for violent
forms of action. Even Ahmet Rıza who was against violent action compromised at the
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end of the congress but he later reverted back to his original position in this matter
(Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 265).
Prince Sabahaddin was not the only rival of Ahmet Rıza in the Young Turks
movement. Murat Bey (1854-1917), who had already risen to prominence in the
opposition circles while he was still in Istanbul, arrived in Paris in 1896 and was
elected to the leadership role of the CUP. However, Murat Bey’s leadership did not last
long as the Sultan convinced him to return to Istanbul and help him implement the
reforms. For some (e.g., Zürcher, 2004, p. 88-89), this was a tactical move by the
Sultan to weaken the opposition.
Born in 1853 in the Dagestan region (in Russia) and having graduated from the
gymnasium in Sevastopol where he studied French philosophes’ books such as
Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, and Rousseau’s Social Contract and the works of
historians like Guizot and Draper (Berkes, 1964, p. 307), Murat Bey moved to Istanbul
after the invasion of the Dagestan region by the Russians. He started his professional
career at ministerial offices in the Sublime Porte. Murat Bey, then, served as a teacher
at the Mulkiye (Civil Service Academy) where he was admired by his students for his
liberalist analysis of the history of human civilization, a perspective he acquired from
reading Guizot (Mardin, 1983, p. 77-82; Zürcher, 1984 p. 15). His students, heavily
influenced by him at the Mulkiye, staged scenes of a revolution during the breaks
between class sessions (Ayni, 1945, p. 7). This was an indication of politicization of the
modern educational system which was not limited to the civilian schools but also
included medical and military academies. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), a former soldier
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and the founder of the Turkish Republic, was also educated in these increasingly
politicized military academies where he, for example, involved in the publication and
circulation of a handwritten periodical in support of libertarian ideas (Karpat, 2000, p.
92-94).
Before moving to Paris, Murat Bey was publishing the liberalist newspaper
Mizan (Balance) because of which he was given the epithet Mizancı (the owner of
Mizan, or balanced man). Thereafter, he was known as Mizancı Murat. In this
newspaper, Mizancı Murat did not openly criticize the Sultan. However, he harshly
criticized the Sublime Porte bureaucracy including ministerial offices. At the same time
he was more supportive of the idea of preserving the post of the Caliphate and the
Islamic character of the Ottoman society. In this regard, he was considerably more
religious than Ahmet Rıza (Zürcher, 2004, p.87). Perhaps this was the reason why he
was elected for the leadership of the CUP when we went to Paris. His discourse was
more likely to appeal to masses in a society where religious sensitivities were still very
strong. A large segment of the CUP was still religious as well. However, Ahmet Rıza
resumed his leadership role of the CUP following the return of Mizancı Murat to
Istanbul after making peace with Sultan Abdulhamid II.
Ahmet Rıza’s nationalism was not purely ethnic nationalism and the depth of
his nationalism was surpassed by other intellectuals in the Young Turks movement.
Yusuf Akçura, a Tatar who was born in the Russian city of Ulyanovsk in 1876 and
migrated to Istanbul with his mother at the age of seven, emerged as one of the staunch
defenders of ethnic nationalism. In the article Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Kinds of

186
Politics) he published in the journal Türk in 1904, Yusuf Akçura compared the potential
of Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism as alternative ways for the benefit
of the Ottoman state. In his opinion, Pan-Ottomanism would not produce unity in the
long run because minority ethnic communities would seek their own independence
even if the Ottoman state tried its best to keep the Empire as a multi-ethnic and multireligious entity. Therefore, Pan-Ottomanism was not a viable option.
The non-Muslims, too, did not want it [the establishment of Ottoman Nation],
because all of them had their own past, their own independence and their own
governments in that past which was now being glorified because of the revival
of national consciousness. Muslims and especially the Turks had ended their
independence and had destroyed their governments. [...] These invigorated
subjects, whose wisdom was now brighter than their masters' and who
understood that some of the hands extending towards them were really sincere,
did not fail to recognize the role played on the formation of this new policy by
the pressure of Western powers, who, for their own interests, sought the
maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The interests of some of
them were probably with the idea of the Ottoman nation, yet they were also
prone to exalted emotions rather than cool calculations. Thus, literally none of
them wanted to form a new national unity by letting themselves merge with
those whom they looked upon as their enemies. (Yusuf Akçura, 1992 [1904], p.
141)
As the second option, Pan-Islamism would make it difficult to form alliances
with some of the great powers of Christian Europe which the Empire desperately
needed and more importantly Pan-Islamism would alienate non-Muslim minorities such
as the Armenians and the Greeks living within the borders of the Empire.
[T]he interests of Islam do not completely coincide with Ottoman and Turkish
interests, because the strengthening of Islam would lead in the end to the
separation of some non-Muslim peoples from the state. The rise of the conflicts
between the Muslims and the non-Muslims would lead to a partition of the
present-day Ottoman commonwealth and its weakening. (Yusuf Akçura, 1992
[1904], p. 139)
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Therefore, it would be more realistic for the Turks, who shared triple identities
as Ottomans, Muslims and Turks, to focus only on Pan-Turkism which would extend
the power of a Turkified Ottoman Empire to other places outside the Empire (i.e.,
Central Asia and Eastern Europe) where ethnically Turkish people live as minorities.
Now, let us survey the benefits of the policy of Pan-Turkism (Tevhid-i Etrak).
By such a policy all Turks living in the Ottoman Empire would be perfectly
united by both ethnic and religious bonds and the other non-Turkish Muslim
groups who have been already turkified to a certain extent would be further
assimilated. Those who have never been assimilated but at the same time have
no national feelings would be entirely assimilated under such a program.
But the main service of such a policy would be to unify all the Turks who, being
spread over a great portion of Asia and over the Eastern parts of Europe, belong
to the same language groups, the same ethnicity and mostly the same religion.
Thus there would be created a greater national political unity among the other
great nations. In this greater national unity the Ottoman state as the most
powerful, the most progressive and civilized of all Turkish societies, would
naturally play an important role. There would be a Turkish world in between the
world of the Caucasian and the East Asian ethnicities. Recent events suggest
that such a division of the world into two great blocs is imminent. In between
these two blocks the Ottoman state could play a role similar to that which is
played by Japan among the East Asian ethnicities. (Yusuf Akçura, 1992 [1904],
p. 145-146)

Figure 6. Yusuf Akçura
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Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), was not the only intellectual of Turkish origin
hailing from the Caucasus to have contributed to the development of ethnic nationalism
in the Ottoman Empire and other parts of the Turkic world like Azerbaijan. As it was
remarked by Zürcher (2003), it was the mostly “the children of borderlands” [sic]
within the Young Turks Movement who contributed significantly to the emergence of
ethnically defined Turkish nationalism. Yusuf Akçura together with other intellectuals
such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869-1939), Mehmed Emin Resulzade (1884-1955), Sadri
Maksudi Arsal (1878-1957) and İsmail Gasprinsky (1851-1914) who were from the
Caucasus region played significant roles in the expansion of ethnically defined Turkish
nationalism (Gökçek, 2008, p. 47-48 and p. 113; Özkaya, 2011; Kösebalaban, 2011, p.
41). I agree with Zürcher (2003) when he says that these intellectuals “were sensitized
earlier to the problems of identity and political loyalty” (p. 280). Some of these
“children of borderlands” lived long enough to continue contributing to the
development and application of ethnically defined Turkish nationalism during the
formative years of the Turkish Republic which was established in 1923 (Şimşir, 1995;
Shissler, 2003).
Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) who is known as one of the “fathers of Turkish
nationalism,” was born in the Eastern city of Diyarbekir which was at the crossroads of
Turkish and other Near Eastern civilizations and in a place where the Kurds were the
majority (Zürcher, 2003; Parla, 1985, p. 10; Heyd, 1981). His nationalism, however,
was slightly different than the nationalism of Yusuf Akçura. Ziya Gökalp’s perception
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of religion was greatly influenced by sociologist Emile Durkheim who looked at
religion from a functionalist perspective.
Ziya Gökalp (2013) saw a potential in the religion of Islam for contributing to
the formation of an overarching socio-political identity. For him Islam could be one of
the fundamental elements for developing and maintaining the solidarity of the Ottoman
society. However, religion could best function as a source of social solidarity if it was
blended with Turkish nationalism. That is why he defended the potential of the
synthesis of Muslim and Turkish identities against the idea of forming an identity with
the synthesis of Ottomanism and Islam (Grigoriadis, 2012, p. 47-48; Üngör, 2011, p.
31). For him, religion bears the potential for establishing a moral basis of the society
while nationalism supplies the framework of cultural norms. However, Zıya Gökalp
attributed more power to nationalism than he did to religion in terms of their respective
potentials for the production of a basis of social solidarity and for maintaining a broad
based society. He saw religion as a force which should be subordinate to the supreme
ideal of nationalism which is the most powerful form of collective consciousness in
modern times (Parla, 1985, p. 36-37 and p. 61). In this regard, the religion of Islam, in
Ziya Gökalp’s perspective, provides patriotic and fraternal sentiments to the members
of the nation (Heyd, 1950, p. 99) and thus helps produce a “national-patriotic morality”
which is based on love and commitment to the nation and to the national culture (Parla,
1985, p. 61). In such a formulation, religion is confined to its spiritual boundaries and
does not intervene in the operation of secular institutions (Parla, 1985, p. 40).
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Figure 7. Ziya Gökalp
Therefore, Ziya Gökalp did not see nationalism only as the overarching political
identity, he also saw it as a source of individual level morality based on the sense of
duty and commitment towards the nation which is supported by religious sentiments. In
this sense, nationalism transforms the individual because it protects the self from
individualist commitments and aspirations.
Today, a Turk is aware of [his/her] duty to protect [himself or herself]
from behaviors which might harm the nation and to strive towards the
elevation of it to the highest levels. That is why, [he or she] abstains from
personal aspirations and individualist inclinations and struggles to be
exclusively concerned about the sacred duties [towards the nation]. The
Turkish youth have very well understood that the most sacred duty today
is the unification of the Turks beyond and above all other social
ideologies. Ottomanism and Islam can only be secured after this
unification. (Ziya Gökalp, 2013 [1918], p. 40-41)
Such a transformation of the self has implications with regard to the
secularization of the individual consciousness although it does not fully exclude or
reject religious sentiments and commitments. As Juergensmeyer (2008, p. 20) argued,
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secular nationalism and religion are alternative ‘ideologies of order’ which ascribe
meaning and order to day-to-day life and offer alternative perspectives of how to make
sense of the world from their unique coherent perspectives. Besides determining the
reason of existence of the social and political order, these two competitive worldviews
also provide guidance to individuals about the ideal form of existence in the world and
give instructions about the relationships with other persons and the society at large.
Because the loyalty of the individuals in it is first and foremost to the nation and not to
religion or any other entity, secular nationalism positions individuals within a specific
place in the universe and within a particular history.
In his formulation, Ziya Gökalp prioritized nationalism over religion. The
supreme ideology in his thought was nationalism which defined the principal character
of the social and political order of the Ottoman society with respect to this geographical
entity and determined the supreme commitments of the individuals living in this
society. Therefore Ziya Gökalp’s nationalism had secularist implications with regard to
the political character of the society and moral orientation of the self. As it is described
above, the discourse of Yusuf Akçura prioritized secular nationalism over religious
identity more so than Ziya Gökalp. These two intellectuals significantly contributed to
the development of secularist nationalism both in the late Ottoman society and in the
formative years of the Turkish Republic. Furthermore, their impact was not limited
only to the secularization of the political ideology of the state and moral orientation of
individuals. They also took part in the secularization of knowledge especially including
history, linguistics and literature.

192
Yusuf Akçura who advocated the appropriation of an ethnically defined Turkish
nationalism over Pan-Islamism and Pan-Ottomanism was also the first president of the
Association of Turkish History (Berktay, 1992, p. 169). The establishment of the
Association of Turkish History in early 1930’s was a major sign of the secularization of
historical thought. Instead of constructing a historical narrative of the common history
of Muslims, the founders of the new Turkish Republic pursued ways of constructing
unique historical narratives of the Turks dating back to pre-Islamic times. Kitromilides
(2006, p. 50) contended that a similar process of secularization of historical thought
was also experienced in the Orthodox Christian nations of the Balkans in modern times.
For him this was a reflection of the impact of the Enlightenment historiography which
was based on secular aspirations and values. Nationalism was the framework through
which these secular values and aspirations were structured. Thusly, a new form of
collective nationalist historical identity was constructed.
Ziya Gökalp strongly emphasized the development of Turkish as a language of
culture, literature and science in his books The Principles of Turkism, (1968, p. 76-77)
and Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (1959). He argued that the official
and literary language of the Ottoman Turkish which borrowed words, expressions,
terminology and grammatical rules heavily from Arabic and Persian is far from being
the national language because it is unintelligible by common people. In this form, it is
not possible to make it the language of all. Therefore, it is necessary to use the simple
form of Turkish which is spoken by “the ladies of Istanbul” and which is used in the
folk literature. Words borrowed from other languages primarily including Arabic and
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Persian which have synonyms in Turkish should be abandoned. Foreign words should
be borrowed only in the absence of their equivalents in Turkish.
Perhaps, the Young Ottomans especially Namık Kemal did not anticipate that
their religious nationalism (i.e., Pan-Islamism) in which religious sense of belonging
was prioritized over forms of identity would be followed by a secularist form of
nationalism in which religion could find a place in this new paradigm only if it was
subservient to ethnically and culturally defined nationalistic aspirations. Rather than
advocating an ethnically defined nationalism the Young Ottomans propagated religious
nationalism (i.e., Pan-Islamism). In their nationalism religion was at least to certain
degree prioritized over ethnically defined nationalism. However, the nationalism of the
Young Turks starting with Ahmet Rıza and continuing with Yusuf Akçura and Ziya
Gökalp was gradually evolving into a purely secularist sense of belonging.
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Counterrevolution of 1909
Despite disagreements and conflicts within it, the CPU gradually grew into a
large underground network of revolutionaries dispersed around the Empire especially in
the southern parts of Balkans. Merging with the secret society of Osmanlı Hürriyet
Cemiyeti (the Ottoman Freedom Society) in 1907 provided the CUP with “the
revolutionary manpower” (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 4; Zürcher, 2004, p. 89) which was
critical for the success of the revolution prepared by the committee. In a short period of
time following the merger with Ali Riza’s side, Talat Bey, Enver Bey and Niyazi Bey
who had established the Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti steadily grew in power and
influence in the CUP in greater part because they united disorganized fractions of the
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opposition in Macedonia. They were also successful in mobilizing army officers
(Howard, 2001, p. 74) and even villagers in the Balkans (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 108).
Its successful outreach to the officers in the army was gradually changing the
character of the CUP as it was increasingly overtaken by the soldiers although it had
started as an organization mostly composed of civilian intellectuals (Dündar, 2006, p.
37). Historian Strachan (2001) reports that of the 505 members of the CUP in Salonica
alone, 309 were officers in the army by the year 1908. In another account, (NezirAkmeşe, 2005, p.5 1), there were 2000 soldier members of the CUP only in the Third
Army which was based in the Balkans. Strict rules of membership to the CUP was
applied at that time. Only those who studied in the modern military schools (Mektepli /
Schooled) could be accepted into the organization by invitation. The soldiers who did
not go through the military academies (Alaylı / Risen from the ranks) were not accepted
(Nezir-Akmeşe 2005, p. 51). In the observation of Feroz Ahmad (2014, p. 75), when
they are compared to the Alaylı soldiers, Mektepli officers were much more akin to
secularist ideals because of the education they received. These officers spread the
ideology of the CUP and regularly recruited new members in the army. Thusly, the
CUP had gradually turned into an organization of soldiers.
Even though other factors such as the tax revolt of 1906 and 1907 in different
parts of the Empire ripened the conditions for a popular revolution (Kansu, 1997), it
was again the soldiers in the CUP who eventually executed the Young Turk Revolution
of 1908 and forced the Sultan to reinstitute the constitution of 1876 and the Ottoman
Parliament. The period following the reinstitution of the constitution is called as the
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Second Constitutional Era. In the execution of the revolution, the direct role of the
civilian founding fathers of the CUP members especially those who were in exile were
limited. That is why most of them were sidelined and marginalized afterwards.
The CUP established a political party after the revolution and won 60 of the 275
seats which was enough to be declared as the winners of the election in 1908 (Kayalı,
1995, p. 271). Even though the margin of the CUP’s success in these elections was
narrow, they were still triumphant because they were the ones who brought about the
revolution. That is why they also enjoyed a moral authority over other political parties
such as the Ahrar Fırkası (The Liberal Party) which was formed shortly before the
1908 elections by the liberalist such as Prince Sabahaddin. Although they were the
strongest opponents of the CUP, Ahrar Fırkası lost the elections decisively (Özbudun,
1987, p.334). However, Ahrar Fırkası continued to be the strongest opposition after the
elections as they were able mobilize the upper class centralist and liberalist elite against
the CUP which consisted of lower-middle class soldiers and bureaucrats (Ardıç, 2012,
p. 149; Hanioğlu, 1995).
After the election, the CUP did not form the government because the members
of the CUP who carried out the revolution were junior officials and young bureaucrats
who lacked experience and seniority status which was critical in the traditional
Ottoman Society (Zürcher, 2004, p. 94). The CUP also lacked a dominant presence in
the parliament since they only controlled less than a quarter of the seats (Özbudun,
1987, p. 334) even though they won more seats than any other party. Consequently,
they left the formation of the government to the existing Grand Vizier Sait Pasha. Yet,
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the CUP remained as the guardians and the watchdogs of the newly established
constitutional system and as a very influential pressure group. Even though they were
not the government, they behaved as the de facto owners of it. They intervened in
matters of governance when they deemed necessary (Ahmad, 1969; Zürcher, 2004, p.
94). However, there were several major offices controlled by the CUP. For example,
Ahmet Rıza who played a significant role in the establishment of the CUP was the
president of the lower house of the Ottoman Parliament.
Several oppositional political parties and organizations were also established
after the revolution by groups who were antithetical to the CUP (e.g., Mutedil Hürriyet
Perveran Fırkası / The Party of Moderate Liberals) and by the former members of the
CUP who found the party’s position far too liberal or too conservative (e.g., Ahali
Fırkası / People’s Party) (Zürcher, 2004, p. 101). There were also religiously motivated
organizations established in this context. Among them was the İttihad-ı Muhammedi
Cemiyeti (The Society of Muslim’s Unity) organized around the leadership of
Naqshbandi Şeyh Derviş Vahdeti (1869-1909) who was editing the newspaper Volkan
(Volcano). It was mostly the lower ranking ulema and a group of Sufi leaders who were
mobilized around İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti and the newspaper Volkan (Ardıç,
2012, p. 109). With the aim of establishing a government comprising of more religious
members of the parliament and reinforcing the institutions of the Caliphate and the
Sultanate, Colonel Sadık Bey who was previously a member of the CUP, left the
organization and formed the New Party (Hizb-i Cedid) in 1911 with other dissidents
such as Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi (Yigit, 2014, p. 114; Weiker, 1973, p. 39).
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Growing dissent in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution resulted in a
counterrevolution attempt which unfolded in the form of a mutiny on 13 April 1909
(March 31st in the Ottoman Rumi Calendar, hence it was known as the 31 March
Incident). In the words of Hanioğlu (2008, p.154), the counterrevolution was carried
out by “an improbable combination of old regime supporters, Islamists, liberals, and
non-Turkish nationalists”. Although Zürcher (2010, p. 82) argues that there is more
evidence to support the idea that it was the Liberals who instigated the mutiny, the
questions of who and what organization initially planned and organized the
counterrevolution is still debated (Kayalı, 2012, p. 29). However, there is a consensus
that troops which were still loyal to the Sultan Abdulhamid II, madrasa students, some
hojas (lower rank ulema) and serving and dismissed alaylı officers were involved in the
mutiny (Zürcher, 2010, p. 76; Hale, 2013 p. 39). There are contentions that Derviş
Vahdeti, the editor of the newspaper Volkan and the unofficial leader of the İttihad-ı
Muhammedi Cemiyeti supported and encouraged the dissidents when the counterrevolution was unfolding (Shaw, 1977, p. 280; Anscombe, 2014, p. 127). Demanding
the restoration of Sharia and the removal of the CUP members from the government
including Ahmet Rıza from the presidency of the Lower House of the Parliament and
Talat Pasha from the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the revolutionaries were able to take
over the capital in one day without any significant resistance from the CUP, the Army
or the Sultanate. The Sultan complied with the demands of the crowd. As a result they
were able to remove the CUP from power for about 11 days (Zürcher, 2010, p. 76).
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In response, the CUP helped organize “the Action Army” (Hareket Ordusu)
which marched from Macedonia to Istanbul to suppress the mutiny and to restore the
order in the Capital. Mahmut Şevket Pasha assumed the command of the Action Army
once it reached Yeşilköy in the vicinity of Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal (the future
founding father of the Turkish Republic) who came with the army was the chief of staff
of the division which was under the command of Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha (Hale, 2013, p.
39; Erickson, 2013, p. 9). A close friend of Mustafa Kemal, İsmet Bey (İnönü) who
would later become the second president of the Turkish Republic, was also an officer in
the Action Army (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 281). Quickly reaching Istanbul, the Action
Army easily restored the order and the power of the CUP by the declaration of martial
law (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 154-155).
Sultan Abdulhamid II was deposed with the accusation that he passively
watched the uprisings and facilitated the expansion of the insurrection. He was sent to
exile in Salonica and was replaced with his younger brother Murad who ascended the
throne as Sultan Mehmed (Reşad) V. Two summary court-martials were immediately
established. Derviş Vahdeti was captured as the scapegoat of the revolt and executed by
the summary court-martial. These courts also tried and executed large number of other
individuals for being part of the uprisings. In addition, many alaylı officers were
dismissed from the army in the aftermath of the 31 March Incident and the system of
rising from the ranks without being educated in modern military academies was
abolished. Such a move made the CUP not only the dominant force in the army
(Zürcher, 2004, p. 97-98) but also a very strong player in the Ottoman political life. In
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order to fund the reinstitution of the government, military officers were sent to different
parts of the Empire to collect taxes, which for Shaw and Shaw (1977, p. 281),
contributed to the increasingly authoritarian control of the society by the army.

Figure 8. Prisoners of the 31 March Incident

After the 31 March incident, the CUP took up a more aggressive stance against
any kind of opposition and against traditional religious groups and organizations. On
the other hand, the 31 March Incident left a long lasting image in the memory of
secularist reformists and revolutionaries including the young officers in the army such
as Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and İsmet (İnönü) Bey. Therefore, the incident illustrated
the growing gap and tension between the secularist and religious groups in the Ottoman
and Turkish societies even though the higher ranking ulema and other religious leaders
had denounced the uprising as it was unfolding.
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The incident was utilized in the following decades by the secularists as an
ideological and discursive tool to create an opposite image of the secularist ideals and
to present an example for the potential danger of religious individuals and groups who
were involved or showed the potential for involvement in politics. Thenceforth, the
demand for Sharia had been associated with the image of the 31 March Incident.
Similarly, religious groups’ involvement in politics have often been equated with the
demand for the implementation of Sharia regardless of whether it was pronounced by
those who were involved in politics or not. The derogative terms “irtica”
(fundamentalist political reaction) and “mürteci” (fundamentalist reactionary) started to
be widely used ever since to label publicly visible religious individuals and groups as
threats to the secular regime.
The CUP continued to exert its impact on the Ottoman society especially after
winning the 1912 election with a landslide, allegedly by force and by rigging the
elections (Zürcher, 2004, p. 103). Although the CUP consolidated power in its hands,
the CUP was not able to stop the decline of the Empire. The First World War brought
the end of not only the six hundred years long rule of the Ottoman dynasty but also the
end of the relatively short lived government of the Young Turks and the CUP.
Nonetheless, ideas nurtured by these revolutionary groups continued to exert their
impact on the social and political life of the Turkish Republic which was formally
established five years after the end of the First World War and one year after the end of
the Turkish War of Independence against the Greeks in Western Anatolia.
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As I argue in further detail below, it is not easy to claim that the new Republic
was a direct continuum of the Young Turk ideology and that of the CUP. However, it is
not possible to fully understand the transformation of the Turkish society after the
establishment of the Republic without understanding how the ideological undercurrents
of the Young Turks and the CUP influenced the new secularist elite either. It is equally
important to comprehend what roles did the development and transformation of the
newly established educational, political, legal and cultural institutions played in the
history of secularization of the Turkish society before and after the establishment of the
new Republic.
Transformations witnessed in the late Ottoman society were not limited to the
nature of political life and political ideologies. That is why it is also equally important
to investigate if and how the development of other forms of ideologies such as
positivism, scientism and materialism influenced the late Ottoman society and the
Turkish nation. The development of these ideologies were part of other social and
political transformations, too. In addition, investigating sociological implications of
these ideologies would help us better understand the philosophical foundations of the
secularist paradigm which is what this dissertation pays a great deal of attention.
Science and Secularization in the Late Ottoman Society
The development of modern sciences in the history of the Ottoman Empire
started as part of a pragmatic approach to the reformation of the army. It was later
expanded into military academies and other schools which were established to provide
modern education to the increasingly growing number of civil bureaucrats needed by
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the rapidly centralizing state especially during the Tanzimat. Ideological interpretations
of science started to be visible with the establishment of scientific societies and the
publication of science journals. The earliest form of the ideological interpretation of
science was its promotion as a tool for the advancement of (Muslim) civilization and
subsequently as a means to socioeconomic development. Such perspectives of science
are best reflected in the development of the idea of progress. In the beginning, the idea
of progress was not openly used against religion but it gradually turned into or as a
discursive tool in the Young Turk Movement to legitimize social and political
transformation away from religion and occasionally as an ideological weapon to attack
religion for being an obstacle to progress. In this sense, science was used as part of an
alternative social and political philosophy.
The second form of the ideological interpretation of science was its use as a tool
for the development of an alternative ontology against religious worldviews. Secularist
ontological perspectives such as materialism and naturalism were justified on the basis
of scientific evidences by European intellectuals such as D'holbach, Lamarck and
Ludwig Büchner who strongly influenced some of the prominent figures in the Young
Turks Movement such as Beşir Fuad, Baha Tevfik and Abdullah Cevdet. These
ideologues introduced and promoted materialist and naturalist interpretations of science
in the late Ottoman society. Below are the short history of how these two streams of
ideological interpretations of science developed and their implications with regard to
secularization.
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Science, civilization and the idea of progress: The human effort to improve
the human condition. Münif Pasha (1828-1910) who served as the Education Minister
became one of the pioneers who took part in the introduction and dissemination of
positive sciences in the Ottoman society. His most influential work was the initiative he
took in the establishment of Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye (The Ottoman Scientific
Society) in 1861 (Budak, 2011, p.57) inimical of the Royal Society of England (Lewis,
2001, p.130) and the publication the journal Mecmua-i Funun (The Journal of Sciences)
in 1862. Members of Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye took the responsibility of publishing
Mecmua-i Funun which covered areas such as chemistry, physics, medicine, geology,
archeology, astronomy, geography, forestry, economics, history, education, history of
science and technology, history of Greek philosophy, politics, grammar, languages,
philosophy, public health, urban planning, classification of sciences, finance, child
education and printing (Davison, 1963, p. 181; Bahadır & Danışman, 2005, p.288-289;
Budak, 2011, p. 71-91). Using a simple language, Mecmua-i Funun aimed popularizing
science among different segments of the society. Mecmua-i Funun stopped publication
after 47 issues.
Similar journals started to be published by others. These journal include
Rehber-i Funun (Guide of Sciences - 11 issues in 1882), Medrese-i Funun (College of
Sciences, 8 issues in 1884), Hazine-i Funun (Treasures of Sciences, 1 issue in 1885),
Kevkeb-ul Ulum (Star of Sciences, 16 issues in 1886), Numune-i Terakki (Example of
Progress, 9 issues in 1887 and 1888) and İrtika, (Rising High, 23 issues in 1897)
(Bahadır & Danışman, 2005, p.288).
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Figure 9. The first page of the table of contents of the first issue of Mecmua-i Funun
(The Journal of Sciences) (1860)
These journals were published prior to the Second Constitutional Period (19081918) and they are listed in the historical order in which they were published. Most of
these journals used funun as opposed to ulum in their titles. As I cited from Berkes
(1964) above, ulum mostly, if not exclusively, refers to traditional religious sciences
whereas funun predominantly refers to Western sciences and technology. In the
observation of Ra’isniya (2012), the use of funun instead of ulum in these titles “reflect
the significance the publishers of these journal attributed to Western science and
technology” (p. 218). In the way Berkes (1964) sees the difference between ulum and
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funun, the emphasis on Western science can be seen as an indication of secularization
of education.
The titles of the last two (Numune-i Terakki - Example of Progress and İrtika Rising High) have references to progress which I think is an indication of gradual
increase in seeing science (and possibly technology) as a source or tool of progress and
thus as an instrument of social change expanding into areas outside science and
education. This, I think, is indicative of the influence of the way the Enlightenment
movement perceived and presented science. Indeed, Berkes (1964, p. 178), says that
Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye which published Mecmua-i Funun consisted of readers of
Voltaire, Diderot and d’Holbach. All of these thinkers were prominent figures in the
Enlightenment movement of France (Porterfield, 2005; Copleston, 2003; Vartanian,
1975). A more direct confirmation of the influence of the Enlightenment on Mecmua-i
Funun and its publishers can be seen in a statement in the 6th issue of the journal which
stated that the purpose of the journal and Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye was “the
promotion of interest in the progress of industries and the enlightenment of minds”
(translated and cited in Berkes 1964, p. 179). Hanioğlu (1995, p. 94) reports that
Mecmua-i Funun persistently focused on the superiority of modern sciences and
indirectly attacked religion disguised in the form of criticizing superstition17. Likewise,
they published a series of 16 articles about the materialist philosophers of the Western
World including the antiquity as opposed to publishing only two articles about Muslim
philosophers (Budak, 2011, p. 112-113).
17

For more about Voltaire’s attacks on superstition, see Charles Frankel (1969, p. 107-109).
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Cemiyet-i İlmiye also established a library which offered courses in arithmetic,
political economy and five different languages (Davison, 1963, p. 181). Another major
project of the Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye was the promotion of the establishment of
Dar-ul Funun (House of sciences), the first modern university in the Muslim World.
Dar-ul Funun was established in 1870. As the head of this new university, Tahsin
Efendi (1811-1888) was appointed. Like most other reformers, Tahsin Efendi (aka.
Hoca Tahsin) was sent to Paris for education where he stayed for twelve years. There,
he served as the Imam of the Ottoman Embassy and as the Chaplain of the Muslim
students who were sent to France by the Ottoman state (Keddie, 1972, p. 39). While he
was in Paris, he became close friends with the prominent members of the Young Turks
who were there in exile (Mardin, 1962, p. 222).
Without presenting convincing evidence of why this was the case, Berkes
(1964, p. 181) argues that, during his stay in Paris, Hoca Tahsin was heavily influenced
by the contemporary scientific materialist Ludwig Büchner. Regardless, Hoca Tahsin
returned to Istanbul as a strong proponent of modern sciences. He wrote the first
psychological treatise in Turkish and popularized contemporary theories of Astronomy
in the Ottoman society (Mardin, 1962, p. 223). The idea of progress was another
perspective Hoca Tahsin promoted. In his vision, the extension of the path of progress
of Muslim societies was contingent on the appropriation of modern sciences and the
refutation of dogmatic practices of religion. In this regards, he was similar to the
members of Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye, who, too, believed in the necessity of science
in the path of progress (Budak, 2011). At the same time, Hoca Tahsin saw the disunity
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of Muslims as a major obstacle against their progress as a civilization. For that reason,
he worked towards the ideal of the Unity of Muslims (Mardin, 1962, p. 224). The
establishment of Memalik-i İslamiye Coğrafya Cemiyeti (The Society for the
Geography of Muslims) by Hoca Tahsin when he was the head of Daru-l Funun was
part of this effort (Azmi, 1997, p. 37).
Hoca Tahsin did not see science only as a cure to social ills, he also considered
it as a strong tool for individuals’ attainment of happiness. In the inauguration speech of
Dar-ul Funun, he emphasized the role of science in the empowerment of the individual
and the nation, and described science as “the spirit of civilization and the guarantor of
the advancement of happiness” (Burcak, 2005, p.77). In establishing an association
between science and civilization, Tahsin Efendi was implying the necessity of the
expansion of positive sciences into the institutional organization of the society and into
the arrangement of the lives of individuals. Such a statement indicates that Hoca Tahsin
saw a strong relationship between the development of civilization and happiness. It
might be that he regarded the improvement of the conditions of social and individual
lives of human beings as one of the strongest keys, if not the only one, for the
attainment of happiness. Science would serve as the tool through which the conditions
of life from the macro level to the micro can be improved. In promoting these ideas
Hoca Tahsin emphasized the power of secular forces for the attainment of happiness
although he was a devout practicing Muslim. That is why it seems to me that Hoca
Tahsin, perhaps unintentionally, was promoting secularist ideas in a similar way it was
done by Namık Kemal whose employment of the term vatan (motherland) bore
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secularist connotations although Namık Kemal used it as part of his Pan-Islamist
discourse.
As Zafirowski (2010, p. 108) put it, the perspective which sees modern science
as the core integral component of true human civilization derives from the
Enlightenment movement and from the Renaissance. In this paradigm, the development
of science and its impact on the society are perceived as a counterforce against the
social standing and political authority of religion. The civilizational perspective which
sees science as the dynamo of civilization was embraced by a greater proportion the
Ottoman intelligentsia since the Tanzimat. However, the first generation of these
intellectuals did not see science as an alternative to and as a counterforce against
religion. It rather was a complementary component for religion in their eyes. As such,
science was seen from a pragmatic perspective which could explain the nature of how
things work in the universe and thus facilitate the improvement of the material
conditions of life. Therefore, science was seen as a testament to and as a tool for the
perfectibility of life. That is probably why the first generation of the exponents of
science including the religious ones were not hesitant to borrow evolutionary
perspectives. Together with Münif Pasha who published an article titled “Ethnological
evolution of the monkey called orang-utang,” Hoca Tahsin is considered by historians
(e.g., İhsanoğlu, 2011, p. 163) as one of the leading intellectuals who introduced the
evolutionary theory in the Ottoman Empire because he wrote a book titled Tarih-i
Tekvin Yahud Hilkat (History of the Genesis and Creation) in which he presented the
creation of the universe in multiple stages.
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Despite their efforts for the introduction of positivist sciences, the pioneers of
modern education in the history of Ottoman Empire like Hoca Tahsin were trying to
reconcile science and religion in the same way the Young Ottomans such as Namık
Kemal and Ziya Pasha attempted to reconcile contemporary Western ideals such as
democracy, liberty and human rights with traditional Islamic notions such as
Meşveret (consultation), Hoca Tahsin and his contemporaries such as Selim Sabit
Efendi (1829-1910) wanted to present the new modern sciences as methods
compatible with Islamic teachings. Just as the Young Ottoman ideologues criticized
contemporary Muslim societies and their rulers for breaking away from the real social
and political tradition of Islam, the likes of Hoca Tahsin including Münif Pasha
(1828-1910) criticized the intrusion of superstition and dogmatic beliefs and practices
of religion in Muslim societies.
However, a new generation of intellectuals who were, to varying degrees,
hostile against religion emerged with the transition from the reconciliatory Young
Ottoman ideology to the explicitly and unapologetically secularist segment of the
Young Turk ideology. The beginning of the Young Turks Era witnessed the
emergence of a new class of reformist intellectuals who were neither concerned about
the reconciliation of science and religion nor had an ideal of utilizing science for the
advancement or unity of the Muslims. They promoted science as a tool for the
progress of the Turkish nation which happened to be Muslims living in the Ottoman
Empire. Ahmet Rıza Bey, the prominent leader of the CUP, represents one of the
major cornerstones of such a transition
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Ahmet Rıza was born in Istanbul in 1859 to a father (‘İngiliz’ Ali Bey) who
used to serve as a member of the first chamber of the first Ottoman Parliament (18761878) and to a mother (Naile Hanım) from Austria who had converted to Islam
(Gündüz & Budak, 2011, p. 13). He studied at the Galatasaray Lycee in Istanbul but he
spent some time in Konya where his father was exiled (Howard, 2001, p. 73; Mardin,
2006, p. 165-166; Zürcher, 1984, p. 14). While in Konya, Ahmet Rıza observed the
impoverished conditions of the villages in Anatolia and decided to study agriculture in
France so that he could contribute to the improvement of agricultural production in the
Ottoman lands. Upon finishing his studies at the Agricultural School of Grigon, he
returned home from France and started working at the Ministry of Agriculture.
However, he couldn’t find opportunities and necessary conditions for putting his
knowledge into practice because of widespread systemic problems he saw in the
Ottoman society and the state.
Hailing mass education as a means to transform the society, Ahmet Rıza started
teaching at an idadi (middle school). He eventually became the director of education in
the city of Bursa where his transformation attempts of the educational system were met
with resistance. During a visit to Paris in 1889, he resigned from his post and stayed in
France (Berkes, 1964, p. 305-306; Mardin, 2006, p.166). There, he participated in the
lectures of the positivist Pierre Lafitte. Ahmet Rıza was already familiar with
positivism while he was still in Istanbul from reading a book written by Dr. Eugene
Robinet (Tekeli & Ilkin, 1993, p. 221) who was a disciple of Auguste Comte (Mill,
1866, p.127). Reading the works of materialist Enlightenment philosopher d’Holbach at
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an early age had deeply influenced Ahmet Rıza, too, as admitted by himself (Ahmet
Rıza, 1922, p. 15; as cited in Mardin, 1983, p. 181).
In a memorandum he sent to Sultan Abdulhamid II, Ahmet Rıza said that he, in
the last six years long stay in Paris, had investigated the reasons of the progress and
lack thereof of nations. He also shared his suggestion that the path to be saved from the
chains of reprehensible conditions, including that of the Ottoman society, would be
paved by acquiring and implementing positive sciences (Berkes, 1964, p. 306). This
was a major sign of the growing place of positivism in Ahmet Rıza’s thinking.
Indeed, he published articles in Le Jou`rnal Occidental which was a French
positivist journal (Shissler, 2003, p. 116) and participated in the establishment of the
International Positivist Society (Fındıkoğlu, 1962, p. 10; Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 203;
Kurzman, 2009, p. 41). The Journal Meşveret (Consultation) he published while he was
in France were published in two languages: Turkish and French. The motto of the
Turkish version was “Wasavirhum fil Amr,” the Quranic verse (3:159) which says “And
Seek their counsel in the matter” but the motto of the French version was the Comtian
positivist notion of “ordre et progrès” (Order and Progress in English, Nizam ve
Terakki in Turkish) (Emil, 2009, p. 102).
As Hanioğlu (1995, p. 203) puts it, those who were positivists in the Young
Turks movement were compelled to conceal their positivism out of the fear that it
might attract backlash from the religious elements of the movement and of the Ottoman
society. Ahmet Rıza did not openly criticize the religion of Islam although he criticized
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traditional religious establishment such as the leaders of Sufi lodges for deceiving and
corrupting masses morally and intellectually (Mardin, 1983, p. 182-183).

Figure 10. The first page of the French version of the newspaper Meşveret (Mechveret)
including an article about public education in Turkey. January 15, 1896. Published in
Paris. (Courtesy of Ercument Asil)

Ahmet Rıza’s positivism was mostly reflected in his appropriation of the ideal
of rational scientific progress which aims at improving the material conditions of life.
Such an improvement and progress could be possible with rational planning and
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efficiently centralized administration which, for him, was lacking in the Ottoman
society. In order to reverse these conditions, Ahmet Rıza started taking active
leadership roles in the development and organization of the Ottoman opposition
movement (The Young Turks) after several years of contemplation and intellectual
activities in France. As I described in detail above, he took part in the establishment of
the CUP which was mobilized around the idea of instituting the constitution of 1876
and the parliamentary system.
Ahmet Rıza and decentralist Prince Sabahaddin had disagreements about the
nature of the ideal form of political structure for the Ottoman Empire. Another
difference between the two in their scientism. Ahmet Rıza wanted to apply hard
(natural) sciences for the reordering of the of the society especially including
administration and economic production whereas Prince Sabahaddin aspired to use the
methodology of soft (social) sciences especially including sociology for the analysis of
the problems in the Ottoman society and for the solutions to be implemented
accordingly18. However, Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahaddin shared a similar
perspective in that they both believed in the power of scientific methods for the
development and “progress” of the Ottoman society.
As it is described in the beginning of this chapter, the idea of borrowing positive
sciences from the Western world started with the purpose of modernizing the army in
the Ottoman history. When the implementation of science and modernization efforts

For more about Prince Sabahaddin’s admiration for sociological methods see Hanioğlu (2001,
p. 82-83).
18
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expanded into the other areas of the society during the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876),
Ottoman intellectuals started debating the scope and the limits of borrowing from the
Western civilization. There was a consensus in the Young Ottomans generation that it
would only be the science and the technology as well as some of the political ideals and
institutions of the West (e.g., constitutionalism, parliamentary system) which could and
should be borrowed. Arguing that all of these valuable tools originally belonged to
Islamic civilization, they saw the “re-adoption” of these tools and principles as highly
efficient and necessary tools for the development of the Muslims around the world, the
Ottoman Empire in particular. One step later, adoption of sciences was freed from the
concerns of reconciling it with religion or utilizing it for the betterment of Muslims as
we saw it in the case of Ahmet Rıza. It was regarded as an efficient tool for national
development. Ahmet Rıza also rejected wholesale borrowing as he was concerned
about the protection of the Turkish nation and about retaining the unique characteristics
of this nation’s culture and language. Because of his nationalist and anti-imperialist
sentiments, he had antagonistic feelings against the West as well.
In short, proponents of reform and modernization in the Ottoman history were
predominantly against the idea of wholesale borrowing from the West. They favored
borrowing what they considered was beneficial (science, technology etc.) from the
Western civilization and but they were wary of taking what they believed was harmful
(e.g., materialistic and individualistic culture) citing religious and nationalistic reasons.
However, as the decline of Muslim societies in the face of the challenges coming from
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the Western civilization doomed nearer and nearer, some Young Turks started openly
promoting the idea of adopting the Western civilization as a whole.
Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869-1939) was one of the strongest defenders of the idea of
full scale borrowing of the Western civilization. In his monologues, Üç Medeniyet
(Three Civilizations), which he wrote shortly after WWI, Ahmet Ağaoğlu asserted that
the idea of selective borrowing from the Western civilization was not a realistic
approach. For him, the concept of civilization should be understood as a way of life in
the broadest sense. Each civilization develops its own common mind, heart, intelligence
and its own feelings, sensibilities and its unique memory. Likewise, each civilization
has its commonly shared moral standards, value systems and its criteria of the good.
Such components of a given civilization are the products of its entirety and they
develop as a whole with their positive and negative sides. Therefore, partitioning a
civilization and trying to selectively adopt its particular components is not possible. If a
society wants to benefit from the specific components of a civilization, the only feasible
way is to fully enter into this civilization.
In Ahmet Ağaoğlu’s categorization, there are three major world civilizations.
The first and the most populous one is the Buddha-Brahman civilization which contains
India, China, Korea and Japan. The second (largest) is the Western civilization
including Europe, America and Australia. The third and the last one according the size
and history of it, is the Muslim civilization which comprises most of Africa and some
parts of Europe and Asia. The Western civilization, Ağaoğlu said, prevailed and
defeated the other two civilizations both physically and ideologically. The decline of
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the Ottoman Empire as the last stronghold of the Muslim World is an undeniable
testament to this defeat which, among other things, convinced almost every one for the
superiority of the Western civilization. Nonetheless, he says;
There are people who are attributing the supremacy and the triumph of this
[Western] civilization to its particular components such as its science and
technology; and trying to abstain from its other aspects. In other words, such
people, with the purpose of being secured from the negative and even disgusting
[sic] sides of it, are demanding selective borrowing of the European civilization.
Those who are suggesting these ideas, if they are not sincere, want to follow the
reason of the ignorant. If they are sincere, they don’t fully understand what
civilization is. The ideas we have presented so far prove that the civilization has
a holistic nature and it cannot be divisible. It cannot be filtrated. The aspect of it
which succeeded is its totality, not its particular components. If science and
technology is developing in Europe more than other places, [the reason of] this
should be looked for in the totality of it. The science and technology of today’s
Europe is directly the result of its general conditions and all of its components.
It is not something else. [...] If the European civilization prevailed, it did not do
it only with its science and technology. It did it with all aspects of it all the
positive and negative sides of it. [..] Borrowing bits and pieces from the
European civilization cannot and did not work. [..] Because civilization cannot
be divisible, those who wanted to takes only parts of it collided with it and
collapsed. The reason why we have struggled for hundred years and could not
get any result is because of this. (Ağaoğlu, 2012 [1919], p. 23-24)
As a result, Ahmet Ağaoğlu suggested a full scale adoption of all aspects of
the European civilization for the Ottoman society to benefit from its science and
technology even if it would cost losing some of the characteristics of the nation.
Arguing that nations somehow retain their own unique personalities sui generis
even when they change their religions, moral standards, laws and their music and
architecture. All nations have changed their religions at least once in their history
and moral standards are not static either. Since this is the case, nations, depending
on their level of progress, can take or develop whatever they need. Therefore, the
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Ottoman society, too, should not be hesitant to fully enter into the Western
civilization in order to enter into the path of progress according to Ahmet Ağaoğlu.
As it can be seen in the reformist ideas of Ahmet Rıza and Ahmet Ağaoğlu,
discussions regarding the question of why and how to barrow modern sciences and the
role of it in the progress of the Ottoman society were expanded into areas wider than
reforming educational institutions. And, the transition from the reconciliatory Young
Ottoman approach (e.g., Hoca Tahsin) to the approach of the Young Turks (e.g., Ahmet
Ağaoğlu) who prioritized the development of science over religion, as part of their
understanding of the progress in the direction of Westernization, indicates the
emergence of scientism as a counter force against religion. Indeed, Hanioğlu (2005, p.
32) suggests that science in the Ottoman society “was approaching the status of
religion” for a growing number of intellectuals since the second half of the nineteenth
century. For Hanioğlu, faith in science was gradually taking the place of religion.
In my opinion, it was not science which was replacing religion, it was the idea
of progress which was doing it. Religion, in its conventional meaning, is broader than
belief in God; it is a way of life centred on faith in God. The religion of progress is
centred on faith in science which, in my observation, was replacing faith in God in
different ways. Firstly, those who religiously believed in modern science were taking
contemporary scientific perspectives as their ultimate point of reference for explaining
how things work in the nature instead of referring to God for making sense of existence
and interpreting the natural phenomena. Secondly, they were emphasizing the power of
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scientific methods and technology, instead of trusting God, for the organization and
security of the conditions of life.
Widespread instrumentalization of science or knowledge for the improvement
of life was proposed as early as the 16th century by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who is
also considered as one of the pioneers of the philosophy of modern sciences. Criticizing
previous generations of philosophers for ignoring the study the real world (nature) and
for failing to utilize the knowledge thereof for the benefit of human beings, Bacon
presented the aim of knowledge as increasing human beings’ happiness and eliminating
their sufferings (Bury, 1955, p. 50-51). In his uncompleted utopian work New Atlantis
(2014 [1900]), Bacon outlined the framework of a Collage of Research which, through
the innovations made therein, improved the lives of the community surrounding it and
made its members happy. In doing so, Bacon attributed secularly oriented significance
to knowledge, education and educational institutions, a trend which continued after him
and characterized the Enlightenment’s utilitarian approach to knowledge and science.
The idea of progress through scientific discoveries and socio-economic development
which became one of the most influential ideology, perhaps the strongest one, in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the Western World. It increasingly became the
governing principle, or in other words the religion, of modern societies. Although the
secularist religion which was based on the idea of progress is mostly attributed to the
positivist sociologist Auguste Comte, religiously perceived conceptions of the idea of
progress gradually dominated the Western world since the Enlightenment and it was
expanded into the other parts of the world in varying degrees.
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John B. Bury (1955), Karl Löwith (1949, p. 60) and Alain de Benoist (2008,
p.7) agree that the idea of progress can be considered as “the religion of Western
civilization.” Emerging as early as the mid-seventeenth century, the idea of progress
projected historical change as a cumulative process by which conditions of life evolve
universally and linearly towards the direction of the better. Such an idea is not only
about the description of the nature of socio-historical change, it is also an ideology
which adheres to the conviction that this a kind of a change must take place.
The idea that progress is a necessity is an ideological position and depending on
the context it motivates and mobilizes human action. In this sense, human beings are
implicitly attributed the sovereign mastery over the nature and the society. Thus, the
idea of progress has implications with regard to the questions of what the nature is,
what the purposes of its existence are, and with respect to the questions of who human
beings are and what their purpose of existence is. In this sense, the idea of progress
have moral philosophical implications. Therefore, the idea of progress has ontological
and moral philosophical implications as well. Because the ideology of progress is
mostly, but not exclusively, projected as a macro process of social change, it entails
social engineering in terms of the rearrangement of societal institutions. That is why,
the idea of progress has political philosophical implications as well.
The idea of progress also attributed meaning to social change and to the
unfolding of history. Although, attributing meaning to history did not start with the rise
of the idea of progress in the seventeenth century (Löwith, 1949; Nisbet, 1980; de
Benoist, 2008), the uniqueness of attributing meaning to history in the theorization of
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progress is its secularist character. Religious perspectives (scripture, theologians, clergy
etc.) attributed meaning to history, too, but theirs was in the form of reading history as
the realization of divine providence. It was with the expansion of the Enlightenment
that human beings began collectively attributing meaning to history independent of
God’s providence.
For Löwith (1949, p. 60), a doctrine of progress could not arise insofar as the
doctrine of God’s providence is unchallenged. In addition, religious conception of life
and human flourishing encompasses the life before and after the grave and the ultimate
goal is the felicity in the latter. The idea of progress perceives the improvement of the
conditions of life exclusively in this world. Such an improvement is projected in the
years and the generations to come (Bury, 1921). That is why the modern conception of
progress is inherently anti-religious, which in the case of the Enlightenment was
substantiated by naturalism, positivism, materialism and rationalism. This, I think,
explains why many prominent figures who promoted and in some cases religiously
supported the idea of progress were also atheists, anti-clerical and/or anti-religious
individuals. Voltaire (1694-1778), for example, presented the Church as the main
obstacle to progress in his Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations (1756) in which he
chronicled the progress of human reason in history (Topazio, 1959). Condorcet (17431794) shared similar perspectives in his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress
of the Human Mind (Ex: 1955 [1795]). For him, the advancement of scientific methods
and knowledge will enlighten the people who will break the shackles of the unfreedom
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of the religious regime. Proudhon (1809-1865) took another aggressive stance against
religion in The Philosophy of Progress (2009 [1853]).
Let us speak then of religion, of that respectable faith, towards which the
unbelieving still know only how to express contempt, the believer to form only
wishes, and in order to summarize in a word all that matter, tackle the problem
of Divinity. Here again I find myself placed on new terrain, where the idea of
Progress comes to reform all that which has been written and taught by the
learned, in the name of the Absolute. (p. 24)
The list of the philosophers and ideologues who approached the notion of
progress from a perspective antithetical to religion can be expanded. However, the idea
of progress was not limited to intellectual circles. It was also popularized and put into
practice by political establishments in different ways. The idea of development is one
major example. Although these two notions, progress and development, are strongly
related and interchangeably used in certain contexts, they have different connotations
with regard to the areas and the scope of change. Development is mainly understood in
economic terms and it mostly refers to the processes of macro social change in material
conditions of life. The notion of progress, however, is broader horizontally and
vertically. Its connotations encompass transformations in material (economy,
technology etc.) and nonmaterial (philosophy, ideology, culture etc.) conditions as well
as changes in individual (micro) and societal (macro) levels. Perhaps one might suggest
that developmentalism is the macro level application of the ideology of progress into
areas such as economics, technology, education, health, infrastructure, government and
other socio-economic and socio-political institutions. Hence, it might be argued, the
idea of development drives from the ideology of progress which means that
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philosophical connotations of the ideology of progress can be traceable in the idealistic
and practical aspects of developmentalism.
Historical sociologist Philip McMichael, in his book Development and Social
Change (2011) established a link between developmental projects, capitalism in
particular, and utilitarian conceptions of the good. For him, capitalism “is based in
Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy of common good”. Besides, McMichael
pointed to a connection between “the pursuit of individual self-interest” and the
capitalist variant of the developmental project (p. 50). The entire (capitalist) system is
organized around the goal of producing utility (good) for the highest possible number
of individuals in the society. Socialism stands out as the opposite alternative to
capitalism with regard to the question of if and how economic production should be
regulated. Capitalism is mostly concerned about the individual whereas socialism
prioritizes collective needs of human beings (Ogles, 2007). The socialist system in its
idealized form aims to produce utility for the collective. Nevertheless, socialism is, too,
based on -its own- ideals of how to better serve the needs of human beings and how to
make them happy.
Capitalism and socialism -or any other form of centralized forms of
developmental projects emphasizing the role of centralized state and regulated
economy- are two alternative interpretations of the idea of progress at the macro
(societal) level. They provide alternative secularist perspectives about the perfectibility
of social, economic, cultural and political institutions, the society and eventually the
entire human civilization. These two developmental projects or a combination of them
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at varying degrees have been applied by almost all of the governments in modern times.
In the Ottoman Empire, it was the centralist conception of developmentalism,
supported by Ahmet Rıza and the Committee of the Union and Progress, which
prevailed over the more liberalist and individualist form of developmentalism promoted
by Prince Sabahaddin and his organization The League of Private Enterprise and
Decentralization. The form of developmentalism which was more centralist and
collectivist than it was liberalist and individualist continued to be implemented after the
establishment of the Turkish Republic as well.
The idea of progress is not only about the perfectibility of the society and the
advancement of the human civilization, it is also, and more importantly, about the
perfectibility of human beings at the micro level. In this ideology, the progress of
civilization is both a result and a precursor to the perfectibility of human beings. Put
differently, the progress of civilization is both an outcome and the precondition to the
fulfilment of human beings’ potentials and desires, the strongest of which is the
attainment of happiness. As Nispet (2000) explains,
The idea of progress centers upon man’s [sic] moral and spiritual condition on
earth, his happiness, his freedom from torments of nature and society and above
all his serenity and tranquility. The goal of progress or advancement, on earth,
of these spiritual and moral virtues, thus leading toward ever-greater perfection
of human nature. (p. 5)
In saying that the idea of progress projects earthly moral and spiritual guidelines
for human beings and that the idea of progress formulates and offers an alternative
(earthly) definition of human happiness and the ways to be secured from the pressures
of the nature, Nisbet contends that the idea of progress has its own secularist moral
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philosophy. In such a formulation, the ultimate purpose of human beings is selfrealization and the attainment of happiness in this world. Religion, too, offers directions
for happiness but it does it so by pointing to happiness in the hereafter. Attainment of
happiness is confined to joy, felicity and tranquility in this world in the conception of
the idea of progress. Another difference is that, religion, (in Nisbet’s (2000) words,
Christianity) prioritizes salvation over happiness (p. 8).
The issue of human perfectibility has been less often emphasized in the idea of
progress compared to the emphasis put on the perfectibility of the society. In addition,
there have been variations across different societies in terms the relative degrees of
emphasis given to the perfectibility of the society and human beings. For example, the
French Enlightenment was more collective in its orientation than others. Secularist
ideas regarding the perfectibility of the society in the form of national development
were abundant there. However, the French Enlightenment was short on ideas regarding
the perfectibility of human beings as individuals unlike the British Enlightenment
which produced Lockean and Benthamite conceptions of human perfectibility
(Passmore, 1970, p. 190). Perhaps because the Ottoman intelligentsia were influenced
strongly by the ideologues of the French and to a certain degree by the German
Enlightenment, which, too, was more collectivist in its orientation, exponents of the
idea of progress in the Turkish history predominantly focused on issues pertaining to
the perfectibility of the society.
Nevertheless, micro level implications of the idea of progress can also be found
in the justifications presented for the macro (societal) level applications of it. For
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example, many in the French Enlightenment movement, including the Encyclopaedists
who played an enormous role in the popularization of science, perceived the purpose of
existence and the progress of the society and of the government as facilitating “the
attainment of terrestrial happiness by its members” (Bury, 1955, p. 173). Therefore, the
ultimate goal of societal organization and its progress is the temporal (terrestrial)
happiness of individuals. In other words, it is the well-being and desires of the
individuals which are at the center. Secondly, the idea of progress sees human beings as
the master of not only their own destiny but also of the nature. It is through the will,
needs and desires of the human beings that the nature and the society should be
controlled and manipulated or else human beings run the risk of “getting into the mercy
of an external will” (Bury, 1955, p.5). By the use of their own will and their own
reason, human beings can and will continue in the path of progress from savagery to the
highest points of civilization and thus they will create, in desirable ways, a society
which will increase its members’ happiness (Elliott, 1982, p. 471). In this sense, the
development of idea of progress is about "an increased sense of the possibilities of
human action, human happiness, human decency, in this life" (Hamilton, 1966, p. 157159; as cited in Marty, 1982, p. 495). Therefore, the idea of progress, as it is finely
described by Keohane (1982) is “the fascination with the human effort to improve the
human condition”19 (p. 26).

I borrowed the phrase “the human effort to improve the human condition” which is included
in the title of this subsection from these words of Keohane.
19
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There are three sides of the human effort to prepare and improve the conditions
for the fulfillment of human potentials and for the attainment of happiness. These are
freedom, knowledge and power. Especially in the eighteenth and the nineteenth
centuries, the Enlightenment Movement, including the pioneers of the idea of progress
emphasized freedom and liberty as prerequisites for the improvement of the human
condition and for the pursuit of happiness (Nisbet, 1980, p. 179-236). In many cases,
Enlightenment philosophers presented and defended freedom and liberty as a
counterforce against religion. Put it differently, they saw religion as the biggest obstacle
against the development and expansion of the freedom.to pursue the potentials offered
by the secular perfectibility of human nature. For example, Condorcet (1795 [1955]),
whose ideas contributed substantially to the development of the idea of progress, said in
the introduction of his book Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the
Human Mind:
[N]ature has set no term to the perfection of human faculties; that the
perfectibility of man is truly indefinite; and that the progress of this
perfectibility, from now on words independent of any power that might wish to
halt it, has no other limits than the duration of the globe upon which nature has
cast us. This progress will doubtless vary in speed, but it will never be reversed
as long as the earth occupies its present place in the system of the universe, and
as long as the general laws of the system produce neither a general cataclysm
nor such changes as will deprive the human race of its present faculties and its
present resources. (p. 4-5)
Similar ideas were expressed by humanists in more contemporary societies. For
instance, Joseph Leon Blau, who was part of the group which signed the manifesto A
Secular Humanist Declaration in 1980 in the United States, contended that the greatest
goal and obligation of human beings was the fulfillment of his or her potential for

227
growth and striving towards infinite perfection without relying on revelation or any
other form of supernatural intervention. Thereby, Blau espoused a secularist moral
philosophy in which human beings are positioned at the center of the moral order which
fosters aspirations for “the human effort to improve the human condition”
(Wohlgelernter, 1993, p. lxi).
By way of reading French philosophes and through being actively engaged
in the public debates of the French society during their education and exile, the
Ottoman intelligentsia including both the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks
were heavily influenced by the libertarian ideas of the Enlightenment. In the
beginning, their demand of liberty was not from the religious establishment or from
religious dogmas but from the authoritarian bureaucracy and the Sultan. The Young
Turks took a more critical stance against religion in their articulation of the need for
the expansion of freedom but it was after the establishment of the Turkish Republic
that “freedom from religion” became one of the tenets of the new regime. (Yavuz,
2009, 153; Çağatay, 2014, p. 45).
Exaltation of secular knowledge was the second component of the human effort
to improve the human condition. Because happiness involves the sense of security from
the pressures of the nature and the society as well as benefitting from the resources they
contain, the knowledge of the nature and the society are critical for human flourishing.
The knowledge of the nature of human beings is equally important in this respect.
Prescriptions for human happiness can best be prepared only when their nature is well
known and when the subsequent question of what makes them happy is correctly
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answered. As it was described Koahane (1982, p. 33), the idea of “controlling human
behavior even shaping human nature, to ensure that men would pursue their own
secular happiness efficiently” was one of the defining characteristics of the idea of
progress. Only a fuller understanding of both sides, the nature and human beings, can
help human beings fulfill their potentials and be happy.
Emphasizing the superiority scientific knowledge was one of the defining
characteristics of the European Enlightenment Movement which was introduced into
the other parts of the world and the Muslim World was no exception. Ottoman
intellectuals translated and published the works of European thinkers who emphasized
these ideas. For example, Münif Pasha, who took part in the establishment of Cemiyet-i
İlmiye-i Osmaniye (The Ottoman Scientific Society) and in the publication of Mecmuai Funun (Journal of Sciences) translated the works of French philosophes (Mardin,
1962, p. 285) Voltaire, Fenelon, and Fontenelle and published Muhaverat-ı Hikemiye
(Philosophical Dialogues) which was an anthology of the selected writings of these
thinkers who emphasized “the supremacy of reason over superstition and the
importance of enlightenment and education” (Berkes, 1964, p. 199).
The emphasis on the superiority of scientific knowledge grew stronger over
time in the late Ottoman society and eventually in the Modern Turkish Republic to a
degree that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's words “Hayatta en hakiki murşit ilimdir fendir”
(The most truthful guide in life is knowledge and science) became the motto of not only
the educational system but also of the state and its secularist cadres.
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Figure 11. The emblem of the journal Funun ve Sanayi (Science and Industry)
Headline(s): Those who do not comprehend the subtleties of fine arts and
artisanship come into and depart this world of wonders blindly. (Fehmetmeyen
dekaiki nefise-i sanayii, ibretistan-i aleme ama gelir gider.)
Inscriptions on the image: 1: Science (Funun) 2: Culture/Civilization
(Umran) 3: Perseverance (Sebat) 4: Knowledge (Marifet) 5: Technology
(Sanat) 6: Effort/Industry (Gayret)
A combination of the secularist emphasis on freedom and knowledge, fostered
in the Enlightenment movement, was reflected in the exaltation of the use of one’s own
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“reason.” Science has been presented as the result and as an achievement of the free use
of reason, which was generally, if not universally, perceived and presented in the
Enlightenment movement and in the groups and societies it influenced, including
contemporary the world, as the free and independent human capability to know the
nature of things. To give an example from the contemporary world, an institution
established by the famous atheist Richard Dawkin’s presented its mission in a similar
way.
The mission of the Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science is to
support scientific education, critical thinking and evidence-based understanding
of the natural world in the quest to overcome religious fundamentalism,
superstition, intolerance and suffering20.
The other third aspect of the human effort to achieve these goals, is the will and
power to control and manipulate the nature and to organize the society in order to
prepare the environment for the improvement of the human condition and to dispel
elements and forces which might pose threats to the prospects of these ideals. On the
one side, the development of science, in the modern secularist conception of the idea of
progress, offers the accurate and reliable knowledge of the nature, human beings and
the society. On the other hand, technology together with the centralized organization
and regulation the society provides the power needed for human flourishing. Centrally
governed developmental projects, such as capitalism and socialism, are the mechanism
through which knowledge and power are improved and utilized for the benefit of the
members of the society. Therefore, knowledge and power or in other words science and
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technology, and centralized political organization are integral parts of the human
endeavor to improve the human condition.
According to Canadian social philosopher Charles Taylor, the idea of the
improvement of human condition and the agency attributed to human beings not only
transformed the moral orientation of individuals but also secularized a large segment of
modern societies. Parallel to the rise of this secularist understanding of the
improvement of the human condition, “new conceptions of the good and new locations
of moral sources such as the notion of self responsibility and new definitions of
freedom and reason as well as a new sense of dignity” came into existence (1989, p.
177). This, for Taylor, is the defining characteristic of modern secular societies.
The idea of progress through the development and application of modern
sciences was not promoted, first in Europe and subsequently in the Ottoman Empire,
only as a competent and necessary method for the improvement and perfection of the
conditions of life and therefore, for the attainment of happiness by human beings.
Strongly influenced by Lamarckian, Büchnerian and Darwinian theories of evolution,
the idea of progress was also presented and justified by some of the prominent
members (e.g., Beşir Fuad, Abdullah Cevdet) of the secularist fraction in the Young
Turks movement as part of a universal law of evolution which rules over the nature,
living beings in particular, and over the society (Doğan, 2012).
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Ontological interpretations of science in the late Ottoman society. Beşir
Fuad was another figure who represented the transition from the Young Ottoman
reformist thought to the secularist fraction of the Young Turk ideology. If Beşir Fuat
represented a sharp transformation to an openly secularist Westernization ideology at
the intellectual level regarding the construction of reality, Ahmet Rıza Bey represented
a similar, albeit a softer one compared to that of Beşir Fuat’s, transition in terms of the
application of secularist worldviews (i.e., positivism and materialism) in economic,
social and political organization of the society which was formulated in the idea of
progress.
Born in 1852 to the family of a man named Hurşit Pasha who served as the
mutasarrıf (governor) of Maraş and Adana (Sevgi and Özcan, 2005, p. 264), Beşir Fuad
started his education at a rüşdiye in Istanbul. Afterwards, he attended a Jesuit school in
Syria and continued his educational career at the Military academy (Askeri İdadi) in
Istanbul (Okay, 1969, p.56-58) and received his final degree from the War Academy
(Harbiye). After graduation and serving as the aide de camp (yaver) of the Sultan
(Abdulaziz), he continued as a soldier who fought in the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish
War. Having left the army after the war, Beşir Fuad continued his career as a writer
(Fuad & İnci, 1999, p. 1). He knew French, German and English well enough to write
introductory grammar books in these languages for the Ottoman learners (Mardin,
1983, p. 56). However, Beşir Fuad did not understand Arabic or Persian. He was able to
read the Qur’an from the French translation (Berkes, 1964, p. 293).
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Although he died at an early age (35), Beşir Fuat was one of the most prominent
intellectuals of 1880’s (Mardin, 1983, p. 56; Hanioğlu, 1995b, p. 16). Having written
articles about modern science, philosophy and the philosophes of the Enlightenment
movement in the newspaper Tercuman (Mardin, 1983, p. 56), Beşir Fuat is most
famous for being one of the pioneers of naturalism, empiricism and positivism in the
history of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. As M. Orhan Okay, who wrote the most
extensive biographical work on Beşir Fuad, reports (2012, p. 49), it was the German
materialist Ludwig Büchner (1824 –1899), which left the strongest footprint in his
intellectual life. Büchner and especially his book Kraft und Stoff21 (Matter and Force)
are the ones mentioned the most in Beşir Fuad’s publications and in the letters he
exchanged with his friends. In a letter he wrote to his close friend Muallim Naci, a
faithful Muslim, Beşir Fuad, said:
Whatever we investigate from the existing beings, two things attract our
attention at the first sight: matter and force. In order to fully appreciate the
significance of these two concepts, we should remember that a book which
appeared with the same title revolutionized the world of philosophy. (In Okay,
1969, p. 184-185).
Although Beşir Fuad is known as one of the pioneers of positivism and
materialism in the late Ottoman society, his influence at the popular level was limited
perhaps because his positivist and materialist ideas were scattered around in his literary
works. However, his biographer Okay (1969, p. 215) claims that Beşir Fuad had a
greater influence over other Ottoman intellectuals such as Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmet
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Kraft und Stoff: Empirisch-naturphilosophische Studien (Force and Matter: EmpirocoPhilosophical Studies) 1855.
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Nebil and Baha Tevfik. These intellectuals spread the materialist ideas of Büchner
more explicitly and systematically.
Abdullah Cevdet was born in 1869 to a strongly religious Kurdish family in the
town of Arapgir in the Eastern province of Harput. His father was a battalion clerk
(Creel, 1978, p. 10) and his mother was a housewife. His uncle was an ordained imam
(Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 6). Having completed his elementary level education in Hozat and
Arapgir, he was enrolled in the military rüşdiye (middle school) in the city of Mamurat
el-Aziz (Elazığ). Upon successfully finishing his studies at this school, Abdullah
Cevdet was enrolled in the Kuleli Military Medical Preparatory School in Istanbul in
1885. By the time he moved to Istanbul for his education, oppositional ideas against the
rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II were already expanded into civilian and military schools.
Although Hanioğlu (1966, p. 5-6) points to the lack of reliable information about
Abdullah Cevdet’s relationship with these ideas, Creel (1978, p. 10-11) contends that
he started discussing issues regarding “the state of the nation” with his close friends
such as Konyalı Hikmet Emin, Kafkasyalı Mehmed Reşid and Diyarbakırlı Ishak
Sükuti.
After graduating from Kuleli, Abdullah Cevdet and his close friends started
studying at the Gülhane Military Medical Academy in Istanbul where they became
more actively involved in political issues (Creel, 1978, p. 11). As Hanioğlu (1966, p. 610) puts it, the Military Medical Academy in Istanbul was one of the centers of
oppositional ideologies mostly because of the exposure of the students of this school to
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positivist and materials ideas through their access to the books printed in Europe and to
foreign, mostly French, instructors who were emphatic to such ideas.
As it is mentioned above, Abdullah Cevdet and his close friends (e.g., Mehmed
Reşid and İbrahim Temo) established the secret society of İttihad-ı Osmani (the
Ottoman Union) in 1889 with the purpose of restoring the 1876 constitution and
Ottoman Parliament which were suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878. The
society of İttihad-ı Osmani was expanded into other schools in Istanbul and eventually
it was named as İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Committee of Union and Progress).
As it is described above the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP) eventually
dominated oppositional movements in the late Ottoman history and executed the Young
Turks revolution of 1908. Although Abdullah Cevdet was among its founders, his
influence in the CUP had been very limited especially after Ahmet Rıza’s participation
in the movement. By the time the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 unfolded, Abdullah
Cevdet was already marginalized in the CUP. However, Abdullah Cevdet continued to
play influential roles in the development of secularist ideas and ideologies in the late
Ottoman society.
As Zürcher (2005, p. 16) observed, Abdullah Cevdet became the most radical
and outspoken secularist (materialist) in the Young Turks movement. Although he
came from a strongly religious family, it did not take long for Abdullah Cevdet to be
attracted to positivist and (biological) materialist ideas he was exposed to during his
studies at the Military Medical Academy in Istanbul. One of the turning points in his
life in this regards was when his friend İbrahim Temo gave him French biologist Felix
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Isnard’s book Spiritualisme et Matérialisme (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 12-13). In this book,
Isnard (1879) asserted that the truth and the nature of things could only be understood
by way of scientific inquiry and that doubt should be cast on ideas and claims if they
are not demonstrated by reasoning or by science. In the same book, Isnard also went on
to make moral philosophical claims. As he argued it, religions could not be a true
source of morality especially in contemporary societies because they were are not based
on empirical and rational foundations. That is why, Isnard contended, scientific
materialism would and should replace all other moral systems which were not based on
these principles.
Abdullah Cevdet was moved by the ideas of Isnard and motivated to present
them to the Ottoman public. However, a greater influence came when Abdullah Cevdet
was acquainted with the materialist ideas of German materialist Büchner and his book
Kraft und Stoff (Matter and Energy). Büchner’s writings and his materialistic arguments
were already known among the secularist Young Turk intellectuals such as Beşir Fuad
but it was Abdullah Cevdet who to a much greater extent popularized Büchner and his
ideas.
The main idea Büchner presented in his Kraft und Stoff and in his other
materialist writings was the metaphysical materialist argument that all that exist in the
universe were either matter or things and processes which arise out of the motions and
interactions of material forms of existences at the micro and macro levels. By this
axiom, Büchner, like other metaphysical materialists, aimed at disproving the existence
of non-material beings and elements. According to this position, for example, what
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human beings experience in their consciousness are all outcomes of biological therefore
material processes. There is no soul or other forms of consciousness which are not
based on matter or on the motions and interactions of it.
Büchner also argued that the sources of all kinds of changes (motions and
interactions) observed in material forms of existences were due to the force (energy)
which are inseparably included in the material beings because there is no observable
force (energy) in the universe which does not come from material forms of existences.
As a consequence of these two axioms, Büchner also argued that matter and force were
eternal. Thus, Büchner wanted to negate the idea that what is observed in the universe
were because of the creation or intervention of another source of power. In other words,
Büchner, by presenting these axioms, was not only making ontological and
epistemological arguments, he was also attacking religious worldviews including the
idea that the universe and all that it contains were the creations of a source (e.g., God)
which is outside and above the observed forms of existences.
[T]hose who talk about an independent or supernatural force, which has evolved
the universe out of itself or out of nothing, are in antagonism with the first and
simple axiom of philosophical view of nature, grounded on experience and
reality. Neither can force create matter, nor matter force, for we have seen that a
separate existence of these is neither empirically possible nor logically
imaginable. But things which cannot be separated can never exist separately.
That the universe cannot have risen out of nothing we shall find presently, we
treat of the conservation or eternity of matter and force. [...] Never can nothing
became something, nor something nothing. [...] The universe or matter with its
properties, conditions or movements, which we name forces, must have existed
from and will exist to all eternity, or -in other words- the universe cannot have
been created. (Büchner, 1884, p. 10)
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Similarly, Büchner contended that just as there is no (creative) force outside and
disconnected from matter, there is not and there cannot be a source of order which
regulates and dictates the interactions and relationships between different forms of
matter and material existence. In other words, there is not a law-giver outside and
independent from the Nature. What we observe as patterns and laws in Nature,
according to Büchner (1864, p. 93-94), are the natural and absolutely necessary
expressions, motions and interactions of all physical forces and their properties. As
such, the laws of Nature do not exist outside matter or Nature and they are not
accessible to outside interference without any exception. Consequently, the laws of
Nature are immutable and eternal like force and matter, they are not created. Therefore,
[E]verything that happens, has happened, and shall happen; happens, has
happened and shall happen naturally [...] in a manner that rests exclusively on
the regular working together or interactions of materials that have existed from
all eternity and of the natural forces united with them. (Büchner, 1864, p. 95)
In this regard, Büchner appropriated a mechanistic worldview based on the
deterministic principles of Newtonian physics. Whatever happens in Nature, happens
because the nature and properties of matter necessarily and absolutely dictates it so. Put
differently, causes in Nature are the ultimate sources of every form of existence and
being. Nothing can happen or exist without the dictation of the causes (matter and
energy) in Nature. Alternatively, nothing can ultimately reverse or stop the necessary
outcomes of the properties and interactions of matter in the universe. On the other hand,
however, Büchner contended that biological life could progressively acquire new
properties and therefore transform and develop over time from the simplest to most
complex form due to what he called “the general law of variation” and “with the help of
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natural phenomena.” This, for him, was yet another evidence that everything including
living beings existed, exists and will exist in whatever form they might have had
because of the forces of Nature not because of outside interference(s). We are
fascinated and perplexed with what we observe in Nature because we see the end result
of these processes which took millions of years to perfect itself.
Whatever may have been the nature of the process of evolution as regards the
details, however much may yet remain obscure and doubtful in regard to the
exact manner in which the organic formation has taken place, this much at any
rate we can aver with certainty: that it has, and must have, happened without the
interference of a super-natural power. If at the present day this creation, while
we survey the surrounding Nature, impresses us beyond measure, and if we
cannot entirely repel the intellectual impression which points to the existence of
a direct creative power, this feeling is in reality to be accounted for by the fact
that we see the final results of natural forces that have worked through many
millions of years spread out before us in one aggregate picture, and that, while
we look only at the present, without remembering the past, it is difficult for us
to imagine at first sight that Nature has evolved all this out of herself. (Büchner,
1894, p. 211)
In explaining his materialist, naturalist and evolutionist perspectives, Büchner
was not only presenting philosophical arguments, he was also urging his audience to
liberate themselves and the society from the “childish nonsense, false convictions and
superstitious dogmas of the past”. Just as biological life gets perfected over time, the
society, too, can and should be perfected by being liberated from the primitive ideas of
the past chiefly including religious dogmas. Education of the masses through scientific
methods should be the way to achieve this goal. In this regard, Büchner found a
stronger voice and following in the late Ottoman society perhaps more than he did in
Germany and other European societies. It was Abdullah Cevdet who vigorously
presented the materialist and naturalist ideas of Büchner and the ideas of other
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materialist and naturalist philosophers (e.g., Felix Isnard, Gustave Le Bon) in the
Ottoman society.
In addition to helping establish the secret of İttihad-ı Osmani which later grew
into the CUP, Abdullah Cevdet had already started translating the works of European
philosophers while he was still a student at the Military Medical Academy. In 1890,
Abdullah Cevdet translated one of the chapters of Kraft und Stoff into Turkish which
was the first translation of Büchner’s works in the Ottoman history (Hanioğlu, 1981, p.
12-13; Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 226). The complete translation of Kraft und Stoff was done in
1911 by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil (Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 226). Abdullah Cevdet
translated another chapter from the first volume of Büchner’s Science et nature: essais
de philosophie et de science naturelle in 1891 (Hanioğlu, 2009, p. 16-17).
In the same year (1891), he also started compiling the compendium Funun ve
Felsefe (Science and Philosophy) which included statements from a long list of nonMuslim and Muslim philosophers, scholars, theologians, politicians and poets mostly
about philosophy, science and knowledge. It seems that by bringing together statements
from Western secular philosophers and thinkers, and from Muslim sources, Abdullah
Cevdet wanted to appeal to his audience in the Ottoman society where religious
sensitivities were still very strong and to convince them that the ideas he borrowed
from European philosophers were already confirmed and supported by Muslim
scholars. One of the first quotations he included in this volume and the interpretations
Abdullah Cevdet (2009) provided in that context attests to this approach.
One of the virtuous scholars of Islam, al-Jurjani [d. 1078], defined philosophy
in his Kitabu’t Tarifat as follows:
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It is striving by humanly possible ways towards becoming like God in order to
attain eternal happiness as it was pointed out by the truthful messenger of God
when he said: “be molded by the ethics of God,” which [according to al-Jurjani]
means, ‘try to be similar to God by obtaining comprehensive knowledge and by
becoming liberated from the limitations of corporeal existence.’
This is the best of definitions of philosophy and wisdom and it better describes
the approach of the Sufis. This definition also contains the brilliant truth
declared by [Friedrich Heinrich] Jacobi: “Human beings descended from
animals and they are destined to become gods”.
Similarly, al-Maarri’s verses,
The thing that perplexed [humans is];
The living being which is created from the lifeless
expresses the essence of the principles of what is called Darwinism. (In
Abdullah Cevdet, 2009 [1912], p. 49-50. Trans. ZN)
Although he occasionally referred to religious sources for supporting his
secularist arguments and saw religion as a feasible tool for the unification and
mobilization of masses towards secular goals, Abdullah Cevdet did not hesitate to
criticize religious dogmas and the backwardness of traditionally religious (Muslim)
societies. Besides directly and indirectly challenging the idea of the existence of God,
Abdullah Cevdet, departing from the works of materialists such as Ludwig Büchner
and Charles Letourneau, rejected the immortality of the soul (Hanioğlu, 2005).
Moreover, he translated the works of European orientalists such as Reinhart Dozy who
strongly criticized Islam and Muslims for being uncivilized and backward.
At the same time, Abdullah Cevdet remained as an activist who dedicated most
of his efforts for the introduction and prevalence of the ideas he synthesized from
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European scientific materialists and naturalists. Like many of the prominent members
of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks Movements, he was persecuted and
exiled which did not bar him from his activism. While he was in Geneva in 1904,
Abdullah Cevdet started publishing his own journal İçtihad (Regeneration) in Geneva
in which he wrote simplified articles about science and scientific discoveries with the
purpose of proving to the educated masses the supremacy of science and scientific
methods in all areas of individual and social life. In this journal, he also presented and
discussed social, economic and political problems of the Ottoman -and later on
Turkish- society.

Figure 12. Abdullah Cevdet
Abdullah Cevdet had a long lasting and often controversial legacy. In addition
to helping establish one of the most influential political movements (i.e., the CUP), he
is remembered as one of the strongest advocates of materialism, naturalism, (social)
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Darwinism and scientific revolution in the history of Turkey. In this respect, he is
considered with the gratitude of the secularists and with the aversion of the religious
individuals and groups as the mastermind and inspiration for the establishment of the
secularist Turkish Republic.
Abdullah Cevdet lived long enough to see the first decade of the modern
Turkish Republic and continued publishing his journal İçtihad until his death in 1932.
He charmingly praised the achievements of Atatürk and his secularist reforms, in an
article he wrote in İçtihad.
The last month of March (1924) has been recorded in the annals of history as a
rich and most brilliant and unforgettable month in the intellectual history of the
Turkish nation because of the significant and courageous transformations it
witnessed especially including the dissolvent of the Sheri'a (courts), the
unification of education [the abolishment of madrasas] and the abolishment of
Caliphate. (İçtihad, 1924, p. 3344. Trans. ZN)
Atatürk met with Abdullah Cevdet in Ankara in January 1925 (Creel, 1978, p.
26) and told him” “Doctor!, we are putting into practice what you have been
advocating”. However, Abdullah Cevdet occasionally criticized the new regime
especially after 1927 for their authoritarianism and for the inefficiency of educational
policies (Creel, 1978, p. 26).
Abdullah Cevdet was not the only Young Turk intellectual who presented and
defended materialist ideas of European philosophers. There were other Young Turks
who championed materialism and materialist philosophers perhaps more explicitly than
Abdullah Cevdet. For example, at around 1910 and 1911 Subhi Edhem in his book
Darwinism said:
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The idea that a creative power [God] bringing a particle let alone an object into
existence from nonexistence has fully been disproven with the emergence of the
idea of “force and matters” because natural sciences perceive matter as eternal
and immortal. Therefore, eternal things cannot be created. (As cited in Doğan,
2012, p. 197. Trans. ZN)
In 1909, Dr. Nami wrote an article in the journal Bahçe (Garden) introducing
Darwin and his theory of evolution and briefly comparing it to Lamarck’s theory of
evolution. In appraisal of the two especially Darwin, Dr. Nami concluded:
[Darwin] succeed [in formulating the evolutionary theory] somewhat similar to
Lamarck but stronger than him. This was not a negligible thing for the scientific
community. With his new theory of natural selection, Darwin was giving an end
to the old dogmas and destroying them from their roots and thus he was
preparing a scientific and marvelously rich platform for the naturalists. (As cited
in Doğan, 2012, p. 179. Trans. ZN).
The Turkish Republic: Top-down Secularization
The Turkish War of Independence and the Rise of Mustafa Kemal
Following the Armistice of Mudros (30 October 1918) which mandated the
dissolution of the Ottoman armed forces and gave the Allied Forces the right to occupy
strategic parts of Turkey if and when they deemed necessary (Macfie, 2013, p. 173181), the vast majority of the remaining Ottoman lands were occupied by Britain,
Greece, France and Italy. Mustafa Kemal who rose to prominence because of his
contributions in the Ottoman Army’s defense against the Allied Forces in the Gallipoli
Campaign (1915-1916), was given extensive military and civil powers and sent in the
spring of 1919 by the Ottoman War Ministry to Anatolia with the responsibility of
supervising the implementation of the armistice (Shaw & Shaw, p. 342). For some (i.e.,
Bıyıklıoğlu, 2000 [1959], p. 30-34; Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 342; Gawrych, 2013, p. 65-
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66), those who appointed Mustafa Kemal to this duty, including the Grand Vizier and
the Sultan, expected that under the disguise of supervising the disarmament of the
army, he would organize a resistance movement. Because the Ottoman army was
demobilized with the armistice, local resistance organizations were already formed in
Anatolia and Rumelia. Mustafa Kemal was expected to unify and organized these local
resistance movements which were scattered around Anatolia and Rumelia.
After setting foot on Samsun on 19 Mayıs 1919, Mustafa Kemal assumed the
leadership role in the organization of several congresses. The first proclamation of
resistance was issued in Amasya on June 22, 1919. Two weeks later Mustafa Kemal
resigned from the army after exchanging disputing telegrams with the capital (Erickson,
2013, p. 33). Delegations from the resistance movements from several Eastern
provinces met in the first congress of the independence movement which was held in
Erzurum between July 23 and August 7 under the auspices of Kazım Karabekir Pasha
(Mango, 2000, p.7). Mustafa Kemal was elected as the chairmen of the congress by
winning 38 of the 56 delegates’ votes (Dural, 2007, p. 55-56).
Around the time the congress was held, Mustafa Kemal and some of the other
prominent members of the resistance movement (i.e., Kara Vasıf, Bekir Sami, Esat
Pasha and Halide Edip) were considering the acceptance of foreign aid, but not
mandate, from the United States against the British encroachment (Kinross, 1964, p.
187; Akgün, 2009, p. 34). Eventually, this idea was rejected by the congress because of
the support the United States gave to the Armenian independence movement (Davison,
2013, p. 210). At the end, the congress issued a declaration emphasizing the need and
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commitment to the protection of the territorial integrity of the homeland, resistance to
foreign occupation and rejection of the mandate or protectorate of any foreign power. It
also established the Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) which was accorded
the authority and responsibility to implement the decisions made at the congress.
Mustafa Kemal was elected as the president of the Committee. (Symons, 2012, p. 103;
Zürcher, 2004, p. 150).
Sivas was home to the second independence movement congress which
convened in the beginning of September 1919. Decisions taken at this congress of the
resistance movement reinforced the proclamations made in the declaration of the
Erzurum Congress. However, unlike the regional scope of the Erzurum congress,
delegates from all parts of Turkey participated in the Sivas Congress (Davison, 1994, p.
176). In addition, one of articles of the declaration of Sivas Congress emphasized the
unity and brotherhood of different ethnic groups living in the remaining Ottoman lands.
“All Islamic elements living in the above mentioned domains [the Ottoman
lands within the armistice lines] are true brothers, imbued with feelings of
mutual respect and sacrifice for each other, and wholly respectful of racial and
social rights and local conditions.” (As cited in Mango, 2000, p. 10)
Upon receiving a telegram in support for the independence movement from
Hacı Musa Bey, the leader of the Mutki Tribe in the Kurdistan region, Mustafa Kemal
praised “the nobility of Kurdish people and applauded their religious attachment to the
caliphate and the Sultan as well as their eternal brotherhood with the Turks” (Gawrych,
2013, p. 88; Mango, 2000, p. 11).
Although the declaration of the Sivas Congress emphasized loyalty to the
Sultan, it called for the meeting of the Assembly of Deputies from all parts of the
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homeland at a place outside the capital which was under the British occupation.
Regional resistance movements were also unified under the structure of a single
organization, Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti (The Society to Defend
the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia). Heyet-i Temsiliye which was established in the
Erzurum Congress was given the responsibility of coordinating the operations of this
society and the army. The congress also established the position of the General
Commander of the National Forces of Anatolia. Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) (1882-1968) was
appointed to the position. Ali Fuat would report to the Representative Committee
(Heyet-i Temsiliye) and therefore to Mustafa Kemal who was its president (Gawrych,
2013, p. 82-84). Decisions made at the congress was sent by telegrams to a long list of
places in Turkey (Akgün, 2013).
In the meantime, the Ottoman Parliament convened in Istanbul for the last time
on March 18th, 1920 with the participation of only a fraction of its members. Majority
of the participants sympathized with the independence movement. The British who held
the city under occupation raided the parliament and arrested some of the participants
while others were able escape. Thus the Ottoman Parliament was closed down forever
which facilitated the establishment of a new parliament by the independence movement
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.
The declaration of the Sivas Congress called for a larger gathering of local
representatives. Because it was outside the reach of occupying forces and because of its
central location in Anatolia, the town of Ankara was chosen as the meeting place of the
representatives. Upon his arrival in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal was joined by İsmet Bey
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(İnönü) (1884-1973) who would become one of his closest friend and ally during the
War of Independence and after the establishment of the new republic.
After several days of preparation which included sessions of recitation of the
Qur’an in the mosques of the town, the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet
Meclisi) was opened with the procession led by three imams held on 23 April 1920.
The first meeting of the Assembly took place in the same day with the participation of
369 representatives who were sent to Ankara by the efforts of the local branches of The
Society to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (Kinross, 1964, p. 217).
As early as the Sivas Congress, Mustafa Kemal was increasingly gaining and
emphasizing independence from the Sultan and from the government in Istanbul.
However, the establishment of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara with the
participation of a large number of delegates from around the homeland marked a
turning point in the establishment of an independent government under his control and
leadership.
Only ten days before the opening of the Grand National Assembly, the
Şeyhülislam issued a fatwa (11 April 1920) declaring the government in Ankara as
infidels. In the following days, a group of Muftis and ulema in Ankara and in other
parts of the country issued counter-fatwas against the fatwa of the Şeyhülislam
contending that his ruling was not legitimate because he and his office was under the
control of the enemy (the allied forces). Among the ulema who nullified the fatwa of
the Şeyhülislam was Said Nursi who was one of the members of the Darü’l-Hikmeti’lİslamiye (Islamic Academy of Higher Learning).
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Figure 13. Mustafa Kemal (center-front) during the opening ceremony of the Grand
National Assembly, 23 April 1920.

In the formative stages of the independence movement and the new government
in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal did not use a discourse antithetical to religion. He rather
sought to utilize religious sentiments in order to unite the people of Anatolia who were
composed of different ethnic backgrounds and to gain the support of local religious
leaders for the independence movement against the occupying forces. Mustafa Kemal
was elected as the president of the Grand National Assembly. One of his main goals as
the leader of the independence movement and as the president of the Grand National
Assembly was to establish a new structure of coordination and cooperation between the
citizenry, the military and civil administrative bodies independent of the Sultan and the
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government in Istanbul. In other words, he assumed the leadership of forming a new
independent government in Ankara. One of the challenges he faced in this regard was
to unite and mobilize various ethnic groups living in Anatolia. In these days of
uncertainty, he saw religion (of Islam) as strong tool he could instrumentalize to
overcome this obstacle. In a speech he gave at the Grand National Assembly one month
after its formation, Mustafa Kemal said:
The individuals which constitute our Assembly are not only Turks, or Kurd, or
Laz, or Çerkez; but the components of the Nation of Islam composed of all. It is
a sincere community. Consequently, the nation that we strive to defend and
protect does not consist of single element. It is composed of various Muslim
Nations. (As cited in Özcan, 2012, p. 66)
By the time the new government was fully established in Ankara, the Allied
Forces (Britain, France and Italy) had mostly withdrawn their occupying forces from
the Ottoman lands including Istanbul. However, the Greeks remained with full force in
Western Anatolia and advanced further into the mainland following its occupation of
the coastal city of İzmir (Smyrna) on 15 May 1919. Therefore, the new government in
Ankara which grew out of the independence movement focused largely on the
preparations for the expulsion of Greeks from the lands they occupied.
As the full scale war with the Greeks drew nearer, the new government in
Ankara managed to form a regular army with a structure of a chain of command by
controlling and in some cases suppressing irregular bands of local resistance such as the
militia forces of Çerkes Ethem (1886-1948) (Kinross, 1964, p. 246-252). The Grand
National Assembly, in the first week of its foundation, passed the Anti-treason Law
(Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu). Four months later, İstiklal Mahkemeleri (Independence
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Tribunals) were established and given extraordinary powers accorded by the Antitreason Law. These developments enabled the new government to suppress any
opposition against its policies and operations and to punish army deserters (Zürcher,
1984, p. 146).
The first full scale encounter with the Greek military forces after the formation
of the regular army took place in the beginning of 1921 (9 to 11 January). The
independence army met the Greek reconnaissance forces in the valley of İnönü in the
vicinity of Eskişehir, under the command of İsmet Bey. The Battle resulted in the
withdrawal of the two sides but it was the independence army which claimed victory
because it gave a setback to the Greek forces which was three times its size. With their
sizes doubled, these two forces fought again in the same place in the spring of 1921,
which resulted in decisive Turkish victory. However, this did stop the advance of the
Greeks in the summer. Mustafa Kemal was appointed as the Army Chief of Staff (Baş
Komutan) on 5 August 1921 and commanded the army in the Battle of Sakarya (August
21-September 13, 1921) which halted the advance of the Greeks. After the yearlong
stalemate, the independence army launched a counterattack in August 1922 and in two
weeks chased out the Greek forces from Western Anatolia. The armistice officially
ending the war was signed in the town of Mudanya on October 14, 1922. Shortly after
the end of the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal abolished the Sultanate
and eventually established the new Turkish Republic in 1923 and started implementing
top-down secularist reforms.
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Ideological Backgrounds of Mustafa Kemal
Mustafa Kemal was born (as Mustafa) in the winter of 1880-1881 (Mango,
1999, p. 26) as the fourth of the six children of a middle class family in the city of
Salonica (Macfie, 1994, p. 12). His father, Ali Rıza Efendi (1839-1888), was of Turkish
and Albanian origins who started his professional career as a minor officer at the
Department of Pious Foundations (Evkaf) (Mango, 1999, p. 27) and continued as a
customs officer at the port of Salonica (Froembgen, 1935, p. 36). Resigning from this
post, he started a timber business with a friend (Macfie, 1994, p. 11; Lewis, 2002, p.
243). Ali Rıza Efendi died of typhus when his son Mustafa was only 7 years old
(Brock, 1954, p. 4). Zübeyde Hanım (1857-1923) was Mustafa’s mother who sent him
to a local religious school (mahalle mektebi) at an early age. However, his father Ali
Rıza Efendi took him from this school a few days later and enrolled him in a modern
secular school which was recently established in Salonica by the modernist
schoolmaster Şemsi Efendi (Macfie, 1994, p. 12-13). This school was renown in the
region for its discipline and the salutation of students and teachers in military style
(Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1986, p. 30).
Receiving disciplined education at Şemsi Efendi’s school might have inspired
Mustafa to become a soldier because he, at the age of twelve, was enrolled in the
Military Secondary School (Askeri Rüşdtiye) with his own efforts and against the will
of his mother. It is widely accepted that during his studies at this school that his
Mathematics teacher whose name was also Mustafa suggested young Mustafa to add
Kemal -which means perfection- to his name in order to prevent confusion at the
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school. From then on, he became known as Mustafa Kemal. However, Andrew Mango
(1999, p. 37) suggested that young Mustafa might have added Kemal to his name out of
his admiration for the Young Ottoman reformist Namık Kemal.
After graduating from this elementary military school in 1896 as the fourth best
student (Mango, 1999, p. 40), Mustafa Kemal started attending the Military High
School in Manastir (Manastır Askeri İdadisi) which provided him the opportunity to
learn French and to familiarize himself with the sociopolitical developments in the
Ottoman society. At this conjecture of his life, Mustafa became more interested in
patriotic ideals of the Ottoman intellectuals. As it is described by Volkan and Itzkowitz
(1986, p. 42-43), Mustafa Kemal was especially influenced by the patriotic poetry of
Namık Kemal. Upon reading one of his poems describing the desperation of the
Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal awakened to the idea of saving the motherland.
The enemy put his knife at the throat of the country,
There is no one to save the ill-fated mother.
In response, Mustafa Kemal paraphrased the last line of Namık Kemal’s poem
and proclaimed his aspirations to save the nation.
The enemy put his knife at the throat of the country,
There is someone to save the ill-fated mother.
(In Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1986, p. 42-43)
Mustafa Kemal graduated from Military High School in Manastir by graduating
second in his cohort of 700 students (Gawrych, 2006, p. 5). The next step at the
educational career of Mustafa Kemal was his enrollment in the War College (Mekteb-i
Harbiye) in Istanbul in 1899. However, Mustafa Kemal was not involved in ideological
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and political activism in the first year of his studies at the War College. As he
mentioned in an interview he gave to Ahmet Emin Yalman in 1922, “he was drawn into
the fantasy of youth” during his freshman year (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (2006 [19191938], p. 49). The college was located in the vicinity of Beyoğlu, Pera and Galata
which were the hub of entertainment in Istanbul with their cafes, bars and brothels.
Mustafa Kemal, like some other students of the college, frequented these places
(Kinross, 1965, p. 15; Volkan and Itzkowitz 1986, p. 48). His habit of heavy drinking,
which would eventually cause his death in 1938, started during these years. In Mustafa
Kemal’s own account, heavy drinking was, starting from his first year at the War
College, a way for him to cope with his overwhelming mental activity and the stress of
life. When asked by his doctor Hasan Rıza Soyak to reduce his alcohol consumption, he
said:
I've got to drink: my mind keeps on working hard and fast to the point of
suffering. I have to slow it down to rest it at times. When I was at the War
College and then at the Staff College, my mates in the dormitory usually had to
wake me up in the morning. At night my mind would get fixed on a problem,
and, as I thought about it, I was unable to sleep. I would spend the whole night
tossing and turning in my bed, until finally I dozed off exhausted just before
dawn. Then, naturally, I couldn't hear the sound of reveille. It's the same now.
When I don't drink, I can't sleep, and the distress stupefies me. (As cited in
Mango, 1999, p. 46)
However, Mustafa Kemal managed to focus on his studies especially in the
second year of college and started to be involved revolutionary activism. By this time,
secret revolutionary societies started emerging in modern military and civil academies.
As it is outlined in detail above, the revolutionary society of the Committee of Union
and Progress (the CUP) was established by a group of students in the Military Medical
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Academy in Istanbul around the same time Mustafa Kemal started his studies at the
Military Academy. The goal of this society was to work towards the reinstitution of the
constitution and the parliament which were suspended by the Sultan in 1878. The CUP
gained momentum when they reached out to the influential reformist dissidents such as
Ahmet Rıza and Mizancı Murat. Revolutionary discourse of such intellectuals and the
pioneers of reformist opposition like Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha were circulated in
the modern schools.
Another revolutionary influence came from the admiration of the French
Revolution and the military success of the Napoleonic armies among the students in
modern military schools in the Ottoman Empire (Mango, 1999, p. 49). In addition,
students at these academies had access to domestic and foreign newspapers reporting
significant developments and covering reformist and revolutionary ideas despite the
strong literary censorship imposed during the Hamidian Era (Gawrych, 2006, p. 13).
Thus, institutions of higher learning especially including military academies were
increasingly becoming politicized.
As he recalled later, the impact of revolutionary ideas were growing when
Mustafa Kemal was studying at the War College.
During the years at the War College political ideas emerged. We were still
unable to gain real insight into the situation. It was the period of Abdulhamid.
We were reading the books of Namık Kemal. Surveillance was tight. Most of
the time we found the chance to read only in the barracks after going to bed.
There seemed to be something wrong in the state of affairs if those who read
such patriotic works were under surveillance. But we could not completely
grasp the essence of it. (In Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1986, p. 47).
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With the goal of securing entry into the highly prestigious Staff College (Harp
Akademisi), Mustafa Kemal studied vigorously since his second year at the War
College (Turan, 2004, p. 46; Mango, 1999, p.46-47). Graduating fifth of 459 (Volkan &
Itzkowitz, 1986, p. 47), Mustafa Kemal, in 1902, enrolled in the Staff College where
his involvement in political issues was taken to another level. On the one side, he was
relentlessly studying and on the other side he was becoming more active in political
activism at his new school in Istanbul. Together with some of his close friends Mustafa
Kemal started producing a handwritten newspaper discussing prevalent problems in the
Ottoman state (Mango, 1999, p. 51) and supporting libertarian ideas (Karpat, 2000, p.
92 - 94).
He graduated from the Staff College in 1904 ranking fifth out of 43 and was
appointed as a staff captain. Mustafa Kemal described, in the interview he gave to
Ahmet Emin in 1922, that he and his friends secretly continued meeting and “carrying
out their political activism” at an apartment they rented in the name of a friend in
Istanbul. However, the activities of this group were intercepted when one of their
friends who was not part of their secretive circle approached and asked if he could stay
at the apartment by saying that he could not afford to rent his own place. This person,
who was actually a spy, informed the palace about the activities of Mustafa Kemal and
his friends who were arrested and jailed for about a month (Mango, 1999, p. 54-55;
Atatürk, 2006 [1919-1938], p. 42).
After their release, Mustafa Kemal was exiled to a cavalry unit in Syria where
he met another political exile also named Mustafa who had studied at the Military
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Medical Academy in Istanbul in which the CUP was established. Because of his
involvement in a plot, Mustafa (Cantekin) was arrested and exiled to Syria where he
opened a business in the local souk. Before the arrival of Mustafa Kemal, he had
established a small revolutionary political society called Vatan (Fatherland). Shortly
after meeting Mustafa (Cantekin) and learning about Vatan, Mustafa Kemal became a
member (Zürcher, 1984, p. 32-33). Assuming its leadership shortly thereafter, Mustafa
Kemal and opened new branches in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Beirut. Yet, the impact of this
revolutionary society was limited in greater part because it was far away from the
Balkanian provinces which were the hotbed of revolutionary fervor. Faced with this
challenge, Mustafa Kemal applied for and received a sick leave of four months and
went to his hometown Salonica where he continued his revolutionary activism. There,
he established a branch of the society of Vatan by changing its name to Vatan ve
Hürriyet Cemiyeti (Fatherland and Freedom Society) (Kinross, 1965, p. 32). As Gawry
(2006, p. 18-19) observed, the name of reflects the influence of the French Revolution
in Mustafa Kemal ideology.
When the capital discovered the presence of Mustafa Kemal and his
revolutionary activism in Macedonia, he went back to his post in Syria. However, he
was appointed to the General Staff in the Third Army in Salonica in 1907 (Kinross,
1965, p.32-33). Upon his return, Mustafa Kemal realized that his secret society was
overtaken by the CUP which by that time had emerged as the most dominant and
influential frontier of opposition and revolutionary movements in the Ottoman Empire.
He, too, became a member of the CUP but his stature was overshadowed by the
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prominent members of the committee primarily including Enver Pasha (Macfie, 1994,
p. 36-40). As such, Mustafa Kemal did not play a significant role in the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908 which was largely led by Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha and Niyazi Bey.
When the counterrevolution of 1909 (the 31 March Incident) unfolded, Mustafa Kemal
was dispatched to the Action Army as a minor officer under the command of Şevket
Pasha to suppress the uprisings.
By this time, Mustafa Kemal’s revolutionary and reformist ideology like most
of the Young Turks was becoming increasingly nationalist and secularist. Mustafa
Kemal’s nationalism before the establishment of the Turkish Republic was reflected in
his favorable perception of dissolution of the Empire as a precondition for the
establishment of a pristinely nationalist Turkish state (Hanioğlu, 2013, p.37). In
addition, Mustafa Kemal, like many of second generation peers in the Young Turks
Movement was heavily influenced by the materialist, positivist and scientist ideas of
the Enlightenment philosophers. For example, Mustafa Kemal read Ludwig Büchner’s
Kraft und Stoff (Matter and Energy) and struck by its emphasis on the materialist basis
of human thinking. Other famous materialists and positivists such as Baron d’Holbach,
Gustave Le Bon and Voltaire also had profound effect on the development of Mustafa
Kemal’s secularist worldviews (Tüfekçi, 1983; Hanioğlu, 2013, p. 52). Evolutionist
ideas of Darwin and other materialist ideologues influenced Mustafa Kemal as well. He
once declared that human beings were evolved from the fishes of the sea (Hanioğlu,
2013, p. 53).
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Establishment of the Turkish Republic: Secularism as a State Ideology
Mustafa Kemal rose to prominence after his success as a colonel in the Ottoman
war efforts against the Gallipoli Campaign of Allied Forces during the WWI. His
success landed him the opportunity to be sent to Anatolia by the Capital as an inspector
who would supervise the disarmament of the army which was mandated by the
Armistice of Mudros (1918). After arriving in Samsun in May 1919, Mustafa Kemal
assumed the leadership of the independence movement which was scattered around
different parts of the Anatolian peninsula. In so doing, he also pioneered the
establishment of the Grand National Assembly in 1920 and became its president. As it
is described at length above, Mustafa Kemal led the Turkish War of Independence
against the Greek Army which was backed by the Allied Forces.
The victorious end of the Turkish War of Independence greatly helped Mustafa
Kemal and his government to establish themselves at the national and international
levels as the competent authority in Anatolia. The new government signed treaties with
the great powers of the world such Britain, France and Russia. This encouraged the new
government to explicitly mobilize towards curbing the power of the Sultan and the
already incapacitated Ottoman government in Istanbul. It was only two weeks after the
War of Independence was officially ended (1 November 1922) that Mustafa Kemal
compelled the Grand National Assembly to declare the abolishment of the Sultanate.
During the articulation of the matter, he declared:
Gentlemen, sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone
because scholarship proves they should be; or through discussion and debate.
Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power and by force. It was
by force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and sultanate of the
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Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the
Turkish nation has rebelled and has put a stop to these usurpers, and has
effectively taken sovereignty and Sultanate into its own hands. This is an
accomplished fact. The question is merely how to give expression to it. This will
happen in any case. If those gathered here, the Assembly, and everyone else
could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if
they do not, the truth will soon find expression, but some heads may roll in the
process. (Lewis, 2002, p. 258) [Emphasis added]
The Ottoman dynasty had remained in power since 1299. When they, under the
command of Sultan Selim I, defeated the Memluks in 1517 in Egypt, the post of
Caliphate was transferred to the Ottoman dynasty. Thereafter, Ottoman rulers assumed
the title of Caliph in addition to their title Sultan. However, the institution of the
Caliphate was only a symbolic post and it did not have executive power separate from
the Sultanate. It was only after the ascension of Abdulhamid II to the throne that the
post of Caliphate started to be actively used as a tool to foster unity in the Muslim
World against the intrusions of the great powers of the West. After the dethroning of
Abdulhamid II, his brother Mehmed (Reşad) V reigned between 1909 and 1918 as the
Sultan Caliph. After his death, Mehmed (Vahdettin) VI (1861-1926) was crowned as
the new Caliph Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. He was in power during the years of
Turkish War of Independence.
One of the first things the new government in Ankara did was separating the
posts of the Caliphate and the Sultanate and the abolishment of the latter. In November
1, 1922 the Grand National Assembly of Ankara abrogated the post of Sultanate with
the mandate of Mustafa Kemal. The Assembly also passed a resolution making Ankara
the new capital. The Sultan, Mehmed V, was forced to go to exile. Two weeks later, the
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Sultan left Istanbul aboard the British steamer HMS Malaya and went to Malta.
Abdulmecid II, the cousin of Mehmed V, was appointed as the new Caliph. In April 15,
1923, an article was added to the Anti-Treason Law (Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu)
making objections to the abolishment of the Sultanate a treason punishable with
execution.
The new Turkish Republic was officially established on October 29, 1923. The
post of Caliphate was abolished in 4 March 1924 in the same day all of the madrasas,
Sufi lodges and religious endowments were closed and outlawed which were ensued by
other aggressively secularist policies. Wearing fez, turban or any other religious dress
in the public sphere was banned. Wearing the western style felt hat was made
mandatory for all males by the implementation of the “Şapka Kanunu” (The Hat Law)
(Özdalga, 2013b, p. 41) in 1925. The religiously based Ottoman civil code (mejelle)
was replaced by the adoption of the Swiss civil code in 1926. The Arabic script which
had been used in the Ottoman society for centuries was replaced by the Latin script in
1928. The Arabic call to prayer (ezan) was forced to be recited in Turkish starting in
1932. Thusly, removing or at least marginalizing all of the religious symbols and
elements from the public life in the newly established republic became the pillar of the
new regime. Even though Mustafa Kemal abolished the sultanate in 1922 and
established the Turkish Republic in 1923 with the declaration that “sovereignty
unconditionally belongs only to the people,” (Hakimiyet kayıtsız şartsız milletindir), the
political system during his lifetime (d. 1938) was far from being democratic in nature.
Turkey was governed by the single-party rule system between 1923 and 1950. The
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ideology of the Halk Fırkası (People’s Party) which was the party established by
Mustafa Kemal was also the ideology of the Turkish state in the formative decades of
the Republic. The set of ideas and policies adhered and propagated by Mustafa Kemal
and the People’s Party has been referred to as Kemalism.
Nationalism, laicite (secularism), republicanism, etatism, populism and
revolutionism were described as the six principles of the Kemalist ideology in the
program of the People’s Party. These six pillars of Kemalism were amended to the
constitution in 1937 as the defining characteristics of the Turkish Republic. Of these six
principles, the strongest in practice have been nationalism and laicite. The cadres of the
People’s Party aspired to establish an explicitly and pristinely Turkish state. Mustafa
Kemal’s expression of “Happy is the one who says I am a Turk” (Ne mutlu Türküm
diyene) became one of the guiding principles of Kemalism. The presence of other
ethnicities were tolerated only if they didn’t challenge the Turkishness of the state and
the society. Acquiring last names was made mandatory by the implementation of
Soyadı Kanunu (the Law of Last Names) in 1934. Taking foreign or non-Turkish
family names were forbidden as well. Mustafa Kemal chose Atatürk, which means the
Father of Turks as his last name. Thereafter, he became known and referred to as
Atatürk inside and outside Turkey.
Under the rule of Atatürk (1923-1938) top-down turkification of the society
continued in different areas. Turkification of the language and nationalist reading of
history was part of this endeavor. The Turkish Historical Association was established in
1931 with the idea of studying and teaching the history of the Turks before and after the
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rise of Islam. The Turkish Language Association was instituted in 1932 under the
patronage of Atatürk and with the purpose of turkifying the language by the expulsion
of foreign words and by suggesting new Turkish words to replace them (Bayyurt, 2009,
p. 120; Johanson 2011, p. 732). Turkification of the language was not only related to
the rise of nationalism but it was also part and parcel of the secularization policies of
the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic. As it is observed by Schlyter (2005),
Turkish language reform was part of Atatürk’s general political plan to make
Turkish society less dependent on its Islamic past and to lay the ground for a
modern civic state characterized by economic progress and social welfare. (p.
1907)
As Akural (1984, p. 133) suggested, Atatürk and the like-minded People’s Party
cadres might be aware of the influence of the language on the worldview of those who
speak it. Arabic and Persian, for the Kemalists, represented a particularly religious
worldview. Thus, by reforming and turkifying the language, they were not only
contributing to their nationalist cause, they were also paving the way for the further
secularization of the Turkish society.
The pillar of revolutionism in the Kemalist ideology reflected strong adherence
to the idea of civilizational progress. Atatürk and the cadres of the People’s Party, like
many of the first and second generation Young Turks, believed in the superiority of the
Western civilization. They held the conviction that it was through the disconnection
and freedom from religious ideas and practices and through the development of science
and scientific methods that the Europeans achieved tremendous accomplishments in the
path of civilizational progress. Reliance on science and the application of scientific
methods, instead of religious ideas, practices and forces, was the key for the Turkish
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society to join in the European Civilization as well. Two approaches were used by
Atatürk and the People’s Party in this regard. On the one hand, they implemented topdown reforms in the direction of Westernization and secularization. On the other hand,
they systematically and forcefully marginalized religious symbols and forces in the
society. In addition to banning the use of religious titles such as hoca, hafiz, şeyh and
hazret, the new regime forcefully closed down all of the Sufi lodges (tekke and zaviye)
in 1924. Those who resisted change were harshly punished. For example, the Ankara
Independence Tribunal issued at least 138 death sentences between March 1925 and
March 1926 to those who protested these top-down reforms primarily including the hat
law (Mango, 1999, p. 436).
Atatürk justified these policies by contending that such reforms were necessary
steps towards becoming a part of the true human civilization as it was developed in
Europe. During his visit the city of Kastamonu in which he declared the hat law,
Atatürk Said:
In the face of knowledge, science, and of the whole extent of radiant
civilization, I cannot accept the presence in Turkey's civilized community of
people primitive enough to seek material and spiritual benefits in the guidance
of sheiks. The Turkish republic cannot be a country of sheiks, dervishes, and
disciples. The best, the truest order is the order of civilization. To be a man it is
enough to carry out the requirements of civilization. The leaders of dervish
orders will understand the truth of my words, and will themselves close down
their lodges [tekke] and admit that their disciplines have grown up. (In Mango,
1999, p. 435)
Anti-clericalism was not the discursive strategy used by Atatürk in support of
Westernization. He criticized -albeit implicitly- religious worldviews as part of the
same effort. For example, he asserted in 1924 that “age-old rotten mentalities, tradition
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worshiping, superstition and nonsense had to be thrown out of the heads the nation” in
order to “survive in the world of modern civilization” (Berkes, 1964, p. 464).
In a speech he gave in the town of Akhisar in October 1925, Atatürk made it
clear that he wanted an unconditional integration into the Western civilization.
The civilized world is far ahead of us. We have no choice but to catch up. It is
time to stop nonsense such as “should we or should we not wear hats?”. We
shall adopt hats along with all other works of Western civilization. Uncivilized
people are doomed to be trodden under the feet of civilized people. (In Mango,
1999, p. 438).
Atatürk also presented his conviction for wholesale borrowing of the Western
civilization as the will of the nation. In a speech he gave at the School of Law in
Ankara University in the same year (1925), he said:
This nation has now accepted the principle that the only means of survival for
nations in the international struggle for existence lies in the acceptance of the
contemporary Western civilization. (In Berkes, 1964, p. 470)
These remarks are indications that Atatürk appropriated the idea of wholesale
borrowing of the Western civilization as it was suggested earlier by Ahmet Ağaoğlu.
That is why, Ahmet Ağaoğlu who had previously advocated wholesale adoption of
Western Civilization a few years before the establishment of the Turkish Republic
championed the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his close friend Ismet Inonu for
achieving this goal in a short period of time. In the foreword of his book “Three
Civilizations” (Üç Medeniyet) which was published in 1927, Ağaoğlu wrote:
This book was initially written in 1919 and 1920 in Malta and it was published
in several pieces in the journal Turk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) after I returned
home [from exile]. The book had made the case that the Western Civilization,
which is one of the three major civilizations in the world, prevailed over the
other two [Sino-Indian and Muslim civilizations] and that our salvation was
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rested solely on the appropriation of this (Western) civilization as a whole. This
issue has already lost its previous significance. Our great revolution which
sprung from the supreme mastermind of Gazi [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk] and
executed by the powerful hands of Ismet (Inonu) Pasha achieved what was seen
ten years ago as a mere ideal and as a fantasy to the enlightened Turkish
intellectuals. In this short period, we have completely changed from inside and
outside. The ideals which we could not even dream of and the thoughts we
could not afford to talk about a few years ago have now become principles of
our lives. With the determined will of Gazi [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk], we have
entered, from head to toe, into the boundaries of the Western civilization. (2012
[1927], p. 1)
Atatürk’s secularist and progressivist reforms were not limited to changes in the
areas of politics and culture. He also intensified educational reform in the direction of
westernization. As I described in detail above, increasing numbers and types of modern
primary, secondary and postsecondary schools were established throughout the Empire
in the last two centuries of the Ottoman history. However, the Ottoman reformers such
as the Sultans and civilian bureaucrats did not close down religious schools. That is
why, modern, traditional and religious schools existed side by side in the late Ottoman
society. Shortly after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk’s government
banned and closed down all religious schools under the banner of the unification of
education (tevhid-i tedrisat). Religious instruction was also gradually removed from the
modern schools. All of these steps, as observed by Winter (1984, p. 185-186), were part
of the broad policy of secularizing the nation.
The secularist character of Atatürk’s educational policies was epitomized in his
famous declaration; “The most truthful guide in life is science and knowledge”
(Hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir). The word mürşit he used in his expression does not
only and simply mean guide, it also refers to religious (Sufi) masters which is another
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indication that Atatürk’s appraisal of science bore antithetical connotations against
religion. Just as science refuted religious dogmas, secular scientific education became
not only as the most reliable source of knowledge but also as the ultimate “guide” in all
areas of life in the ideology of Atatürk. Of course, he was not the only ideologue who
adhered to such ideas. As I described above, he was greatly influenced by other
European positivists, materialists and secularists such as Ludwig Büchner and their
Ottoman disciples like Abdullah Cevdet. As Hanioğlu (2005) reports, Atatürk once told
Abdullah Cevdet after the establishment of the Turkish Republic that they (Atatürk and
the cadres of the People’s Party) were putting his (Abdullah Cevdet’s) ideas into
practice.
Atatürk’s antithetical stance against religion in all areas of life including
education did not remain only at the discursive and policy levels. As it is briefly
mentioned above, the Kemalist regime crushed any individual or group opposition
against their secularist policies. For example, İskilipli Atıf Efendi who published an
article criticizing the secularist character of Kemalist reforms was executed in 1926
(Mango, 1999, p. 438). After Said Nursi (1878-1960) started writing and circulating
treatises in support of Qur’anic teachings in 1925, he and his disciples were subject to
persecution for the rest of their lives as well. Thusly, secularization after the
establishment of the Turkish Republic became a state publicly which was strictly
implemented by force. The secularist movement in the history of Turkey started as an
oppositional and revolutionary movement which in its formative decades extensively
used discursive mobilization strategies. However, after capturing the halls of power
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(government) the secularist movement was transformed into a radically conservative
establishment.
Conclusion
There were several parallel and in some cases simultaneous processes which
were related to the development of secularization in the history of the Ottoman Empire
and the Turkish Republic. Some of these parallel processes were unfolding in the form
of institutional transformation of the society, while others were happening at the
discursive and ideological levels including issues pertaining to the construction of
reality and moral orientation of the self. In my understanding, all of these processes
should be studied simultaneously in order to better understand the dynamics of
secularization in the late Ottoman society and especially in the first several decades of
the modern Turkish Republic.
The first of these parallel processes was the gradual emergence of the
centralized nation state and its expansion into the lives of the citizenry in greater part
because of the development and the spread of modern administrative and educational
institutions. As Turam, (2011, p. 20) argues, one of the defining characteristics of the
rise of nation states is “the transformation of subjects into citizens” which is mostly
achieved by the centralized educational systems. The last century of the Ottoman
Empire witnessed the establishment of various kinds of modern public schools which
expanded into the periphery in a considerably short period of time. Alongside the
growth of the new educational system, traditional religious schools steadily lost their
social significance. Eventually, these schools were abolished by the leadership of the

269
new Republic in 1924 under banner of “unification of education” in the same day the
institution of the Caliphate together with Sufi lodges were abolished. The development
of a centralized school systems as part of other centralization reforms produced, for
those who control these institutions, opportunity spaces for the education and
mobilization of the masses. Centralization and expansion of administrative institutions
including the government produced similar opportunity spaces. These transformations
started with the first wave of reforms between 1779 and 1839. The Tanzimat Era
(1839-1876) was fully characterized by the advancement and expansion of such
reforms. Centralization reforms never stopped until the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire. It was in the first two decades of the modern Turkish Republic that the
processes of the establishment of a fully centralized Nation State reached its strongest
point.
Another similar parallel process was the gradual militarization and therefore
dictatorizalization of the state. As it is outlined by Uyar and Edward (2009), the army
and the soldiers had been considerably influential since the birth of the Ottoman State
and they, especially the revolting Janissary corps, also posed threats to the stability of
the state. The corruption of the army was also credited with the loss of wars in the
eighteenth century and therefore in the decline of the Empire. As a result,
modernization efforts in the history of Ottoman Empire started with the reformation
and disciplining of the army which was supported by the establishment of military
schools during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II. By the abolishment of the
Janissaries, the Sultanate was able to curb the destabilizing power of the traditional
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army corps. In the following decades, opposition in the Ottoman Empire was formed
within the ranks of the civil bureaucracy of the Sublime Porte. This oppositional
frontier started as a journalistic movement and it proved successful in the declaration of
the First Constitution in 1876. However, the abolishment of the constitution and the
newly established Ottoman Parliament in 1878 by Sultan Abdulhamid II who resisted
the demands of the opposition with tight ruling and tactical moves aimed at pacifying
certain elements of the dissent diminished the Young Turks expectations for a peaceful
civilian revolution. The failure of the hopes for a smooth transition to the constitutional
system under such circumstances convinced many especially the members of the CUP
for the feasibility and necessity of a coup d’état style revolution. Such an inclination
favored the members of the CUP who were soldiers and officers in the army because it
was the military which would supply the manpower for the projected revolution.
Eventually, it was the soldiers such as Enver Bey, Niyazi Bey and Talat Bey who
executed the revolution of the 1908 and dominated the CUP in the years to follow.
Continuing wars in the first two decades of the twentieth century also legitimized and
boosted the status of the soldiers as the protectors of the motherland and of the nation.
Therefore, the state in the last several years of the Ottoman Empire and especially
during the formative years of the new Turkish Republic turned into a state of soldiers
which embraced strictly enforced top down reforms. As I described above, it was
almost exclusively the mektepli (educated) officers who dominated the CUP and they
were generally more akin to secularist ideals. That is also why most of the reforms
undertaken by these military rulers were in the direction of secularization.
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The third and perhaps the most important one was the gradual development of
the secularist movement. Secular ideals which were initially nourished in the post
Enlightenment environment of European societies were first employed by the Western
educated Ottoman intellectuals who were not against religion. These intellectuals
wanted to reconcile some of the secular ideals developed in the West such as the idea of
progress, democracy, liberty and nationalism with traditional religious notions. In other
words, secular ideals and religious principles and commitments existed side by side in
the mind and in the discourse of the same person. This was especially true for the
Young Ottomans movement. The line of separation between the secular/secularist and
the religious became more visible in the Young Turks movement. This time, religious
and secularist ideals were propagated by different individuals and factions within the
same oppositional movement of the Young Turks. There were those who were openly
religious, and there were those who were explicitly against religion (E.g., Beşir Fuad,
Abdullah Cevdet, Baha Tevfik, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Yusuf Akçura) in the same
movement. One step later, the gap between the secularist and the religious became
much wider and much sharper. With the establishment of the new Turkish Republic
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the secularists were
explicitly and aggressively at odds with public and private forms of religiosity and with
the religious establishments such as the traditional madrasa schools, religious notables,
and Sufi organizations (tariqat).
One part of the development of the secularist movement was the emergence of a
frontier of nationalists (e.g., Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp) who advocated a shift
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from multiculturalist political ideology of Pan-Ottomanism and from the religiously
characterized Pan-Islamism to the ethnically and culturally defined Pan-Turkism. Like
Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism was a modern political ideology, too, since it was born
in the second half of the nineteenth century as response to the encounters with Western
powers and as an answer to the challenges of maintaining the territorial integrity of the
Empire when minority nations especially the Christians in the Balkans (e.g., Serbs,
Greeks and Bulgarians) were declaring their independence one by one. Besides its
practical socio-political implications, Pan-Islamism had strong religious connotations
as well. At least, it was a political identity which emphasized and prioritized religious
affiliation. The shift to Pan-Turkism marginalized religiosity-based forms of identities
and thus it symbolized a sharp transition to a secular form of identity. Moreover, PanTurkism and Turkish nationalism were embraced and promoted by openly secularist
elite and statesmen in the late Ottoman society and in the first several decades of the
modern Turkish Republic.
The development of the secularist movement and its transformation from the
reconciliatory Young Ottoman ideology to the openly secularist faction of the Young
Turks movement and to the aggressively secularist policies of the founding fathers of
the Turkish Republic was also reflected in the development and transformation of
Westernism. Pioneers of reform in the Ottoman history advocated selective borrowing
from the West while some of the later generation reformist intellectuals such as Ahmet
Ağaoğlu advocated the adoption of the material and immaterial aspects of the Western
civilization as a whole. It is important to note that Westernization has already been
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equated with secularization in the Turkish history. Some of the secularist defended
secularism in the form of Westernization which to them meant reaching to the highest
and brightest level of human civilization.
The conflict and rivalry between the positivist, statist, nationalist, liberalist,
traditionalist, religious, materialist and even atheist factions in the Young Turks
Movement, in the CUP and in the Ottoman and Turkish societies at large are
indications that the development of reformist ideas and modernization projects were not
simply the result of the unfolding of a linear process of modernization (or
secularization) independent of human agency. Most of the revolutionary ideas and
mobilization strategies were contested and each side were mobilized to realize their
goals. This is indicative of the importance of social movement dynamics of reform and
modernization in the Ottoman Empire. Even though reformist intellectuals and activists
and in some cases their formal and informal organizations made concessions and
negotiations, they were part and parcel of the development and transformation of the
nature of the old and new social and political institutions in the society. Mobilization of
the Young Turks, however divided it might be, vis-à-vis the Sultan and the Sublime
Porte bureaucracy and vis-à-vis other conservative establishments is yet another
dimension of the human element of major socio-historical transformations in the late
Ottoman society regardless of who and to what extent won the ideological debates and
the political battles. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the counterrevolution of
1909 and their results are yet another striking example of how movementcountermovement dynamics played a role in the development of secularism and its
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encounters with religion. Such a history revolved around the ideas and mobilization and
counter-mobilization strategies of all sides. That is why I have argued throughout this
dissertation that the study of the role of human element and social movement dynamics
should be an integral part of the studies of secularization and revivalism.
It should also be noted that secularism of the secularist movement in the
Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic should be understood, at least partially, in
conjunction with the development and the expansion of the secularist movement(s) of
the Western European societies. Secularist ideologues among the Young Turks and the
CUP borrowed ideas heavily from their European counterparts especially from France
and Germany. A great proportion of the leading members of the Young Turks were
educated in Europe, mostly in France, in the second half of the nineteenth century. In
addition, the Young Turks as the leading political oppositional front in the Ottoman
Empire were organized in Europe. For example, the first and second congresses of the
Ottoman opposition were organized by the Young Turks in France in 1902 and in 1907.
A more direct introduction of European secularists and their philosophies were done in
the form of translations. The works of Western secularists (materialists, positivists,
naturalist etc.) and the works of orientalists (e.g., Ernest Renan and Reinhart Dozy)22
were translated in to Turkish. This is also to say that revivalist movements and their
mobilization strategies especially at discursive levels in Turkey can be seen as a
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The works and the discourse of Western orientalists are of particular importance perhaps as
much as the other Western secularists in terms of understanding external intellectual sources of
the secularist movement in the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey. The discourse of the orientalists
such as Ernest Renan and Reinhart Dozy were charged directly against the religion of Islam and
historical and contemporary Muslim societies.
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response to the secularist movement(s) of Western Europe even though the question of
how (well) the Young Turks and other secularists interpreted and presented the ideas of
Western secularist ideologues remains contested.
One of the main conclusions I drive from studying the development of the
secularist ideas in the modern history of Turkey is that the conflict between the modern
secularist movement(s) and religious forces and religion, including its socially
organized forms, was not first and foremost about the clash of atheism with belief in
God. It was the clash of the idea of progress between “the human effort to improve the
human” and “a life which is centered on the idea that things including human beings
are created”. Therefore, it is not solely about the question of if and who created the
universe, it is more about the ways of life organized around answers given to these
questions. That is where, I think, the social significance of and the clash between
secularism and religious forces come from. Especially when it is looked at from the
secularist movement’s side, answers given to the question of if and who created the
universe and everything therein seems to be a justification for the secularist
perspectives of who the human beings are and what the purpose of their existence is.
That is the reason why, I think, naturalism and its various forms of interpretations such
as evolutionary perspectives have been an integral part of the secularist formulation of
the idea of progress.
The fourth parallel process which is directly related to the third is the gradual
progression of the secularist movement from the ranks of opposition to the
commanding heights of the increasingly centralized state apparatus. Until the
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revolution of 1908, almost all of the intellectuals demanding change regardless of
whether they were religious or secular, or somewhere in between, were part of the
opposition. The secularist ideologues faced resistance not only from the conservative
state but also from the traditional establishments of the society. When the CUP came to
power, the secularists had direct access to the ranks of power. However, they had to
share this power with and in many cases had to concede to the more religious fractions
of the CUP. Nonetheless, the secularist side of the CUP managed to assume the
leadership role of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) and established the
new secularist Republic. Eventually, the secularist movement which once was on the
side of the opposition were now the uncontested owners of the state which had been
steadily increasing in power because of centralizing modernization reforms.
As the secularists moved from the ranks of opposition to the halls of power, the
nature of their discourse and mobilization strategies had also evolved. In the beginning,
the secularist movement was part of the journalistic opposition movement and they,
like other members of the opposition, sought to convince the Sultan and the Sublime
Porte bureaucracy and to a limited degree the common people for the necessity of
reform. Their dialectical discourse was enriched by the intellectual terminology and the
libertarian rhetoric they borrowed from the West as well as the terminology they called
for help from the religious and cultural tradition. They presented justifications, in some
cases from religion, for the reformist ideals and projects they defended. In this regard,
secularist ideologues were similar to the “organic intellectuals” in the Gramscian sense.
However, their discourse took the form of indoctrination as they apprehended the
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commanding heights of the society including educational institutions after the
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Instead of convincing the masses for
reform, they justified the use and abuse of brute force for the implementation of
secularist policies which they thought would take the Turkish society to the level of
contemporary Western civilization. In this regard, the transition of the secularist
movement from the ranks of opposition to center of the state represented a transition
from being organic intellectuals to traditional intellectual in the Gramscian sense.
Yet another parallel process of change was the transformation of the
philosophical foundations of the discourse of the secularist movement. The notions of
democracy, liberty, constitutionalism and nationalism which were nourished in the
secularist post-Enlightenment environment of European societies were somehow
reconcilable with religious rhetoric as the Young Ottomans tried to achieve. I think that
this is one of the major reasons why the line of separation between the religious and the
secular ideas was not very visible in the Young Ottoman thought. However, the
discourse of reformist intellectuals in the subsequent generations especially among the
Young Turks was not limited to political aspirations. They were also interested in
questions regarding ontological, epistemological and moral philosophical issues in
similar ways they were discussed and presented in contemporary Western societies
especially in France and Germany. These intellectuals were acquainted with and
strongly influenced by positivism, naturalism and materialism. Such perspectives were
not only hard to reconcile with the teachings of religion, they were also dichotomous
alternatives to religious worldviews. There were staunch supporters of these ideals in
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the late Ottoman society such as Beşir Fuad, Baha Tevfik, and Abdullah Cevdet who,
according to scholars like Hanioğlu (2005), influenced the founding fathers of the new
Republic. That is why, I think that it is crucial to understand what roles such ideals
played in the development of secularization and how they influenced the late Ottoman
society and the newly established Turkish Republic.
There was a shift from the pragmatic approach to science as a means to improve
the material conditions of life in the Muslim World towards the perception of science as
an alternative weltanschauung which was antithetical to religious worldviews. I
observed four different stages in which perception of science was transformed in the
late ottoman society and in the formative years of the Turkish Republic. Firstly, during
the first wave of modernization reforms undertaken with the support and sponsorship of
Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II, science was, in the eyes of these statesmen, a
necessary tool for improving the military technology as a measure to counterbalance
the rise and expansion of technologically superior European armies and thus to prevent
decline of the Empire. Secondly, civilian pioneers of reform and modernization around
the declaration the Tanzimat started seeing and presenting science as a powerful
instrument through which societal organization and the material condition of life could
be enhanced and developed. In this regard, science was associated with and presented
as the essential component of the idea of civilizational progress. Thirdly, Young Turks
such as Abdullah Cevdet, who were influenced by the European, mostly German,
materialist and naturalist philosophers like Büchner, perceived and presented science as
an alternative weltanschauung which was the invalidation of religious worldviews such
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as the idea that the universe and everything therein are created by God and that there
will be a resurrection after death. Fourth, towards the end of the progression of
secularist worldview from ranks of opposition to the ranks of power, science was
eventually ascribed the status of an encompassing paradigm providing the most
effective assistance, the most reliable source of knowledge and the most truthful
guidance in all aspects of life. Such an exaltation of scientific worldview was
epitomized in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's declaration that “science is the ultimate source
of guidance.”
In the first two of the four stages I outlined here, science was not seen or
presented as an antithesis of religion. That is probably why, there was not a significant
en masse resistance or counter-mobilization efforts against the development of science
in the Ottoman Society. Indeed, reactionary responses to change during these times
were mostly directed against the intrusion of the Western culture and morals, not to
science and technology and not even to Western originated socio-political ideologies
such as constitutionalism and parliamentarianism. As we saw in the generation of the
Young Ottomans, there was a broad, if not pervasive, consensus in the Ottoman society
even among the ulema that it was permissible and indeed necessary to acquire the
science and technology of the Europeans. They also favorably looked at and in many
cases wholeheartedly defended constitutionalism and parliamentarianism. The Young
Ottomans were inspiration to the subsequent generations of both religious and
secularist reformists.
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In conclusion, the emergence of an explicitly secularist movement (e.g., the
Young Turks) in the late Ottoman society coincides with (1) the presentation of science
as an alternative and antithetical worldview providing ontological and epistemological
invalidations of the fundamental teachings of religion and (2) with the rise of purely
nationalists ideology of identity formation. Those who established the modern Turkish
Republic including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his close friends like Ismet Inonu were
second generation Young Turks who were fully convinced about the truthfulness and
merits of these parallel strand of secularist ideologies to a degree that they were
committed to reshape the remnants of the Ottoman society and raise new generations
according to these principles. That must be the reason why they showed little or no
tolerance for the public presence of religiosity and religious symbols and harshly
persecuted individuals and groups which did not comply with their secularist and
nationalist policies and laws. Thus, they established a secularist and hegemonic oneparty system which did not leave any legitimate space for alternative ideas and
ideologies.
As I outlined above, the history of secularization in Turkey indicates that the
secularist movement was not fixed in time and space. It was a dynamic movement
which consisted of shifting ideas and mobilization strategies from time to time and
from one context to the other. In addition, not all of the secularists interpreted the
world, the society and religion in the same way. For example, some had a more
reconciliatory approach towards religion while others were more hostile against it.
Similarly, some of the secularists were mobilized against social and political aspects of
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religion while others were more critical about its meaning aspects. However, the history
of secularization in Turkey also shows patterns of continuity in the secularist movement
vis-à-vis religion and religious forces. Perhaps because of the socio-historical factors
such as the development of the centralized nation state that the secularist movement
succeeded in monopolizing societal institutions and thusly marginalizing religion.
Institutionalization of secularization and marginalization of religion also consolidated
the secularist movement at a specific conjecture in the history of Turkey. The
establishment of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk was a
major turning point in this regard. The cadres of Atatürk’s People’s Party which single
handedly ruled Turkey for about three decades (1923-1950) centralized and
monopolized secularism in Turkey. Consolidation of the secularist movement and its
control over the societal institutions further separated the lines between secularism and
religion in Turkey and made the relationship between secularism and religion more
diametrical and dialectical. Perhaps because the consolidation of the secularist
movement and its control and monopolization of societal institutions that the revivalist
movements started to emerge in Turkey. The next two chapters of this dissertation
explores revivalist ideas of Said Nursi, the emergence of the Nur Movement and its
mobilization strategies with regard to these processes.

CHAPTER IV
THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF SAID NURSI’S
REVIVALIST DISCOURSE
Introduction
This chapter analyzes Said Nursi’s (1878-1960) reformist and revivalist
discourse at three subsequent stages vis-à-vis the development and transformation of
secularist ideas and movements in the late Ottoman and early Turkish societies. The
first stage includes Said Nursi’s reformist discourse until the Young Turk Revolution of
1908 and its aftermath (until 1910).
I will focus on three central themes in the reformist discourse he developed
during this first period. The first is his project of opening a university in the Eastern
provinces of the Ottoman Empire where he could teach religious and positive sciences
together. As part of discussions regarding his University project, I will also discuss Said
Nursi’s perception of science at this conjecture of his life. Secondly, I will explore Said
Nursi’s ideas regarding İttihad-ı İslam (Pan-Islamism) with respect to his analyses of
the reasons for the decline of the Muslim World and the solutions he proposed. Third, I
will investigate Said Nursi’s discourse of political reform (i.e., constitutionalism and
parliamentarianism) leading up to the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution. In so
doing, I will also compare Said Nursi’s religiously backed reformist discourse to the
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discourse of other contemporary reformists (e.g., theYoung Ottomans such as Namık
Kemal, Ziya Pasha, Ali Suavi and Hoca Tahsin) who supported their reformist ideas
with religious references.
At the second stage of this chapter, I will explore Said Nursi’s revivalist
discourse during the period stretching from the aftermath of the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908 to the establishment of the secularist Turkish Republic. As I discuss
below, Said Nursi was not explicitly mobilized against a particular secularist ideology
or movement until around 1910. I also note below that Said Nursi mostly utilized a
reformist discourse -more so than ideas directly relating to religious revival- until this
time. However, he was going through a transformation around 1910 in his discursive
mobilization strategies. For the first time, Said Nursi started presenting responses to the
development of secularist ideologies such as materialism, positivism and naturalism.
Meanwhile, he was also discussing methodological problems prevalent among the
contemporary Muslim communities. I will describe and discuss the transformations
Said Nursi was going through in his revivalist discourse during this period (~1910 to
~1923) in conjunction with the development and transformation of the secularist
movement and the ideas they advocated.
At the third and the last stage, I will analyze discursive strategies Said Nursi
employed in his revivalist writings after the establishment of the secularist Turkish
Republic and their sociological implications. Because issues regarding ontological and
moral philosophical aspects of revivalism which pertain to the construction of reality
and the self occupies a more central position in his revivalist writings, I will try to
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answer the question of how and why Said Nursi chose such an approach to religious
revival. I will also contextualize this anlaysis with regard to the development and
transformations of the secularist movement in the Turkish society. Subsequently, I will
analyze social movement dynamics and mobilization strategies of the revivalist
movement Said Nursi established vis-à-vis the secularist establishment in the next
(fifth) chapter of this dissertation.
The Reformist Discourse of Said Nursi Until 1910
Having completed his mostly self-led education at various places in the
Kurdistan region and having gone through awakening to the contemporary idea of
İttihad-ı İslam (Pan-Islamism), Said Nursi arrived in Istanbul, the capital city of the
Ottoman Empire, in 1907. He had the purpose of pursuing financial support from the
Sultan for his project of opening a university in the East in which he could teach
religious and modern sciences side by side. Shortly after arriving in Istanbul, Said Nursi
actively participated in the intellectual debates of his day regarding the reform and
renewal of the Muslim World, especially including the Ottoman Empire and its
Kurdistan region where he hailed from. Said Nursi started addressing his ideas about
educational, social and political reform to the general public by way of publishing
articles in some of the Ottoman newspapers. In this respect, he also directly
communicated with the Ottoman intelligentsia and the administrative authorities.
One of the first things Said Nursi did after arriving in Istanbul was to submit a
petition to the palace explaining the need for establishing a university in the Kurdistan
region. The petition was opened with a statement that it was only those who spoke
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Turkish who were benefitting from the newly established (modern) schools (mekteb) in
Kurdistan and that others, mostly Kurds, were left vulnerable to the misfortunes of
ignorance, blind imitation and falling into doubts in matters of religion because they
couldn’t make sense of the content of modern sciences.
Establishment of a university with several branches in various places in this
region was presented in the petition as a remedy for combating these challenges. These
schools would carry the name madrasa because of its acceptability among the local
people but they would teach both religious and modern sciences. The petition was also
published in the newspaper Şark ve Kürdistan (The East and Kurdistan) on November
9, 1908. The palace rejected the petition and requested Said Nursi to go back to
Kurdistan. However, Said Nursi remained in Istanbul and started publishing articles in
support of constitutionalism and freedom from political despotism.
As I described in the previous chapter, the constitutionalist movement in the
Ottoman society had gained momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century in
greater part because of the efforts of the Young Ottoman intellectuals such as Namık
Kemal (1840-1888), Ziya Pasha (1825-1880), and Ali Suavi (1838-1878). The first
constitution was declared and the first parliament was established in 1876 by the newly
crowned Sultan Abdulhamid II, who ascended to the throne in place of his brother
Sultan Murad V with the help of reformists such as Midhat Pasha (Karpat, 2002, p.
505). Sultan Abdulhamid II abolished the constitution and dismantled the parliament in
1878, and sidelined influential bureaucrats including Midhat Pasha by way of
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relocating or exiling them to the peripheral provinces. His stance against the opposition
demanding change became more authoritarian over time.
As I also described extensively in the previous chapter, members of the CUP
(İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) who were organized against the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid
II with a demand that he reinstitute the 1876 constitution and the parliament which he
had abolished in 1878. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) which was
originally developed by civilians gradually turned into a secretive organization of
soldiers who were educated in the modern military schools and academies. In the
meantime, the Sultan was closely monitoring the actions and mobilizations of the
members of the CUP, other oppositional groups and individuals who had the potential
of challenging his rule and producing disturbances. The Sultan also applied strong
literary censorship which contributed to the transformation of the opposition into
secretive organizations. When their two decades long attempts towards the restoration
of the constitution of 1876 by other means failed, some of the prominent soldiers in the
CUP took to the mountains in Rumelia which forced Sultan Abdulhamid II to accept
the demands of the opposition on the 24th of July in 1908. Thereafter, the CUP steadily
grew in power and influence over the government. They deposed Sultan Abdulhamid II
after the countercoup (31 Mart Incident) in 1909 and brought his brother Reşad Efendi
as Sultan Mehmed V to the throne.
Said Nursi had arrived in Istanbul in the eve of the Young Turks Revolution of
1908 which, I think, made his petition less likely to be accepted and increased doubts
about the prospects of his plans. It is also important to remember that nationalism was
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on the rise not only among the members of the CUP and the educated segment of
Turkish population but also among the minority ethnic communities throughout the
Empire. Either the Sultan or the bureaucrats might have perceived Said Nursi’s petition
for the establishment of a university in the Kurdistan region and possibly his other
activities in the capital with suspicion. The fact that he was asked to go back to
Kurdistan indicates that they were not only concerned about Said Nursi’s potential of
causing problems among the local tribes of Kurdistan, they might also be concerned, to
a greater degree, about his potential of producing troubles in Istanbul. Perhaps, they
were worried about his growing influence within the ulema and among the community
of Kurds living in Istanbul at that time.
Arriving in the capital in the eve of the 1908 Revolution, Said Nursi started
publishing articles in support of constitutionalism. His first article appeared in the
newspaper Rehber-i Vatan (The Guide of the Fatherland) with the title Wa shawirhum
fi'l-amr (And Seek Their Counsel in the Matter) which is a quotation from the Qur’an
(3:159) (Said Nursi, 1908, July 20, p. 4). As I mentioned in the previous chapter, this
verse was extensively used by the Young Ottomans in their religious legitimization and
justification for the demands of the establishment of a constitutional and parliamentary
system in the Ottoman Empire. Namık Kemal, who was one of the most prominent
members of the Young Ottomans movement, wrote an article (20 July 1898) with the
same title in the Young Ottomans’ newspaper Hürriyet (Liberty). In this regard, Said
Nursi used a discourse which was very similar to the Young Ottomans,’ especially
including Namık Kemal. The basic idea, in the discourses of both the Young Ottomans
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and Said Nursi, was that the original teachings of the Qur’an and the other sources of
Islam emphasized the necessity and significance of consultation in issues relating to
administration and governance.
Dereliction of this fundamental principle by despotic rulers in the recent history
was, together with several other factors, responsible for the stagnation and decline of
the Muslim World according to the Young Ottomans and Said Nursi. Thus, the
establishment of a parliamentary constitutional system in Muslim World, the Ottoman
Empire in particular, was both legitimate and necessary for reversing its decline.
Said Nursi openly championed the revolution of 1908 although he was not
directly involved in its execution. In a speech he gave in the town square of Salonica
three days after the revolution, he applauded the coming of “freedom”.
This revolution has broken the heavy chains constraining the mind of humanity
and destroyed the obstacles against the potential of progress. Thus, it brought
into light and set free the jewel of humanity and directed it towards the point of
perfection. (Said Nursi, 2004e [1910], p. 13)
At the same time, Said Nursi cautioned his audience that the protection of this
freedom was contingent on the protection of religious sensitivities and morals.
O the children of the fatherland! Do not misinterpret this freedom so that it does
not escape us and so that it doesn’t drown us by making us drink the corrupt
slavery of the past in a different cup again. Freedom flourishes through
following the [religious] guidelines, the teachings of the Sharia and through
good morals. The liberty, justice and equality (Hürriyet adalet ve musavat)
which were established among the companions of the Prophet despite the
prevalence of savagery and forceful oppression in their times is an undeniable
testament to this claim. Otherwise, interpreting liberty and freedom as
indulgence in illicit pleasures, wastefulness, transgression and subservience to
the desires of the selfish soul will be like being freed from the oppression of a
ruler and then willfully entering into the enslavement of the selfish soul. This
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will be a sign of deserving the oppression of the past and unworthiness of the
real freedom. (Said Nursi, 2004e [1910], p. 15)
In an article written as an open letter to members of the reinstated parliament
following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Said Nursi maintained that it was
imperative for the constitutional system to keep the teachings of the religion of Islam in
its hands at all times.
Otherwise, he contended, “atheism, as the greatest error in human civilization,
would find a fertile ground for its expansion if religion was confined to the conscious of
individuals”. In this process, “religion would become subservient to other things which
would result in its marginalization and decline” (Said Nursi, 19 December 1908, p. 2022). This is clearly an indication that Said Nursi was genuinely concerned about the rise
of secularization in the Ottoman society if religion was not going to be part and parcel
of the new constitutional system. Apparently, his main concern until this time was that
the vacuum left by the marginalization of religion could provide opportunity structures
for the development and expansion of atheism.
In addition, his open letter to the members of the parliament reveals that Said
Nursi saw internal threats to the religion of Islam as well in case Islam would not be the
determining characteristics of this new system. Firstly, under these circumstances,
people would look at religion from superficial perspectives. This, for him, would
facilitate the development and expansion of dogmatic understanding and practices of
religion which he considered detrimental to the flourishing of the true teachings of
Islam.

290
What is more, he was concerned that marginalization of religion in the new
social system would compartmentalize Muslims and give rise to disunity and conflicts
between the various element of the community of Muslims (Turks, Kurds, Arabs, etc.).
Perhaps, he was thinking that it was the religion of Islam and its social standing in the
society which would bind these different groups under one framework.
These are clear indications that Said Nursi wanted to see the teachings of
religion as the defining characteristic of the new system. In other words, he did not only
provide religious justifications for constitutionalist reforms, he also wanted to give a
religious direction to the revolution. In this respect, he saw freedom (hürriyet) and
constitutionalism (meşrutiyet) as necessary conditions and efficient tools for the
flourishing of the teachings of the Qur’an and the religion of Islam.
After the declaration of the constitution in 1908, Said Nursi also started
publishing articles about the social problems facing contemporary Muslims with a
special focus on the Kurds and the Kurdistan region. Said Nursi’s strategy of
addressing the problems of this region was twofold. On the one hand, he was trying to
convince the capital and the Ottoman intelligentsia, through his speeches and writings,
that they should pay attention to and use the resources in their disposal to help solve the
problems of the Kurds and the Kurdistan region. Offering education in the Kurdish
language in addition to Turkish in this region was one of the solutions Nursi suggested.
On the other hand, Said Nursi was addressing the Kurds through the articles he
published in newspapers and through the telegrams he sent to local notable tribesmen
for urging them to take active part in the establishment and development of the new
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constitutional system (Said Nursi, 2004a [1910], p.158-159).
In the first article he wrote for the newspaper Kürd Teavun ve Teali Gazetesi
(Kurdish Solidarity and Progress) in 1908, Said Nursi contended that the Kurds had
three treasures that they needed to protect and preserve. These are (1) Islam, (2) the
jewel of humanity and (3) nationhood (Milliyet). However, he asserted (1), poverty
(fakr), (2) ignorance (cehl), and (3) conflict (ihtilaf) were three major obstacles to
protecting these treasures. In order to eliminate these hurdles, he argued, the Kurds
needed to work in the areas of education (maarif), unity and the love of nation (ittifak
ve muhabbet-i milli) and individual entrepreneurship and self-struggle (teşebbüsü şahsi
ve sa’y-i nefsi) (Said Nursi, 12 December 1908, p. 13). Said Nursi would slightly revise
this formulation three months later when he talked about the reasons for the stagnation
and decline of the Muslims and the solutions he proposed in an article he published in
the newspaper Volkan (Volcano), (Said Nursi, 24 March 1909, p. 2-3) which was the
voice of pan-Islamism in the contemporary Ottoman society .
Arguing that material progress was key to the spread of the message of Islam
because of the fact that Europeans took Muslims hostage with their science and
industry he listed the same three obstacles (i.e., disunity, ignorance, poverty) to this
progress. The solutions he suggested were very similar, too. The only difference was
that instead of presenting individual entrepreneurship and self struggle as a way to
eliminate poverty, he proposed industry/industriousness and technology (sanat) (Said
Nursi, 24 March 1909, p. 2-3).

292
There are several points which are noteworthy in remembering Said Nursi’s
analysis of the challenges faced by the Kurds and the Muslims in general. The first is
that Said Nursi did not present the issue of solidarity among the Kurds in exclusive
terms. In other words, he didn’t advocate the idea of Kurdish independence. As a strong
supporter of the idea of Unity of Muslims (İttihad-ı İslam), he believed that reversing
the decline of contemporary Muslims, especially the Ottomans, was contingent on the
involvement and engagement of the various (ethnic) elements (anasır). He advised the
Kurds that “strength comes through cooperation (with Turks and other Muslims)”
(ittifakta kuvvet var), “life flourishes with unity (ittihadda hayat var)” and that
“happiness comes with fraternity (uhuvvette saadet var)” (Said Nursi, 12 December
1908, p. 13).
After publishing ten articles in the newspapers Kürd Teavun ve Teali Gazetesi
(Kurdish Solidarity and Progress) between December 2, 1908 and January 9, 1909, Said
Nursi, in early March 1909, started writing for the newspaper Volkan (Volcano) which
was edited by Derviş Vahdeti who was the leader of the society of İttihad-ı
Muhammedi (The Society of Muslims Unity). According to Mardin (1989, p. 84) Said
Nursi was among the founders of this organization. However, Said Nursi said that far
from being a founder of the organization, he initially looked at the organization with
skepticism because he was afraid that this blessed name which theoretically belongs to
each and every one of the Muslims could be exploited and hurt by the errors of those
who appropriated it. But, Said Nursi says, he joined the organization after learning that
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trustable pious persons like Süheyl Pasha and Sadık Bey who were more concerned
about their religion than politics also joined it (Said Nursi, 2004c [1910]).
There was an observable shift in Said Nursi’s discourse when he started writing
for Volkan in March 1909 in the sense that issues pertaining specifically to Kurdistan
occupied less space in his articles. He focused more on ideas regarding
constitutionalism, İttihad-ı İslam, educational reform and the methodology of
responding to the challenges coming from Europe. One of his core arguments in the
articles he published in Volkan was that contemporary Muslims were living at a new
conjecture in history and that they should understand the unique challenges of this time
which require new methods of action. Spreading the message of Islam, which is a
responsibility for all Muslims, was contingent on material development because the
Europeans were able to keep Muslims under their pressure by utilizing science and
industry. And because “poverty, ignorance and conflict” are the major obstacles to
material development, he asserted, Muslims, too, should excel in science (fen) and
industry (sanat).
With regard to the method of confronting external adversities against Islam,
Said Nursi maintained that prevailing over the civilized could only be achieved by
convincing them with truthful arguments, not by defeating them with force. For him,
using the force of weapons and swords in the past could be excused for the
advancement of the message of Islam when confronting the attacks and resistance of
the adversaries who were not civilized. Now that the adversaries of Islam are civilized,
he said, there is no such excuse anymore (Said Nursi, 24 March 1909, p. 2-3).
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Succession over the civilized in matters of religion can only be achieved
through presenting convincing arguments, not through coercion. (Said Nursi, 10
March 1909, p. 3)
Yet, he was concerned that educational institutions were far from being able to
facilitate material progress and producing persuasive arguments in response to the
ideological challenges against the religion of Islam. Disconnectedness of three different
educational institutions; madrasas, modern schools (mekteb) and Sufi lodges (tekke) and
their adversity against each other, for Nursi, were among the main reasons for the
inefficiency of the Ottoman educational system. He did not advocate the unification of
these three systems of education because each of these institutions, specializing in their
area of expertise, could be part of a well-integrated system of division of labor.
Instead, he suggested that “teaching the truths of Islam with their evidences and
proofs in modern schools (mekteb), offering courses on the necessary sciences of
civilization in madrasas instead of teaching them pseudo-science of the medieval
scholars, and the presence of specialized scholars (ulema) in Sufi lodges (tekke)” (Said
Nursi, 24 March 1909, p. 2-3).
Said Nursi’s mobilization strategies thus far can be considered as a form of
reformist activism which sought to bring about structural changes at the institutional
level in Kurdistan, in the Ottoman society and the Muslim World at large. The
discourse Said Nursi used as part of this activism was not uniquely different from the
contemporary intellectuals of the Ottoman society. As it is described previously,
reforming the madrasa education, emphasizing the significance of science, supporting
the idea of İttihad-ı İslam, selective borrowing from the West and advocating
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constitutionalism were ideas supported at least fragmentarily by other intellectuals (e.g.,
the Young Ottomans) and by other prominent Muslims reformists like Jamal ad-Din alAfghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). The significance of science
as a necessary tool for reversing the decline of the Muslim World was also previously
emphasized by religious intellectuals such as Hoca Tahsin Efendi (1811-1888) and
Selim Sabit Efendi (1829-1910).
One of the differences between other prominent Muslim reformists such as the
Young Ottomans and Said Nursi was that the first mostly, if not exclusively, brought in
religious references into their discourse as a form of legitimization in support of their
call for reform. They didn’t strongly emphasize the role of religion in terms of
characterizing the new constitutional system. However, the latter, Said Nursi, resolutely
presented religion as an essential component of the new system to be established. In an
open letter to the members of the newly established parliament (Said Nursi, 19
December 1908, p. 20-22), he maintained that it is imperative for the constitutional
system to keep the teachings of the religion of Islam in its hands at all times.
Another difference lies in his pursuit of establishing a university in the East
where religious and modern sciences would be taught together with the purpose of
eliminating the disconnectedness of classical madrasa education and the education
provided in modern schools which were established since the Tanzimat Era. The
disconnectedness of these two educational systems had two negative implications with
regard to secularization. Learning modern sciences (fünun-u medeniye) without
reference to religious sciences (ulum-u diniye) would foster doubt (about the teachings
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of religion) and madrasa education without knowing modern sciences would lead to
dogmatism (Said Nursi, 2004b [1911], p. 142). Both of these processes would further
marginalize religion and provide a platform for secular ideas to grow. In order to
respond to this challenge, Said Nursi proposed reconciliation of the findings of modern
sciences with the teaching of religion. With this purpose he sought to establish a
university in the East.
However, it seems that Said Nursi’s activism until 1910s was not directed
against a particular secularist group or a specific secularist ideology such as naturalism,
positivism, determinism and utilitarianism. Perhaps, he saw the greatest challenge in
the modern orientalist assertions that the religion of Islam was an obstacle to
civilizational progress. In response, he wanted to achieve two things. On the one hand,
he, similar to the Young Ottomans, was trying to awaken contemporary Muslims to the
dire need for implementing institutional reforms and to the necessity of hard work
which would facilitate the development and flourishing of the Muslim World. In this
regard, he was also open to selective borrowing (science, industry etc.) from the
Western civilization. On the other hand, he was trying to make sure that these reforms
do not go in the direction of marginalizing the religion of Islam in the public life of the
contemporary Muslim societies.
These are indications that Said Nursi, until this time, was not deeply concerned
about the philosophical underpinnings and secularist implications of the concepts of
science, civilization and the idea of progress. As it is described below Said Nursi
changed his position regarding these issues especially after 1910s.
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Back in the East: Conversations with the Kurdish Tribesmen and the Sermon in
Damascus
Almost one year after the trial at the court martial, Said Nursi made a trip back
to Kurdistan region in the Spring of 1910 (Şahiner, 2013, p. 114). He spent the summer
traveling among the local tribes and tried to convince them about the merits of
constitutionalism. As he described it later, Said Nursi found the local tribesmen
extremely confused about constitutionalism (meşrutiyet) and other contemporary issues.
In order to eliminate their confusion, he suggested them to ask their questions so that he
could directly address issues confusing them (Vahide, 2005, p.84-92). He complied a
summary of these dialogues in Turkish and in Arabic. The title of the Turkish version
was Munazarat (The Debates) while the Arabic version’s title was Rachatat al-Awamm
(The Prescription for the Common People).
After traveling among the local Kurdish tribes during the summer of 1910, Said
Nursi headed south, where the majority of the population were Arabs. In the spring of
1911, he arrived at Damascus. Upon the request of local scholars, he gave a sermon at
the Umayyad Mosque to a crowd of about ten thousand people which included around
one hundred religious scholars (Şahiner, 2013, p. 117-118). In this sermon1, he
presented solutions to the six major problems he identified as factors hindering the
progress of contemporary Muslims. These problems were: (1) the growth of
hopelessness among Muslims, (2) the death of truthfulness in the socio-political life, (3)

1

This sermon was published with the title “the Damascus Sermon” by Nursi in 1911.
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love of hatred, (4) not knowing the luminous spiritual ties bonding Muslims, (5) the
spread of despotism like contagious infections, and (6) dedication only to selfish goals
(HS:40-44).
Transition from Reformist Discourse to Religious Renewal: Publication of
Muhakemat
Said Nursi authored his first major work Muhakemat (Reasonings) and
published it both in Arabic and Turkish in Istanbul in 1910. Unlike Munazarat (The
Debates) which addressed the common people, Muhakemat’s audience was the ulema
as title of its Arabic version (Reçetet-ül Havass - The Prescription for the Learned)
testifies. In this book, Said Nursi discussed epistemological and rhetorical problems
which were widespread among the scholarly circles in Muslim communities, regarding
the methodology of deciphering the message of the Qur’an and its application in the
contemporary world.
My aim in this book is as follows: I seek to show the straight path in Islam,
proving false the doubts that its enemies have tried to spread about it, and to
show how baseless are the whims and worries of those Muslims who have
imprisoned themselves in the faulty understanding of some of the outer aspects
of Islam. I also hope to be able to lend a helping hand to those loyal friends of
Islam and the truth-seeking scholars who try to lead people to the truth, who
strive for the [future] of the Muslim world, and who exert themselves with the
hope of victory on the straight path. (RES:4-5) [The bracket in the body of the
text is my correction of the translation]
In so doing, Nursi claimed, he would help brush away the dust which has been
accumulating on the surface of Islam, because of the methodological mistakes of the
Muslims in the last seven hundred years. Methodological fallacies covered throughout
the book Muhakemat include literalism (zahiriyyun, zahirperest and ehli zahiri),
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superficiality (sathiyet, sathi nazar, nazar-ı sathi2), dogmatism (taassub), blind
imitation (taklid), intellectual despotism (tahakkum), partisanship (iltizam and
taraftarlık), self-aggrandizement (meyl-üt tefevvuk and gurur-u nefs3), intellectual
extremism (ifrat and tefrit), emotionalism (hissiyat), sensationalism (mubalağa and
hayal), and descriptionalism (tasvir ve tezyin-i müddea).
In the beginning of the history of Islam, he argued, reason, evidence and
consultation prevailed over emotional dispositions, unsubstantiated descriptions and
forceful imposition of ideas which later became commonplace in Muslim societies.
What generally prevailed in the [last several centuries] and gave rise to spite,
enmity, and the complex of being superior was emotions, inclinations, and
force. A powerful, [persuasive] speech was enough to guide people. At that
time, the ability to embellish a thesis in such a way that it would affect the
feelings and inclinations or make it attractive with the power of rhetoric or
gestures served for evidence. But comparing ourselves to them means returning
to the corners of that time. Every age has a character peculiar to itself. We
demand evidence, and are not deceived through the mere statement or
embellishment of a thesis. (RES:32-33) [The bracket is my correction of the
translation]
Said Nursi’s emphasis on “helping polish Islam by way of brushing away the
dust accumulated on its surface because of the methodological mistakes of Muslims in
the past” can be perceived as a sign of transformation from his reformist activism to a
revivalist discourse. Through his reformist activism, Said Nursi sought to bring about
change in the outer world and in the society at large with the purpose of improving
material conditions of Muslim societies and thusly reversing the decline of the Muslim
World through educational, economic and political reform.

2
3

MUH:33-34, 49-50, 77, 87, 94, 121, 124, 153.
MUH:33.

300
Methodological obstacles inherited from the last several centuries, for Nursi,
prevented contemporary Muslims from benefiting from the universal message of the
Qur’an. In order to adequately address contemporary issues and questions and to guide
the common opinion, Nursi suggested the composition of a new exegesis of the Qur’an
by a consultative team of religious scholars who are specialized in different (positive)
sciences. These scholars need to understand the peculiar challenges, demands and
questions of their times. Because natural sciences were emerging as the dominant
paradigm of modern societies, he contended, it is imperative for religious scholars to
understand the language of science especially if they had the purpose of relating the
message of the Qur’an to contemporary challenges and questions.
However, Said Nursi did not suggest writing a “scientific exegesis.” He
perceived familiarity and expertise in scientific disciplines as a necessary auxiliary tool
for understanding the language of modern times. In his perspective, discoveries of
science could be seen as testimonies to the order and purposefulness in the creation and
thus to the power, will and wisdom of the Creator. However, scientific information, for
him, was not the definitive source of knowledge. Therefore, he didn’t consider
scientific information to be a genuine component of the exegesis he suggested to be
written.
It is not enough for a non-Muslim, in order to become a Muslim, merely to enter
a mosque. Likewise, merely by being included in books of Shari‘a or
interpretations of the Qur’an, matters pertaining to the natural sciences or to
philosophy, geography, history, and so on, cannot be regarded as being included
in matters of the Shari‘a or the Qur’an. [...] Their opinions on the matters
parenthetically included in the books of these sciences are not to be regarded as
definitive evidence or rulings. (RES:27)
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Such a perspective indicates a major shift in Said Nursi’s approach to science.
Until the publication of Muhakemat, Nursi promoted the appropriation of science and
scientific education as a tool for material development (maddeten terakki) which he
thought was critical for the regeneration and flourishing of the Muslim civilization and
thus for “spreading the message of the Qur’an” (ilayi kelimetullah). We see in the book
Muhakemat that Said Nursi was becoming more interested in the epistemological
aspects of modern sciences around 1910-1911.
It is important to note that the reformist discourse of Said Nursi until this time
did not have an explicitly dialectic intonation. He was not expressly mobilized against a
particular group or ideology. However, we see in Muhakemat that Said Nursi started
emphasizing the necessity of the realignment of contemporary Muslim’s perception and
presentation of religious teachings to the methodology and the universal message of the
Qur’an which was obscured and concealed because the aforementioned fallacies and
mistakes of Muslims.
Thenceforth, we see an increasing presence of ideas pertaining to religious
renewal in Said Nursi’s discourse more so than his emphasis on societal reform. We
also see in Muhakemat that Said Nursi started addressing ontological and
epistemological challenges to religious worldviews coming from the ideological
interpretations of science such as naturalism, positivism and materialism which
signifies a transition to a dialectic discourse in Said Nursi’s understanding of religious
revival.
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Departing from the idea that the four central messages of the Qur’an are (1) the
existence and the unity of God (tevhid), (2) resurrection (haşir), (3) prophethood
(nübüvvet) and (4) justice (adalet), Nursi dedicated the third and the last chapter of
Muhakemat to the discussions regarding the evidences for the truthfulness of these core
teachings and to the refutation of doubts and denials cast against them. In presenting
evidences for the existence and unity of God, he presented arguments against the
naturalist and the materialist idea of “the eternity of the matter” and the assertion that
what is observable in the universe are the mere results of the constant motion and
interaction of atoms.
Force and forms [matter] which are claimed to be brought into existence by the
motions of atoms (harekat-ı zerrat) are only attributes (a’raz) and therefore they
cannot be the source and the essence (cevher) of the various forms and kinds of
existence for the fact that attributes (a’raz) cannot be the essence (cevher). That
is to say, all of the stages and fragments of the various kinds of existences and
all of the distinguishing characteristics of (their) attributes (a’raz) must have
been constantly, at all conditions and at all times brought into existence ex
nihilo. [...]
What they call “matter” is something which is constantly changing form and it
cannot escape the spatio-temporal conditions and movements of appearance and
disappearance (existence and nonexistence). Therefore, it (matter) being
brought into existence from non-existence is certain (MUH:121. Trans. ZN).
The materialist idea of “the eternality of matter” and attributing powers to the
motions of atoms and the naturalist conviction that it is the laws in the nature -not an
external power, will and knowledge (i.e., God)- which are the sources of order and
perfection in the universe, are as old as the ancient Greek philosophy. However, these
ideas were adopted and reformulated in European societies since the Enlightenment and
supported by philosophers such as Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751), Baron
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d'Holbach (1723-1789) and Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899).
Young Turks including Beşir Fuad, Abdullah Cevdet, Baha Tevfik and Ahmed
Nebil introduced similar ideas through translations and quotations from the works of
these materialist philosophers to the Ottoman society. It was Ludwig Büchner’s Kraft
und Stoff (Force and Matter) which profoundly influenced the secularist Young Turks.
Three central arguments in this book were that (1) matter and force are inseparable
(there is no force at work in the universe which is independent and separate from
matter), (2) matter is eternal (nothing comes into existence from non-existence) and (3)
the order in the universe is a result of the motion of atoms which are obeying the laws
of Nature without any outside intervention.
The excerpts I quoted above from Said Nursi’s Muhakemat clearly indicates
that he was responding to these materialist ideas which were introduced to the Ottoman
society by some of the secularist Young Turks around the same time Muhakemat was
written. Materialist ideas of philosophers such as Ludwig Büchner, Felix Isnard, Baron
d'Holbach and Gustave le Bon were fragmentarily presented in the Ottoman society
before 1910, too, but it was in 1911 that Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil fully translated
and published the Kraft und Stoff of Büchner (Hanioğlu, 2005, p. 67). In addition,
Abdullah Cevdet, especially after the revolution of 1908, parted ways with the CUP
which he had laid its foundations with his friends in the Imperial Medical Academy.
After the revolution, Abdullah Cevdet continued to independently publish his
increasingly secularist and atheistic ideas in his journal İçtihad.
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Secularist Young Turks did not introduce materialist and naturalist ideas only as
a new scientific paradigm, they also used them as evidences nullifying and disproving
religious teachings such as the existence of God, immortality of soul and resurrection. It
seems that by 1910 Said Nursi was informed about the expansion of the materialist and
naturalist ideas of European philosophers chiefly including Ludwig Büchner in the
Ottoman society. Perhaps, seeing that the revolution of 1908 did not go in the direction
he aspired also contributed to his concerns that the impact of secularist ideas would be
more detrimental for the preservation and revival of religion.
Qur’an as the Absolute Source of Guidance: Publication of İşarat-ul icaz
When WWI broke out, Said Nursi joined the war effrots in the vicitinity of his
homeland and fought with his students against the invading Russian forces. As he was
fighting in the frontlines, Said Nursi continued writing an exegesis of the Qur’an he
started shortly before the war. According to an account provided by Mustafa Yalçın (b.
1895), one of the militias in the regiment under Said Nursi’s command, whenever he
found time from fighting, Said Nursi was dictating his book and his students were
writing. At nights, he was teaching religious matters and the content of the book
(exegesis) he was writing to his students and to the other militias (Şahiner, 2011, p. 8384). Upon his return to Istanbul from captivity, one of the first things he did was the
publication of the exegesis İşarat-ul icaz (Signs of Miraculousness), he started writing
before the war.
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The exegesis which was published in 1918 in Istanbul4 following his return
from the prisoners’ camp in Russia included Said Nursi’s interpretation of all of the
seven verses of the opening chapter (al-Fatiha) and the first 33 verses of the second
chapter (al-Baqarah) of the Qur’an. In addition to illustrating the presence of the four
core teachings (unity of God, prophethood, resurrection and justice) at all places in the
Qur’an, this volume was written to demonstrate the extraordinary interconnectedness,
coherence and eloquence of the text of the Quran by only using the conceptual tools of
logic, grammar, syntax, semantics and rhetoric. Hence, he wanted to prove that the
Qur’an was the divine speech of God and that it is was the absolute source of guidance
for human beings at all times.
Following his escape from the prisoners' camp and arrival in Istanbul, Enver
Pasha (1881-1922), the deputy commander in chief and the minister of war who knew
Said Nursi from the Eastern Front (WWI) and helped the publication of İşarat-ul icaz
by supplying its paper, endorsed him as a candidate for a membership as a scholarly
expert at Darü’l-Hikmeti’l-İslamiye (Islamic Academy of Higher Learning). The
Şeyhülislam approved the appointment of Said Nursi after receiving conferral from the
Sultan (Mehmed V) in August 1918 (Şahiner, 2013, p. 158-171). Darü’l-Hikmeti’lİslamiye was a newly established institution which consisted of the sub-commissions of
theology (kelam), jurisprudence (fıkh) and ethics (ahlak). This institution was also
responsible for responding to criticisms and challenges against the religion of Islam,

Şükran Vahide (2005, p. 132) thinks that the drafts of Nursi’s book could have been brought to
Istanbul by his nephew Abdurrahman who came from the Kurdistan region and joined his uncle
after his return from the prisoners’ camp.
4

306
contributing to the religious education of the Muslims and offering consultation and
fatwas in matters of confusion and disupte (Albayrak, 1993, p. 506-507).
During his tenure at Darü’l-Hikmeti’l-İslamiye (1918-1922) Said Nursi
published around a dozen treatises including Nokta (1918), Şua’at (1918-1919), Lemaat
(1920), Tuluat (1920-1921), Sunuhat (1920), Rumuz (1920-1921), İşarat (1921),
Hutuvvat-ı Sitte (1920), Hakikat Çekirdekleri I (1920), and Hakikat Çekirdekleri II
(1921). These treatises covered a wide range of issues pertaining to social, political,
philosophical and theological issues. Among the social issues discussed in these works
are social inequality (İşarat), conflict (İşarat, Tuluat), social justice (İşarat, Lemaat)
and religion and social life (Lemaat).
Political issues such as the occupation of Istanbul by the British (Tuluat),
nullification of the fatwa issued by the office of Şeyhülislam under the pressure of the
occupying forces against the Turkish Independence Movement (Tuluat), the nature of
sultanate and caliphate (Sunuhat), nationalism (Sunuhat), İttihad-ı İslam (Rumuz) and
conflicts among Muslim scholars (Tuluat) are also covered in Said Nursi’s publications
during this period. Philosophical questions regarding the cause and effect relations
(Lemaat, Hakikat Çekirdekleri), naturalism (Lemaat), materialism (Lemaat, Hakikat
Çekirdekleri), epistemology (Lemaat, Hakikat Çekirdekleri), comparison of the
concepts of the pure and relative justice (Sunuhat), principles of moral action (Lemaat)
and theological inquiries concerning the evidences of the existence and unity of God
and bodily resurrection after death (Nokta), the nature of good deeds (Sunuhat), the
eloquence of the Qur’an (Rumuz), the methodology of its interpretation (Sunuhat) and

307
the meaning and evidences of prophethood (Şuaat) also take up a large proportion of
these treatises.
Although Said Nursi had been a proactively involved in reformist and revivalist
activism through his publications in the last two decades of the Ottoman Empire, his
impact at the grassroots level was limited. However, he was renowned in the political
and intellectual circles. When the newly established Turkish government was
established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, Said Nursi was invited to
the new capital to be recognized for his contributions to the war efforts against the
Russians in the Eastern front and for his support of the independence movement. The
new parliament welcomed him with an official ceremony on November 9, 1922. With
the request of several deputies, he also gave a brief address in the chamber and prayed
for the success of the parliament (Şahiner, 2013, p. 210-213).
After arriving in Ankara Said Nursi also distributed a letter in the parliament
urging the leaders of the independence movement including Mustafa Kemal and the
other deputies for the preservation Islamic faith. Just as he did in the case the revolution
of 1908, Said Nursi wanted to give a religious direction to the newly established
government in Ankara.
Those who support and admire your victory in the War of Independence and
your invaluable service are this broad community of believers especially
including common people who are strongly [religious] Muslims. They
seriously love you, support you and they are grateful to you. They present and
offer you a very strongly awakened power. For the benefit of Islam, you, too,
should join them by upholding the principles of the Qur’an. (T:141, Trans. ZN)
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In the same letter, Said Nursi also emphasized the significance of obligatory
prayers (salat). After reading Said Nursi’s memorandum letter, Mustafa Kemal scolded
him by saying: “We have invited you here so that you can enlighten us with your high
opinions, but you started talking about salat!” Said Nursi, too, responded back sharply
by saying “Pasha! the greatest matter in Islam after faith (iman) is obligatory prayers
(salat). Who denies this is a traitor and the hükm [opinion or case] of the traitors are
rejected!” (T:143). Some of the then-members of the parliament (e.g., Ali Sururi,
Abdulgani Ensari, Tevfik Demiroğlu, and Hüseyin Aksu) confirmed the altercations
and disputes between the two (Akgündüz, 2014, p. 402-407).
While he was in Ankara, Said Nursi wrote a treatise refuting atheistic arguments
of naturalism and materialism. He said that he wrote this treatise because he saw “a
despicable current of atheism which was dangerously and secretly poisoning the minds
of the deputies” and because “he was deeply alarmed that this monster [sic] would
attack the pillars of faith” (L:177). However, Nursi regretted later (L:177), that the
impact of this treatise was limited because it was published in Arabic which was not
understood by most of the deputies.”
These are indications that during the six months he stayed in Ankara in the
aftermath of the War of Independence and in the eve of the establishment of the
Turkish Republic, Said Nursi saw once again that the impact of the development and
expansion of secularist ideas including naturalism and materialism were prevailing
among the new political leaders of the society. Moreover, these ideas were becoming
the ruling ideas of the society with the movement of secularism into the halls of power.
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Said Nursi was disappointed with what he saw in Ankara and according to his
own account, he was convinced that “it would be impossible to oppose and confront
this person [Mustafa Kemal] by legitimate means” (Ş:359). That is why, Said Nursi
said, he “decided to withdraw from sociopolitical life and to dedicate his time and
energy for saving the faith [in God, hereafter etc.]” (Ş:359). Apparently, what Said
Nursi observed in the aftermaths of both the revolution of 1908 and the War of
Independence convinced Said Nursi about the impracticality of seeking change at the
societal and political levels. As it is investigated in further detailed below, Said Nursi
developed a new micro level approach to revivalism after the establishment of the
Turkish Republic and formed the Nur Movement which has been one of the largest and
most influential revivalist movements in the Muslim World.
Said Nursi went back to the province of Van after his disappointment in Ankara.
He later wrote that his trip back to Van started a new chapter in his life as he went
through an intellectual transformation about the methodology of religious thinking and
about the methodology of religious revival. He called the first part of his life before this
intellectual transformation as “the Old Said” and the period after that as “the New
Said.” When he went back to Van during the emergence of the New Said, he secluded
himself from the society except for teaching religious sciences to a small group of
students in the outskirts of the city.
When he was exiled to the Western provinces by the new government following
the Şeyh Said Incident, he started writing treatises in his exile with the aim of providing
evidences to Qur’anic teachings such as existence of God and bodily resurrection and
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for refuting the ontological and moral philosophical bases of what he broadly called
philosophy including positivist science’s portrayals of nature and causality. When a
group of his followers started to circulate his writings, the state banned the publication
of his works. Consequently, his followers started reproducing Said Nursi’s treatises
writing out them by hand. Wary of the spread of his writings and influence, a series of
arrests and trials of Said Nursi and his students was initiated by the secularist
establishment in 1935 which would last until his death in 1960 (Vahide, 2005).
Said Nursi’s Revivalist Discourse after the Establishment of the Turkish Republic
Shortly after he was sent to exile in the western provinces which was inhabited
predominantly by Turks, Said Nursi started writing revivalist treatises in Turkish. He
gave copies of these writings to the local people who visited him. As the number of
people, mostly local villagers, who started reading and distributing his treatises
increased, a revivalist movement started to emerge around the ideas of Said Nursi. The
vast majority of the treatises he wrote in the first five years of his exile (1925-1930)
were compiled into the book Sözler (The Words) which became his magnum opus. The
Words includes 33 chapters (words). With some exceptions, chapters of The Words are
compiled in the chronological order in which they were written.
Said Nursi’s other writings and the letters he exchanged with his followers and
students after the establishment of the Turkish Republic were compiled into some of the
other volumes of the Risale-i Nur Collection.
The first eight chapters of the book The Words were written in the format of
allegorical stories. After outlining these allegorical stories, Said Nursi discussed
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symbolic meaning of their content in a popularly accessible stylistic format. As I
describe and discuss below, Said Nursi used these allegorical stories as a way of
reorienting his readers’ pursuit of happiness and sense of fulfilment towards a GodConscious direction as part of the revivalist approach he developed especially after the
establishment of the secularist Turkish Republic.
Taking the first chapters of The Words as a departure point, I explore and
investigate Said Nursi’s understanding of secularism and the discursive and rhetorical
approach he used in his response to secularization. In discussing the implications of
contents of these chapters, I will refer to other relevant passages from the Risale-i Nur
as well. As the analysis I present below illustrate, moral philosophical themes in the
introductory chapters outweigh ontological and political philosophical issues. Another
characteristics of these chapters is that responses to secularization and modernization
are implicitly and indirectly addressed.
However, some of the subsequent chapters in The Words and in the other books
of the Risale-i Nur more directly and explicitly address issues regarding secularism
(e.g., atheism, materialism, naturalism, secular humanism and nationalism). I will
explore the content of these chapters in my analyses of Said Nursi’s discursive response
to secularization after the exploration of the introductory chapters.
The Elementary Dialectics of Religious vs. Secularist Moral Philosophy and
Ontology in Said Nursi's Revivalist Writings
The opening chapter of The Words, which is the core book of the Risale-i Nur,
starts with an interpretation of Bismillah (In the name of God) which is the shortened
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version of Bismillah er-Rahman er-Raheem [In the name of God, the Most-Merciful,
the Most-Compassionate], the recurring phrase at the beginnings of all but one of the
114 chapters of the Qur’an. Bismillah is also an expression recited by Muslims at the
beginning of their deeds and actions. Said Nursi provides different explanations of
Bismillah in other places but the interpretation he presented in the first chapter of The
Words is as follows.
Bismillah, (In the Name of God), is the start of all things good. We, too, shall
start to it.
Know, O my soul! Just as this blessed phrase is a mark of Islam, so too it is
constantly recited by all beings through their tongues of disposition.
If you want to know what an inexhaustible strength, what an unending source of
bounty is Bismillah, listen to the following story which is in the form of a
comparison. It goes like this:
Someone who makes a journey through the deserts of Arabia has to travel in the
name of a tribal chief and enter under his protection, for in this way he may be
saved from the assaults of bandits and secure his needs. On his own he will
perish in the face of innumerable enemies and needs. And so, two men went on
such a journey and entered the desert. One of them was modest and humble, the
other proud and conceited. The humble man assumed the name of a tribal chief,
while the proud man did not. The first travelled safely wherever he went. If he
encountered bandits, he said: "I am travelling in the name of such-and-such
tribal leader," and they would not molest him. If he came to some tents, he
would be treated respectfully due to the name. But the proud man suffered such
calamities throughout his journey that they cannot be described. He both
trembled before everything and begged from everything. He was abased and
became an object of scorn.
And so, my proud soul! You are the traveler, and this world is a desert. Your
impotence [acz] and poverty [fakr] have no limit, and your enemies and needs
are endless.
Since it is thus, take the name of the Pre-Eternal Ruler and Post-Eternal Lord of
the desert and be saved from begging before the whole universe and trembling
before every event. (W:15-16)
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In this introduction, Nursi starts with a brief statement that Bismillah is “recited
by all beings through their tongues of disposition5" which apparently is about
cosmological ontology because it has implications with regard to the questions of “what
is the source and purpose of existence?” Nursi leaves this statement unexplained, but to
be touch on later and he continues with a simple and yet metaphorically rich account of
the human ontology that he further extrapolates in the rest of The Words and in the
other parts of the Risale-i Nur.
Before he narrates an allegorical story which he uses to interpret the meaning of
it, Said Nursi mentions that Bismillah is the start of all things good”. He does not
explicitly declare that he will establish a connection between Bismillah and the concept
of the good in this chapter but the story he tells and the explanations he provides reveal
that he does. There are two ways in which he establishes such a connection in the First
Word. The first is about the relationship between Bismillah and the good in moral
philosophical sense which regards human action, and the second is about the good in
ontological sense which is about the existence and state of affairs of all things in the
cosmos.
In the first part where he disposes the bases of his moral philosophy, he also
establishes an ontological account of human beings. As I have noted earlier, I treat this
ontology (of human beings) as part of moral philosophy. Such an ontology deals with

“Tongue of disposition” (Lisan-i hal) is a phrase which refers to non-verbal signification. When
Nursi says that all-beings recite Bismillah, he contends that everything (conscious and
unconscious) are testament to the perfect attributes of God which they dispose through the state
of their being.
5
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the nature of human beings which lays the foundations of the nature of human action.
Therefore, the ontology of human beings -at least for the purpose of this dissertation- is
considered to be part of the moral philosophy. In this vein, the ontology of human
beings is different from the ontology of the cosmos. The first relates to the moral
philosophical good whereas the second concerns the ontological good.
In the text I quoted above, Nursi first expounds a brief ontology of human
beings and consequently he lays the foundations for an understanding of the bases of
moral philosophical good. The journey and desert metaphors he uses in this text are
indications of seeing human beings in a challenging journey in time and space. In such
a journey, human beings are in destitute for (1) meeting their needs and (2) being
secured from harm.
Elsewhere in the Risale-i Nur (F3), Nursi contends that human beings are given
a comprehensive nature which connects them with almost all beings and a limitless
capacity to love. Nevertheless, they constantly suffer the pain of separation as they
depart the things they love with the passage of time. Due to the same comprehensive
nature, they are also tormented by the fears of calamities bearing the potential of
harming their bodies, their lives and the world they live in. These calamities include
things as small and as near as infinitesimal microbes and as big and as far as an
explosion in the sun (F1). Such love and such fears are the sources of (1) limitless
poverty and (2) limitless impotence on the side of human beings, which are related to
their destitute for (1) meeting their needs and (2) being secured from harm respectively.
In other words, human beings are stricken with limitless poverty because they have
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boundless needs. They are also afflicted with limitless impotence because they have
endless fears. All of these are related to the journey of human beings in time and space
and their comprehensive nature.
The concepts of limitless poverty (acz) and limitless impotence (fakr) occupy a
central place in the Risale-i Nur (Vahide, 2006) especially in its moral philosophy
including the human ontology. In many places in the Risale-i Nur (Ex: W13, W17, R4)
Nursi suggests that only by finding a point of support (trust) against all their enemies
(fears, death, separation, destruction, sickness etc.) and a source of help for all their
needs human beings can be happy. Throughout the Risale, Nursi maintains that there is
none but one such trust: God, the pre-eternal and post-eternal creator of the cosmos in
its entirety and particularity at all times.
It seems that by alluding to limitless poverty (acz) and limitless impotence
(fakr) Nursi aims at fostering a form self reflexivity and individual consciousness of the
need for something similar to what sociologist Giddens (1991) calls “trust” for attaining
ontological security. For Giddens, “trust” is a core component of personality
development starting from early ages. In circumstances of uncertainty, “trust” is
established between the one in need (e.g., infant) and the caretaker which screens out
potential dangers and harm and thus provides a sense of ontological security to the self
(p. 38-39).
Pannenberg (1970) makes a distinction between “trust” and “security.” For the
most part, human actions, including culture and language, strive to culminate ways of
securing conditions for life. Throughout history, human civilizations produced different
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means as tools for establishing this kind of security. Magic of ancient societies and the
technology of modern times are part of this endeavor. Nonetheless, Pannenberg asserts,
such means will never end and will never provide a fuller sense of security because of
the variability and unpredictability of human experience. Human beings, unlike
animals, are open to the world in the sense that they are cognizant of the whole reality
that encounter them (p. 30-44).
Totality and individuality of the world are beyond the perception and control of
human beings. As a consequence, they need to have some sort of “trust” in and for each
moment. The object of “trust,” Pannenberg implies, might change but the need for it
does not. He also postulates, similar to Giddens that trust establishes a relationship
between individuals and the object of trust, a process which bears the potential of
transforming the self. For example, trusting self acknowledges that he or she does not
have power over himself or herself.
What Nursi does in the Risale-i Nur starting with the First Word is to situate the
pursuit of happiness in a cosmic frame of reference stretching the boundaries of time
and space. Out of this arise uncertainties of great magnitude for which the self needs
finding and establishing connections with a source of “trust” possessing “inexhaustible
strength” (power) and “unending bounties” (mercy) which can provide a sense of
ontological security. In this way, Nursi aims at laying the foundations of transforming
the self towards a God-conscious direction.
Having started the chapter with reference to the good and continuing with
discussions regarding the unlimited impotence and poverty of human beings in their
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pursuit of happiness, Nursi indicates that he considers happiness (i.e., meeting the
needs and being secured from the fears) as a great good sought by human beings.
In opening the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle provides a concise definition of
the good as a moral philosophical concept.
Every craft and every line of inquiry, and likewise every action and decision
seems to seek some good: that is why some people were right to describe the
good as what everything seeks. (Aristotle, 1999, p. 1)
In Aristotle’s account, there is a hierarchy of (moral philosophical) goods. Some
of them are good in and of themselves while some are means for another greater good.
The good which is not chosen for another good is the highest good; it is the good, per
se. Almost two centuries after Aristotle, Roman orator and philosopher Cicero
formulated the term summum bonum to refer to the concept of the highest good and he
contended that every ethical and moral theory should be studied with regard to the
central role of its summum bonum (Devettere, 2002, p. 36). The concept of ultimate
concern which bears similar connotations with more emphasis on existential issues was
offered by theologian Paul Tillich (1957) more recently.
According to Aristotle, the highest good for human action is happiness
(eudaimonia6) as there is no greater good sought by happiness other than being happy.
Every other things are means to achieve happiness. Thus, happiness is the complete of
all goods, therefore it is the highest good.

Eudaimonia is generally translated as ‘happiness’. An alternative translation is “human
flourishing” which involves performing our function well (Luper, 1999). For Aristotle that
function is reasoning.
6
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I will discuss later in this chapter whether Said Nursi sees happiness (or human
flourishing) as the greatest good but it seems thus far that he considers happiness as a
great good. However, he suggests that human beings cannot achieve this good without
finding an “inexhaustible strength an unending source of bounty” [partial quotation
from the text above] for their unlimited impotence and poverty. For the question of how
to find this strength and bounty, Nursi, in continuum of the First Word, suggest that the
acknowledgement of unlimited weakness makes the self establish connections to (the
names of) God:
Since it is thus, take the name of the Pre-Eternal Ruler and Post-Eternal Lord of
the desert and be saved from begging before the whole universe and trembling
before every event.
Indeed, this phrase [Bismillah] is a treasury so blessed that your infinite
impotence and want bind you to an infinite power and mercy; it makes that
impotence and want a most acceptable intercessor at the Court of One AllPowerful and Compassionate. The person who acts saying, "In the Name of
God," resembles someone who enrolls in the army. He acts in the name of the
government; he has fear of no one; he speaks, performs every matter, and
withstands everything in the name of the law and the name of the government.
(W:16)
One of the characteristics of Nursi’s writing style is that he chooses different
attributes to refer to God depending on the context. In so doing, I think, he aims to
relate God closely to the particular instances of his readers’ experiences in their lives.
Indeed, in the addendum to the First Word, which is an additional alternative
interpretation of Bismillah’s full length version (In the name of God, the Merciful, the
Compassionate), Nursi, as a reflection of this approach, discusses the distinction
between Divine Unity (Vahidiyet) and Divine Oneness (Ehadiyyet).
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The first (Divine Unity) refers to God as the only creator of the entire universe
in its totality at a macro level. The latter (Divine Oneness), however sees God as the
creator and sustainer of each and every individual micro level instances and
experiences. He interprets the three components of Bismillah (1- In the name of God, 2The Merciful, 3 – the Compassionate) to draw attention to micro (Ehadiyet) perspective
within the Macro (Vahidiyet) contending that this is the methodology of the Qur’an.
[J]ust as divine oneness and eternal besoughtedness have a manifestation together
with all the divine names in everything, in animate creatures in particular, and
especially in man’s mirror-like essence; so too through divine unity each of the
divine names connected to beings encompasses all things. Thus, lest minds
become overwhelmed by divine unity and hearts forget the Most Pure and Holy
Essence, the Qur’an constantly draws attention to the stamp of divine oneness
within divine unity. And that stamp, with its three salient points, is “In the Name
of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. (W:19-20)
I see a similar pattern in the first part of the First Word. Because he related the
pursuit of happiness as a great good to human beings’ journey in time and space, he
uses the title ‘the Pre-Eternal Ruler and Post-Eternal Lord’ (of the universe) so as to
relate the personal experiences of his readers. Obviously, pre-eternity and post-eternity
are terms related to time, and universe is related to space. Likewise, in the next
paragraph, he refers to God as the All-Powerful and Compassionate relating to the
impotence (as a source of strength) and poverty (as a source of abundance) in their
search for happiness.
This introduction and other similar passages in the Risale-i Nur (e.g., W2, W3,
W5, W6, W7, W8, W12, W30, L20, and R4) are indications that the moral
philosophical concept of good and therefore the transformation of the self plays a
central role in Nursi’s discourse. I will revisit this subject with a broader approach for
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further exploration of the dynamics of the construction of the self in Risale and its
connotations with regard to secularization. For now, I will turn to the First Word for a
brief analysis of Nursi’s understanding of ontology and ontological good and their
sociological implications.
As Pannenberg (1970) described it, “the object of trust must be known by
experience and must shown itself to be trustworthy. Trust is not possible otherwise.”
The following passage signals that at this point Nursi intended to address this issue and
wanted to briefly answer the question of whether it is really God (the Pre-Eternal Ruler
and Post-Eternal Lord) who creates everything in the universe. Apparently, his
suggestion for trusting God in the quest for happiness as a human good, which involves
infinite love and limitless fear about all things in the universe, is based on the idea that
everything is the creation of God. Moreover, Nursi had stated in the very beginning of
the First Word that Bismillah is “recited by all beings through their tongues of
disposition.” Now, he comes back to this point to substantiate it.
At the beginning we said that all beings say “In the Name of God” through the
tongue of disposition. Is that so?
Indeed, it is so. If you were to see that a single person had come and had driven
all the inhabitants of a town to a place by force and compelled them to work,
you would be certain that he had not acted in his own name and through his own
power, but was a soldier, acting in the name of the government and relying on
the power of the king.
In the same way, all things act in the name of Almighty God, for minute things
like seeds and grains bear huge trees on their heads; they raise loads like
mountains. That means all trees say: "In the Name of God," fill their hands from
the treasury of Mercy, and offer them to us. All gardens say: "In the Name of
God," and become cauldrons from the kitchens of Divine Power in which are
cooked numerous varieties of different foods. All blessed animals like cows,
camels, sheep, and goats, say: "In the Name of God," and become fountains of
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milk from the abundance of Mercy, offering us a most delicate and pure food
like the water of life in the name of the Provider. The roots and rootlets, soft as
silk, of all plants, trees, and grasses, say: "In the Name of God," and pierce and
pass through hard rock and earth. Mentioning the name of God, the name of the
Most Merciful, everything becomes subjected to them.
Indeed, the roots spreading through hard rock and earth and producing fruits as
easily as the branches spread through the air and produce fruits, and the delicate
green leaves retaining their moisture for months in the face of extreme heat,
deal a slap in the mouths of Naturalists and jab a finger in their blind eyes,
saying: "Even heat and hardness, in which you most trust, are under a
command. For, like the Staff of Moses, each of those silken rootlets conform to
the command of, And We said, O Moses, strike the rock with your staff,
[Qur’an 2:60] and split the rock. And the delicate leaves fine as cigarette paper
recite the verse, ‘O fire be coolness and peace’ [Qur’an 21:69] against the heat
of the fire, each like the members of Abraham (UWP). (W:17-18)
Similar to his introduction to the issues pertaining to moral philosophy in the
beginning of this first chapter, Nursi, in this section, starts with a brief and simple
introduction to ontological issues (regarding the cosmos) which he discusses in further
detail and complexity in other places of the Risale-i Nur (W30).
There are two points which I think are noteworthy here. First, Nursi makes the
case for the idea of God creating everything by way of negating causality. Suffice it to
say now that one of the ways Nursi makes inferences about the existence and unity of
God is to make a comparison of causes and effects. On the one hand are incapable,
blind, powerless and mindless causes and on the other are more complex, orderly,
perfect, beautiful and meaningful effects. It would be impossible to attribute these
complex and meaningful effects (such as the fruitful trees) to senseless, mindless and
powerless causes (the earth, the seeds, the sun, water, oxygen etc.) and to the abstract
laws through which these elements interact, hence the necessity for the existence of
God (F23).
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Secondly and more importantly, there is an explicit connection in this excerpt
above which deals primarily with ontology and with the two aspects of moral
philosophical good that Nursi dealt with earlier. He first brings the issues of unlimited
impotence and poverty of human beings when he touches on issues regarding the moral
philosophical good, contending that these two sides of the human good is the source of
unlimited impotence and poverty which could only be satisfied by finding an
“inexhaustible strength” and an “unending source of bounty.”
Now, Nursi opens up an ontological approach where he evokes the idea that
God is the “inexhaustible strength” and the “unending source of bounty.” In saying
“Even heat and hardness, in which you most trust, are under a command” and “The
roots and rootlets, soft as silk, of all plants, trees, and grasses, say: ‘In the Name of
God,’ and pierce and pass through hard rock and earth,” Nursi points to the
(inexhaustible) power of God. It is his power, Nursi suggests, which is making these
impossible things happen. Thus, Nursi aims to appeal to the impotent side of human
beings. When he says that it is God’s mercy which is giving human beings the great
variety of fruits and food from the trees and domestic animals, he is appealing to the
other (boundless poverty) side.
Thence, Nursi brings together the moral philosophical good and the ontological
good. Things, such as trees and animals, depend on God for coming into existence and
in their journey towards reaching perfection, order, beauty and meaning. Human
beings, too, should recognize this and turn to Him for their needs in their
spatiotemporal journey. Therefore, there is a strong relationship between moral

323
philosophy and ontology in Nursi’s thinking.
Thirdly, in the beginning of the First Word where Nursi deals with the moral
philosophical good, being “proud” and “selfish” is the source of deviation from the
good as it is portrayed in the story of the two men travelling in the desert. Those who
live exclusively for themselves and trust their imagined but de facto non-existent
limited power (W30) are the source of their own despair and misery (W7). For
ontology, it is the naturalist who falsely speculates the truth about the good (order,
perfection, meaning etc.) in the cosmos by attributing the qualities they observe to the
causes and to the laws in nature in denial of their true source (i.e., God).
In Aristotle's hierarchy of goods, happiness, since it is the ultimate goal, is the
greatest good. The assumption behind such a conviction is that we live for attaining
happiness and we do not instrumentalize it to reach something greater than that. At the
outset, it is not very clear whether the pursuit of happiness is presented as the greatest
good in the First Word because most of this chapter revolves around issues regarding
happiness and the way through which it can be attained. Three things convince me that
happiness in and of itself is not the greatest good neither in the First Word nor in the
rest of the Risale-i Nur.
First, the very beginning of this (first) chapter proclaims (in the original
language): “Bismillâh her hayrın başıdır.” Şükran Vahide translated this phrase as: “In
the Name of God, is the start of all things good.” In the original (Turkish) language, the
word used in place of “start” in the English translation is “baş” (as in başıdır) which
has multiple meanings in Turkish, the most literal of which is the “head” as the upper

324
part of the body. Online dictionary of Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language
Association) lists this as the first meaning7. Other meanings listed in the same
dictionary include “beginning/start,” “top” "head [leader]" and “main.” The translator
chose to use the word “start” for the translation of baş and hence translation: “In the
Name of God is the start of all things good.”
The following sentence in the original language is “Biz dahi başta ona başlarız”
which can be literally translated as “We, too, shall start to it.” However, the translator
choose to translate it as “We, too, shall start with it.” I think that the translator chose to
translate it this way because she interpreted the preceding sentence (Bismillâh her
hayrın başıdır) to be only understood as “In the Name of God is the start of everything”
by only focusing on the meaning of the word (baş) as “start/beginning.”
Another reason might be that because Bismillah (In the name of God) is
customarily recited at the beginning of good deeds among Muslims. She probably
thought that Said Nursi meant to do the same and wanted to start with Bismillah to an
important task but perhaps he mistakenly used the preposition “to” instead of the
preposition “with.”
However, if and when other meanings of baş primarily including main and top
were also included, if not exclusively used, it would be much easier to understand why
Nursi mentions “starting to Bismillah” rather than saying “starting with Bismillah.”
This might seem to be a subtle nuance but it answers an important question
which is whether Nursi sees human happiness as an end in and of itself or in other
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words as the greatest good. This nuance [using the adjective to instead of with] is one
important indication that Nursi does not see “Bismillah – In the name of God” as a
means to an end but an end in and of itself. Put differently, Bismillah is not something
that is employed to get something else. It is an ideal way of life, indeed a paradigm of
making sense of the world and living accordingly. As such Bismillah is not exclusively
something with which another thing is achieved, it is something to be started to.
Secondly, the rest of the First Word especially the last part attests to the idea
that Bismillah in and of itself is the greatest good and not human happiness even though
happiness is tied exclusively to Bismillah.
Since all things say: “In the Name of God,” and bearing God’s bounties in
God’s name, give them to us, we, too, should say: “In the Name of God.” We
should give in the name of God, and take in the name of God. And we should
not take from heedless people who neglect to give in God’s name.
Question: We give a price to people, who are like tray-bearers. So what price
does God want? Who is the true owner?
The Answer: Yes, the price the True Bestower of Bounties wants in return for
those valuable bounties and goods is three things: one is remembrance, another
is thanks, and the other is reflection. Saying, “In the Name of God” at the start is
remembrance, and, “All praise be to God” at the end is thanks. And perceiving
and thinking of those bounties, which are priceless wonders of art, being
miracles of power of the Unique and Eternally Besought One and gifts of His
mercy, is reflection. However foolish it is to kiss the foot of a lowly man who
conveys to you the precious gift of a king and not to recognize the gift’s owner,
it is a thousand times more foolish to praise and love the apparent source of
bounties and forget the True Bestower of Bounties. (W:17)
Here, Nursi summarizes and more explicitly states what he implicitly hinted
before. Read the cosmos “In the name of God” for “all things say Bismillah” (alludes to
ontology). Such a conviction necessitates that human beings should conduct their lives
including their interactions with others based on the greatest good “In the name of
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God” and hence they should ‘Give and take in the name of God”. As such, Bismillah
brings together the ontological and moral philosophical good in the form of Godconsciousness. Therefore, Bismillah, for Nursi, is the greatest good.
In answering the hypothetical question in the First Word about the price God
wants for his bounties, Nursi further emphasizes that it is the recognition of God as the
source of all that is good. Having started the chapter with issues pertaining to the
ontological and moral philosophical good, he closes it with a call for the
acknowledgement of God, seeing him at the center of one’s own life and acting
accordingly.
O my soul! If you do not wish to be foolish in that way, give in God’s name,
take in God’s name, begin in God’s name, and act in God’s name. And that’s
the matter in a nutshell! (W:18)
Another reason why I think that the pursuit of happiness is not at the foci of
Nursi’s understanding of the good is the way he complied the remaining chapter of his
book The Words is the main book of the Risale-i Nur. In the following chapters of The
Words, Nursi continues to use metaphorical stories after the First Word. One of the
common characteristics of all of these chapters is that by way of placing the pursuit of
human good in a cosmic frame of reference and by projecting this pursuit in a broader
spectrum in time and space, Nursi aims to the shift the ultimate concern of his readers
from a temporal one to an everlasting one.
In the process of doing so, he tells his readers that their happiness is contingent
on the (co)operation of the entire cosmos and the stretch of time from pre-eternity to
post-eternity, which are outside their power and control. Securing their (eternal) needs
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and being saved from their enemies, primarily including non-existence, depend on
establishing a strong connection to God - the One who reigns over time and space.
Hence, he aims at convincing the readers that they have to recognize God in their
journey in time and space, or else their short-sighted selfish side will lead to suffering
under the pressure of limitless needs and fears.
Such descriptions alongside the general narrative of the Risale-i Nur indicate
that Nursi sees a duality in the nature of human beings. On the one side is the selfish
soul (nefs) which is always tempted towards immediate pleasures even at the expense
of suffering in the long run. On the other are the heart, mind and spirit connecting
human beings to the past and future which elongate to eternity. The heart (kalb) loves
things eternally, but the passing of time takes away the beloved ones and, therefore,
even pleasureable things turns into pain, for the fact that the departure of the desirable
is also affliction. The mind (akl) brings forth the uncertainties of the future while the
spirit (ruh) wants to be at peace with the past, present and future all at once (W:518519, W:611-612, R4).
Pursuing the interests of the shortsighted soul (nefs) is at odds with the interests
of the heart, mind and spirit. Awakening to the needs of these faculties instead of the
selfish temptations of the soul (nefs) accentuate the unlimited impotence (acz) and
poverty (fakr) on the side of the self and thereupon paves the way for the connection to
God.
Nursi thinks that worldviews and philosophies antithetical to Revelation orient
individuals towards transient goals and blinds them to their real necessities by
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appealing to the desires of the soul (nefs) with amusement and entertainment. This is
not only an anomaly in the sense of a divergent aberration from the real greatest good
(In the name of God), it is also a path based on an unrealistic and impractical approach
to the nature of human beings. It can only work (make people think they are happy) by
canceling out human sensitivities (iptal-i his) which is something Nursi occasionally
likens to drunkenness (W:39, W:48, W:70, W:85).
In order to reorient the self towards the greatest good (Bismillah), he appeals to
the other side with a broader scope of the pursuit of the good. All of the first eight
chapters of The Words, which are also published independently as The Short Words
(Küçük Sözler), revolve around these issues. Even when he writes about the importance
of the 5-times daily prayers in the Fourth Word, Said Nursi brings up the journey in
time and space. He first tells a short story where a mighty ruler sends two of his
servants to a royal domain of his, two months distance away and give the two servants
twenty-four pieces of gold each.
The ruler instructs them to buy the necessities along the way for their stay there.
The first carefully uses his capital in preparation for his final destination whereas the
second heedlessly wastes all but one of the twenty-four golds on gambling and
amusement. The first warns the second that he should spend this last piece of gold for a
ticket to the final destination. Otherwise, he will walk the desert alone in starvation.
The interpretation Nursi provides at the end of the story if as follows.
Oh you who do not perform the prescribed prayers! And O my own soul, which
does not like to pray! The ruler in the comparison is our Sustainer, our Creator.
Of the two travelling servants, one represents the devout who perform their
prayers with fervor, and the other, the heedless who neglect their prayers. The
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twenty-four pieces of gold are life in every twenty-four-hour day. And the royal
domain is Paradise. As for the station, it is the grave. And the journey is man’s
passage to the grave, and on to the resurrection and the hereafter. Men cover
that long journey to different degrees according to their actions and the strength
of their fear of God. Some of the truly devout have crossed a thousand-year
distance in a day like lightning. And some have traversed a fifty-thousand-year
distance in a day with the speed of imagination. The Qur’an of Mighty Stature
alludes to this truth with two of its verses.
The ticket in the comparison represents the prescribed prayers. A single hour a
day is sufficient for the five prayers together with taking the ablutions. So what
a loss a person makes who spends twenty-three hours on this fleeting worldly
life, and fails to spend one hour on the long life of the hereafter; how he wrongs
his own self; how unreasonably he behaves. For would not anyone who
considers himself to be reasonable understand how contrary to reason and
wisdom such a person’s conduct is, and how far from reason he has become, if,
thinking it reasonable, he gives half of his property to a lottery in which one
thousand people are participating and the possibility of winning is one in a
thousand, and does not give one twenty-fourth of it to an eternal treasury where
the possibility of winning has been verified at ninety-nine out of a hundred?
(W:33)
Towards the end of the Third Word which also involves a road story, is this
conclusion.
O rebellious soul, know that one of those two travelers represents those who
submit to the Divine Law, while the other represents the rebellious and those
who follow their own desires. The road is the road of life, which comes from the
Spirit World, passes through the grave, and carries on to the hereafter. As for
the kit-bag and rifle, they are worship and fear of God.
There is an apparent burden in worship, but there is an ease and lightness in its
meaning that defies description. For in the prescribed prayers the worshipper
declares, “I bear witness that there is no god but God.” That is to say, he finds
the door of a treasury of mercy in everything because he is believing and saying,
“There is no Creator and Provider other than Him. Harm and benefit are in His
hand. He is both All-Wise; He does nothing in vain, and He is AllCompassionate; His bounty and mercy are abundant.” And he knocks on the
door with his supplication. Moreover, he sees that everything is subjugated to
the command of his own Sustainer, so he takes refuge in Him. He places his
trust in Him and relies on Him, and is fortified against every disaster; his belief
gives him complete confidence.
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Three more chapters down the road, the Sixth Word directly presents “taking the
name of God” from the perspective of a profitable trade in reference to the Quranic
verse (9: 111): “Verily God has purchased from the believers their persons [selves anfus in Arabic] and their property that Paradise might be theirs.”
In the story narrated in the Sixth Word, a king entrusts two of his subjects with
estates full of equipment, delicate machinery and workshops at a time of war and
instability. The king sends a messenger to the two men to convey a decree and to
instruct them to sell the property to the king in return for a great profit after the war is
over, for the reason that they “are indigent and resourceless, and unable to provide the
cost of these great tasks.” The messenger also says that they would keep the property
with them but the king assumes the responsibility of maintaining and protecting the
estate and the provision of all the expenses. They will continue working in the estate
albeit under the King’s name. If they do not sell, the machinery, delicate tools and
scales will lose their value all together.
One of the two subjects, who was “selfish, arrogant, and proud” denies the
existence of such a king in the first place, ignores the dangers of the wartime, the
earthquakes and tumults of the world and declines the offer. The other reasonable one
responds positively, agreeing to happily sell the property back to the king.
O soul full of caprices! Look at the face of truth through the telescope of this
parable. As for the king, he is the Monarch of Pre-Eternity and Post-Eternity,
your Sustainer and Creator. The estates, machinery, tools and scales are your
possessions while in life’s fold; your body, spirit and heart within those
possessions, and your outward and inward senses such as the eye and the
tongue, intelligence and imagination. As for the noblest lieutenant, it is the
Noble Messenger of God; and the wisest decree is the Wise Qur’an, which
describes the trade we are discussing in this verse: “Verily God has purchased
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from the believers their persons and property that Paradise might be theirs”.
The surging field of battle is the tempestuous surface of the world, which
ceaselessly changes, dissolves and reforms and causes every man to think:
“Since everything will leave our hands, will perish and be lost, is there no way
in which we can transform it into something eternal and preserve it?” (W:38-39)
In response to the question at the end of this excerpt, Nursi maintains, revelation
(the Qur’an) says that “there is, a beautiful and easy way which contains five profits
within itself.” He goes on to describe what it means to sell “the self” (nefs) and
properties to God and what the five degrees of profits are in doing so (being Godconscious) and what the five degrees of losses are in refusal.
The Short Words are not the only places where Nursi aims at engaging in a
dialogue involving cost (loss) and benefit (profit) calculations with the self to channel
the orientation of its pursuit of the good towards a God-conscious direction. Acting in
the name of God, Nursi asserts, might seem to be burdensome, but the good it brings to
the self outweighs its difficulties a thousand times (e.g., W2, W3, W5, W6). Pursuit of
the desires of the selfish shortsighted soul might seem to bring some immediate relief
(from duty) but it torments the heart, mind and the spirit.
Although the Ninth Word is not included in The Short Words, it, too, takes a
similar approach. In this chapter, Nursi answers a question about the reasons of praying
(salat) five times a day. He again approaches the issue from a broader cosmological
perspective and relates it to the everlasting journey in time and space and thus to the
pursuit of the good. Having presented some of the core meanings of prayers (salat) as
the servant’s acknowledgement of his/her faults, impotence and poverty through which
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one fully appreciates and prostates in love and wonderment before the perfect qualities
of God reflected in His creation, Nursi goes on to say that each of the 5 prayers are
reminiscent of and corresponds to major transformations and bounties in the life of the
universe, in the history of human beings in this world, in the life-span of individuals, in
the alternation of the seasons in a year and in the progression of the day. All of these
transformations resemble each other. The early morning (fajr) prayer, for example,
calls into mind the transformations and bounties in the beginning of the creation of the
universe, the appearance of humankind on earth, the moment of conception in the
mother’s womb, and the early spring. Likewise, the last prayer (Nightfall/Isha) is
reminiscent of,
[T]he world of darkness veiling all the objects of the daytime world with a black
shroud, and winter hiding the face of the dead earth with its white cerement, and
even the remaining works of departed men dying and passing beneath the veil of
oblivion, and this world, the arena of examination, being shut up and closed
down for ever, it proclaims the awesome and mighty disposals of the AllGlorious and Compelling Subduer.
[…] It is a time that calls to mind the disposals of The Creator of the Heavens
and the Earth’s awesomeness and the manifestations of His beauty in the utter
destruction of this narrow, fleeting, and lowly world, the terrible death-agonies
of its decease, and in the unfolding of the broad, eternal, and majestic world of
the hereafter. And the universe’s Owner, its True Disposer, its True Beloved
and Object of Worship can only be the One Who with ease turns night into day,
winter into spring, and this world into the hereafter like the pages of a book;
who writes and erases them, and changes them.
Thus, at nightfall, man’s spirit, which is infinitely impotent and weak, and
infinitely poor and needy, and plunged into the infinite darkness of the future,
and tossed around amid innumerable events, performs the ‘Isha prayer, which
has this meaning: like Abraham man says: “I love not those that set,” [Qur’an,
6:76] and through the prayers seeks refuge at the Court of an Undying Object of
Worship, an Eternal Beloved One, and in this transient world and fleeting life
and dark world and black future he supplicates an Enduring, Everlasting One,
and for a moment of unending conversation, a few seconds of immortal life, he
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asks to receive the favours of the All-Merciful and Compassionate One’s mercy
and the light of His guidance, which will strew light on his world and illuminate
his future and bind up the wounds resulting from the departure and decline of all
creatures and friends. (W:55-58)
A legitimate question might be asked about the relevance of the introductory
chapters of The Words and similar passages in the Risale-i Nur to Nursi’s
understanding of religious revival and secularization. An answer to this question can be
found in the introduction of the volume “Comparisons of Faith and Unbelief” which is
a compilation of a list of Nursi’s writings from his other books. The first eight chapters
of the book The Words were included at the beginning of this complied volume in the
original order in which they are listed in The Words. Therefore, the First Word is also
the first chapter of this compiled volume. Included before the First Word as an
introduction to the “Comparisons of Faith and Unbelief” is a letter Nursi wrote to his
students explaining his method of religious revival as a response to a lengthy question:
“Why is it that the Risale-i Nur is not defeated in the face of so much opposition
and so many obdurate philosophers and people of misguidance? By preventing
to an extent the dissemination of numerous valuable, true books on belief and
Islam, and by means of their worldly pleasures and vices, they have deprived
many youths and others of the truths of belief. But their most violent attacks,
vicious treatment, lies and propaganda have been directed at the Risale-i Nur, to
destroy it and to scare people away from it and make them give it up. Despite
this, the Risale-i Nur has spread in a way never seen in any other work, six
hundred thousand copies of its treatises being written out by hand with
unflagging zeal and published secretly. How is it that it causes itself to be read
with such enthusiasm, both within the country and abroad? What is the reason
for it? (R:639).
The question itself reveals that Nursi and those who were asking such questions
(it is not clear from the text who asked these question and if it was his
students/followers) see the Risale-i Nur as a movement against another oppositional
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movement trying to “deprive many of the truths of belief.”
There are several clues in the presentation of these questions about how Nursi
perceives this oppositional movement. First, the opposition has something to do with
(secularist) Philosophy. As it is already mentioned, Nursi’s use of the concept of
Philosophy is very broad and it also includes scientism and positivism. Second, this
opposition includes, or utilizes, political power in order to put an end to the expansion
of the Risale-i Nur with brute force, fear factor and negative propaganda. Third, this
rival movement uses tactics to reorient individuals (the self) and their pursuit of the
good towards worldly pleasures and vices.
Therefore, the oppositional movement, as it is presented in this question, has
ontological (philosophy and science), moral (turning towards worldly desires), and
political (use of physical force and propaganda) dimensions. Fourthly, and most
importantly, Nursi does not see misguided moral philosophy and political oppression as
the ultimate threats. He implies that by means of (1) philosophy (scientism), (2)
misguided and deceptive morals and (3) political oppression the antagonist movement
was trying to “deprive many of the truths of faith (iman.). Thus, the real challenge is
about faith. Philosophy (and scientism), misguided deceptive morals and politics are
used to attack belief which is what matters the most according to Nursi.
In his response to the question above, Nursi does not deal with the issue of
political oppression and how to respond to it in order to prevent the decline of belief.
Issues pertaining to moral philosophy and discussions of how the Risale-i Nur responds
to such challenges are at the core of his answer. For Nursi, the Risale, as a commentary
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of the Qur’an, saves (the faith of) many by demonstrating that “in misguidance (vices
and forbidden pleasures) is a sort of Hell” and by indicating that “in belief in God and
good deeds is a sort of Paradise” (Ş:753). The Short Words and other similar places in
the Risale, Nursi affirms, use this strategy.
In all of these stories, the two individuals representing the selfish and the pious
go through the same experiences but the position they take towards themselves and
towards the cosmos greatly changes the way in which they react to the events they
experience. The scenario is the same but not the reactions. The same world becomes a
paradise or a hell depending on the perspective and orientation of the self.
Such an approach is reminiscent of the Kantian distinction between the
noumenal and the phenomenal worlds. The noumenal world is the real world out there
and the phenomenal world is the world we perceive. The first is a fixed reality and the
second changes from individual to individual because not everyone sees the (noumenal)
world in the same way (Ş:753). In Nursi’s descriptions, God-consciousness fosters a
pleasant (phenomenal) world while selfishness, arrogance and unbelief leads to an
unhappy burdensome one. The believer and the denier lives in the same noumenal
world but the difference between the natures of their phenomenal worlds is like the
difference between the heaven and the hell (W7, W8, L20).
As I discuss below, presenting evidences for the existence of the hereafter
including the heaven and the hell occupies a central place in Nursi’s understanding of
religious revival but most of Nursi’s discourse aimed at turning the face of the self
towards a God-conscious direction involves phenomenological differences in the

336
perspectives of the God-conscious and the misguided in this life. Indeed, Nursi says
that he consciously embraces an approach which aims to make the self see the seeds of
paradise in God-consciousness (iman/hidayet) and the seeds of the hell in disbelief
(küfr/dalalet) in this world (Ş:675) here and now. Because the selfish soul does not care
much about what will happen in the long run, it is more practical to bring the pain and
pleasure of the past and future and the agony of the heart, mind and spirit in front of the
shortsighted soul so that it might be convinced to change its course of action for the
better (i.e., God-conscious direction).
Nursi also contended that many, in the contemporary world, know the truths of
belief and they are aware of the rewards of the paradise but the shortsighted soul
deceives them with temptations for selfish immediate pleasure and with the love of this
world, at the cost of losing the greatest happiness in the long run (Ş:675).
Consequently, the soul prevails over the mind and reason. It would not be easy to
convince such people and reorient them towards a God-conscious life by talking about
the rewards and punishment in the hereafter. Because such people are under the
pressure of the soul which is primarily concerned about immediate pain and pleasure,
the only way to save them is to show immediate pain in their indulgence of the worldly,
which are like pieces of glass soon to be broken into pieces, and to show the immediate
happiness in God-consciousness which establishes connection to eternity.
Related to Nursi’s understanding of the nature of turning towards immediate
pleasures are his descriptions of the three faces the world. The first “is mirror to
Almighty God’s Names, reflecting their meanings.” This face of the world is like a
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collection of innumerable letters, meaningful texts bearing messages, which are
describing their Eternal maker. The second one “looks to the hereafter and is its arable
field.” These two sides are worthy of love as they connect the self to Eternity through
finding the Eternally Besought One (God). There is a third aspect of the world which
looks to human beings’ base appetites and to the desires of the worldly. This side is a
veil of neglect and it is the aim of the people of misguidance. Turning towards it leads
to forgetfulness of not only the reality (real source) of the world but also of the real
needs of human beings (e.g., eternal existence in happiness). This face of the world is
ugly and painful because it looks to transience and non-existence, therefore it cannot
and should not be the good sought by the self.
I observed that, in the preceding chapters of The Words, Nursi is trying to
convince the self that pursuing the good within the limits of the third face of this world
will turn into its opposite. Rather than bringing happiness, it loads burdens on the
shoulders of the self that it cannot bear. By suggesting that turning towards the first two
sides can bring true happiness (as a great human good) he intends to channel the pursuit
of the good towards a God-conscious direction.
As the discussions above indicate, there is a strong connection between
selfishness, arrogance, self-reliance and turning to the third (transient) face of the
world, in Nursi’s thinking. Although he does not think that it started in modern times,
Nursi presents this as one of the greatest challenges (problems) of contemporary
societies.
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As is the case for the preceding chapters of The Words, the discourse of Nursi in
trying to orient individuals towards God-consciousness in the entire Risale is more of a
persuasion and reflexivity based approach rather an obligation based one. An indication
of such an approach in Nursi’s writings is the lack of authoritarian language. In other
words, ‘God commands therefore you should do it’ type of language is almost
nonexistent in the Risale-i Nur. Instead, he uses the language that the nature given to
human beings and the nature of their journey in time and space necessitate that they
turn to God.
In the first nine chapters of The Words which is the main book of the Risale, the
primary emphasis is to convince the self to take the long run, including life after death,
into consideration and thus to convince it turn away from the third transient face of the
world in favor of the other two faces which look to the perfect qualities of God (Esmaul Husna) and hereafter (ahiret). This approach is an example of Nursi’s individual
based approach to religious revival. The main issue is not about transforming the world
around the self but changing his or her worldview and to a greater degree reorienting
their ultimate concern by way of presenting a schema of “rational choice”-in the sense
of the term used by the Rational Choice Theory. He presents two scenarios in which
one side’s calculation of costs and benefits are distorted by their selfishness, arrogance
and greediness for immediate pleasures while the other side has a more realistic,
reasonable and truthful attitude.
The content of the Tenth Word (chapter) indicates that at this point Nursi feels
the need to provide evidences to convince the self that (1) the world is indeed a
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reflection of the Esma (the perfect attributes of God) and (2) that there really is an
everlasting life after death. Obviously, the suggestion that the self should be oriented
towards these two faces entails some sort of substantiation that the first two faces of the
world are real. The Tenth Word and other similar passages in the Risale-i Nur(W 29)
are indications that Nursi takes this issue very seriously.
Indeed, these issues are central to his understanding of revival. If one aspect of
his discourse of religious revival involves the orientation of the self’s pursuit of the
good from the third -transient and therefore ugly- face self-centered towards a Godconsciousness direction and therefore to the first two (beautiful) sides of the world
(Esma and Hereafter), the other aspect is about substantiating the ideas that these two
faces are real.
The reason why Nursi takes these issues seriously is not only about feeling the
need that the self might want to see evidences to be convinced but also about his
analysis that these two ideas (Existence of God and bodily resurrection) were attacked
in modern times. Nursi does not think that such attacks started in modern times (W30)
but he asserts that they were intensified in contemporary societies in the form of
scientism, naturalism and materialism.
Formerly, the fundamentals of belief were protected, submission was strong.
Even if the intuitive knowledge of those with knowledge of God lacked proof,
their expositions were acceptable and sufficient. But at this time… the
misguidance of science has stretched out its hand to the fundamentals and
pillars. (L:443)
Providing evidences for the idea of resurrection after death was one of the
central components of Said Nursi’s response to secularization which was supported by

340
the Islamic traditions’ emphasis on such issues. In fact, the categorical opposite of
‘secular’ (dünyevi) in the Muslim World is mostly understood as ‘the otherworldly’
(uhrevi). Etymologically, the word secular derives from the Latin word saeculum
which means ‘belonging to the age’ or ‘belonging to the world’. Religio-historical
meaning of the same word (secular) is generally understood as ‘belonging to the
temporal or to the state authority’ in the context of Western Christian World (Casanova,
1994).
Etymologically closest concept to secular in Muslim context is ‘dünyevî’ which,
too, literally means ‘belonging to the world’. The word ‘dünyevî’ is an adjective like
the word secular and it basically has two meanings. The first refers to temporal affairs
of human existence as in “dünyevî ihtiyaçlar” meaning “worldly needs” (e.g., food and
shelter). The second bears a more dialectical meaning and refers to things other than
God-conscious purposes and/or ignoring the necessities of the afterlife. As an example,
“dünyevî emeller” means “desires and purposes limited to the temporal existence in this
world.”
The categorical opposite of “secular” in the Western Christian context is
“sacred” “holy” “sacramental” or “religious” but the opposite of the term ‘dünyevî’
(secular) in Islamic terminology is “uhrevi” which literally means
“belonging/pertaining to the other world/afterlife.” There is no categorical
representation or spatial separation of “uhrevi” in the social or political life in Muslim
context. In the Christian world, the concepts of secular and sacred are historically
understood as horizontally and spatially separated spheres of life. There is no
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equivalent of such categorical distinctions of the sacred and the secular in the history of
the (Sunni) Muslim World, nor were there any categorical distinctions between the
sacred and temporal authorities.
That is why the oppositional relationship between secular(ist) forces and the
religious have been framed along the lines of the dialectical relationships between the
dünyevi and uhrevi. That is why, I think, the emphasis on ‘taking into the long run into
consideration in the pursuit of the good’ and ‘providing evidences for bodily
resurrection’ occupied a very central place in Said Nursi’s revivalist writings. In
addition, he knew that the secularist Young Turks such as Abdullah Cevdet and Baha
Tevfik, by borrowing ideas from European materialists, were presenting arguments
against the immortality of the soul. This must be the reason why one of the first things
he addressed in his revivalist writings was the issue of bodily resurrection. (See
Appendix B for an example how Said Nursi tried to provide evidences for bodily
resurrection).
Religious Responses to the Secularist Conception of Human Perfectibility
The first ten chapters of the book Sözler (The Words) which were also among
the first writings of Said Nursi after the establishment of the Turkish Republic aimed at
reorienting the self’s pursuit of happiness towards a God-conscious direction by
contending that true happiness can only be attained by acknowledging that God is the
creator of all things and by relying on him in the spatiotemporal journey in time and
space towards eternity. In this regard, Said Nursi was responding to the modern
secularist conception of securing the conditions of life as part of the human effort to
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improve the human condition through secular means (science, technology) methods.
This perspective was best exemplified in the idea of developmentalism.
As I described in the previous chapter, another component of the human effort
to improve the human condition (i.e., the idea of progress) was the secularist
conception of human perfectibility. In their materialist reading of Nature, some of the
secularist ideologues interpreted the history of the cosmos and the living species on
Earth from an evolutionary perspective. As it is formulated by materialist Büchner and
other theorists of evolution (e.g., de La Mettrie, Lamarck and Darwin) who were
inspirations for most of the materialists in the modern history of Turkey, a general law
of evolution reigned in Nature chiefly including biological mechanisms.
Human beings and their social life are part of this evolutionary process as well.
In addition to being a result of biological evolution, human beings are also destined to
be perfected in their psychological, intellectual and social traits. Therefore, an infinite
perfection through self-realization was open for human beings in secular terms. As I
described in the previous chapter, similar ideas were presented by Abdullah Cevdet in
the late Ottoman Society.
It seems that after responding to the secularist conception of securing the
conditions for life for the attainment of happiness in the first ten chapters of his book,
The Words, Said Nursi started presenting his religious response to the secularist
conception of human perfectibility starting from the Eleventh Word.
First of all, it is important to remember in this regard that most of Nursi’s
theological positions in matters of dispute are closer to the Asharite school of thought
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which holds that God creates things and their qualities not because conditions and
wisdom requires it so but because God wills it so. The Asharite School also holds, God,
with His unlimited will, chooses to create with wisdom. Similarly, the real cause for
following the teachings and instructions of revelation and messengers is because they
are God’s commands but those instructions have wisdom and purpose in them.
Likewise, God creates delight and contentment as immediate rewards for the
fulfillment of certain duties. These pleasures are for persuasion (dai), they are not the
actual cause/reason (muktazi). The pleasure of taste, for example, is a strong persuasive
for eating but the real reason we eat is not the pleasure of taste but the fact that we have
to feed our bodies. Taste makes it easier and desirable for human beings to eat. Food is
mostly delicious but we need to and we can eat even when it is not tasty. In some cases
we might need to eat even when the food is sour as long as it maintains our bodies.
Nevertheless, we cannot eat everything tasty for the fact that certain tasty things can
harm our bodies.
Nursi is with the Asharite School in that he, too, thinks the real cause of
following the instructions of the Qur’an and the Prophet is because it is God’s word
(emir). He also thinks that those instructions include wisdom (hikmet) and persuasive
elements (dai). However, many, if not all, of his writings calling for Godconsciousness, including but not limited to The Short Words, contain a great deal of
descriptions of how desirable and wise it is to “take the name of God”, or in other
words, to read the universe as reflections of his beautiful names and to adhere to the
purposes He ascribed for human beings.
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If we group muktazi (real cause) and emir (command of God) into one category
as the primary motives for God-consciousness in Nursi’s thinking, and wisdom
(hikmet) and persuasive elements (dai) into another as the secondary, I saw a mixture of
primary and secondary motives in the discourse of the introductory chapters of The
Words (The 1st thru the 9th) in which the secondary side takes up a greater proportion,
not in terms of primacy but of the length of descriptions. In addition to the revelations
of the textual analysis provided above, the beginnings of all of the eight Short Words
attest to this. With the exception of the Fifth, introductions of all of the (eight) Short
Words expresses, in different ways, that these comparative stories indicate, “what great
happiness and pleasure, bounty, profit, ease, and an honorable-rank are to be found in
belief and reliance in God, taking refuge in him, performing the prescribed prayers and
not committing serious sins” and “what difficulties, great loss, ruin and harm lie in
disbelief, neglecting prayers and committing great sins.” Although it is not explicitly
stated in its introduction, The Fifth Word deals directly with these issues as well.
However, I observed a gradual progression from an emphasis on the secondary
motives to the primary in the order in which chapters of The Words is compiled. The
first nine chapters, which include The Short Words and the Ninth Word, are aimed at
convincing and encouraging the shortsighted soul to take “the name of God” in its
pursuit of the good and to rely on Him by extending the scope of this journey in time
and space and calling into attention the long-run effects of the position the self takes
towards itself and towards the cosmos. This is a way of appealing to the self that, it is
imperative that it takes into consideration what is yet to come in the long run not only
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because of being prepared for the needs and of being secured from existential enemies
in the future but also for the happiness the self seeks here and now.
Only when the faculties of heart, mind and the soul are assured of the self’s
well-being in the future and of the remedies for the grief of the past, human beings can
be happy. What is more, the self’s journey is not limited to the life in this world, it will
continue after death as well, for which the self should be prepared. Such preparedness
primarily involves the knowledge of God in the form of studying His perfect qualities
(Esma ul Husna) in creation. Human beings’ lives in hereafter will be shaped by the
degree of their knowledge of the perfect qualities of God (Esma) and their application
of this knowledge to their lives in this world.
There is an observable shift in the Eleventh Word and the Twelfth Word
(chapters) in the magnum opus of Said Nursi, The Words, in terms of the degree of
emphasis he places on primary and secondary motives “for taking the name of God”.
After trying to convince his readers in the preceding chapters that if they want to be
truly happy they should take “the name of God” and trying to reorient them towards a
God-conscious direction, Nursi tells his audience that the ultimate reason for the
creation of human beings is not for them to pursue happiness; it is to excel in knowing
the perfect attributes of God (Esma-ul Husna) and reflecting this knowledge in their
lives and in their worship.
Therefore, the path of perfection for human beings lies in acknowledging their
weakness and vulnerabilities and -by the necessitation of this condition- in excelling the
contemplation of God’s perfect attributes. Human beings, unlike animals, are adorned
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with very delicate and sensitive capabilities for pondering over the wonders of creation.
Therefore, they should use these capabilities for increasing their knowledge and
appreciation of God not for self-fulfillment.
Similar perspectives are presented in the other subsequent chapters of Sözler
(e.g., 12th, 23th and 30th) and in Said Nursi’s other works (e.g., R4, L20) but a
summary of this approach is provided in the eleventh chapter of The Words.
O my carnal self and my friend! You are not sent here to spend the capital of
your life and your vital potentials on material pleasures and this transient life. If
you do, you will fall to the lowest ranks, although you are far superior with
regard to “capital” than the most developed animal.
[…] [Y]our life’s aim and nature, its apparent form and meaning, and the
perfect happiness in your life, weigh on the scales of your body’s senses the
bounties stored in Divine Mercy’s treasuries and offer thanks on your body’s
behalf. Through the feelings, tendencies, and faculties embedded in your nature,
discover the hidden treasuries—the works and manifestations—of the Divine
Sacred Names and then recognize the Most Holy One through those Names.
[...]
Other living beings worship and glorify their Creator by consciously or
unconsciously obeying the laws He established for their lives. This is the main
purpose for their creation and life. Thus you should consciously observe their
obedience to Him, their worship and glorification of Him, and reflect on and
testify to their worship and glorification. (S11. Trans. Hüseyin Akarsu, p. 139140)
Said Nursi addressed the issue of human perfectibility more directly and
dialectically towards the end of Sözler. In the Thirtieth Word (chapter8), he contended
that what separated the (secularist) philosophy and the message of revelation
throughout the human history lies in their opposing perspectives of the self (ene). For
him, the partial and limited capabilities such as limited knowledge, will and power are
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given to human beings as measures and tools for being able to understand the unlimited
and absolute qualities of their Creator. For example, with their limited knowledge, will
and power human beings build houses and thus start to understand what it means to be
able to create and sustain the entire cosmos with all of its complexities and perfections.
Therefore, they to acquire a level of understanding of the perfect qualities and
attributes. Because the absolute and the unlimited cannot be understood by contingent
(limited) beings, it needs to be partialized. For example, the existence and quality of an
infinite light or brightness cannot be comprehended unless a limit is drawn around it by
a level darkness. Only then human beings can develop a sense of what light is and what
qualities it has. Put differently, only when human beings have a sense of limited
amount of light, they can start making sense of an infinite and unlimited light.
Similarly, partial and limited qualities are given to human beings so that they can start
understanding absolute and infinite qualities and attributes of God. Therefore, partial
qualities are entrusted to human beings so that by using these qualities they can
contemplate about God’s perfect qualities, not for self-realization and selfaggrandizement in exclusive terms.
Said Nursi argued that atheistic (secularist) philosophy throughout the human
history misinterpreted the purpose of these partial qualities and instead of trying to
understand the perfect qualities of God, they promoted and legitimized the use of these
trusted partial qualities for the development of a false sense of self-fulfillment by trying
to become like God. Revelation, on the other hand, taught human beings the true nature
of their selfhood and helped them understand that they are finite and contingent beings
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who are entrusted with limited but very delicate and sensitive quantities so that they
perfect themselves by knowing and appreciating the true sources of all of the qualities
which are continuously reflected in the cosmos and in the inner (immaterial) and outer
(material) aspects of human beings.
That is why, Said Nursi contended, the true student of Revelation (the Qur’an)
is humble and virtuous while the true student of the secular philosophy is an arrogant
transgressor. Nationalist and racialist ideologies which are collective forms of selfaggrandizement were fostered by secularist conceptions of the self as well (W30).
Although Said Nursi does not limit the scope of secularist philosophy of
humanism to modern times, he was apparently responding to secularist humanism of
modern times and their representatives in the Muslim World. As I described in the
previous chapter, Abdullah Cevdet, in his book Funun ve Felsefe (Sciences and
Philosophy), presented quotations for his secularist humanist idea of becoming like
God from Western and Islamic sources. For example, he said that the hadith (saying of
prophet) which says, “Be molded by God-given ethics” was supporting the idea that the
duty of human beings is to strive towards becoming like God. Said Nursi indicated
elsewhere (T:246) that that he was aware of Abdullah Cevdet’s materialist and atheistic
ideas before the establishment of the Turkish Republic and that some of his
publications were responses to these ideas. He did not specify Abdullah Cevdet’s name
in the Thirtieth Word in which he compared secularist and religious conceptions of the
self.
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However, Said Nursi, in the Thirtieth Word, referred to the same hadith which
was brought up by Abdullah Cevdet in support of his secular humanism. Nonetheless,
Said Nursi interpreted it in a completely opposite way. For him, the hadith (Be molded
by God-given ethics) was calling the faithful for acknowledging their weaknesses and
vulnerabilities so that they, in this state of humbleness, can turn towards God and seek
refuge in his perfect attributes.
[In] the line of prophethood considered [...] the aim of humanity and duty of
human beings is to be molded by God-given ethics and good character, and, by
knowing their impotence to seek refuge with Divine power, by seeing their
weakness to rely on Divine strength, by realizing their poverty to trust in Divine
mercy, by perceiving their need to seek help from Divine riches, by seeing their
faults to ask for pardon through Divine forgiveness, and by realizing their
deficiency to be glorifiers of Divine perfection. (W:563)
According to the rule of: Be molded by God-given ethics, which is one of the
principles of the line of prophethood concerning individual life, there is the
instruction: “Be distinguished by God-given morals and turn towards God
Almighty with humility recognizing your impotence, poverty, and
defectiveness, and so be a slave in His presence.” Whereas, the self-seeking rule
of philosophy, “Try to imitate the Necessarily Existent One” is mankind’s aim
for perfection. No, indeed, the essence of humanity has been kneaded with
infinite impotence, weakness, poverty, and need, while the essence of the
Necessarily Existent One is infinitely omnipotent, powerful, self-sufficient, and
without need. (W:564)
It seems to me that Nursi had observed the emergence of what Taylor (1992)
called “exclusive humanism” which takes self-interested human flourishing and
fullness as the greatest good. For Taylor “everyone and hence every philosophy is
guided through some definition of human greatness and fullness.” In pre-modern
societies, human fullness was mostly perceived in religious terms which formulated
human fullness outside the self-interest of the individual. In modern times, human
fullness is conceived and located exclusively with reference to the self. Therefore
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human fullness became the primary good sought by a greater proportion of individuals
in modern societies.
Self-centered moral philosophy is not exclusively peculiar to our ages but,
Taylor contends, it has become a widely available option for a greater proportion of
individuals only in modern secular societies. As it is described above discursive
attempts at reversing the trend of exclusive self-centered secularist humanism
constitutes one of the backbones of Said Nursi’s understanding of revival which has
largely been overlooked by social scientific studies of him and the Movement he
established (Ex: Mardin, 1989).
God or Nature?: Responses to the Ontological Foundations of Secularism
When responding to the philosophical foundations of secularism, Said Nursi
was not only addressing issues regarding secularist humanism. Responses to the
ontological foundations of the secularist paradigm such as materialism and naturalism
are also central to Said Nursi’s discourse of religious revival. In fact, he sees a close
connection between naturalism and secularist humanism. In his formulation, Nature and
the aggrandized self are the two antithesis presented by secularism against God.
Nature is the imaginative ‘god’ of the secularists in macrocosm and the
aggrandized self is their god in the microcosms (W:567). That is why the two sections
of the Thirtieth Word are dedicated to “the Self” (ene) and to “the motions of atoms”
(tahavvulat-ı zerrat). After addressing the issue of secularist humanism in the first
section, Said Nursi presents arguments against the assumptions and axioms of
naturalists and materialists.
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The core idea in this section is that the existence, motions, interactions and
transformations of atoms and their ordered journey towards perfection especially in
biological mechanisms are manifestations of God’s perfect qualities at work, not the
blind, senseless, impotent causes or what naturalist call the laws of nature which do not
have any real existence beyond human beings’ perceptions of patterned occurrences.
In every facet of the motion of all particles the light of Divine unity shines like
the sun. For as is proved briefly in the First Indication of the Tenth Word and in
detail in the Twenty-Second Word, if every particle is not an official of God
acting with His permission and under His authority, and if it is not undergoing
change within His knowledge and power, then every particle must have infinite
knowledge and limitless power; it must have eyes that see everything, a face
that looks to all things, and authority over all things. For every particle of the
elements acts, or can act, in an orderly fashion in all animate beings. But the
order within things and laws according to which they are formed differ from one
thing to the next. If their order was not known to the particles, the particles
could not act, or even if they could act, they could not act without error. In
which case, the particles which are performing their duties in beings are either
acting with the permission and at the command, and within the knowledge and
at the will, of the owner of an all-encompassing knowledge, or they themselves
must have such an all-encompassing knowledge and power. (W:573)
[...]
Since the All-Wise Maker has specified for everything a suitable point of
perfection and an appropriate level of the effulgence of existence, by giving
everything a disposition that will strive to reach that point of perfection, He
drives them towards it. This ‘Law of Dominicality’ is in force in all plants and
animals, as it is in inanimate beings, in which it promotes plain earth to the rank
of diamonds and to the level of priceless jewels. Within this truth, the tip of a
mighty ‘Law of Dominicality’ is apparent. (W:579)
As I described above, it was in 1911 in his Muhakemat (Reasonings) that Said
Nursi, for the first time, responded -albeit briefly- to naturalist denials of the existence
of God. The first time he wrote an entire treatise Hubab (the Seed) in response to
naturalism was in 1922 when he went to Ankara in the eve of the establishment of the
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Turkish Republic. Having observed the development and transformation of the
secularist movement especially including the Young Turks, Said Nursi was thinking
that the new leaders of the society were raised by being exposed to and influenced by
the materialist and naturalist ideas and that they were about to transform the society in
accordance with and legitimized by these principles.
In order to revalidate religious worldviews in the eyes of the members of the
newly established parliament in Ankara. Said Nursi wrote the treatise in Arabic. He
expanded and translated it into Turkish (Tabiat Risalesi / the Treatise on Nature) (F23)
after the establishment of the Republic which became one of the most widely circulated
and read works of him.
In this treatise, Said Nursi identified three major naturalist and atheistic
perspectives of Nature. These are (1) causes create things, (2) things come into
existence and take up forms by themselves and (3) things naturally happen or Nature
necessitates or creates them. After presenting three arguments about the impossibility
of each of these three perspectives he moves onto presenting evidences for the idea of
Creation by God. For example, in presenting one of the impossibilities for the idea
things creating or forming themselves (in an orderly fashion), he said:
For you yourself are a being and not some simple substance that is inanimate
and unchanging. You are like an extremely well-ordered machine that is
constantly being renewed and a wonderful palace that is undergoing continuous
change. Particles are working unceasingly in your body. Your body has a
connection and mutual relations with the universe, in particular with regard to
sustenance and the perpetuation of the species, and the particles that work
within it are careful not to spoil that relationship nor to break the connection.
In this cautious manner they set about their work, as though taking the whole
universe into account. Seeing your relationships within it, they take up their
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positions accordingly. And you benefit with your external and inner senses in
accordance with the wonderful positions that they take. If you do not accept that
the particles in your body are tiny officials in motion in accordance with the law
of the Pre-Eternal and All-Powerful One, or that they are an army, or the nibs of
the pen of Divine Determining, with each particle as the nib of a pen, or that
they are points inscribed by the pen of Power with each particle being a point,
then in every particle working in your eye there would have to be an eye such as
could see every limb and part of your body as well as the entire universe, with
which you are connected. In addition to this, you would have to ascribe to each
particle an intelligence equivalent to that of a hundred geniuses, sufficient to
know and recognize all your past and your future, and your forebears and
descendants, the origins of all the elements of your being, and the sources of all
your sustenance.
To attribute the knowledge and consciousness of a thousand Plato’s to a single
particle of one such as you who does not possess even a particle’s worth of
intelligence in matters of this kind is a crazy superstition a thousand times over!
(F:236-237)
At the end of the passage quoted above, Said Nursi asserts that believing in the
naturalist ideas he mentioned and criticized was “a crazy superstition a thousand times
over.” Obviously, the author is responding to the materialist and naturalist charges that
religious teachings were superstitution. By writing this treatise, Said Nursi wanted to
show that it was the materialist and naturalist perspectives which would not be
validated in the cosmos.
There are several other chapters in the Risale-i Nur including The Words (e.g.,
W12, W22 and W32) in which Said Nursi addresses similar issues and refutes
materialist and naturalist denials of God’s existance. There are also numerous other
chapters (e.g., LT20, R2, R3, R7, F30) and passages in the Risale-i Nur in which Said
Nursi provides examples of reading the signs in creation in light of relevant Quranic
verses. Such an approach is one of the defining, perhaps the most distinguished
characteristics of Said Nursi’s approach to religious revival in modern times.
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Said Nursi frequently mentioned throughout the Risale-i Nur that the greatest
challenge to religion was coming from (ideological interpretations of) science and
(atheistic) philosophy and emphasized that the Risale-i Nur stood firmly against this
challenge with the help of methodological principles and evidences he learned from the
Qur’an. Only with a few exceptions, all of the chapters of the Risale-i Nur opens with a
Quranic verse relating to the content. For example, the chapter (the Tenth Word) in
which Said Nursi presented evidences for bodily resurrection opens with the verse:
“Look, then, to the signs of God’s mercy -how He restores life to the earth after its
death-verily He it is Who quickens the dead, for He is powerful over all things (Qur’an,
30:50).” The body of these chapters also frequently include Qur’anic verses and
terminology. In so doing, Said Nursi contended, the Risale-i Nur proved the truths of
the Qur’anic teachings against the atheistic, materialistic and naturalistic charges
against it.
Said Nursi was inspired during his formative years of reformist activism to
establish a university (Madrasatu’z-Zahra) in which he could offer solutions to the
challenges arising out of the disconnectedness of the classical madrasa education and
the education provided in modern schools. In this regard, he proposed an institutional
solution to the challenges to the secularization of education and he wholeheartedly
pursued this project before the establishment of the Turkish Republic. When he was in
Ankara shortly before the establishment of the Republic, he pursued the support of the
new parliament, too. The petition was signed by 167 deputies but it was eventually
rejected (Vahide, 2005, p. 172).
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Said Nursi mentioned later (K:206, K:229, K:251, Em:35) that the Madrasatu’zZahra project remained as a life-long dream for him even after the establishment of the
Republic. However, he did not advocate nor he was mobilized towards bringing
institutional level change as part of his revivalism against the spread of secularist
ideologies such as materialism and naturalism after 1923. The conversations he had
with a group of students when he was in exile in the city of Kastamonu best describes
this approach. When the students told he them their teachers were not teaching them
about God, he said: “do not listen to the teachers listen to the sciences”.
In Kastamonu a group of high-school students came to me, saying: “Tell us
about our Creator, our teachers do not speak of God.” I said to them: “All the
sciences you study continuously speak of God and make known the Creator,
each with its own particular tongue. Do not listen to your teachers; listen to
them.
“For example, a well-equipped pharmacy with life-giving potions and cures in
every jar weighed out in precise and wondrous measures doubtless shows an
extremely skillful, practiced, and wise pharmacist. In the same way, to the
extent that it is bigger and more perfect and better stocked than the pharmacy in
the market-place, the pharmacy of the globe of the earth with its living potions
and medicaments in the jars which are the four hundred thousand species of
plants and animals shows and makes known to eyes that are blind even – by
means of the measure or scale of the science of medicine that you study – the
All-Wise One of Glory, Who is the Pharmacist of the mighty pharmacy of the
earth. (R:226)
This anecdote indicates that just as he wanted to reorient his audience’s pursuit
of the good towards a God-conscious direction by directly engaging them and offering
them a schema of rational choice regarding existential questions, Said Nursi wanted to
equip the Muslim community with methodological and rhetorical tools by which they
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could be saved from the challenges of secularist ideologies such as naturalism and
materialism. In this regard, he was not trying to respond to the impact of the
ontological foundations of secularism in the society by trying to take over or controll
modern educational institutions but by supplying the Muslims with methodological
perspectives through which they could decipher the codes of the secularist worldview
and read the universe from a God-centered perspective. In so doing, Said Nursi did not
challenge the validity of scientific “findings,” he rather criticized the materialist and
naturalist interpretation of them. This perspective is epitomized in his suggestions to the
students that they should “listen to the sciences not the (naturalist) teachers” (R:226).
Why Not Political Struggle?
As it is described above Said Nursi went through several transformations in the
ways in which he approached religious revivals. In addition to pursuing the support of
the Sultan for his project of establishing a university with several branches in the
Eastern Provinces, Said Nursi supported the constitutionalist movement when he went
to Istanbul. He also wanted to give a religious direction to Young Turks revolution of
1908 and to the newly established government of Ankara after the War of
Independence in early 1920’s. Around 1910, Nursi started to be more interested in and
concerned about the philosophical foundations of secularism such as materialism,
naturalism, scientism and humanism.
Observing that the secularists were using these ideas to attack the foundational
teaching of the Qur’an such as the existence and unity of God and bodily resurrection,
Said Nursi, especially after retreating to the city of Van in 1923, the year the Turkish
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Republic was established. In Van, Said Nursi focused exclusively on strengthening the
foundations of belief and deliberately and strictly abstained from being involved in
political debates. Although he was continuously prosecuted, exiled and jailed until his
death in 1960, Said Nursi remained faithful to this perspective and articulated the idea
that politicization of revivalism and trying to change the society by being involved in
power relations would be detrimental to spreading the message of the Qur’an.
Service of the All-Wise Qur’an severely prohibited me from the world of
politics. It even made me forget about it. For the whole story of my life testifies
that fear has never taken me by the hand and prevented me taking the way I
considered to be right, nor can it. And why should I be frightened? I have no
connection with the world apart from the appointed hour. I have no family and
children to think of. It is not wanting to preserve worldly glory and renown
which consists of hypocritical, undeserved fame, may God bless those who help
in destroying it. There only remains the appointed hour and that is in the hands
of the All-Glorious Creator. Who has the power to interfere with it before the
time of its coming? Anyway we are among those who prefer honorable death to
degradation in life. [...] Indeed, service of the Qur’an prevents me from thinking
of socio-political life. [...]
The bewildered man anxiously wonders: “Does he want to attract me with the
light then hit me with the club?” And sometimes when, due to some defect, the
club is broken, the light flies away, too, or else is extinguished.
They want to be saved, but cannot find the way: they are confused. As for the
clubs, they are the political currents. And the light, the truths of the Qur’an.
Light cannot be disputed, nor can enmity be held towards it. No one can detest it
apart from Satan the Accursed. And so, in order to hold in my hand the light of
the Qur’an, I said, “I seek refuge with God from Satan and from politics,” and
throwing away the club of politics, embraced the light with both hands.
I saw that in the political currents, there are lovers of those lights in both the
opposition and the supporters. It is necessary that no side and no group casts
aspersions on or holds back from the lights of the Qur’an which are shown, or
from the teachings of the Qur’an, which are far superior to all political currents
and partisanship and are exempt from and free of all their biased considerations
(L:69-70).
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As he also articulated similar ideas elsewhere (L:84-85; L:487-488; F:143-144)
Said Nursi contended that far from being able to provide solutions against the spread of
atheistic ideologies such as naturalism and materialism, “the stick of politics” would
ward off those who are in need of the eternal message (the light) of the Qur’an. Trying
to make people religious by “the stick of politics” would only produce hypocrites and
their religiosity would fade away when “the stick” get broken. The best way would be
to awaken people to their existential needs by showing them the light of the Qur’an not
“the stick of politics.” Therefore, he contended “the light” and “the stick” (the message
of the Qur’an and political power) cannot be used at the same time.
Conclusion
As it is outlined in this chapter, Said Nursi’s approach to religious renewal and
revival transformed over time in conjunction with the development and transformation
of the secularist ideas and the secularist movement in the last two decades of the
Ottoman Empire and in the formative years of the modern Turkish Republic. Until the
Young Turks Revolution of 1908, Said Nursi in similar ways to the Young Ottoman
intellectuals such as Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha wanted to reverse the
decline of the Muslim World through institutional and societal reform in the face of
internal and external, material and intellectual challenges.
As a man of learning, he was initially concerned with the intellectual challenges
faced by the Muslim community in the modern times. For him, the disconnection
between the traditional madrasa education and the education provided in the newly
established modern schools was conducive to dogmatism (taassub) and blind imitation
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(taklid) among those who could not make sense of the findings science and to doubt
and denial (şüphe) of Qur’anic teachings among those who are only exposed to modern
education. Said Nursi wanted to address this issue by establishing a university in which
he could teach religious and positive sciences side by side.
Especially in the beginnings of his reformist activism Said Nursi was also
concerned about the worsening material conditions of the Muslim World which he
thought was detrimental for spreading the message of Islam (ilayi kelimetullah). In
response to this challenge, he, like most of the contemporary religious activists,
favorably looked at the adoption and utilization of modern science (fen) and technology
(sanat). With the purpose of uniting and mobilizing the Muslim community for
working towards the rejuvenation of the Muslim World, he supported the idea of
İttihad-ı İslam (Unity of Muslims).
Said Nursi, in the first years of his reformist activisim, also advocated the idea
that political despotism (istibdad) was one of the reasons of the decline of the Muslim
World. In this vein, he supported constitutionalism (meşrutiyet) and parliamentarianism
(meşveret). He championed the revolutions of 1908 which led to the reinstitution of the
constitution of 1876. However, he was concerned that if the revolution did not go in the
right direction it could lead up to the marginalization of religion in the society. In the
articles he published in Ottoman newspapers advising the leaders of the revolution
(members of the CUP) along the lines of such concerns.
Said Nursi’s revivalism until this time (1910-1911) was mostly in the form of
reformist activism. He tried to convince the rulers, intellectuals and influential figures
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of the Ottoman society about the necessity of the reforms he proposed or supported. In
so doing, Said Nursi was not explicitly mobilized against a particular secularist
ideology or movement. That is why his revivalist ideas were not characterized by a
dialectical discourse. However, in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, Said Nursi
started addressing challenges posed by the development of explicitly secularist
ideologies such as materialism and naturalism which were introduced and propagated
by the Young Turks such as Abdullah Cevdet.
In the eve of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Said Nursi once again
wanted to make sure that the newly emerging government does not go in the direction
of secularizing the society. He went to Ankara in 1922 where the new government was
based, but he was disappointed to see that secularist ideas were prevailing among the
founders of the new government primarily including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Realizing
that the secularist movement was about to fully capture the ruling heights of the society
convinced him about the impossibility of reversing the secularization of the society by
directly engaging the political establishment.
Said Nursi developed alternative approaches to religious revival after the
establishment of the modern secularist Turkish Republic. Instead of endeavoring to
reverse the process of secularization from the macro societal level, he aimed at
transforming individuals one by one. Once they moved from the ranks of opposition to
the halls of power, secularists were trying to change the society with their institutional
power. As a response, Said Nursi was trying reverse this process by directly engaging
the individual.
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The strategy he used in this regard was to convince his audience by challenging
the ontological and moral philosophical foundations of the secularist worldview. One
part of this strategy was invalidating the naturalist and materialist reading of the cosmos
which were introduced to the Ottoman society by the Young Turks such as Beşir Fuad,
Abdullah Cevdet and Baha Tevfik. The other part of Said Nursi’s revivalist
methodology was the reorientation of the self’s pursuit of the good from a self-centered
and temporal one towards a God-conscious and transcendent direction.
In this regard, Said Nursi wanted to convince his readers and followers that
attainment of true happiness would only be possible by being God-conscious. As he
presented it, attainment of true human happiness as the good pursued by all human
beings is contingent on being secured from all of the humanly fears and being provided
with all of the material and immaterial needs in the journey in time and space which
prolong to eternity after death and resurrection.
Therefore, true happiness can only be attained by acknowledging that each and
every component, moment and aspect of existence from pre-eternity to post-eternity
was the creation of the all-powerful, all-knowledgeable and all-merciful God and by
relying on Him. Because the naturalist and materialist reading of the cosmos denies that
time and space and everything therein are created and under the control and command
of the all-powerful God, it is not only an inaccurate reading of existence, it is also the
source of desperation both in this world and in the next. Being self-centered and only
seeking immediate pleasures at the expense of serenity in the long run is also an
aberration from God-consciousness and therefore it is another source of human
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vulnerability to desperation and misery in this world.
Therefore, Said Nursi implied, “the human effort to improve the human
condition” cannot be the source of human happiness. I described in the previous chapter
that the increasing emphasis on ‘the human effort to improve the human condition’ was
one of the dominant characteristics of the secularist worldview which was also adopted
by secularizing forces in the history of Turkey. The modern idea of civilizational
progress was a reflection of this philosophy. One component of the idea of progress
was being liberated from the ideological and political constraints of the traditional
religious worldviews and the other component was the emphasis on the human
endeavor through scientific means to master the universe with the purpose of
understanding its ‘nature’ and eventually manipulating it for the benefit of improving
and securing the conditions for unconstrained human flourishing on their own terms.
My readings of Said Nursi’s revivalist discourse especially after the
establishment of the Turkish Republic indicates that he was challenging the materialist
naturalist and scientist paradigm which was established around the idea of ‘the human
effort to improve the human condition on its own terms’. However, he, after 1920s, did
not focus on reversing this paradigm by restructuring the institutions of the society.
Instead, he aimed at reversing it by reconstructing a religious worldview and by
reorienting the self’s pursuit of the good towards a God-conscious direction.
By engaging a micro level approach to revivalism, Said Nursi was trying to
reframe the conflict between secularism and revivalism in the mind and perspective of
the individual and thus he was aiming at reversing the trend of secularism which was
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being imposed from atop by the reorienting the self towards a God-conscious direction.
In this regards, Said Nursi was pulling the dialectical relationships between secularism
and religiosity into an alternative space in which he could level the field vis-à-vis the
institutional power of the secularist establishment.

CHAPTER V
THE NUR MOVEMENT’S MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES
Introduction
As it is outlined in the previous chapter, Said Nursi was involved in revivalist
activism for about two decades in the late Ottoman society. However, the emergence of
the Nur Movement coincides with his exile into the Western Anatolian provinces in
1925 by the leaders of the Turkish Republic which was founded in 1923. Although the
secularist establishment closely scrutinized and persecuted its members, including Said
Nursi, the Nur Movement grew into one of the largest revivalist movements in Turkey
and in the Muslim World.
In this chapter, I will investigate mobilization strategies of the Nur Movement
vis-à-vis the secularist establishment. In doing so, I will, by employing the Gramscian
concepts of hegemony and civil society, explore the development of the secularist
regime during the one-party rule of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s People’s Party (19231950). In this context, I will discuss the implications of the establishment of the
secularist hegemonic order with regard to the development or lack thereof of the civil
society during the one-party rule and with regard to the development of religious (and
other social) movements. Consequently, I will explore the discursive, rhetorical and
material strategies employed by the Nur Movement and its members vis-à-vis the
policies and mobilization strategies of the secularist establishment.
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The State, Civil Society, Religion and Religious Movements in the Recent History
of Turkey
Centralization of government in a bureaucratic sense in the Ottoman Empire
began as early as the sixteenth century under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent
(Atçıl, 2014). However, the centralized state’s expansion into the daily lives of its
subjects at unprecedented and ever increasing levels started with the state-sponsored
reform projects of the nineteenth century including the establishment and
modernization of educational institutions (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). The sponsors of
these reforms in the higher echelons of the state machinery, in certain cases including
the sultan (e.g., Mahmud II), pursued to phase out the traditional intermediaries
between the state and the citizenry, such as the ulema and the leaders of minority millet
communities, in order to facilitate the expansion of the modernization projects
(Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Parallel to the increasingly centralized state’s expansion
into the lives of the citizens in the late Ottoman society was the growth of a secularist
movement and their transition from the ranks of opposition into commanding heights of
the society (i.e., the state). As the secularists moved from the periphery into the center,
their secularist idea was to become the ideology of the state, starting with the Young
Turks revolution of 1908 and the counter coup d’état attempt of 1909 (the 31 March
Incident). The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 represented the triumph
of the secularist revolution and epitomized the development of an aggressively
secularist regime, which was committed to secularize all aspects of the society with the
intention of catching up with the progress of the Western civilization. With its
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militaristically implemented top-down reforms, the secularist movement sought to
establish a hegemonic and dictatorial domination over the Turkish society in the
Gramscian sense, especially during their single party rule between 1923 and 1950.
Individuals and groups who directly or indirectly challenged the power or ideological
foundations of this system were criminalized and subsequently punished. The Nur
Movement, which was established by Said Nursi after his exile into Western Anatolia,
was the religious group that was scrutinized, prosecuted and persecuted the most by the
secularist regime; even though the movement adopted a mobilization strategy which
was not based on direct confrontations with the regime.
Marxist theoretician Gramsci contended, in repudiation of the economic
determinism (fatalism) of Karl Marx, that the ruling classes do not rule only and
necessary by controlling the means of economic production, they also do so by
controlling the production of meaning and ideas (ideology). Marx, too, emphasized the
role of ideology as part of his explanations of the ways in which ruling classes
subordinate the lower classes. According to Marx, ideologies are forms of false
consciousness that are constructed by those who control the means production and
imposed on the rest of society in order to sustain the status quo. Ideologies, in Marx’s
theory, do not develop or change independent of economic relations. In other words,
transformations and fluctuations in ideologies are necessary reflections of
transformations in relations of production. Consequently, the transformation of the
society (i.e., revolution) in favor of the exploited classes can only and necessarily be
possible by the transformation of the relations of production. Gramsci reformulated the
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classical Marxist perspective by emphasizing the role of ideology in its own right and at
least somewhat independent of production relations. Not denying that ideologies mostly
serve the interests of the ruling classes, Gramsci postulated that it is possible to
transform the prevalent ideology (or ideologies) of a social system without significantly
transforming the economic structures. That is why, he asserted, political struggle could
and should also be directed towards the transformation of the dominant ideology (or
culture) in the society (Kertzer, 1979, p. 321-328). In the Gramscian sense, the ruling
classes do not always persuade the subordinate classes by force to preserve the status
quo or to guide the society in new directions. The powerful constructs worldviews and
they aim to direct the society towards the actualization of these worldviews. They also
seek to win the consent of the masses during this process. However, they do not
directly and explicitly negotiate the validity and legitimacy of this worldview; rather,
they seek to establish implicit consent through their domination of the civil society
which is composed of private social institutions such as the church, trade unions and
schools (Lears, 1985, p. 568-569). This implicitly manipulated and thusly dominated
consent is what Gramsci calls (cultural) hegemony. In this sense of hegemony,
domination is not unequivocally exerted from above, it is, at least to a certain degree,
negotiated and reformulated. This makes cultural hegemony a dynamic process that
needs to be constantly reinvigorated by the ruling classes in order to maintain the status
quo. Otherwise, alternative worldviews might grow and contest the ideological bases of
the existing order (Gramsci, 1971).
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Although Gramsci emphasized the role of (implicit) consent, he affirmed that
the preservation of cultural hegemony also involves the legitimized use of coercive
force which is implemented by the political society (the police, the army, the judicial
system etc.). The ruling classes, under normal conditions, reassure the consent of the
masses (i.e., cultural hegemony) by controlling the political society. When coercive
force predominates over consent in the ruling classes’ attempts at constructing,
maintaining or transforming their worldviews, this system is not a pure hegemonic any
more in the sense that it was conceptualized by Gramsci. Especially when the ruling
classes cannot win the implicit consent of the masses, they largely turn to the power of
the state apparatus to coerce the masses to accept and abide by their worldviews
(values, norms, policies etc.). Such a system comes closer to what Gramsci calls
“dictatorship [plus] hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 239). In this system, the dictatorial
system cannot express itself in terms of an overarching consensual hegemony, but it
can assume the leadership role of allying classes and groups (Salvadori, 1979, p. 251).
According to Öncü (2003), foundation of the secularist Turkish nation state
after the War of Independence took the form of “dictatorship plus hegemony” in the
sense it was conceptualized by the Gramsci.
The political revolution, to which the masses were oblivious, brought about
comprehensive transformations in the political, legal and educational
institutions of the country, leading to the secularization of politics - and to some
extent of social life. Among these transformations, the emergence of the nationstate, the Republic of Turkey, in October 1923, was certainly the decisive one.
[...] This process, spreading over two decades, the 1920s and the 1930s,
constituted a "social revolution from above," proceeding in the footsteps of the
Young Turks. [...] [The new regime] failed to confront all facets of the question
of democracy, that is, of establishing a secular democratic republic based on
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political and civil rights and freedom […]. As early as 1927 the Ankara regime
had established absolute domination in all parts of the country, mostly through
coercive measures. (Öncü, 2003, p. 314-316)
In the first three decades of the Turkish Republic, the secularist establishment
controlled the state apparatus (the police, the army and the judiciary) and maintained its
“dictatorship plus hegemony” over the weak civil society. They closely scrutinized
ideologies and movements, which in their eyes had the potential of threatening “the
regime”. There were two major groups whose ideology posed intolerable threats to the
secularist Turkish nation state. First, the new Turkish Republic was established as a
nation state that heavily utilized Turkish nationalism as its primary tool for identity
formation. Ethnic identities (e.g., Kurdish) other than Turkisness were a serious threat
to the state’s nationalist building blocks. The new republic was also established based
on an aggressively secularist worldview (ideology). Any type of religious worldview,
identity, movement or organization (including Sufi orders) which had the potential of
challenging the social, political and philosophical foundations of the secularist
establishment were, in many cases, prosecuted and persecuted under the leadership of
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his secularist predecessors such as Ismet Inonu. And as
Atatürk’s biographer Andrew Mango (2002 put it, his authoritarian policies hindered
the development of the civil society in Turkey.
It remains nonetheless true that Atatürk’s practice was in line with the
authoritarian tradition of government in in Turkish society. Moreover, his
decision to ban dervish orders in 1925, and his single-party rule in the 1930s,
either outlawed or subordinated or subordinated to the state such autonomous
organizations as did exist. Atatürk’s practice thus froze, where it did not set
back, the development of Turkish civil society. It can thus be argued that while
Atatürk laid the foundations of democracy, he arrested its development. (p. 21)
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The Kemalist approach to secularism was also embraced by the founding
fathers and the rulers of other countries in the Middle East and the Muslim majority
North Africa. The dictators of Egypt (Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni
Mubarak), Tunisia (Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali), Syria (Hafiz Asad) and the Shahs
of Iran (Reza Pahlavi) as well as the ruling elite who supported them were secularists
who imagined establishing and developing new nations distilled from the forces and
influences of religion by using all of the means at their disposal, including the use and
abuse of power, to suppress any potential rivalry from religion against the secularist
state and its authority. Another common characteristic of the Middle Eastern nations is
that most of them had at some point been ruled under military dictatorships in their
recent history. Kemal Atatürk (ruled: 1923-1938) and Ismet Inonu (1938-1950) of
Turkey, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni
Mubarak (1981-2011) of Egypt, Hafiz al-Asad of Syria (1971-2000), Saddam Hussein
(1979-2003) of Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi (1961-2011) of Libya were all military
generals. This reinforced the militaristic and therefore dictatorial nature of
secularization in the Muslim World. Religious movements, especially including those
that had revivalist orientations, were criminalized and were denied access to operate in
the dominated civil society. In some cases, this led to violent encounters between the
secularist establishment and these revivalist movements. Such encounters had long
lasting legacies in these societies.
During the one party rule of Mustafa Kemal’s People’s Party, elections were
held in the format of ‘open voting close counting’ (açık oy, gizli tasnif). In 1950,
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Turkey had its first free and fair elections (close voting, open counting) in the eve of its
entrance into the NATO. The Democratic Party, which was established under the
leadership of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, won the parliamentary elections
consecutively in 1950 (52.7%), 1954 (57.6%) and 1957 (47.9%). Celal Bayar became
the third president of the Turkish Republic and Menderes was elected as the first
democratically elected prime minister. The Democratic Party, under the primacy of
Adnan Menderes, abrogated some of the restrictive laws against religious practices
such as the ban on Arabic Azan (call to prayer). Adnan Menderes was deposed in 1960
by the army, which assumed the role of the vanguards of the secularist regime since the
establishment of the Turkish Republic. After the military coup d’état, Adnan Menderes
and two ministers from his cabinet were hanged by the junta.
Necmeddin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the first explicitly
religious political party that won the parliamentary elections in Turkey in 1996 and
formed a coalition government. However, they party was deposed and outlawed by the
secularist establishment in the aftermath of the secularist February 28th Coup D’état in
1997. Prime Minister Erbakan, together with several other prominent members of the
Welfare Party, were barred from participating in elections for 5 years. Other members
of the Welfare Party established the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) in 1998. Merve
Kavakçı, a woman wearing the headscarf, was elected as a member of the parliament in
the 1999 elections from the Virtue Party. However, members of other political parties
including the newly elected Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit aggressively protested her
presence in the parliament and prevented her from taking the oath of office. Eventually,
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Merve Kavakçı’s Turkish citizenship was revoked by the state. The chief prosecutor
filed a case at the Constitutional Court against the Virtue Party five days after Merve
Kavakçı was denied the opportunity to take the oath in the parliament. The
Constitutional Court declared the Virtue Party unconstitutional and closed it in 2001 on
grounds that its members violated the secularist principles of the Republic.
Tayyip Erdogan was elected as the mayor of Istanbul in 1994 from the Welfare
Party. He was deposed in 1998 by the constitutional court because a poem he recited in
a gathering in the city of Siirt “incited hatred and included divisive rhetoric”. He was
jailed for 10 months and barred from participating in parliamentary elections. In 2001,
he played the leadership role in the foundation of the Justice and Development Party,
which won the parliamentary elections in 2002. The new government lifted the ban
barring him from participating in elections and he became the Prime Minister of Turkey
in 2003. In 2008, secularists filed a closure case against the Justice and Development
Party and requested the barring of 71 prominent members of the party from politics
with the claim that they violated the Republic’s principle of laicite (secularism). Seven
votes were required for the constitutional court to approve the closure request. Of the
11 judges, only six approved the request, which consequently saved the party from
being outlawed. Thereafter, the coalition of religious groups that allied with the Justice
and Development Party under the leadership of Erdogan started gaining the upper hand
in Turkish politics and curbed the power of the secularist army and the judiciary.
During the single party rule of the People’s Party and until the establishment of
religiously oriented political parties (i.e., the Democratic Party) and their success in the
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first democratically held election in 1950, Said Nursi and the revivalist Nur Movement
he established were at the frontline of the dialectical relationships between secularism
and revivalism. In the previous chapter, I explored sociological implications of
rhetorical response of Said Nursi to the philosophical foundations of secularism. In the
following sections of this chapter, I will explore social movement dynamics of Said
Nursi’s and the Nur Movement’s mobilization strategies vis-à-vis the “hegemonic
[plus] dictatorial” policies of the secularist establishment. As part of this endeavor, I
also investigate the ways in which members of the Nur Movement interpreted Nursi’s
revivalist ideas and how these ideas were turned into action in this process.
The Special Mission of the Nur Movement: ‘Jihad of the Pen’
After his disappointment with the secularist inspirations he observed among the
leaders of the new government established in Ankara under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal, Said Nursi returned to the Eastern city of Van, which is where he spent most of
his formative years. In his first year in Van, Said Nursi stayed in Nurşin Mosque and
started teaching religious sciences and the exegesis he wrote during WWI, to a group of
students as well as learned mollas (Atasoy, 2011, p. 116). He also occasionally
provided sermons in Kurdish at the mosque. When he knew that there were Turks
among the audience, he was giving his sermons in Turkish (Akgündüz, 2014, p. 518).
As the number of people coming to the Mosque to visit him and ask his opinions in
various matters increased, Said Nursi lamented that that the local people were still
approaching him as the “Old Said” who was involved in reformist activism and talked
about issues pertaining to politics. He withdrew to the remnants of an Armenian
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monastery and eventually to a cave in the Erek Mountain, which he used as a madrasa
with a small group of his students (Atasoy, 2011, p. 162). According to the accounts
provided later by Molla Hamid, one of these students, Said Nursi was focusing only on
issues regarding “fundamentals of belief” such as the existence and unity of God,
evidences of bodily resurrection and contemplation over God’s creation in his teaching
(Atasoy, 2010, p. 128; Şahiner, 2011, p.115-116). Said Nursi and his students returned
to the city only for Friday prayers and during cold weather (Vahide, 2005, p. 177-179).
When Said Nursi was in Van, a group of Kurdish notables were preparing for an
armed uprising under the leadership of Şeyh Said against the government of Mustafa
Kemal. These notables contacted Said Nursi several times directly and indirectly and
asked his support for the revolt. When Şeyh Said wrote a letter asking his support, Said
Nursi replied:
The struggle you are embarking on will cause brother to kill brother and will be
fruitless. For the Kurds and Turks are brothers. The Turkish nation has acted as
the standard-bearer of Islam for centuries. It has produced millions of saints and
given millions of martyrs. The sword may not be drawn against the sons of
Islam’s heroic defenders, and I shall not draw mine! (Trans., Vahide, 2005, p.
181)
As Molla Hamid described it, Kör Hüseyin Pasha, the chief of Haydaran tribe,
approached Said Nursi around the same time and told him that he had prepared five
thousand men armed with weapons and ammunitions, and that he was waiting for his
order to strike the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal in the city of Van. Said Nursi talked to
him for about an hour and dissuaded him by arguments in similar ways for why he
refused to join Şeyh Said’s revolt (Atasoy, 2011, p. 190-193).
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Sheik Said revolted in February 1925 citing the new regimes betrayal to the
religion of Islam. He captured the city of Elazığ and some of the small towns in the
region. The government in Ankara passed the Law of Restoration of Order (Takrir-i
Sükun Kanunu) on March 4 and reestablished the Independence Tribunals. The
government suppressed the revolt and captured Şeyh Said in Mid-April (1925) and
executed him with several dozen of his prominent men.
After suppressing the Şeyh Said rebellion, the government in Ankara dislocated
scores of Kurdish notables (e.g., Şeyhs, landlords and tribal leaders) and exiled them to
different parts of Turkey. Although he did not take part in the rebellion and declared it
illegitimate, the government decided to exile Said Nursi as well. In February 1926, Said
Nursi’s madrasa was raided and he was exiled to the South-Western province of
Burdur. He was sent from Van to the coastal city of Trabzon, where he and other exiles
boarded a ship and were sent to Istanbul. From there, Said Nursi was sent to the
southern coastal city of Antalya. He arrived in Burdur in May 1926 (Akgündüz, 2014,
p.606-626).

Figure 14. Map of Turkey
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Shortly after arriving in Burdur, Said Nursi started giving lessons (ders) and
sermons to the local people and visitors at the Delibaba Mosque for about seven months
(Şahiner, 2013, p.234). While he was in Burdur, he started writing a collection of (11)
short treatises (ders / lessons) which were later compiled into the booklet Nurun İlk
Kapısı (The First Gate of the Risale-i Nur). These treatises were very similar to The
Short Words (the first 8 chapters of The Words), which were analyzed in detail in the
previous chapter. Like he did in The Short Words, Said Nursi, in these treatises, was
aiming at transforming the pursuit of happiness towards a God-conscious direction, by
maintaining that human beings are in an eternal journey in time and space, and only by
finding an unlimited source of power and mercy they could be saved from their fears
and provided with what they need. In this regard, he was also emphasizing that faith in
God and afterlife and acting accordingly was the source of finding heaven (true
happiness), and beings saved from eternal suffering (hell) even in this world. He was
also emphasizing that focusing on the immediate worldly pleasures was at odds with
turning towards God and finding true happiness.
“O the heedless arrogant! What happened to you that you are inviting Muslims
towards the worldly in the way of the foreigners? That life is nothing but a
dream in deep sleep and a heedless indulgence. [...]. Do you know what your
situation looks like? It looks like a heedless drunk who thinks the lion is a horse,
the gallows is a swing and the wound is a red rose. In such a state, he still thinks
he is a true guide (mürşid). [...] (NİK:3. Trans. ZN).
Contending that the lion is death, the gallows is the grave and the wounds are
human beings’ limitless impotence and (existential) poverty, Said Nursi asserted that
the heedless side of the contemporary civilization and the students of misguided
philosophy were the source of such a delusion.
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The disciples of the misguided and heedless civilization and the misleading
philosophy became deluded with their ambitions and tyranny. Yet, with
deceptions they are inviting Muslims to the customs of the foreigners
[Europeans] and to leave the pillars of Islam. They fail to understand that in
every foundational tenet of Islam is a wisdom and a [truthful] sign. (NİK:3.
Trans. ZN).
Adding a note to the manuscript that his criticism of philosophy was only
directed at the ideologically interpreted side of philosophy (and science) which attacked
the tenets of Islam, Said Nursi gave hand-produced copies of these short treatises to his
visitors. These writings, together with the growing numbers of people visiting Said
Nursi and participating in his lessons (ders) might have alarmed the secularist
authorities who relocated to him to the city of Isparta in January 1927, and eventually
to the remote village of Barla, which was interlocked between the lake of Eğirdir and
surrounding mountains. The village did not have access to motorways at that time.
In the first two years of his exile in Barla, Said Nursi’s contact with the local
people was very limited as it was intended and mandated by those who exiled him. He
spent most of his time going out to the gardens and hills surrounding the village for
contemplation. However, it was in Barla that the vast majority of the Risale-i Nur was
written and the foundations of the Nur Movement were laid down. One of the first
individuals who established connections with Said Nursi in Barla was a young man
named Süleyman (Kervancı) (1898-1965). Below is an excerpt from his account of how
he met and established connections with Said Nursi.
I met Bediuzzaman [Said Nursi] in the Spring of the year he came to Barla. It
was an afternoon; I was chatting with a group of young men on the side of the
road which passes through the village. I had not met with him until that day, I
was too young then. However, I was seeing him go to the gardens and hills
outside the village and come back in the evening. It was raining the day I met
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him and the road was muddy. Bediuzzaman was passing through fifteen meters
away from where we were chatting. He greeted us with his hand and we greeted
him back. Then, I realized that he only had one shoe on his feet. The other was
missing. It was torn and he was carrying it in his hand. [Out of my compassion]
I could not bare it. I wanted to go and help him. I walked after him and as I
approached, he turned back and said: “Come my brother!” We went to his
house. I brought water from the fountain and washed his shoes. He asked my
name. I said: “Süleyman”. He said: “You can come here when you have time”. I
started visiting him, taking lessons from him and helping him out, and I never
quit. (Akgündüz, 2014, p. 683. Trans. ZN)
Süleyman Kervancı regularly visited Said Nursi and offered his help to him
with domestic work and with scribing and copying his writings. In a letter he sent to
Said Nursi several years later (c. 1935), he talked about how reading the treatises of the
Risale-i Nur provided him a sense of happiness which he could not find elsewhere and
how confident he was that the Risale-i Nur would someday prove the truthfulness of the
Qur’an to the world.
As your servant, student and brother, I have read all of the treatises of the
Risale-i Nur which have been written thus far. I have seen them as bright suns
and immensely benefited from each and every one of them. These lights have
enlightened the path of my eternal journey and they have shown me what I was
lacking in the path towards afterlife. [...] I have never seen the equivalent of the
contentment and happiness I observed in the sea [sic] of the Risale-i Nur in
other places. As a result of the considerations I had in my conscience, I came to
the conclusion that each and every one of the treatises of the Risale-i Nur are
true exegeses of the Qur’an. With my limited capacity, I was able to understand
that the study of these [treatises] are healing and very effective cures for those
who are struggling with [spiritual] wounds. I have the opinion that time will
show the value of these [treatises] and it will be spread all around the world
from the East to the West. It [time] will also show Europe how bright of a sun is
the Qur’an. (B:56-57. Trans. ZN)
Another person who was among the first to meet and become a disciple of Said
Nursi was Şamlı Hafız Tevfik (Göksu). Born in 1887 in Barla, Şamlı Hafız Tevfik
spent most of his formative years outside the village with his father Hafız Veli Efendi,
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who was a captain the army. When his father was stationed in Damascus, he had seen,
but not met Said Nursi when he gave his famous (Damascus) sermon in the Umayyad
Mosque in 1911. During his father’s stay in Damascus for twenty years, Şamlı Hafız
Tevfik received education in religious sciences in the local madrasas. Before Said Nursi
was exiled to Barla, Şamlı Hafız Tevfik had returned to his village and started working
as an imam at one of the mosques in the village. After meeting Said Nursi, Şamlı Hafız
Tevfik played a significant role in the writing and circulation of the Risale-i Nur. Most
of the Risale-i Nur was written in the form of dictation. Şamlı Hafız Tevfik together
with several others were the scribes of Said Nursi, hand writing the treatises he was
dictating. These scribes were also making fair copies of the treatises and distributing
them to the growing number of Nursi’s following. Because Atatürk mandated the use of
the Latin alphabet (in 1928) and banned publications in the Arabic (Qur’anic) script,
which had been used throughout the Ottoman history and because the spread of Nursi’s
writings was sanctioned by the government, members of Nur Movement were secretly
hand copying the treatises of the Risale-i Nur in the Arabic script for themselves and
for those who could not produce their own copies. Thousands of copies of the Risale-i
Nur were reproduced and distributed by this way. Those who copied, distributed and
read the Risale-i Nur called themselves Nur Talebesi (Students of Nur/Students of
Light/Nur Students) were prosecuted by the secularist establishment. Hundreds of them
were arrested and jailed between 1935 and 1960. Şamlı Hafız Tevfik was also jailed in
1935 and again in 1943 together with Said Nursi (Şahiner, 2011, p. 288; Şahiner, 2013,
p. 244; Akgündüz, 2014, p. 736-738).
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Another scribe of Said Nursi during his exile, was Ahmed Galib (Keskin), who
was a teacher at the elementary school in Barla. Ahmed Galib was not only serving as a
scribe. As he was also a poet, he was writing poems in praise of the writings of Said
Nursi, which at that time was referred to as Sözler (The Words).
The human’s truthful knowledge are your Words
The interpreter of the treasures of the Unity [of God] are your Words
[...]
Protecting from the waves of disbelief
Like the Arch of Noah are your Words
[...]
Drowning the Pharaohs of denial
Like the Tablets of Stone are your Words.
[...]
Disproving the people of misguidance
Like the eloquence of Aaron are your Words
Destroying the disbelieving army of the Goliath
Like the voice of David are your Words
[...]
Your proof of resurrection stands ever-strong
Like the predictions of Ezra are your Words
[...]
Saving the mind from heavy burdens
Like the light of Elijah’s abstinence [from apostasy] are your Words
[...]
Constantly reminding the mercy of the Merciful
Like the gratitude of the compassionate Zechariah are your Words
[...]
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Reviving the dead and curing the blind
Like the breath of Jesus are your Words
[...] (B:99-101. Trans. ZN)
Contending that Ahmed Galib’s praise of The Words can be considered as the
praise of the Qur’an because The Words are an interpretation of it (BL:85), Said Nursi
included this poem in one of the volumes of the Risale-i Nur (B:99-101).
The poem of Ahmed Galib reveals much about the discourse and motivations of
those who devotedly reproduced, distributed and read the Risale-i Nur, even at the risk
of being prosecuted. Ahmed Galib saw and presented Nursi’s works as a protective
shield against the challenges of secularist ideas and venerated them as highly
convincing tools for restoring the faithful’s confidence in the validity of the worldview
of the Qur’an such as ‘the existence and unity of God’ and ‘bodily resurrection’. The
fact that he likened the Risale-i Nur to the symbolic achievements of Biblical and
Qur’anic prophets indicates the degree of the bewilderment he experienced because of
his exposure to the imposition of secularist worldviews. His claim that Risale-i Nur was
“Saving the mind from heavy burdens” attests to this bewilderment. Born in the year
1900, Ahmed Galib must have witnessed the spread of secularist ideas during his
education in the years the Committee of Union of Progress was in power (1908-1914).
As a teacher, he also must have witnessed the top down imposition of secularist ideas in
the formative years of the Turkish Republic. Perhaps Ahmed Galib was thusly exposed
to the intrusion of secularist ideas more than others. That he became a scribe and a
follower of Said Nursi and that he wrote such poems in veneration of the Risale-i Nur
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are indications that he found a voice and reassuring point of support in Said Nursi’s
revivalist ideas.
A similar account was provided by Refet Barutçu. In a letter he wrote to Said
Nursi, Refet Barutçu said:
We used to regret that we were living in a time disbelief (dinsizlik) was
spreading. Now there is no grief and no regret. Because we found a teacher
(üstad) like you, we are not worried about what kind of a time we are living in.
(B:208)
Refet Barutçu (1886-1975) was born in Istanbul during the Hamidian Era in
which the Young Turks were increasing their pressure on Sultan Abdulhamid II with
the demand of the reinstitution of the constitution and the parliament. As was described
in detail in the third chapter of this dissertation, some of the Young Turks were also
introducing secularist ideas and attacking religious worldviews during this time. Born
and raised during the prominence of the Young Turks, Refet Barutçu studied at the
prestigious Mekteb-i Aliye-i Sultaniye and at Mekteb-i Harbiye (the War College)
(Şahiner, 2011, p. 385). As was also discussed in the same chapter, military schools,
including the War College, in the late Ottoman society were centers of secularist and
revolutionist ideologies. Ottoman materialists like Beşir Fuad and Abdullah Cevdet
were educated in these schools. The founding fathers of the secularist Turkish Republic
including Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Inonu received education in these schools as well.
Refet Barutçu’s concerns about “the spread of disbelief” might be accentuated because
of his familiarity with the secularist ideologies he gained at these schools.
Like many of others, Refet Barutçu did not join the Nur Movement because he
was proselytized by other members of the movement. As he describes it, he had heard
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about Said Nursi when both were in Istanbul and that he had seen him once at a mosque
in Istanbul in 1921. However, they did not meet each other personally then. In 1930,
Refet Barutçu retired from his position as a captain in the army at the age of 34, and
started serving as an imam at a mosque in Istanbul. One year later, he married someone
from the city of Isparta and moved there. As he described it (Şahiner, 2011, p. 383384), Refet Barutçu mentioned the name of Said Nursi in a conversation he was having
with a librarian about contemporary scholars, adding that he did not know where he
was. When the librarian told him that Said Nursi was in the village of Barla (in the
province of Isparta), Refet Barutçu visited him, although he was advised by the local
people that he could be punished by the government. Thereafter, he became one of the
prominent members of the Nur Movement. Some of the letters he exchanged with Said
Nursi were included in different volumes of the Risale-i Nur. In addition, some of the
questions he asked Said Nursi resulted in the writing of some of the treatises of the
Risale-i Nur (e.g., F12). For example, he sent a letter seeking explanations about the
content of two Qur’anic verses. There first one was about the idea of God giving the
sustenance of all of the living beings from the smallest to the largest without any
exception (Qur’an, 29:6), and the second was about the meaning of the Qur’anic
expression that “seven (layers of the) heavens were the creation of God (i.e., Qur’an
17:44; 2:29; and 65:12)” (F:99-103). Apparently, Refet Barutçu was looking for
assurances for the truthfulness of Qur’anic teachings regarding Nature, which were
challenged by ideological interpretations of science such as materialism and naturalism
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which he might have been familiar with because of his education and his career in the
army.
Another letter written by Refet Barutçu indicates that it was not only the Risalei Nur’s refutation of the ontological side of the secularist ideas (i.e., naturalism and
materialism), which appealed to him. Said Nursi’s criticism of the humanist side of
secularist philosophy which was based on the idea of “the human effort to improve the
human condition” through scientific tools and methods also resonated with him.
Those who are thinking of themselves as intelligent, considering the progress of
science as their own achievement, and begging truth and knowledge from
Europe are turning away from the eloquent Qur’an which is the treasure of
truth. Had they studied this excellent text [a treatise Said Nursi wrote about the
eloquence of the Qur’an (W25)] with curiosity and without bias, they would be
awakened from their ignorance and understood the value of this book which
contains the great principles and truthful guidelines for the happiness of human
beings in this world and the next. (B:64)
Another noteworthy aspect of Refet Barutçu’s remarks is his emphasis on the
peculiarity of ‘the time’ (in which disbelief was spreading) his was living in. The
emphasis on the peculiarity of ‘the time’ was actually one distinctive characteristic of
the revivalist discourse and mobilization strategies of Said Nursi and the Nur
Movement. They regularly emphasized that it was ‘the time for saving faith (iman)”
because never before the foundations of faith were challenged so strongly as it was
done by science and philosophy in the contemporary society. In the words of Said
Nursi;
[The first and the foremost important mission] is to save faith [iman] in a way to
silence the philosophy and the materialist ideology because of the challenge of
science and philosophy and the spread of materialism and naturalism. (E:266)
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With the emphasis on the peculiarity of the time was born the idea of a unique
mission for the Nur Movement. It was the “jihad of the pen.” There were several
aspects of how the idea of “the jihad of the pen” was formulated and put into practice
by the Nur Movement. The first was the refutation of the materialist and naturalist
ideas, which were used as evidences against the teachings of the Qur’an. This first
mission found its best expression in the Nur Movement’s discourse of imanı kurtarmak
(saving the faith) (e.g., S:749, S:663, Ş:359, Ş:441-442, Ş:555, T:287, T:708, B:366,
K:22, K:78, E:67, E:112, E:219-220, E222), küfrün belini kırmak (breaking the
backbone of atheism) (T:95, T:162), küfrü mutlakı kırmak (breaking down absolute
atheism) (T:492, E:118, E:239, ST:223), and ehl-i küfrün tahriblerini tamir (repairing
the damage of atheism) (T:623).
The second aspect of the peculiar mission of the Nur Movement was
strengthening the foundations of faith through the contemplation over the universe in
light of Qur’anic verses. This approach was called iman-i tahkiki (investigative faith) in
the discourse of the Nur Movement. They contended that if the foundations of faith
(iman) are not strengthened through investigation (tahkik) it could be easily defeated
especially at a time when these foundations were attacked by the articulations of
materialism and naturalism. Therefore, the mission of the Nur Movement was to
elevate the unsubstantiated imitative faith (taklidi iman) of the masses to the level of
investigative faith (tahkiki iman) with the purpose of empowering them with tools
through which each and every one of them could nourish their faith and protect it
against the challenges of atheism (E:266, S:690, S:749, S:761, S:766, S:772, M:376).

387
“Yes, because the load-bearing walls of imitative faith have been shattered and
curtailed in this devastating age, every believer needs to obtain investigative
faith with strong foundations so that they can be protected from the organized
attacks of the misguided. At a most needed and delicate time in this fearsome
age, the Risale-i Nur is fulfilling this duty by providing strong evidences for
even the deepest and more subtle matters of the truths of the Qur’an. Thus the
sincere students of the Risale-i Nur who attain investigative faith (iman-i
tahkiki) also become points for support and confidence for the other faithful in
their villages and towns. Therefore, the strength of their faith gives the sense of
confidence and courage [about the truthfulness of the Qur’an] to other believers
even if they do not see each other. (M:466)
Members of the Nur Movement, primarily including Said Nursi, called this
approach “jihad of the pen”, (cihad-ı manevi - manevî mücahede - ilmi mucahede murekkep ile mücahede - manevi muharebe) (L:155-156, L:167, Ş:271, Ş:435, Ş:469,
Ş:593, Ş:701-702, T:135, T:152, T:304, T:432, T:457, T:707, B:45, B:109-110, B:164,
B:206, K:99, K:149, K:234, E:82, E:190, Em:139, Em:241-245, M:417, ST:15, ST:77,
ST:84-85, ST:142, ST:147, ST:168) fighting against the spread of atheism with a
diamond (immaterial) sword (elmas kılınç) (Ş:271, Ş:316, Ş:596, Ş:723, T:59, T:198,
T:261, T:285, T:516-517, T:596, Ms:267, B:14, B:169-170, K:20, K:24, K:37, K:100,
K:227, K:234, E:47, E:62) instead of material swords (maddî kılınç). Apparently, this
rhetoric resonated with and mobilized those who joined Said Nursi and formed the Nur
Movement. Excerpts from two letters sent to Said Nursi by Sabri Arseven (1893-1954),
one of the first followers of the Movement, attest to this.
I was able to finish scribing the Thirtieth Word which defeats and silences the
deniers and the polytheists with its state of the art “equipment of the jihad of
Unity [of God] (malzeme-i cihadiye-i vahdaniye) and with its steel-like power
and strength, diamond-like value and sardonyx-like fortresses. (B:41)
There is no doubt that anybody even those have a trace amount of fair reason,
intelligence and sense of humanity should testify how the extraordinary success
of this “jihad of the pen” [cihad-ı manevi] which is declared against the harmful
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individuals [eşhas-ı muzırra] of this age disproved and silenced this
contemptible group of people. (B:45)
As we have seen in the other passages above, the emphasis on the peculiarity of
the time (i.e., harmful people of this age) and the special mission of the Risale-i Nur
(i.e., jihad of the pen) are observable in Sabri Arseven’s letter. There are several other
points in this excerpt, which need to be explored further. First, he mentions that the
“jihad of the pen” stood firmly against “the harmful people of this age”. Although he
does not specify who these people are, he was, I think, implicitly referring to Atatürk
and his close friends. Therefore, the success of the Risale-i Nur in disproving atheistic
arguments and providing evidences for the teachings of the Qur’an, in his eyes, was a
success against the secularism of Atatürk and his policies. These statements, therefore,
indicate that despite all of the top-down secularist reforms, which were in many cases
implemented by brute force, the Risale-i Nur gave hope, courage and confidence to the
group of religious people of Anatolia who formed a revivalist movement around the
ideas of Said Nursi.
Said Nursi wrote extensively until 1950 and the members of the Nur Movement
such as Sabri Arseven secretly reproduced these writings by hand and distributed
around. Sabri Arseven played a critical role in the logistics of this endeavor. He was an
imam at a mosque in the village of Bedre. The village of Barla where Said Nursi was
exiled was located in the West side of the Eğirdir Lake which detached Barla from most
the motorways. Bedre was in the South West side of the same lake. Unlike Barla, Bedre
had access to the motorways. More importantly, there was a small pier at the village,
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which served a connecting point for the transportation of people and goods between the
nearby villages, the town of Eğirdir and the provincial city of Isparta.
When he was an imam in Bedre, Sabri Arseven served as the connecting point
for the circulation of the Risale-i Nur and transferring letters between Said Nursi and
his students elsewhere. It was because of this crucial role that he was called “the
Customs Officer of the [Risale-i] Nur” (Risale-i Nurun İskele Nazırı - Nur İskele
Memuru / Nur) by Said Nursi (K:7, K:120, K:129) and he was known as “Station
Sabri” (Santral Sabri) among the other members of the Nur Movement (Şahiner, 2011,
p. 293). Sabri Arseven was arrested in 1943 and spent nine months in jail. He died in a
traffic accident in 1954 (Şahiner, 2011, p. 292). Many of the letters he exchanged with
Said Nursi were included in one of the volumes of the Risale-i Nur (Barla Lahikası).
Not all members of Nur Movement were as educated as Ahmed Galib, Refet
Barutçu or Sabri Arseven. For example, Adilcevazlı Bekir Ağa was an uneducated man
who became a member of the Nur Movement and who carried manuscripts of Risale-i
Nur and letters between Said Nursi and other members of the movement. With the help
of an educated person, he sent a letter to Said Nursi explaining his motivation for
joining the movement.
Although I am illiterate, I have had all of your treatises read to me and I listened
to them. [...] In hearing them I have investigated the state of my spirit and my
heart. I tried to comprehend what I understood and what I felt. I saw that there
was a strong urge and excitement in me, calling me to duty; “go!, go!.” I saw
the [bright] keys these treatises showed me. I understood that I should find my
brothers who are more knowledgeable about [the Risale-i Nur], and I considered
it a duty to myself to join them and help them. In order for the attacks of those
who betrayed religion to stop, I looked for and found my brothers. (B:54-55)

390
Bekir Ağa’s words indicate that even uneducated people were well aware of the
secularist dictations and policies. This is not surprising given that the government,
under the leadership of Atatürk, had closed down all of the madrasas, banned the use of
Arabic script, punished those who were teaching the Qur’an, mandated the recitation of
the call to prayer in Turkish and forced everybody to wear a felt hat instead of the fez or
the turban. What is more interesting in Bekir Ağa’s letter is that he saw a potential in
the discourse of Risale-i Nur for stopping or reversing these policies. The excitement
described in his letter, also gives hints about what motivated and mobilized members of
the Nur Movement at the risk of being punished by the secularist regime.
Another uneducated person who played a significant role in the formative years
of the Nur Movement was Abdullah Çavuş (Kula) (1901-1987), a farmer from a village
(İslamköy) in the vicinity of Barla. He was around the age of 30 when he met Said
Nursi. Like Sabri Arseven he took a significant role in distributing the Risale-i Nur and
in facilitating the communication between the members of the Nur Movement and Said
Nursi. As he described in an interview he gave to Şahiner (2011, p. 310), he was
carrying manuscripts of the Risale-i Nur and letters between Barla and other villages at
nighttime so that he would not be detected by the secularist establishment.
I was leaving İslamköy at nighttime with the mail bag on my shoulders and
stopping by other villages. I was arriving at Barla at dawn and giving [letters
and manuscripts of the Risale-i Nur] to the Hoca [Said Nursi]. He was greeting
me with gratitude when I arrived. We used to the pray the Morning Prayer
together. Then I was going to bed and sleeping. (Şahiner, 2011, p. 310)
Abdullah Kula’s village, İslamköy, became one of the centers of the newly
emerging Nur Movement. People of this village were writing the Risale-i Nur day and
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night which was the reason why Said Nursi called the village “Nur Fabrikası” (the
Factory of Nur / Light” (K:201). Hafız Ali (Ergün) (b. 1898), one of the most
prominent members of the Nur Movement during its formative years, was from
İslamköy. He died in the Denizli Prison in 1944 where he was held with Said Nursi and
other members of the movement. Because of his contributions to the movement, Hafız
Ali was also called by Said Nursi as “the owner of the Factory of Nur” (e.g., K:21,
K:82).

Figure 15. A page of the Risale-i Nur handwritten by Hafız Ali in Arabic (Ottoman)
script (c. 1930-1940) (Courtesy of Ahmet Akgündüz)
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Hafız Ali started learning religious sciences and memorizing the Qur’an at an
early age. He served as an imam in the villages of Isparta province. He moved back to
his own village around 1930 as an Imam and as a Qur’an teacher. After meeting Said
Nursi in 1930, he started reproducing hundreds of copies of treatises from the Risale-i
Nur with his wife Ümmühan. They also introduced Risale-i Nur to the other residents
of the village who joined them in reproducing these texts. Some of the letters Said
Nursi exchanged with Hafız Ali were included in different volumes of the Risale-i Nur.
Not all members of the Nur Movement during its formative years were people
who were originally from the vicinity of Barla. One of the most prominent followers of
Said Nursi during this period was Colonel (İbrahim) Hulusi Yahyagil who was born in
1896 in the Eastern Anatolian city of Elaziğ. His father, Mehmed Husrev Yahyazade
was a low rank officer in the army. After receiving his first education at a local mosque,
Hulusi Yahyagil was enrolled in the Military Middle School (Askeri Rüşdiye) in the
same city. He started his Military High School education in the neighboring city
Erzincan and finished it in Istanbul. He was enrolled in the War College (Mekteb-i
Harbiye) in Istanbul. When WWI broke out, Hulusi Yahyagil, like many of his peers,
were ordered to join the army as a sub-lieutenant before graduating from the War
College. Having fought in different frontiers during WWI and in the Turkish War of
Independence, he went back to the War College in 1925 and graduated 1927 with the
rank of a Captain (Yüzbaşı). After serving short spells in other places, he was appointed
in 1928 to the battalion in the town of Eğirdir which was in the vicinity of Barla where
Said Nursi was exiled in 1927 (Atasoy, 2014, p. 25-45).
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Since his childhood, Hulusi Yahyagil was a very pious and observant Muslim
who was interested Sufism. He also had connections with Sufi traditions and masters.
However, as he described it later, he had not heard about Said Nursi until he was
appointed to Eğirdir. It was a man named Şeyh Mustafa (1890-1959) who was his
neighbor in Eğirdir who mentioned Said Nursi in praise to Hulusi Yahyagil during their
conversations they had before and after they attended the local mosque. Upon hearing
about his presence in Barla, Hulusi Yahyagil visited Said Nursi in 1929. As he
indicated later, during these times he was in search of a (Sufi) shaikh who could be his
guide (BL:29).
Hulusi Yahyagil was in the opinion that perhaps Said Nursi could be the shaikh
he was searching for. In their first meeting, they had a several-hours-long conservation.
Said Nursi might have understood what Hulusi Yahyagil was searching for. He told
Hulusi Yahyagil that he was “not a shaikh but an imam, like Imam Ghazali and Imam
Rabbani (Ahmad Sirhindi) ” (Atasoy, 2014, p. 60). Because these two figures (Imam
Ghazali and Imam Rabbani) were influential figures in in religious renewal in the
history of Islam, Said Nursi was, obviously, indicating that he had revivalist orientation
not necessarily a Sufi approach.
Although he was not too far away from Barla, Hulusi Yahyagil visited Said
Nursi only a few times. He mostly communicated with Said Nursi through letters. In at
least two of these letters, Hulusi Yahyagil indicated that Said Nursi convinced him that
Sufism was not a viable option in modern times as it could respond to the peculiar
challenges of the time.
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As my life was passing through in searching for the truth, the destiny had put
me five years ago in the Naqshbandi Sufi path [tarikat] by way of the great
Naqshbandi shaikh Muhammed Kufrevi. Then, because of a temporary eclipse,
this path was also lost [by me] and I was amongst darkness and thorns. Finding
your Sözler [The Words] I was taken away from the darkness into the light, from
turbulence into safety and from calamity into happiness. “All praise is to God,
this is His favor”. And you are saying “it is not time for Sufism [tarikat].” [And
I say:] 'Well-said, I agree'. (B:32)
[Said Nursi] gave me and to all of those who are listening the lesson that “It is
not the time for Sufism [tarikat], it is the time to save faith [iman]. [...] I have
wholeheartedly said “yes!” to this, to the other lessons he taught in the Risale-i
Nur and to the truths he deducted from the Qur’an. I approved it and thusly I
have called this person “Üstad” [Master] who gave me the lesson of my life.
This was the first time I called someone Üstad in my life. It was not a mistake
and I was right. (B:29)
Hulusi Yahyagil related later that meeting with Said Nursi profoundly changed
his life and that he dedicated all of his time and energy to reading and writing the
Risale-i Nur (Şahiner, 2011, p.320). However, he had to leave Eğirdir because he was
appointed to another place as part of the routine in the army. However, he remained in
contact with Said Nursi through the letters they exchanged. In many of these letters,
Hulusi Yahyagil asked questions to Said Nursi about the Qur’an, hadith and about
theological matters in addition to giving feedback to newly written treatises of the
Risale-i Nur. Said Nursi’s answers to these questions constituted the vast majority of
one of the largest volumes of the Risale-i Nur, Letters (Mektubat). Said Nursi praised
Hulusi Yahyagil, for his effort towards the establishment of “investigative faith,” in
many of the letters he wrote to him and to the other members of the Nur Movement
(e.g., B:250-251).
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Figure 16. Hulusi Yahyagil (c. 1930)

Figure 17. Abdullah Kula (c. 1980)
Hulusi Yahyagil’s departure from Eğirdir was one of the turning points in the
history of the Nur Movement. As it is mentioned above, his relocation from the
battalion in Eğirdir was part of the routine practice in the Army. However, he requested
to be relocated to the eastern city of Elazığ where he originally hailed from. Shortly
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after arriving at Elazığ, Hulusi Yahyagil started reading and discussing the Risale-i Nur
with a group of people at the house he inherited from his father (Atasoy, 2014, p. 104).
In addition to being a symbolic turning point in terms of the Risale-i Nur’s expansion
out of the South Western Anatolia where Said Nursi was exiled, reading together and
discussing the Risale-i Nur like Hulusi Yahyagil and his friend did became a common
practice among the members of the Nur Movement. As the movement grew and
expanded into different parts of Turkey, so did the number of people getting together
and reading the Risale-i Nur.
In the beginning, they were convening at each other’s houses as it was done by
Hulusi Yahyagil’s group. However, members of the Nur Movement also started
designating separate apartments and houses for this practice. The act of getting together
and reading the Risale-i Nur was called ders (study) and the placed they were holding
ders sessions were called dershane (studyhouse). These places were are also
occasionally called as medrese (madrasa).
Especially after 1935, Said Nursi (L:257, L:267, T:548) strongly and regularly
advised his followers to establish dershanes contending that these places would
facilitate the study of the Risale-i Nur and revive the (traditional) madrasa education in
a better form.
[...] It is imperative for the students of the Risale-i Nur to open a small dershane
everywhere, if possible. Although everybody can benefit to a certain degree
[from reading Risale-i Nur] not everybody can fully understand everything. And
because it [Risale-i Nur] is the interpretation of the truths of the Qur’an,
[reading it] is both religious science (ilm), knowledge of God and thus a kind of
worship. In five-ten weeks, the study of the Risale-i Nur provides the results of
what was achieved in five-ten years in the madrasa education in the past, and it
[the Risale-i Nur’s success] has been doing so in the last twenty years. (E:249)
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As I describe below, the secularist establishment, concerned about the growth of
the Nur Movement, relocated Said Nursi in 1935 from the village of Barla to the city of
Isparta and in subsequent years to other cities. The government wanted to keep Said
Nursi in close surveillance by relocating him to urban centers where the eye of the
government was stronger in city centers. He was first sent to Isparta and then to
Kastamonu and Emirdağ. His relocation to urban centers only contributed to the growth
of the Nur Movement and facilitated the expansion of the dershanes in other cities
including Istanbul and Ankara. A letter signed by several members of the movement
(c.1948-1952) says that there were close to 200 dershanes only around the Eastern
province of Dıyarbakır (Em:231).
Through the combination of the practice of ders and the space of dershane, the
idea of “jihad of the pen” which constituted the core of the Nur Movements revivalist
discourse had found its first and most significant institutional form. The vast majority
of the treatises included in the Risale-i Nur was written in Barla. Educated and
uneducated people of the region participated in “the jihad of the pen” by reading,
reproducing or distributing the Risale-i Nur in their locality. Those who were able to
read and write the Ottoman Turkish in the Arabic script were mostly doing the
reproduction of manuscripts of the Risale-i Nur and those who were uneducated where
contributing to the logistics of this endeavor by distributing the Risale-i Nur and
carrying letters between the members of the movement. The expansion of the
movement into urban areas with Said Nursi’s relocations significantly increased the
pace of the reproduction of the treatises of the Risale-i Nur and the growth of the
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movement. On the one hand, members of the movement who were in urban areas
started finding places to publish the Risale-i Nur with copier machines and with the
printing press. On the other hand, the institution of the dershane eased the mobilization
of the movement by serving as connecting points and places of collective action
between the members of the movement. These places served as places of
proselytization as well.
In one sense, dershanes were a form of the embodiment of Said Nursi’s idea of
establishing a university in which he could teach religious and modern sciences
together. He was not able to realize his dream of establishing a university but the
dershanes his followers established served as a substitute for this university project.
Although they were frequented by men of all backgrounds, those who were staying at
the dershanes were unmarried men, mostly high-school and university students. In the
morning time, they were studying at the modern educational institutions and in the
evenings and during the weekends they were personally and collectively studying the
Risale-i Nur, organizing ders sessions and carrying out the reproduction of the Risale-i
Nur. Veli Işık Kalyoncu who was a student in Ankara in 1950’s described their
dershane life.
Publications [of the Risale-i Nur] were continuing in the Doğuş Printing House.
One day, brother Said [Özdemir] said: ‘Let us rent a place nearby the printing
house and follow publications from there’. We rented a large room in the
upstairs of a restaurant in Ulus district on Dışkapı Street. Things like
proofreading were done there. We were going there in the evenings after getting
out of college and working until late hours. We also moved the Dershane which
was in the Nizip Apartment to an apartment nearby the theology faculty. We
were going to college and at the same time we were doing our share of duty in
the service of Risale-i Nur. We were seven people staying in this dershane. [...]
Over time, this dershane started to become a destination for some of the
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religious students of the faculty. We were getting together on Saturday evenings
and reading from the Risale-i Nur. [...] When our master [Said Nursi] sent our
brothers who were staying with him to Ankara, they were staying with us. We
used to ask about our master from these brothers. We used to learn a lot from
them. (Şahiner, 2008, p. 299)
Thusly, dershanes became alternative educational institutions where Said
Nursi’s revivalist ideas and his interpretation of the Qur’anic verses were put into
practice by growing number of people. The political system did not allow for them to
study religious and modern sciences side by side under the structure of one institution
but they were able to this by attending dershanes and modern educational institutions
simultaneously.
Dershanes did not have any official recognition. Nor did the Nur Movement try
to make them official. Therefore, they were not part of the civil society which barely
existed in the formative years of the Modern Turkish Republic. In this regard,
dershanes were alternative spaces in which the Nur Movement was mobilized to reach
out to greater numbers of people in the society especially in the urban environment.
This was a way of carving out their own civil society or, in other words, their domain of
mobilization under the scrutiny and pressure of the secularist political establishment.
In this regard, dershanes gave a strong footing to the movement in terms of
affecting the opinion of the masses and undermining the expansion of the secularist
Weltanschauung which was projected and in certain ways imposed on the society by
the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic. As I explore it below, the Nur Movement
deliberately and persistently avoided the use of political discourse and political
mobilization strategies even though they were continuously prosecuted by the secularist
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establishment. Nonetheless, they were accused of forming organizations against the
new regime and trying to demolish it. Said Nursi and his followers were arrested and
put into jail and tried in different courts. They were eventually acquitted because the
prosecutors could not provide hard evidences to support their accusations.
However, I think that the secularist establishment’s concern that the Nur
Movement was undermining their secularist revolution was genuine. At the societal
level, Atatürk and the cadres of his the single party rule destroyed the symbolic power
of religion and thus humiliated and marginalized religion and religious people, but
those who were mobilized around the Risale-i Nur offered reassurances for their
religious convictions and a sense of accomplishing a very special historical mission. In
doing so, Said Nursi took the leadership role of reorienting the discontent felt by
Anatolian Muslims towards a discursive and rhetorical realm. The idea of “jihad of the
pen” was one of the central components of the ways in which he reoriented the
resentment of Muslims towards a battle of ideas.
The Nur Movement’s Encounters with the Secularist Establishment
Especially after 1930, the number of men and women reproducing the Risale-i
Nur by hand and reading them in hiding was growing under the increasing scrutiny of
the secularist establishment. In a few years, the scope of the Nur Movement expanded
beyond the vicinity of Barla where the vast majority of the Risale-i Nur was written.
Concerned with the growth of the Movement, the Ankara Government sent an official
memorandum to the governor of Isparta in 1934 urging him to relocate Said Nursi from
Barla to the city of Isparta (the provincial center) and to closely follow his actions. The
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letter which was sealed by the Interior Minister clearly stated that the secularist
establishment perceived Said Nursi as a threat to their “revolutions” (devrim). Figure 18
is a copy of the memorandum and the translation of its content.

Figure 18. A memorandum (about Said Nursi) which was sent by the interior ministry
to the gubernatorial office in Isparta (July 7, 1934) (In Akgündüz, 2014, p. 1069)
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R. 7/7/ [1]934 About Bediuzzaman Saidül Kürdi
To the Governorate of Isparta,
It is understood from our investigations that a response was not provided [by
your office] to the inquiry, dated 9 April 1934 with the registration number
2797, about Bediuzzaman Said-i Kurdi.
It is not appropriate to keep this person in Uluborlu [the district which included
Barla] as he is attributing a sacred duty to himself and deceiving people around
your province and in this way he is walking [acting] against our revolution. It is
requested from you to immediately relocate him to the provincial center
[Isparta], to closely watch his actions and not to let him involve in any negative
propaganda without any condition.
Interior Minister

On July 25th, 1934 Said Nursi was taken by the authorities to the city of Isparta
where he was forced to live in a house. A police officer was stationed permanently in
front of his door in order to prevent him from communicating with others. Only a few
of his students were allowed to enter the house and attend his needs (Vahide, 2005, p.
212). Said Nursi was kept in this house under surveillance for about nine months.
Under the house arrest, he continued writing treatises. During this time, he was
occasionally permitted to attend Friday prayers. In one of these occasions, in the spring
of 1935, thousands of people gathered on his path to the mosque to see him. This
incident further panicked the secularist establishment. They started searching the
houses and businesses of those who were associated with Nur Movement. Hundreds of
members of the Nur Movement including Said Nursi were arrested in April 25th, 1935.
Said Nursi and 120 of these men were handcuffed, loaded to trucks and sent to
the prison in the city of Eskişehir in the beginning of May 1935. Said Nursi was put
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into solitary confinement. The prosecutor charged Nursi and his students with abusing
religion for political purposes and disrupting the public order. In his defense, Said Nursi
emphasized that they were only concerned about existential issues and that they did not
and would not exploit religion for social and political matters which are not as
important. Contending that they have never disrupted the public order and they would
never do so, he asserted that because the new system claims to be secular (laic / laik), it
should abide by this principle and not intervene in peoples’ religiosity just as it does not
intervene in the lives of those who are not religious.
For sure, just as the sun cannot be a satellite of the moon and follow it, so belief
in God, which is the luminous, sacred key to eternal happiness and a sun of the
life of the hereafter, cannot be the tool of social life. There is no matter in the
universe more important than the mystery of belief, the greatest question and
greatest riddle of the world’s creation, so that belief may be made the tool of it.
[...] Can all the most weighty political questions of the world loom larger than
death for someone who is certain of death, so that he can make it the tool of
those questions? For the time of its coming is not known, the appointed hour
may come at any time to cut off your head. [...] The ever-open grave is either
the door to a pit of nonbeing and eternal darkness, or the gate to a world more
permanent and light-filled than this world. [...]
[I]s it at all fair, is it at all reasonable, to consider the Risale-i Nur, which
discloses and explains hundreds of questions related to belief like this one
[resurrection after death], to be a biased and harmful work that exploits politics?
What law requires this? [...]
Also, since the secular republic remains impartial according to the principle of
secularism and does not interfere with those without religion, of course it also
should not interfere with religious people on whatever pretext (T:218. Trans.
Vahide, 2005, p. 221).
[Our concern is faith [iman]. With the brotherhood of faith, we have brotherly
relationships with the ninety-nine percent of the population of Isparta. Society
and social order is about the coexistence and integration of the few with the
majority. Social order is not the subjugation of ninety-nine people to one
person. Only, a cruel person who thinks that the rest of the society is against
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religion like him will consider being religious as something against the social
order. (T:226, Trans. ZN].
Of the 120 who were brought to the Eskişehir prison, 104 were acquitted and
released. One of them died of heart attack during his interrogation. The remaining 15
and Said Nursi were sentenced to 6 months and 15 months in prison respectively.
Although they were all acquitted from the charges of forming an organization to change
the political system and disrupting the social order because the prosecutor could not
present evidence to these claims, Said Nursi and these 15 men were sentenced because
of a treatise (F:24) Said Nursi wrote about the “naturality” of hijab (Şahiner, 2013,
p.266).
Said Nursi was released from the prison of Eskişehir in March 1936 and sent to
the city of Kastamonu which was located in the Northwestern Black Sea Region. After
being forced to live inside the police station for three months, he was put into a house
right across the police station. His communications with the outside world was
restricted and his house was regularly searched by the police for the copies of the
Risale-i Nur. A more aggressively secularist governor Avni Doğan, who had previously
served in the War Tribunals, was appointed to Kastamonu to increase the pressure on
Said Nursi.
Among the few who were able to directly communicate with Said Nursi during
this time were Mehmet Feyzi Pamukçu (1912-1990), a man in his mid-twenties who
had a sound background in religious sciences. He helped Said Nursi in making fair
copies of his writings and writing the letters they exchanged with the other members of
the Nur Movement who were in Barla and Isparta. These correspondences were
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compiled into one of the volumes of the Risale-i Nur, Kastamonu Lahikası (Kastamonu
Letters). Mehmet Feyzi Pamukçu also facilitated Nursi’s communication with the other
members of the movement in the region (Atasoy, 2013). Among the other people who
communicated directly with Said Nursi -albeit infrequently- were Ziya Dilek (1902-?)
who was a high ranking civil servant in the neighboring town of İnebolu, Ahmed Nazif
Çelebi (1891-1964) and his son Selahaddin Çelebi (1913-1977). The Çelebi family
bought a manual copier machine (teksir makinesi) from Istanbul and started the mass
reproduction of the Risale-i Nur. They also contributed to the development of the Nur
Movement in Inebolu.
Said Nursi stayed in Kastamonu and had very limited contact with the outside
world for more than seven years as he was under the surveillance of the state. However,
the movement was still growing in the vicinity of Kastamonu and around Turkey which
increased the pressure of the state over the movement. When members of the Nur
Movement were subject to the second en masse arrest in September 1943, Said Nursi
together with many other members of the movement, was taken to the prison in the
Southwestern city of Denizli. They were charged with the accusations they were tried
in Eskişehir.
The court in Denizli formed a committee of experts from two local school
teachers to investigate the content of the Risale-i Nur to decide if it contained political
rhetoric and if it provoked unrest against the regime. Contending that this committee
was not qualified for the task, Said Nursi requested from the court the formation of a
committee of scientific and scholarly experts and if needed bringing scientists from
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Europe. The request was accepted by the court and a new committee of experts
including university professors was formed. The committee was asked to read all of the
Risale-i Nur and all of the letters the authorities had apprehended theretofore from the
members of the movement. However, the committee unanimously reported that they
did not find any evidence about political instigation or anything against the established
(theological) principles of Islam. As a result, Said Nursi and all of the other arrested
members of the movement were acquitted and released in December 1944 (Şahiner,
2013, p. 285; Vahide, 2005, p. 260-261).
After the acquittal and release from the prison, the government sent Said Nursi,
in August 1944, to Emirdağ, a town in the province of Afyon, around 170 miles to the
northeast of Denizli. His life in Emirdağ was very similar to what he experienced in
Kastamonu. He was put into a house nearby a police station. There were guardians at
his door, making it very difficult for him to communicate with the outside world. He
was also chaperoned by gendarmes whenever he went outside his residence. Yet, a
group of men from the Çalışkan family who were local merchants established
connections with Said Nursi and facilitated Nursi’s communication with the members
of the movement in and outside Emirdağ. The Çalışkan family dug a hole from the
neighboring store into Said Nursi’s residence and smuggled the Risale-i Nur and the
letters he exchanged with the other members of the movement elsewhere (Vahide,
2005, p. 272-273; Şahiner, 2013, p. 292-303).
Said Nursi and his followers were arrested for the third time in 1948 and put
into jail in Afyon. With the same accusations they were charged before, they were held
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in prison for 20 months. Initially the court found Said Nursi and seven others guilty of
forming a political organization, spreading ideas against the new regime and having a
political agenda. However, the appellate court in Ankara annulled the ruling on grounds
that Said Nursi and his students were acquitted from similar charges before (in Denizli).
They were released from the prison in September 1949. After being held at a house in
Afyon for about two months, Said Nursi was taken back to Emirdağ (Şahiner, 2013, p.
303-313).
In 1950, free and fair elections were held for the first time in the history of
modern Turkish Republic. Between 1923 and 1950, the political system of Turkey was
the single party rule. Atatürk died in 1938 but the secularist cadres of the People’s party
especially including İsmet İnönü continued mandating secularist policies and
persecuting religious individuals and groups. İsmet İnönü served as the second
president of Turkey between 1938 and 1950. In addition to the People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), the Nationalist Party (Millet Partisi) and the Democratic
Party (Demokrat Parti) which was more tolerant towards religion and religious groups
participated in the elections. The Democratic Party won the vast majority of the seats in
the parliament and formed the new government. One of the first things the Democratic
Party did was permitting the recitation of the call to prayer in Arabic which was banned
by the People’s Party previously. Said Nursi openly expressed his support of the
Democratic Party against the People’s Party, congratulated its leaders and praised their
decision to allow the recitation of call to prayer in Arabic. The election of the
Democratic Party eased the mobilization of the Nur Movement but did not fully
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eliminate the pressure of the secularist establishment which still controlled most of the
state apparatus.
Around 1950, Said Nursi consented his followers to print the Risale-i Nur with
the new (Latin) alphabet. Until this time, the Risale-i Nur was written in the Arabic
script mostly by hand. The language of the Risale-i Nur was the Ottoman Turkish but
the alphabet was Arabic. Atatürk made the use of the Latin alphabet mandatory and
banned the use of Arabic script in 1928. Said Nursi and his followers wrote and
reproduced the Risale-i Nur exclusively in the Arabic script but since 1950 they started
the publication of the Risale-i Nur with the new letters. One of the first treatises
published in the new letters was the Guide for Youth (Gençlik Rehberi). A group of
Nursi’s followers who were students at Istanbul University printed several thousand
copies of “the Guide for Youth”. The booklet included Said Nursi’s advice to the youth
for not being indulged in the transient side of the world and the worldly.
Your youth will definitely leave you, and if you do not remain within the
bounds of the licit, it will be lost, and rather than its pleasures, it will bring you
calamities and suffering in this world, in the grave, and in the hereafter. [...] As
for life, if it is without belief, or because of rebelliousness belief is ineffective, it
will produce pains, sorrows and grief far exceeding the superficial, fleeting
enjoyment it brings. Because, since, contrary to the animals, man possesses a
mind and he thinks, he is connected to both the present time, and to the past and
the future. He can obtain both pain and pleasure from them. Whereas, since the
animals do not think, the sorrows arising from the past and the fears and
anxieties arising from the future do not spoil their pleasure of the present.
Especially if the pleasure is illicit; then it is like an altogether poisonous honey.
[...] Life for the people of misguidance and heedlessness, and indeed their
existence, rather their world, is the day in which they find themselves. From the
point of view of their misguidance, all the time and universes of the past are
non-existent, are dead. So their intellects, which connect them to the past and
the future, produce darkness, blackness for them. Due to their lack of belief, the
future is also non-existent. Furthermore, because they think, the eternal
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separations resulting from this non-existence continuously produce darkness for
their lives.
Whereas, if belief gives life to life, then through the light of belief, both the past
and the future are illuminated and find existence. Like present time, it produces
elevated, spiritual pleasures and lights of existence for the spirit and heart-in
respect of belief. (W:158)
As I described in the previous chapter, reorientation of the pursuit of happiness
from a worldly perspective to an everlasting one was one of the core components of his
revivalist discourse. By contending that true happiness can only be attained by God
consciousness not only in hereafter but also in this life, Said Nursi tried to reorient
individuals towards a religious life. Another component of Said Nursi’s revivalist
approach related to the secularist interpretation of science such as materialism and
naturalism. In this regard, he, on the one hand, challenged the epistemological and
ontological foundations of materialism and naturalism and, on the other hand, he wrote
treatises in which he interpreted the cosmos as the reflections of the Perfect Attributes
of God (Esma-ul Husna). In so doing, he wanted to equip Muslims of all backgrounds
with rhetorical and methodological tools through which they could understand the
invalidity of secularist worldviews such as naturalism and materialism and to enable to
read the cosmos as the creation of God. Especially in his life before the establishment
of the modern Turkish Republic, Said Nursi wanted to establish a university so that he
could teach this perspective in an institutional setting but since the establishment of
Turkish Republic under the leadership of Atatürk, Said Nursi espoused an individualbased approach for responding to the challenges of ontological and epistemological
foundations of secularism (e.g., materialism, naturalism, determinism and scientism).
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This approach was best reflected in his answer to the high school students when they
said “Our teachers are not talking about God. Help us learn more about Him”. Said
Nursi replied” Listen to the sciences not the teachers” and gave examples of how to
“listen to the sciences” and learn about God (R:226). The conversation he had with the
high school students was also included in the Guide for Youth. Therefore, the Guide for
Youth included responses to both the moral philosophical (the attainment of happiness
and the pursuit of the good) and ontological foundations of secularism (i.e., naturalism,
materialism and scientism).
In 1952, a prosecutor in Istanbul filed an indictment against Said Nursi and
those who published the booklet. However, the committee of judges, after hearing the
defense of Nursi and those who published the Guide for Youth, acquitted them (Vahide,
2005, p. 311-313; Şahiner, 2013, p. 324-328). It was the last time Said Nursi went
through a major trial after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.
When he was acquitted in 1952, Said Nursi was 74 years old. He had a
relatively easier life afterwards. At his own will, he spent the rest of his life -still under
surveillance- in places he had lived or forced to leave before (e.g., Barla, Isparta,
Emirdağ, Istanbul and Ankara) and oversaw the development of the Nur Movement and
the publications of the Risale-i Nur. He made his first trip back to Eastern Anatolia
after 35 years. Only three days after arriving in the city of Şanlıurfa, Said Nursi died at
a hotel room on March 23, 1960. He was buried in a shrine (Halilurrahman Dergahı)
which is believed by local Muslims to be the mausoleum of Prophet Abraham. After
Said Nursi’s burial, the mausoleum attracted growing number of people around Turkey.
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In 1960, the Democratic Party was deposed by a military junta which tried and
executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes with two other ministers from his cabinet.
The secularist military junta also opened the grave of Said Nursi and relocated his
remains to an unknown location.
Although Said Nursi and many other members of the Nur Movement were
prosecuted and persecuted by the secularists especially in the first three decades after
the establishment of the Turkish Republic, they deliberately refrained from being
involved in political power relations and from developing a politically intonated
discourse. Said Nursi’s writings played a dominant role in the development of such a
strategy. Instead of contesting the authority and legitimacy of the secularist state, he
strongly challenged the philosophical foundations of the secularist weltanschauung
especially including its ontology and moral philosophy. Said Nursi understood that the
secularist weltanschauung had implications at the societal level, too. He also wanted to
counterbalance the expansion of this worldview in the society. However, his strategy of
reversing the processes of secularization, after the establishment of the Turkish
Republic, was not based on the idea of capturing or manipulating the commanding
heights of the society (i.e., political, social, economic institutions). Instead, he aspired
to reverse the expansion of secularization by trying change the worldview of the self
through reorienting individuals’ pursuit of the good towards a God-conscious direction
and through offering them discursive tools for deciphering the codes of secularist
ideologies (e.g., naturalism and materialism) and, instead, reading the cosmos “in the
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name(s) of God”. In this regards, Said Nursi developed a micro level, persuasion and
conversion based approach to religious revival.
Abstaining from political discourse was one of the core components of Said
Nursi’s strategy of persuasion-based revivalism. If one half of his revivalist strategy
was engaging the individual from an ontological and moral philosophical perspective,
the other component was the discourse he used against involvement in power relations.
He frequently emphasized that involvement in power relations would deter people even
if they are convinced about the truthfulness of the message presented to them. As he
described it, if the message of the Qur’an is presented with a political discourse or by
political means, the audience might be concerned that those who are presenting the
message in one of their hands are hiding a stick in the other. Therefore, he asserted, the
audience should not only be persuaded about the truthfulness of the message, they
should also be convinced that there is not a hidden political agenda especially at a time
when political propaganda is and has a bad reputation for being untrustworthy.
[C]urrent politics has become so intermixed with lies and trickery and evil that
it has become like the very whisperings of Satan (W:498).
But if you ask why service to the Qur’an and belief prohibit me, I would say:
Since the truths of belief and the Qur’an are each like diamonds, if I was
polluted by politics, the ordinary people who are easily deceived, would wonder
about those diamonds I was holding, “Aren’t they for political propaganda to
attract more supporters?” They might regard the diamonds as bits of common
glass. Then by being involved with politics, I would be wronging the diamonds
and as though reducing their value (LT:85).
All praise be to God, because I withdrew from politics, I did not reduce the
diamond-like truths of the Qur’an to the value of fragments of glass amid
accusations of political propaganda. Indeed, the diamonds increase their value
in the view of every group in brilliant fashion (LT:71).
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In this vein, Said Nursi asserted that one of the reasons he patiently endured all
of the hardships given to him by those who exiled him from one place to another,
prosecuted and persecuted him with false claims was that all of them gave a message to
the common people that “there is a truth which cannot be sacrificed for anything else”
and that “it is only the truth which speaks” (T:685; Em:78).
Another reason Said Nursi presented for not being involved in politics was that
political action might lead to physical and nonphysical harm to innocent people.
If I join the opposition for the purpose of force and to provoke an incident, there
would be the possibility of committing thousands of sins in order to obtain a
doubtful goal. Many people would be afflicted by disaster on account of one. So
saying that in conscience [I] could not accept committing sins and causing the
innocent to commit sins due to a one or two in ten possibility, [I] gave up
cigarettes together with the newspapers, politics, and worldly conversation
about politics. Decisive evidence for this is the fact that for the past eight years I
have not read a single newspaper nor listened to one being read (LT:84).
In terms of persuading his own followers for not being involved in politics, he
asserted that the most important duty for everyone is to correct themselves first. But
because political matters are more attractive to people, they ignore the most important
realm of responsibility and waste their time and energy by busying themselves with
politics where they have the smallest power and duty. He also warned his audience
about the harms of politics. For example, he said that politics is about taking sides with
a group against another which blinds people to the mistakes of their side and approved
the mistreatment and oppression of the other (R:223-224). Because it is the nature of
politics that people take sides, people with different political orientation will be biased
if the message of the Qur’an if it is presented by their opponents (E:180). In addition,
wasting time with politics would also distract people from their existential questions
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and needs. That is why a true believer cannot be a true politician and vice versa,
according to Said Nursi (E:57).
These ideas must have appealed to or transformed the other members of the Nur
Movement that they, too, avoided political rhetoric. Thusly, Said Nursi was able to
mobilize his followers with the idea of “the jihad of the pen” and not through a
discourse of “political jihad” or “the jihad of the sword”. Said Nursi also convinced his
followers that this was the method of the Qur’an. Colonel Hulusi Yahyagil wrote a
letter to the other members of the Movement and said:
“[The path of the Risale-i Nur] is the highway of the Qur’an. We should remain
in this path and not abstain from the service of it. We are only humble servants
of God. We should not try intervene in the unfolding of the divine destiny. The
contemptible things which are inherited today are the results of our own making
that is why the will of God permitted their unfolding. We should not try to
reverse them [by political action] against the will of God for the capital of
politics are lies and untrustworthiness.
The purpose of our existence is to search for and learn more about our Sustainer
who created us. We should strive for abiding by the principles of the Qur’an
which is revealed to the Prophet. This light [the Qur’an] is the guide and teacher
in our hands. Therefore we should distribute the Risale-i Nur which will help us
understand our guide and teacher [the Qur’an]. Let us do our duty and leave the
result to our Merciful Creator. We should not refrain from praying to each other
which is our strongest power. (B:297)
Discussions and Conclusion
I think that what characterizes the Nur Movement’s mobilization strategies is
“the simultaneous engagement and disengagement of the secularist movement at the
same time”. There were several ways in which the movement used this approach. (1)
The movement’s contestation of the ontological and moral philosophical side of
secularism but not the political authority of the secularists, (2) its discourse of the
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“jihad of the pen” and (3) the development of the dershane structure were all parts of
this same strategy.
It is important to explain what I mean by engaging and disengaging the
secularist movement at the same time, before I describe how and why I think this is the
case. I developed the idea of “engaging and disengaging the secularist movement at the
same time” from Wuthnow’s analysis of the Reformation Movement in his book
Discursive Communities (1989). In his study of the discursive nature of the rise of the
Reformation in the sixteenth century, Robert Wuthnow (1989) observed that the
success of the Reformation movement was about this movement’s articulation and
disarticulation with its social environment at the same time. On the one hand, the
Reformation successfully related to the needs and aspirations of people, proponents and
opponents alike, who lived in the sixteenth century. Some, including those in the ranks
of power, aspired to take side with the Reformation movement while others were so
deeply alarmed with the prospects of this movement to a degree that they took up arms
against it. On the other hand, the agents of the Reformation managed to protect
themselves from being proxy actors advancing the interests of certain groups. Hence,
they were able to “set the terms of their debates rather than simply providing
legitimation for those in power or for those aspiring to power” (p. 4). This enabled their
discourse to establish conditions for its own perpetuation somehow independent of the
social conditions in which they emerged. Consequently, the agents of the Reformation
“were able to provide moral meanings and ideas relating to the longstanding questions
of freedom, will, righteousness, faith, individual discipline and civic order to various
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segments of European societies enduring beyond the sixteenth century” (p. 4-5).
Therefore, Wuthnow proposed, social scientists who are interested in the study of the
Reformation should not only inquire into the social conditions which fashion its
ideology but also study “the reasons why these conditions did not shape it more” (p. 5).
It seems that Wuthnow’s reflexive sensitivity in terms of going beyond
contextual power relations in his analysis of the Reformation is an implicit reaction to
prevalent power relations biased approaches to social movements, especially including
revivalist movements, in social sciences which mostly try to understand these
movements with reference to power relations fixed in a particular point in time and
space. Perhaps, this is the reason why Wuthnow, in these discussions, used the phrase
“social conditions” almost exclusively to refer to contextual power relations pertaining
to a particular place and time. In other words, most social scientists limited their
understanding of “social conditions” to power relations in the context of revivalism. In
response, Wuthnow suggests that the scope of the analysis of the Reformation should
go beyond the boundaries of these “social conditions”.
Wuthnow’s alternative approach is not any less sociological compared to
studies focusing solely on “social conditions” given that these conditions is generally
understood as something limited to explicit contextual power relations. His approach
calls into attention an aspect of the Reformation which should be included in an indepth sociological analysis. There was something in the Reformation that crossed the
boundaries of time and space and Wuthnow contends that we need to understand what
and why it was. Focusing only on immediate “social conditions” (i.e., power relations)
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of the places where it started to emerge would not be sufficient for a fuller sociological
understanding of the Reformation movement. This, I think, is the reason why he studied
the Reformation from the “communities of discourse” perspective.
There is no doubt, Wuthnow is very well aware that any social movement let
alone revivalist movements have some sort of discourses. However, he chose to
describe his study of the Reformation movement as a study of a “community of
discourse” in order to make it clear that his analysis of this movement is not confined to
contextualizing it’s mobilization to immediate power relations. I think that the
underlying idea behind this approach is that material forms of social movement
mobilization can be fixed and limited to a specific context but the discourse might
transcend these boundaries. Therefore, discourse, especially in this regard, is broader
than material aspects of mobilization. It is also more powerful because it can -in the
case of the Reformation movement it did- bring change in a broader scope. If this is the
case, sociological implications of the discursive aspects of the Reformation should be
investigated. Wuthnow implied that this is what he does.
Conceptualizing the Nur Movement as a discursive movement, I argue that
similar approaches can and should be applied to the case of this movement. I am not
suggesting that what Said Nursi and Nur Movement did were the same as the
Reformation Movement or that they would have similar historical impacts. What I
propose is that the study of the Nur Movement, too, should go beyond contextual
analysis of power relations as they deliberately tried to transcend the boundaries of the
immediate power relations. As Taştekin (2014, p. 67) pointed out, Risale-i Nur’s
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apoliticism which reflects itself in the form of de-territorializing and universalist
approach to religious revival played a significant role in its success of appealing to a
broad base of followers and sympathizers inside and outside Turkey.
The revivalist movements literature, especially in the case of the Muslim World,
has been biased towards contextual socio-political implications of these movements and
towards movements whose rhetoric was politically inclined. Indeed, this is the reason
why the discourse of Nursi and the Nur Movement is understudied in the first place.
Because the discourse of this movement can hardly be contextualized (territorialized)
especially in terms of power relations when only social (socio-political) conditions are
taken into account, it was to a greater extent left unexplored compared to other
revivalist movements (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami) in the
Muslim World. This dissertation project aims to fill this gap in the literature by
inquiring into the sociological implications of this “community of discourse”.
One of the primary questions that set me out for studying the Nur Movement
was to understand the reason of why the Nur Movement unlike other major revivalist
movements in the Muslim World was deliberately mobilized against the ontological
and moral philosophical aspects of secularization instead of trying to reverse
secularization by controlling the commanding heights (the state) of the society. I think
that the perspective of “engaging and disengaging the secularist movement at the same
time” offers an explanation to my initial question. The Nur Movement effectively used
this approach to undermine the development of a secularist hegemony in the
society.
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For example, responding to the ontological (i.e., construction of reality) and
moral philosophical (i.e., construction of the self) foundations of secularism but not to
the political system by which secularism was supported, the Nur Movement, under the
leadership of Said Nursi, developed a strategy of simultaneously engaging and
disengaging the sociopolitical context in which they were mobilized. They were
directing their religious responses to the development and in many cases the imposition
of secularist ideas in the contexts they lived in but they were not mobilized to change
the political system which imposed these policies. The movement reproduced and
distributed Said Nursi’s writings which challenged secularist worldviews. In addition to
reassuring the faithful about the validity of the religious worldview, Said Nursi’s
writings invalidated philosophical foundations of secularism in their eyes.
The Nur Movement’s formulation of “jihad of the pen” was part of the same
approach as well. The notion of jihad in the Islamic tradition has individual and societal
level implications. The inner individual level jihad, which is described as the greater
jihad, is the struggle for the attainment and application God-consciousness in the
personal thought processes and actions. The outer jihad, which is described in the
Islamic tradition as the lesser jihad, is the struggle for the establishment of the ordained
(emr-i bil-maruf) and for the prevention of the expansion of the forbidden (nehy-i anil
munker). Historically the notion of jihad remained as an effective mobilizational power
in Muslim societies both at the individual and societal levels. The outer jihad also had
collective connotations. It is the responsibility of all of the community of the faithful.
Therefore, by employing the notion of jihad (of the pen) Said Nursi used a widely
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comprehensible conceptual tool for mobilizing Muslims from all backgrounds.
However, by reformulating the jihad as the “jihad of the pen,” Said Nursi was able to
reorient the jihad towards the ideological foundations of secularism and not towards the
removal of the secularists from the halls of power. This was making the idea of jihad
much less confrontational. Therefore, the notion of “the jihad of the pen” was part of
the strategy of simultaneously engaging and disengaging the political authority of the
secularist regime.
The structure of dershanes and their position in the society was another form of
how the Nur Movement engaged and disengaged the secularist movement (state) at the
same time. The dershane was an institution but it was not part of the civil society.
Therefore, dershanes were not the places in which religious groups negotiated and
came to terms with the state. It was not a legitimate institution in the eyes of the state in
the first place. However, the movement did not use these places to challenge the
political authority or to change it. In this regard, dershanes were places outside the
civil society (which barely existed in the formative years of the Turkish Republic) and
they were disengaging the secularist state. However, the dershanes also contested the
secularist hegemony by serving as places of articulation and mobilization towards
challenging the ideological (philosophical) foundations of the secularist worldview.
Accordingly, the Nur Movement, through the dershane structure, was indirectly
engaging the state at the same time. In a sense, the movement was carving out its own
civil society and producing an alternative public space for itself in which they set their
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own term of engagement with the rest of the society. This, I think, made the secularist
establishment more aggressive and less compromising towards the movement.
There were two major implications of the strategy of engaging and disengaging
the secularist establishment at the same time. Firstly, it was an effective tool for
reversing the expansion of secularism without the use of or without access to
institutional power. Instead of mobilizing its resources for the removal of the secularists
from the halls of power which was not easy to achieve, the Nur Movement, with all of
its mobilizational resources, focused on reversing the expansion of secularism at the
grassroots level. The secularists were using their institutional power to secularize the
society while the Nur Movement was utilizing all of its mobilizational resources for
directly engaging the individual and thusly reversing the expansion of secularism. With
this strategy, the movement was building barriers for the establishment of a secularist
hegemony in the society.
Although Said Nursi and the other members of the Nur Movement did not
confront the secularist establishment and their policies directly and politically, they
together played a significant role in undermining the establishment of the ideological
hegemony of secularism in the Gramscian sense. As it is outlined in the introduction of
this chapter, Gramsci contended that dominant groups do not only rule by controlling
the means of production and by forcing masses to accept their authority, they also
explicitly seek or manufacture the consent of masses for their worldviews through
interacting with them in the realm of civil society (institutions). This is what he called
(cultural hegemony). However, when the ruling elite cannot produce the illicit consent
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of the masses it tends to use and abuse coercive power more frequently. This is how a
social system becomes what Gramsci called “dictatorship [plus] hegemony”. In this
sense, Said Nursi and his followers were mobilized against the cultural and ideological
hegemony of the secularist worldview which was imposed on the society by political
means. Perhaps because they saw Said Nursi and his followers as a major threat against
the establishment of a secularist hegemony, Atatürk and the other leaders of the
People’s Party scrutinized, persecuted and prosecuted them for several decades.
Together with Said Nursi and hundreds of other members of the Nur Movement
including all of the names mentioned above (with the exception of Hulusi Yahyagil),
were at some point in their lives were arrested and jailed because they reproduced, read
or possessed parts of the Risale-i Nur or simply because their names were mentioned in
the letters of the members of the Nur Movement exchanged.
The Nur Movement also used its strategy of disengaging the political power of
the secularists as an effective mobilization strategy for winning the hearts and minds of
the people at the grassroots level. Considering that its target population might be
deterred and discouraged to willfully embrace their message if they think that the
movement had a hidden political agenda, the Nur Movement used every opportunity
including being persecuted and not doing anything in return to give a message to the
masses that they did not have a political agenda and they were not seeking power. In
addition to not using a politically intonated discourse, the members of the Nur
Movement, primarily including Said Nursi, also denounced ‘politics’ as deceptive and
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dishonest. Such a strategy seemed to prove successful as the movement was able to
mobilize individuals from all educational, ethnic, class and regional backgrounds.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
One of the main conclusions to be drawn from this dissertation is that neither
secularism nor revivalism have fixed categorical natures and boundaries. I started this
dissertation with rigidly defined categorical assumptions about secularism and
revivalism. My analyses of the development and transformations of the discourses and
mobilization strategies of the secularist movement in the history of Turkey and the
revivalist Nur Movement suggested it otherwise.
For example, I considered secularism to be a tightly defined ideology with
clear-cut boundaries. As a reflection of this perspective, I expected that the secularists
would have a resolutely consistent worldview across time and space although I was
expecting differences in terms of the ways in which the secularists were mobilized to
secularize the society and in the degree to which they succeeded in this endeavor. That
is to say, I was ready to find variations in the reflections of secularism in the
(Ottoman/Turkish) society but because I had an essentialist approach to secularism, I
did not conceive of significant variations in the development of the ideological and
philosophical aspects of this ideology. The third chapter of this dissertation, which is
dedicated to the study of the secularist movement, showed the inadequacy of this
Perspective and indicated it otherwise. There are substantial variations in the
ideological and philosophical foundations of secularism. Historical processes, socio424
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political contexts, geographies, socio-economic and educational backgrounds and
ideological orientations of actors, and their interactions with the state, with religion and
with religious forces played significant roles in the emergence of substantial variations
in the ideological and philosophical foundations of secularism. The secularists’
approach to religious ideas and in certain cases their confrontations with religion
showed significant differences depending on these factors as well.
However, this dissertation also suggested that these movements can be
consolidated in a specific context. For example, I observed a gradual consolidation of
secularism and the secularist movement in the history of Turkey. Although it was not
the case before, secularism was consolidated into a rigidly defined official ideology of
the state after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. As it was dictated and
sanctioned by the state, secularist ideas were not open to interpretation and contestation
anymore. Because secularism became an official ideology which was imposed by the
state, mobilizational flexibility of the secularist movement was lost to a greater extent
as well. When the secularists were in opposition, they showed a greater level of
variation in their ideological positions and mobilization strategies.
The gradual consolidation of secularism and the secularist movement in the
history of Turkey happened in tandem with several parallel historical processes. The
first was the progressive centralization of the state and its intensified extension into the
lives of its citizenry in the process of the transformation from an imperial and
monarchical structure to a nation state. Centralization of the army which was followed
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and supported by the centralization of other institutions primarily including education
and political administration were the major components of the rise of the nation state.
The second parallel process was the birth of a political opposition movement.
The Ottoman state sent students to Europe so that they acquire and bring back the
science and technology of the West in order to facilitate the modernization of the
Empire. However, some of these students who came back and began working in the
newly established bureaucratic offices started criticizing the inadequacy of the reforms
and the corruptions of the administrative structures. As a result they found themselves
at odds with the powerful bureaucrats and with the Sultan. Consequently, many of these
Western-educated reformists left their bureaucratic positions and started printing
newspapers and journals in which they presented their reformist ideas and their
criticisms of the bureaucratic elites and the Sultan. Therefore, the civil reformist
opposition movement was born in the Ottoman society. The uniting factor among this
first generation of opposition was their demand for the establishment of a constitutional
and parliamentary political system.
The third process was the birth of an expressly secularist movement. The first
generation of opposition in the late Ottoman society especially including the Young
Ottomans such as Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Ali Suavi maintained a reconciliatory
approach between religious and secular ideals. They presented religious justifications
for the ideals and concepts (liberty, justice, equality, constitution, parliament,
nationhood, motherland etc.) they acquired through their exposure to the developments
in Europe. Although some of the discourse of the Young Ottomans such as their
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emphasis on liberty and territorially defined patriotism (nationalism) carried secular
connotations, an openly secularist movement had not emerged in their generation. It
was among the next generation of reformist intellectuals and activists that an
unequivocally secularist movement was born.
The emergence of the explicitly secularist movement (e.g., the Young Turks) in
the late Ottoman society coincides with (1) the presentation of science as an alternative
and antithetical worldview providing ontological and epistemological invalidations of
the fundamental teachings of religion (2) the transition from a reconciliatory approach
to Westernization and religion to the idea of wholesale borrowing of the Western
civilization and (3) the transition from Pan-Ottoman and Pan-Islamist ideologies to
Turkish nationalism. It was through these transitions that the Ottoman reformist
intellectuals were separated into unequivocally opposite ideological camps; religious
and secularist.
Yet another analogous process was the militarization (in literal meaning) of the
secularist movement. Traditionally the strongest challenge to the authority of the Sultan
in the Ottoman history came from the army corps primarily including the Janissaries. In
the first wave of reforms which were sponsored by Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II,
the state wanted to curb the power of the traditional army corps. These reforms were
relatively successful in terms of neutralizing the janissaries. Especially after the
Tanzimat (1839), the main frontier of opposition in the Ottoman society was a civilian
reformist movement who demanded the establishment of a constitutional system. The
Young Ottomans were the pioneers in this respect and they played a significant role in
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the declaration of the first constitution and the establishment of the parliament in 1876.
However, Sultan Abdulhamid II abolished the constitution and the parliament in 1878
which gave rise to the development of more radical and revolutionary oppositional
movements. The Young Turks movement and the CUP which carried out the revolution
of 1908 were born in this context. Most of the leading figures in the Young Turks
Movement and in the CUP were educated in the military academies which were also
centers of secularist ideologies such as materialism and naturalism. Although the CUP
included influential civilians in its formative years, the organization was gradually
dominated almost exclusively by the military officers who were educated in the modern
military academies. It was these soldiers who marginalized the civilians and executed
the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and reinstituted the constitution and the parliament
and eventually controlled the government. Especially after the counter-revolution of
1909 (March 31 Incident) that the CUP, now fully an organization of soldiers, became
aggressively secularist.
The triumph of the CUP was a turning point in the history of the secularist
movement in Turkey. Until the revolution, the secularist movement was, to a greater
extent, in the ranks of opposition. However, in the aftermath of the revolution they
started controlling the state which has been centralizing in the past two centuries. The
secularist movement’s extension into the halls of power reached its peak with the
establishment of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Atatürk and his close
friends who were also coming from military backgrounds and from the ranks of the
CUP.
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As the secularists moved from the ranks of opposition to the halls of power,
their discourse and mobilization strategies were also significantly transformed. When
they were part of the journalistic opposition movement, secularists used discursive
strategies to convince the Sultan, the bureaucracy and to a lesser degree the general
public about the necessity of the reforms they advocated. They enriched their discourse
with the intellectual and scientific terminology they borrowed from the enlightenment
and the post-enlightenment movements and with the terminology and concepts they
acquired from the Islamic tradition. As the secularist movement increased in power by
controlling the state, they started implementing top-down secularist reform and silenced
any opposition with brute force.
All of these parallel processes were part and parcel of the consolidation of the
secularist movement in the history of Turkey. The transformation and consolidation of
the secularist movement was also reflected in the development and transformation of
revivalist ideas and mobilization strategies in the same society as we see it in the case
of Said Nursi and in the Nur Movement he established shortly after the establishment of
the Turkish Republic.
To begin with, I also assumed that Said Nursi, who was actively involved in
revivalism throughout his entire life would carry on an essentially similar philosophical
(and discursive) approach to religious revival as well as a consistent perspective of the
philosophical foundations of secularism. As it was the case with my initial assumptions
about the secularist movement, I was expecting to see significant differences in Said
Nursi’s mobilization strategies especially after the establishment of the Turkish
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Republic. However, I did not expect substantial differences especially in the ways in
which Said Nursi interpreted secularist ideologies and as a result in his revivalist
discourse. As it is outlined in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, there were
significant differences in his approach to the philosophical foundations of secularism as
well. Such a shift was reflected in his revivalist discourse and in his mobilization
strategies.
Until the aftermath of the Young Turk revolution of 1908, Said Nursi’s
reformist and revivalist perspective was similar to the discourse of the Young Ottomans
such as Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Hoca Tahsin. Said Nursi, in the first years of his
activism, maintained a reconciliatory approach to reform and renewal. Like many of his
contemporaries, he favorably looked at selective borrowing from the West. Contending
that spreading the message of the Qur’an was contingent on material progress
especially in modern times, he asserted that science and technology of the West -but not
its worldview and culture- could and should be borrowed. Because he was concerned
that the disconnection between the curriculums of the traditional madrasas and modern
schools would lead to dogmatism in the first and doubt and denial of religion (such as
the existence of God) in the latter, he proposed the establishment of a university in the
Kurdistan region where he could teach religious and modern sciences side by side to
address this challenge. In order to awaken Muslims to these issues and mobilize them
towards action, he embraced the idea of İttihad-ı İslam (Unity of Muslims) as it was
formulated by his predecessors like Namık Kemal, al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh.
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In similar ways to the Young Ottoman approach, he supported the constitutionalist
movement with religious justifications and initially championed the revolution of 1908.
What makes Said Nursi different from the Young Ottomans was that he did not
only provide religious justifications for the political reforms he advocated, he also
wanted to give a religious character for the new system to be established. That is why
he was concerned that the revolution of 1908 could go into another direction and
secularize the society by marginalizing religion. He published open letters to the
members of the new parliament urging them to maintain fundamental principles of
freedom and to make sure that religion will not be marginalized. It did not take long for
him to realize that the revolution was actually going towards a more secularist
direction.
Especially until the end of 1910, Said Nursi was not explicitly mobilized against
a secularist or any other movement, nor did he develop a dialectical revivalist
discourse. He was mostly involved in reformist activism by explaining his ideas in the
newspaper articles he published and in the conversations he had with other intellectuals
and with the statesmen in Istanbul. He also submitted petitions to the palace asking the
financial support of the Sultan for the university project he proposed. The petition was
eventually accepted and the foundations of the university were laid down in the
outskirts of the city of Van but it was not finished because of the Balkan Wars and
WWI.
It was with the publication of his first major work Muhakemat (Reasonings) in
1911 that a major shift was observable in Said Nursi’s revivalist discourse. For the first
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time in his life, he started publicly addressing philosophical implications of secularist
ideologies such as materialism and naturalism. Such a shift in Said Nursi’s discourse
coincides with the increasing number of publications, including journal articles and
translated books, about these ideologies around the same time. Among them was the
translation of Ludwig Büchner’s Force and Matter which greatly influenced secularist
intellectuals (e.g., Beşir Fuad, Abdullah Cevdet, Baha Tevfik and Ahmet Nebil) in the
late Ottoman society. In this book, Büchner challenged the idea that there is a creative
force (i.e., God) outside and disconnected from matter. Likewise, he argued that the
order which is observed in Nature is the result of the motions and interactions of atoms
and the necessary outcomes of the properties of different forms of matter, not the
dictations of an outside will and power. Ludwig Büchner and the other materialists who
were introduced into the Ottoman society also emphasized how scientific inquiry
nullified and invalidated religious dogmas.
Said Nursi presented his criticism of materialist ideas -albeit briefly- in
Muhakemat which signaled a turning point in his revivalist discourse. He stopped
emphasizing the need for acquiring modern sciences for the purpose of improving the
material conditions of life in the Muslims World which he previously presented as a
precondition for spreading the message of the Qur’an. A much sharper shift in Said
Nursi’s revivalist discourse came when he went to Ankara in the eve of the
establishment of the Turkish Republic with the invitation of Atatürk who wanted the
new parliament to officially recognize his contributions to the war efforts during WWI
and for his support of the Turkish War of Independence. Just as he did in the case of the
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Young Turks Revolution of 1908, Said Nursi wanted to give a religious direction to the
new social system which he realized was under the process of development. He was
disappointed to see that the leaders of the new government primarily including Atatürk
were inspired to establish a new society exclusively based on secularist ideals. He
wrote a treatise against naturalism in Arabic in an attempt to undermine this project and
distributed it to the members of the parliament but it did not yield the effect he
expected. He retreated to the city of Van in Eastern Anatolia. From then on, he
dedicated a great deal of his writings and discourse for responding to the philosophical
foundations of secularist ideas such as materialism, naturalism and scientism.
Especially after his exile into the Western Anatolian provinces in 1926, he formed a
movement around this discourse.
Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Said Nursi only and briefly
criticized the ontological aspects of ideological interpretations of science. Although he
intensified his dialectical approach to these ontological issues (construction of reality)
afterwards, his criticism of the moral philosophical implications of secularism and
scientism which pertain to the construction of self took up a much larger space in his
revivalist discourse especially in formative years of the Nur Movement. He, from an
existential perspective, extensively but subtly tried to challenge the secularist ideal of
“the human effort to improve the human condition by humanly and secular means”.
As I described in the third chapter of this dissertation, the idea of “the human
effort to improve the human condition” was one of defining characteristics of the
secularist paradigm and that it was the underlying foundation of the idea of
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(civilizational) progress which has been one of the strongest and most influential
ideologies in the modern world. One of core components of the idea of progress was
the human endeavor to improve the material conditions of life through science and
scientific methods as precondition to the attainment of happiness. The other central
component of the idea of progress was the conception of the infinite perfectibility of
human beings (self-realization) by their own (secular) terms. Human happiness was
contingent on the opportunities of self-realization as well. In its ideal form, the function
of social organization (civilization) is to facilitate the development of the human effort
to improve the human condition. This is the where humanism becomes social.
Although Said Nursi did not directly use the concept of humanism or the notion
of “the human effort to improve the human condition” in his writings, my analyses of
his revivalist discourse (Chapter IV) suggests that his reaction to the expansion of
secular humanism, in other words his response to the moral philosophical foundations
of secularism, is one of the major elements of his revivalist discourse. He contended
that because human beings, unlike animals, are connected to their past, present and
future at the same time with their minds, hearts and spirits; they have fears, concerns,
pains, hopes and pleasures coming from these multiple directions which are far out of
their control. That is why, for him, no human effort, not even science and technology,
can secure human happiness. He asserted that only by acknowledging and relying on
the perfect attributes of God (All-Powerful, All-Wise, All-Merciful etc.) which are
reflected in creation, human beings can find happiness not only in hereafter but also in
this world. In addition to being unrealistic, (because, for him, human beings are
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inherently very weak and vulnerable although they are entrusted with very delicate and
sensitive qualities), self-centeredness and self-aggrandizement are at odds with Godconsciousness. It is through their existential insecurities and vulnerabilities that human
beings turn to God and find the true source of happiness in their eternal journey in time
and space. Because, he argued, self-centeredness and self-aggrandizement blind human
beings by turning their attention towards the temporal and the transient, they become
sources of misery rather happiness. He also contended that a path of perfection opens to
human beings when they, as a result of the acknowledgment of their own weaknesses,
start studying and excelling in the knowledge of God’s perfect qualities. In order to
substantiate the religious idea that God is the creator of the cosmos and that there is life
after death, Said Nursi also wrote several treatises about the existence and unity of God
and about the evidences for resurrection. In this vein, Said Nursi also wrote several
chapters with the purpose of disproving naturalist and materialist arguments.
Accordingly, Said Nursi tried the reorient his audiences’ pursuit of happiness towards a
God-conscious direction and thusly he aimed at preventing the expansion of secularism.
This leads me to think that perhaps the main line of conflict between religious
worldviews and secularism, especially at the societal level, is not about the ontological
question of whether the universe is the creation of God or not. It is rather about the
conflict between the secularist idea of “the human effort to improve the human
condition” as opposed to the religious idea of “providence of God.” In this sense,
ontological arguments become peripheral to and supporting points for moral
philosophical positions (construction of the self). This also convinces me to suggest that
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Charles Taylor might be right when he argued that the emergence of secularism is
mainly about the rise of exclusive humanism and secular conceptions of the human
good.
Another noteworthy point in Said Nursi’s revivalist writings (the Risale-i Nur)
after the establishment of the Turkish Republic is the domination of the micro level
persuasion- and conversion-based approach to religious revival and the lack of an
explicitly political discourse. This was a point I was already familiar with before I
started writing this dissertation. Indeed, one of the goals of this project was to
sociologically explore and understand the reasons of why this was the case. Towards
the very end of this project (in writing the sixth chapter of this dissertation which
focuses on the mobilization strategies of the Nur Movement), I started thinking that
Said Nursi’s deliberate abstinence from politically intonated discourse and from
challenging the authority and legitimacy of the (secularist) political system was an
essential component of his strategy of “simultaneously engaging and disengaging the
secularist establishment” as a way of mobilizing masses at the grassroots level.
I developed this idea from reading Wuthnow’s (1989) book Communities of
Discourse in which he discussed how some of the discursive movements in history
articulated and disarticulated the immediate power relations in the contexts in which
they were developed. Although I did not arrive at the same conclusions with Wuthnow
in terms of the sociological implications of this strategy, I realized that the strategy of
“simultaneously engaging and disengaging immediate contextual power relations” was
the most essential component of the Nur Movement's mobilization strategies vis-à-vis
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the secularist establishment. Given that the Nur Movement is in many ways a
discursive movement, and that it deliberately and explicitly refrained political rhetoric
and mobilization -which was one of the questions which galvanized this dissertation
project-, it is not surprising to see the presence of the strategy of simultaneously
engaging and disengaging the secularist establishment. Of course, the more important
question is the sociological implications and significance of this mobilization strategy.
In studying the development and transformation of the Nur Movement, I
identified three core elements in this movement’s discourse and mobilization strategies.
These three elements are (1) contesting the ontological and moral philosophical aspects
of secularism but not the political authority of the secularists, (2) the discourse of “jihad
of the pen” and (3) the development of the dershane institution (private apartments and
houses in which followers of the movement came together to read and discuss the
Risale-i Nur, establish networks between the members of the movement and device
mobilization strategies in their localities). I observed that all of these three elements are
part of the same strategy of simultaneously engaging and disengaging the political
structure of the secularist establishment.
First of all, by mobilizing towards responding to the ontological and moral
philosophical foundations of secularism, the movement tried to undermine the
development of a secularist hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) in the Turkish society.
As Gramsci pointed out, ruling classes do not only maintain their authority over the
masses by only controlling the means of production and by compelling them with brute
force. The ruling classes also seek to produce an illicit consent about the validity of
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their worldview among the ruled. Especially in the modern context, the ruling classes
seek the illicit consent of the masses by compromising and negotiating with them in the
civil society. Since this is the case, Gramsci contended, the hegemony of a ruling class
can be thwarted by undermining its worldview and therefore without directly engaging
their political authority. Similarly, it seems that regardless of whether it succeed or not,
the Nur Movement’s focus on the ontological and moral philosophical foundations of
secularism was a strategy of undermining the secularist ideology and therefore the
secularist movement by engaging its ideology. However, the Nur Movement, by
deliberately not developing a politically intonated discourse and by not mobilizing
towards the transformation of the political system which was under the control of the
secularists, was disengaging the secularist establishment. Therefore, this movement was
engaging and disengaging the secularist establishment at the same time.
As I described in the fifth chapter, the notion of “jihad of the pen” was one of
the strongest components of the motivational discourse among the members of the Nur
Movement. By using the widely comprehensible notion of jihad which bears dialectical
and in certain cases confrontational connotations, the movement aimed at mobilizing
individuals against the expansion and top-down implementation of secularism which
had also given rise to widespread resentment in the Turkish society in which religion
was still very influential at least in the personal lives of individuals and in local
communities. However, by reframing jihad as “the jihad of the pen” instead of “the
jihad of the sword,” the movement channeled the resentment of religious individuals
towards an ideological battle rather than a more direct confrontation. This, I think, is
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another strategy of engaging and disengaging the secularist establishment at the same
time. The members of the movement were involved in jihad (i.e., confrontation of an
oppositional force) but not in an openly confrontational way.
Thirdly, as the Nur Movement expanded outside the locality in which it
emerged, members of the Nur Movement started using privately owned apartments and
houses as places for getting together for reading and discussing the Risale-i Nur, for
establishing connections between the members of the movement particularly in urban
environments, and for arranging meetings to discuss their mobilization strategies. The
collective activity of reading and discussing the Risale-i Nur was called ders (study).
Dershane (study house) was the name of the places in which the ders sessions were
held. The movement also used dershanes as places of proselytization. Members of the
movement invited their friends, relatives, colleagues and other acquaintances for the
ders sessions.
Dershanes were not legally recognized and they did not have any official status.
Indeed, these places were under the close surveillance of the secularist establishment.
Therefore, dershanes were not part of the civil society, according to the formulation of
Gramsci, because they were not places through which the movement directly engaged
the state and the ruling establishment and came to term with them. However, the Nur
Movement was using these places to engage the rest of the society in an attempt to
counterbalance the expansion of secularist ideas with the purpose of indirectly
undermining the hegemony of the secularists.
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As for the question of why the movement chose this strategy of engaging and
disengaging the secularist establishment at the same time, it seems to me that, first, it
was an efficient strategy of resource mobilization. Especially when the opposition was
a consolidated secularist movement which controlled the centralized nation state and
monopolized the use and abuse of coercive power, challenging the authority of the state
or trying to transform the political structure might very well not be a viable option.
Secondly, the movement deliberately used its abstinence from politics and from
political struggle as a way of appealing to and mobilizing masses. Contending that their
target population would be deterred from joining the movement or accepting its
message if they think that the movement was surreptitiously seeking power, Said Nursi
and other members of the movement tried to undermine the establishment of the
secularist hegemony by the other means, as I described and discussed above.
In addition to testifying to the fluidities, variations and transformations in
secularist and revivalist movements; and to the dynamic nature of their interactions,
findings of this study reiterated one of my initial hypothesizes that secularization (and
religious revival) should be studied with respect to human element (i.e., social
movement dynamics). Although there were fluidities, transitions, diversities and
variations in the history of secularism and revivalism, the end result of the respective
roles and positions of secularism and religiosity in the society is a result of the
mobilization and counter-mobilization of human beings, collective or individual.
As I describe in the second chapter, the development of secularization in the
modern world has been mostly studied from an abstractionist and reductionist
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perspective by the proponents of both the secularization theory and the rational choice
theory. I only studied the articulated ideas of the secularists and the revivalists and I
only described what has been observed and recorded. Yet, this study provided enough
evidence, even more than I expected, to conclude that almost every aspect of the major
transformations in the (Turkish) society were either single sidedly deliberated or
mutually contested regardless of whether the actual outcomes were or were not in the
ways in which they were deliberated or contested. This includes the development and
popularization of science, which is portrayed by many theorists of secularization as the
root cause of the marginalization of religion in modern societies as well. I do not imply
that one side wanted the development of science and that the other rejected it. It is
about the question of whether science would develop and expand without the efforts of
those who believed in its pragmatic, philosophical or ideological value. More
importantly it is about whether science as an abstract being would marginalize religion
without the human effort to interpret the findings and the methodology of science from
a secularist perspective.
Especially in the case of the Ottoman society, religious intellectuals including
the ulema did not oppose the idea of adopting modern sciences. They (e.g., Hoca
Tahsin and Said Nursi) were even suggesting that it was not an option but a necessity
for the flourishing of the Muslim World and for the spread of the message of the
Qur’an. It was after the introduction of secularist ideas which were based on ideological
interpretations of science, (e.g., materialism and naturalism) that it was presented and
used as a tool for attacking and marginalizing religion and therefore religious forces.
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This was not peculiar to the Ottoman society either. Such perspectives of science were
developed in the enlightenment and post-enlightenment movements in Europe and they
were subsequently borrowed by secularist intellectuals and introduced in the late
Ottoman society. As I mentioned above, the translation of Ludwig Büchner’s Force
and Matter in 1911 into Ottoman Turkish was a milestone in this regards.
Such a transition was also reflected in the transformation of revivalist approach
to science. As I described above, there was a major shift in Said Nursi’s approach to
science around the time of the translation and publication of Ludwig Büchner’s Force
and Matter in the late Ottoman society. Although he continued to emphasize the need
for being familiar with the language of science, he started criticizing philosophical
foundations of scientific secularism (materialism and naturalism). Especially after the
establishment of the Turkish Republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
who was strongly influenced by these ideologies, Said Nursi formed a revivalist
movement which was mobilized around the idea of repudiating naturalism and
materialism. Regardless of if and who won this ideological battle, the history of the
development of scientist ideologies such as positivism, materialism and naturalism and
revivalist responses to these challenges attest to the significance of the human element
behind these processes.
One of the weaknesses of this study is its very broad scope. I studied the
development and transformation of secularization in the last three centuries of Turkey
in four subsequent stages of reform with the purpose of providing a coherent historical
analysis. In so doing, I described and discussed the role of major historical
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developments (The Declaration of Tanzimat, The First and the Second Constitutional
Eras, 1908 Young Turk Revolution, The 31 March Incident, WWI, The Turkish War of
Independence and the establishment of the Turkish Republic), influential reformist
figures, oppositional movements which played significant roles in the development of
secularist ideas (i.e., the Young Ottomans, The Young Turks and the CUP), political
ideologies (i.e., İttihad-ı İslam /Pan-Islamism, Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Turkism /Turkish
Nationalism, Centralism and Decentralism), and secularist philosophical ideologies
(i.e., Positivism, Materialism, Naturalism, Scientism and Evolutionism). Moreover, I
described and discussed socioeconomic backgrounds and reformist discourses of
intellectuals and ideologues who played significant roles in the development of
secularist ideas in the late Ottoman society and in the formative years of the Turkish
Republic. On the other hand, I studied the development and transformation of Said
Nursi’s reformist and revivalist discourse before and after the establishment of the
Turkish Republic. As part of my analyses of Said Nursi’s revivalism, I also described
and discussed socioeconomic backgrounds of some of the influential members of the
Nur Movement. What is more, I borrowed and used concepts and terminologies from
different social scientific disciplines (i.e., philosophy, theology, history and political
science) in my study and analyses of the secularist and revivalist movements in Turkey.
Although I have endeavored to establish a systematic approach to the study of these
issues and the use of these concepts and tried to confirm my descriptions and findings
from multiple reliable sources, generalizations and in certain cases superficiality
become almost inevitable when such a broad history with multiple issues in question
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are studied at the same time. Not being trained as an academic historian makes it easier
to fall prey to methodological and factual errors.
Another limitation is that this dissertation mostly focused on discursive aspects
of secularism and revivalism and focused on the secularist and the revivalist
movements’ mobilization and counter-mobilization strategies with regard to the
construction of meaning. Especially in the case of the Nur Movement many other issues
remained unexplored. For example, the organizational structure and power relations
within the movement is an area which needs to explored further. Moreover, I only
studied the development of the Nur Movement during the lifetime of its founder, Said
Nursi, whose ideas to a very large extent shaped the discourse and mobilization
strategies of the movement. That is also why the Nur Movement, during this period,
maintained a consistent and consolidated structure. My preliminary explorations
indicate that there were more variations even conflicts within the Nur Movement after
the death of Said Nursi. It would be informative to study the lines of variations and
conflicts within this movement and their sociological implications.
I hope that despite its limitations, this study will engage in meaningful
conversations with theoretical and empirical studies of secularization and revivalism in
other social scientific disciplines. This dissertation could also significantly contribute to
the study of the Nur Movement in particular. Despite being one of the largest
(revivalist) movements in Turkey and in the Muslim World, the Nur Movement
remained as a largely understudied in social sciences including sociology, mostly
because its discourse was not easy to contextualize with regard to the immediate power
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relations in the society in which it was developed. In addition, the tripartite model I
devised in this dissertation project for investigating the mutual ways in which secularist
and revivalist movements conceive of and mobilize towards the construction of reality
(ontology), the self (moral philosophy) and the society (political philosophy) can be
effectively used in comparative studies of secularist and revivalist movements not only
in the Muslim majority societies but also in the other parts of the World.

APPENDIX A
THE BIOGRAPHY OF SAID NURSI
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Childhood and First Encounters with the Madrasa Education
Said Nursi was born in 18781 to a Kurdish family in the village of Nurs which
was part of the eastern province of Bitlis in the Ottoman Empire. His father was Sofi
Mirza, a pious man and a modest farmer who was associated with the Khalidi
Naqshbandi Sufi order, a revivalist movement which was well established with its
madrasas and tekkes in the region. His mother Nuriye was also a deeply religious
person. Sofi Mirza and Nuriye raised seven children of which Said Nursi was the fourth
in age. The first two, Duriye and Hanım were girls. Although it is not known where and
how she acquired her education, Hanım became renowned in her community as
someone who was well-versed in religious sciences. She married another religious
scholar and went into a self-imposed exile in Damascus with her husband in the
aftermath of the 1913 Bitlis incident (Vahide, 2005, p. 3-4).
It was the third child, Abdullah, who brought a stronger dedication for the study
of religious sciences into the family. Influenced by his elder brother (Molla) Abdullah
who excelled in religious learning, Said, at the age of nine, started attending a madrasa
under Molla Mehmed Emin in Tağ, a nearby village (Şahiner, 2013 p. 39-40).
Education in this madrasa was overseen by Şeyh Abdurrahman Taği, one of the
influential figures in the Khalidi Naqshbandi movement (Mardin, 1989, p. 66). Because
of his quarrels with fellow students and his arguments with the teacher Molla Mehmet
Emin, Said left the madrasa and returned home. However, his experience at this

There is an ongoing debate about Said Nuri’s date of birth. Akgündüz (2013, p. 83-91) provides
a detailed account of why he is convinced that Said Nursi was born in the spring of 1878.
1
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madrasa and his observations in the community established around it under the tutelage
of Şeyh Abdurrahman Taği deeply influenced young Said, as he described towards the
end of his life.
[Şeyh Abdurrahman Taği] trained many students and preachers and learned
men, and when all began to sing his praises, I, immersed in scientific
disputations of a high caliber and placed within a wide circle of science and
tarikat [Sufi path], was convinced that these preachers were about to conquer
the earth.
When the famous ulema and the saints (evliya) and learned men and kutps were
mentioned, I, nine or ten years old, would listen with rapt attention. My heart
felt as if these students, the men of learning, had made extensive conquests in
the field of religion.
If a student showed sign of superior intelligence he would be accorded great
importance. If someone scored a success in a debate around a problem he would
be made much of. I was struck by the fact that I became animated with the same
feelings. There was, in fact, an extraordinary competitive spirit among the şeyhs
[shaykh] at the level of township, sub-province and province. (E:53, as cited in
Mardin, 1989, p.66).
After returning home, young Said continued his studies under the guidance of
his older brother Molla Abdullah who came back home once a week from his madrasa.
A year later, young Said started attending another madrasa, under a Naqshbandi Şeyh,
Sayyid Nur Muhammad. Because of his dissatisfaction with the education provided, his
conflicts with other students and the commanding tones of the teachers, Said’s studies
at this madrasa and several other local madrasas were all cut short (Vahide, 2005, p.69). He eventually headed north around the age of fourteen and arrived at the city of
Beyazıt to study under Şeyh Muhammed Celali.
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Until this time, Said’s studies were limited to the books and treatises on Arabic
grammar and syntax (Vahide, 2005, p. 9-10). It was in the town of Beyazıt that young
Said was set to study advanced level works on subjects such as legal theory (usul alfiqh), theology (kelam), hadith, logic (mantık) and rhetoric (belagat). However, Said
was critical of the strict lines of studying major scholarly books on these subjects
through reading a series of commentaries and annotations written about them. He asked
his teacher to directly study these texts. In so doing, Said studied several dozen major
scholarly works including al-Subki’s Jam al-Jawami on the theory of jurisprudence and
Sharh al-Mawaqif of al-Jurjani on matters of theology (Şahiner, 2013, p. 45-46).
Şerif Mardin (1989, p. 68-69) argues that Said’s challenges against the
cumbersomeness of the curricula used in madrasas and the authoritarianism of religious
scholars at this early age can be attributed not only to the independent personality of
him but also to the educational and bureaucratic reforms of the Tanzimat which
penetrated well into the Ottoman periphery in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Through their acquaintance with the new educational system, intellectuals such as Ali
Suavi, who was also educated in the madrasa system, and students like young Said
were able see the deficiencies in the traditional educational methods practiced in
madrasas. Young Said was also critical of the hierarchical structure of Sheiks and
madrasa teachers and their tendencies for the exploitation of the local population
through increasing the amount they collected from the peasants in the form of zakat
(alms). Traditionally, madrasas in this region were economically supported by the local
population who gave a proportion of their alms (zakat) to these madrasas. Said rejected
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collecting and accepting zakat at a very early age (Mardin, 1989, p. 71; Vahide, 2005,
p. 8).
After four months of self-study in seclusion in Beyazıt, Said passed the
examination of Şeyh Muhammad Celali who gave him his diploma (icazet) in 1892 and
thus young Said was awarded the title Molla Said at the age of fourteen. Thereafter,
Molla Said took off from Beyazıt with the aim of going to Baghdad to meet with and
study under accomplished religious scholars there. After three months of travel on bare
foot, Molla Said reached Bitlis, his home province, along the way. He attended the
lectures of Mehmet Emin Efendi (once again) for two days. His former teacher asked
Molla Said to start wearing the traditional dress of scholars because he had already
obtained his diploma (icazet). Said refused the offer with a response that he did not
think it would be a good idea for someone who is still very young and who still
considers him a student to wear the dress of matured and learned people. After his short
stay in Bitlis, Molla Said headed to Şirvan where his elder brother Molla Abdullah was
teaching at a madrasa (Şahiner, 2013, p. 46-48). As it is reported in Said Nuri’s official
biography (T:435), his elder brother asked Molla Said about what he had studied since
the time they departed. When Molla Said said that he studied eighty books including
books which were not included in the curricula of the traditional madrasa education,
Molla Abdullah, while he was still a teacher at the local madrasa, asked questions to
young Said to test whether he had actually studied these books. Surprised by his
younger brother’s level of knowledge in the answers he provided, Molla Abdullah
started taking lessons from his young brother in private.

451
Departing Bitlis after several months, Said reached the city of Siirt where he
visited the madrasa of locally famous scholar Molla Fethullah Efendi. Biographers of
Said Nursi (Vahide, p. 13; Şahiner, 2013, p. 48-49) reports that after his examination of
young Said, Molla Fethullah Efendi was astonished by his knowledge of religious
sciences, the power of his intellect and his memory. That is why he started calling him
Bediuzzaman (the Wonder of Age).
When the news of the arrival of this young Molla spread in the vicinity of Siirt.
Local ulema gathered around him and challenged him for a debate which was a
customary practice in the local madrasa to establish credibility and superiority among
the men of religious learning. Molla Said accepted the challenge and he reportedly
answered all of the questions asked by the “learned doctors of Islamic Law” in a debate
organized by Molla Fethullah Efendi (Mardin, 1989, p. 71). However, this led the
growth of jealousy among other madrasa students and the local ulema which resulted in
physical attacks against the young Molla (Mardin, 1989, p. 71; Vahide, 2005, p. 13).
The local population who admired and sided with Molla Said after the debate saved
him from bodily harm. News of the quarrels reached the mutasarrıf (sub-governor) of
Siirt, who asked Molla Said to leave the town (Mardin, 1989, p. 71).
Complying with the request, Molla Said moved to Bitlis where he had
previously stayed with Şeyh Mehmet Emin on two different occasions. Vahide (2004)
contends that Molla Said chose Bitlis as his next destination in order to prove and
establish himself in the provincial center. Nonetheless, Şeyh Mehmet Emin dismissed
Molla Said on grounds that he was too young to get involved in serious matters of
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religious learning and scholarship. Molla Said asked his former teacher to give him an
opportunity to test his knowledge and his abilities. Şeyh Mehmet Emin agreed and
prepared a list of questions for Said. He reportedly answered the Şeyh’s questions
without hesitation. Eventually, Molla Said started preaching at the Kureyş Mosque in
Bitlis (Vahide, 2005, p. 14).
According to Mardin (1989, p. 72), Molla Said, during his stay in Bitlis, was
giving advice of moderation to the local notable families of şeyhs who were in bitter
conflict with other notable families and to the madrasa students who were in conflict
with their teachers. This, for Mardin, was the first time Said assumed a reconciliatory
role. Yet, the city of Bitlis was divided into camps after his arrival. On the one side was
the growing number of Molla Said’s followers and on the other was Şeyh Muhammad
Emin and his following. Concerned about the growing tensions between the two sides,
the governor of Bitlis expelled Molla Said from the city of Bitlis.
After a short stay in Şirvan, Molla Said, at around the age of sixteen, arrived at
the village of Tillo where the famous Ottoman scholar İbrahim Hakkı (1703-1780) had
studied for some time (Mardin, 1989, p. 72). Retreating to a place called Kubbe-i Hassa
next to İbrahim Hakkı’s mausoleum, Molla Said dedicated his time to his studies. His
food was brought by his younger brother Mehmed once a day. According to Said
Nursi’s authorized biography, he was sharing much of this food with the ants around
mausoleum. When he was asked about the reasons of why he did it so, he replied that
he admired the “republican character of the ants and bees” (Akgündüz, 2013, p. 299).
Given that the concept of republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik) was a modern development,

453
this is obviously an indication that young Said, by this time, was informed about the
constitutionalist movement (i.e., the Young Ottomans) and their discourse in support of
constitutionalism and parliamentarianism.
First Step into Politics: Young Said and İttihad-ı İslam
The next destination of young Said was the city of Mardin which represented a
turning point in his intellectual life. There, he met two followers of the famous
reformist Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh who were
leading figures in the development and expansion of pan-Islamist (İttihad-ı İslam) ideas
throughout the Muslim World. Born in the region around the border between
Afghanistan and Iran, Al-Afghani traveled to India in 1856 at a very early age and lived
there for about a decade. India was home to one the largest Muslim populations in the
World and like other groups they were under the rule of the British at that time. When
he was in India, Al-Afghani observed the conditions of Muslims under the British
imperialism. He was also exposed to the anti-imperialist movement which was
developing in contemporary Indian society (Keddie, 1983). Al-Afghani left India and
moved back to Iran upon the invitation of Shah Naser Al-Din. However, al-Afghani’s
sharp tone in his political speeches and writings concerned the Shah who expelled him
to Moscow. Al-Afghani continued his anti-British activism as he lobbied the court of
the Tzar against the British. The Shah, once more, invited him back to Tehran but to
expel him yet another time shortly after al-Afghani’s arrival because of his criticism of
the rulers of Persia for their failure of fully understanding and not being able to prevent
the takeover of their lands by the imperialists (Mishra, 2012, p. 104). The rest of al-
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Afghani’s life continued as a perpetual journey, mostly because he was forced to do so,
from one place to the other in the Muslim World (mostly in Cairo and Istanbul) and in
Europe (i.e., London, Paris, Munich and St. Petersburg).
Al-Afghani’s message, which aimed at preventing and reversing the decline of
Muslim societies, was two folded. On the one side, he tried to appeal to the ruling elite
in the Muslim majority lands by urging them for the implementation of institutional
reformation and modernization of these societies. On the other side, he tried to appeal
to the masses by promoting the idea of the unity of Muslims (İttihad-ı İslam) around the
world against the invasions of the Muslim lands by Western powers (Keddie, 2005, p.
11-29). In this regard, al-Afghani’s discourse was not substantially different from the
reformist discourse of the Young Ottomans’ such as Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya
Pasha. However, al-Afghani was more successful in terms of establishing a broad-based
reformist movement across the Muslim World and influencing a greater number of
politicians as well as intellectuals.
Al-Afghani found the strongest voice and following in Cairo where he met one
of his most famous and most influential students; Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), who
became known as an Islamic scholar, jurist and as a political activist criticizing
traditional educational systems of contemporary Muslim societies and dogmatic
religious practices. Like his master al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh also promoted panIslamist ideas (İttihad-ı İslam) (Haddad, 2005). Serving as a teacher at the University of
Al-Azhar, as the grand mufti of Egypt, the chief editor of the official newspaper alWaka-i al-Misriyya (The Chronicle of Egypt) while he was in Egypt and publishing the
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journal al-Urwath al-Wuthqa (The Strong Bond) while he was in exile in Paris with his
master al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh played an enormous role in the expansion of
reformist and pan-Islamist ideas throughout the Muslim World (Kedourie,1997;
Hourani, 1983; Kurzman, 2002, p. 50).
It was in this conjecture that young Said, around year 1892, met two disciples of
the Muslim reformist thinkers Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, who further opened
his eyes to the issues regarding the decline of Muslims societies. Around the same time,
Molla Said also met one of the members of the Senussi order (Vahide, 2005, p. 22;
Mardin, 1989, p. 75) which was formed by Muhammad Ibn Ali as-Senussi (1787-1859)
with the aim of pursuing the revitalization of the religion of Islam in North Africa and
its liberation from the occupation of imperialist powers. However, it did not take long
for young Said to discover similar voices within the borders of the Ottoman Empire
which to a greater level awakened him to the social and political issues regarding the
state of affairs of the Muslim World. As he described twenty years later, (Munazarat, p.
23) it was Namık Kemal’s “Dream” (Rüya) which truly awakened young Said when he
was in Mardin. Dream was written as a prose by Namık Kemal in 1887 describing his
desires for seeing the establishment of freedom in a fictional story in which the angel of
freedom descending from the clouds of the sky and addressing the people about the
beauties of justice and freedom from oppression and striving towards the advancement
of the nation. The angel of freedom also urged its audience to awaken from their deep
sleep.
O people, who are fallen into misery, are you waiting to open your eyes in the
morning of the hereafter? [...] The powerful artist [God] gave eyes and the
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power of sight so that you observe his works of mercy [in creation]. You are
closing this lover of truth and trying to see with your imagination and with your
ears, and thus you are sleeping while your eyes are still open. As you are doing
this, you are becoming like dead bodies. The sight and perception of the most
experienced master [pir] among you cannot reach the truth as much as the
dream of a child who was born blind.
It will not take long that there will be a time when your bodies will not move
even if your heart wants to enter into the field of effort. Even if your power of
intellect starts searching for truth, it will not be able to understand anything. [...]
Sleep! Sleep! There is no easy way to transform this ignorance of life to the
sleep of death! (Namık Kemal, 1993 [1873], p. 251)
Apparently young Said was moved by the sharp language of Namık Kemal. As
the rest of his life until the beginning of the WWI testifies, Said Nursi dedicated much
of his time energy in his activism to issues regarding the unity of Muslims and the
reformation and revitalization of the Muslim societies. In this respect, he was following
the footsteps of reformist Muslim intellectuals as he, too, admitted in 1909.
My predecessors in this matter [İttihad-ı İslam] are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the
late Mufti of Egypt Muhammad Abduh, Ali Suavi Efendi, Hoca Tahsin Efendi,
Namık Kemal Bey and Sultan Selim [II]. (Said Nursi, 2004c [1910], p. 163)
Although the reasons of it are not clearly known, Molla Said was expelled yet
another time from Mardin by the sub-governor (mutasarrıf). He was taken back to
Bitlis, the provincial center, with the escort of two armed gendarmes. Not long after his
arrival at Bitlis, the governor, Ömer Pasha, invited Molla Said to stay at his residence.
Accepting the offer, Molla Said remained in the residence of the governor for two years
in which he spared most of his time to the study of classical Islamic texts (Mardin,
1989, p. 75).
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Governor Ömer Pasha was an elite governor who was educated in the Mulkiye
Schools which were established during the Tanzimat Era. He was speaking several
foreign languages such as French, Greek and Albanian (Kırmızı, 2007, p. 86). There are
reports in Said Nursi’s biographies that the governor was not a strongly religious person
(Akgündüz, 2013, p. 314: Vahide, 2005, p. 24). We do not have firsthand accounts of
why he would invite a young Molla, albeit an unconventional one, to stay in his
residence. However, Said Nursi wrote in one of his letters more than 50 years later that
he “stayed in the residence of the Governor of Bitlis for two years because of his
insistence and his respect for learning” (E:257). While Said was in Bitlis, he also took
lessons from the Hanafi scholar Muhammad Kufrevi (1775-1898). This was the last
time young Said studied under the tutelage of others. In one of his letters, Said Nursi
respectfully recalled his last teacher.
[...] It was honorable Şeyh Muhammad Kufrevi who, as a scholar, gave me this
last and most enriching lesson and who showed me enormous compassion,
beyond the limits of what I would expect. (Akgündüz, 2013, p. 319)
Apart from the lessons he took from his master, Said continued his self-led
studies. According to his authorized biography, Molla Said, who was around the age of
twenty, studied around 40 classical texts in the fields of theology, exegesis, grammar,
syntax, rhetoric and logic while he was staying in the residence of the governor
(Beysülen & Canlı, 2010, p. 90). Ömer Pasha was not the only bureaucrat interested in
having Molla Said stay in his residence. A notable bureaucrat who was known as Şemsi
Pasha invited Said to stay in his residence in Van which was one of the biggest cities in
the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Akgündüz, 2013, p. 330). This was the
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first time in the last several years that Molla Said was changing his place of residence
in peace with local administrative authorities. The details of Said’s relationships with
governor Şemsi Pasha is not well documented. However, staying in his residence
provided an opportunity for him to safely continue his studies and provided him the
opportunity to acquaint himself with the city of Van and its socio-political dynamics
(Yaşar, 2014, p. 40).
The appointment of Tahir Pasha as a governor by Sultan Abdulhamid II to Van
in place of Şemsi Pasha was a major turning point in Said Nursi’s life and in his
revivalist activism. Tahir Pasha was a well-educated governor and he was well
respected by the Sultan who appointed him to Van which was a pilot region of
modernization in the eastern frontier of the Ottoman lands. Besides being an
accomplished statesman, Tahir Pasha was closely interested in the recent developments
in modern sciences and contemporary intellectual debates. In addition to having an
extensive library, he was receiving newspapers and journals published in Istanbul and
in Europe. He made his residence a meeting place of the modern bureaucrats and
teachers who were educated in the reformist environment of the Tanzimat.
Said continued staying at the residence of Tahir Pasha after the departure of
Şemsi Pasha. Unlike his short stays and constant travels in the past, Said remained
based in the city of Van for about twelve years, from 1895 to 1907. During his stay at
the governor’s residence, he was encouraged by the governor to actively participate in
the conversations and debates of the modern educated bureaucrats and teachers
individuals which perhaps for the first time exposed him directly to the effects of
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modernization reforms, the new secular education system, the expansion of the modern
secular sciences and the development and expansion of other secularist ideologies such
as materialism, positivism and naturalism.
Tahir Pasha served as the governor of Van until 1912 and kept Said Nursi closer
to him for about a decade. On the one hand, he encouraged Said and provided him the
opportunities to continue his self-led education. According to Said Nursi’s own
account, he was given a room in the residence in which he continued his studies. He
was also dedicating three hours before going to bed for reviewing all of the books he
had studied theretofore (Vahide, 2005, p. 28). On the other hand, the governor was
trying to open the eyes of this young man to the socio-political developments not only
in the Muslim World but also in the world at large especially in Europe.
Apparently, the governor’s encouragements and directions proved successful.
Said started thinking that the traditional educational system of madrasas and classical
religious sciences and texts were not sufficient for understanding and responding to the
challenges of modern times and to the doubts raised about the teachings of the Qur’an
(Müküslü Hamza, 2004 [1918], p. 588-589). That must be the reason why Said, in the
residence of Tahir Pasha, started studying sciences such as geography, mathematics,
physics, inorganic chemistry, history and philosophy. As a result of these studies, he
wrote Talikat, which was a short treatises on logic which was written as a commentary
on the theologian and mathematician İsmail Hakki Gelenbevi’s (1730-1790) book
Burhan-ı Gelenbevi. He also wrote a short treatise on algebraic equations. These
booklets were written in Kurdish and they were never published (Akgündüz, 2013, p.
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352-360). In the meantime, Molla Said started learning and speaking Turkish. Until that
time he was only speaking Kurdish which was his mother tongue and Arabic and
Persian which were the languages of education and literature in the region he grew up.
The Dream of a University
One day, governor Tahir Pasha told Said that he had read in a newspaper about
the remarks of the British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies who said: “As
long as the Qur’an remains in the hands of Muslims we will not be able control and rule
them”.
[I] in that year suddenly learned about Europe’s evil intentions toward the
Qur’an through the late governor, Tahir Pasha. He even heard from a newspaper
that a British secretary for the colonies had said: “So long as the Muslims have
the Qur’an, we will not be to dominate them. (Ş:70)
Biographers (e.g., Akgündüz, 2013, p. 341; Şahiner, 2013, p. 64; Menek, 2008,
p. 30) of Said Nursi claim that these remarks were made by William Ewart Gladstone
(1809-1898) who in his long career, served, among other things, as the Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies, the Secretary of the Treasury (Chancellor of the
Exchequer) and as the Prime Minister. However, Gladstone’s term as the Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies was between the years 1845 and 1846 which was more
than four decades before Said met Tahir Pasha in the province of Van. As Said Nursi
(Akgündüz, 2013, p. 341) recalls it, the conversation between him and Tahir Pasha
about the remarks of the British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was in year
in year 1316 according to the Hijri calendar which corresponds to year 1889 in
Gregorian calendar. Given that Gladstone’s active political career ended in 1894, there
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seems to be some inconsistencies in these reports. Otherwise, either the newspaper the
governor read was reporting what had been said earlier, or Tahir Pasha was mentioning
something he had seen in a newspaper previously. Another possibility is that Said Nursi
was did not accurately recalled the year in which the conversation happened between
him and the governor.
A careful examination of the language Said Nursi used -as I quoted abovereveals that he neither specified the year in which the British Secretary of State for War
and the Colonies uttered these words, nor he said the that governor read about the
remarks from the newspaper in that year. It seems from Said Nuri’s descriptions that he
only talked about the year (1889 [1316]) in which he had the conversation with Tahir
Pasha. Said Nursi did not specify the name of the British Secretary of State for War and
the Colonies, either. However, there is consensus among the biographers of Said Nursi
(e.g., Akgündüz, 2013, p. 341; Şahiner, 2013, p. 64) that it was William Ewart
Gladstone.
Gladstone has been known for his aversion to the religion of Islam and for his
anti-Islam remarks (Biagini, 200, p. 215; Ahmad, 2013, p. 182). He was especially
harsh against the Turks (Ottoman Empire) because of their territorial advancement into
Europe by force and their conflicts with the European Christians. He described the
Turks as “a scourge to the world” and the Ottoman government as “a disgrace to human
civilization” and “a curse to humanity” in a speech he gave in his eighty fifth birthday
(Burke, 1895, p. 197). Speaking of the Ottoman Empire, in 1893, he said:
We may ransack the annals of the world, but I know not what research can
furnish us with so portentous an example of the fiendish misuse of the powers
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established by God for the punishment of evildoers and the encouragement of
them that do well. No government ever has so sinned, none has proved itself so
incorrigible in sin, or which is the same, so impotent in reformation. (Harland,
1896, p. 44)
Gladstone also asserted that the religion of Islam is “radically incapable of
establishing a good and tolerable government over civilized and Christian races”
(Ansari 2004, p. 80) However, there is no established evidence yet to confirm that he
actually made the remarks Said Nursi quoted. Nonetheless, several sources report that,
Gladstone described the Qur’an as “an accursed book” and claimed that “so long as
there is this book there will be no peace in the world.2” (Zakariya 1991, p. 59-60; Nall,
2013, p. 507). Regardless of whether he actually uttered these words or not, news have
been circulating since then in the Muslim World that Gladstone declared in speech he
gave in the British House of Commons that “so long as the Qur’an remained in the
hands of Muslims it would be impossible to control them”. Muslims around the world,
especially in India organized rallies against the remarks of Gladstone. There were
newspapers in the Muslim World reporting these remarks and publishing responses
against them (See Akgündüz, 2013, p. 343-349). Said must have heard one such report.
Said Nursi recalled later that similar conversations he had with the governor
significantly transformed his approach to learning.
About the year 1316, [I] underwent a radical change in [my] ideas. It was as
follows: up to that time, [I] had only been interested in, and had studied and
taught, the various sciences; it was only through theoretical knowledge that [I]
had sought enlightenment. Then at that date, [I] suddenly learned through the
late governor, Tahir Pasha, of Europe’s dire and evil intentions toward the
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Qur’an. [I] heard that a British Secretary for the Colonies had even said in a
newspaper: “So long as the Muslims have the Qur’an, we shall be unable to
dominate them. We must either take it from them, or make them lose their love
of it.” [I] was filled with zeal. [...] [I] understood that [I] should make all the
various sciences [I] had learned steps by which to understand the Qur’an and
prove its truths, and that the Qur’an alone should be [my] aim, the purpose of
[my] learning, and the object of [my] life. (Vahide, 2005, p. 30-31)
Regardless of the details of the conversation(s) he had with Tahir Pasha, it is
interesting to see that his initial response to the colonial encounters of the Muslims with
the European powers and their orientalism did not carry an explicitly political tone.
Instead of formulating a political solution or a physical encounter against imperialism,
he came up with the idea of responding to these challenges by focusing on learning
various sciences as a necessary step towards proving the truthfulness of the teachings of
the Qur’an. In other words, he saw this challenge as an ideological and philosophical
challenge, more than as a political and physical one. Perhaps, he was also aware,
because of his conversations with the bureaucrats and teachers who were educated in
newly established modern schools and because of his exposure to the ideas of the
reformist elite and secularist opposition in Istanbul, that the challenges against the
religion of Islam and the teachings of the Qur’an were developing within contemporary
Muslim societies as well. As I described in the previous chapter in detail, secularist
fractions in the Young Turks Movement and in the CUP had already been supporting
secularist ideas and presenting challenges against religious worldviews. Given that he
had access to a large library at the governor’s residence and periodicals published in
Istanbul and in Europe, there is little doubt that Molla Said knew about the
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development of secularist ideas and the secularist movement (i.e., The Young Turks) in
the Ottoman Empire.
Said Nursi regretted several decades later that such an awakening was delayed
because of “many deceiving obstacles in that period of youth”. But he said that “the
clash and clamor of war [WWI] awakened him and that such ideas “sprang to life; it
began to emerge and be realized” (Vahide, 2005, p. 30-31). However, one idea that he
developed as a response to his studies, conversations and observations during his stay at
the residence of the governor remained with him during rest of his life. It was the
establishment of a university with the name Madrasatu’z-Zahra in the Eastern part of
the Ottoman Empire in which he could teach religious and natural sciences together. He
had the intention of opening three branches of this university in the provinces of Van,
Bitlis and Diyarbakır.
Reformist Activism in Istanbul
Tahir Pasha was in support of Said’s idea of opening a university in Van but
neither Said, nor the governor had enough financial resources to build these schools.
Said decided to pursue the help of the Sultan for his project. With the encouragement
and support of the governor, Said, around the age of 30, left the City of Van and went
to Istanbul in 19073. He first stayed in the residence of Ferik Ahmet Muhtar Pasha
(1861-1926) for about two months. For a short while, he stay as a guest in the house of
an Armenian in the Şisli district. Şekerci Han, a large building in the Fatih district

Some sources claim that this wasn’t Said Nursi’s the first time Said Nursi came to Istanbul. He
made first trip to Istanbul in 1896 (at around the age of 18) (Köseoğlu ,1999, p. 45)
3
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where some of the notable intellectuals lived, was the next destination of Said. Among
the intellectuals who were residing in the Şekerci Han were famous poet Mehmet Akif
(1873-1936) and Fatin [Gökmen] Hoca (1877-1955) who was the director of the
observatory (Şahiner, 2013, p. 70; Mardin, 1989, p. 78-79). It did not take long for Said
to establish himself in Istanbul as a scholar. He became known as Said-i Meşhur (Said
the Famous). Former head of the court of appeal, Ali Himmet Berki, who was a student
at the Law Faculty remembers the coming of Said to Istanbul.
During those years I was a student in the Madrasatü’l-Kuzat (the equivalent of
the Law Faculty). [...] Nursi’s name and fame had spread throughout Istanbul;
everyone was talking about him in scholarly circles. We heard reports that he
was staying as a guest in a han in Fatih and that he answered every sort of
question that anyone put to him. I decided to go with some fellow students. One
day we heard he was in a teahouse answering questions. We went there
immediately. There was quite a crowd, and he was wearing unusual clothes—
not the dress of a scholar, but the local dress of eastern Anatolia. When we got
close to Nursi he was answering the questions being put him. He was
surrounded by scholars who were listening to him in rapt silence and wonder.
Everyone was satisfied and pleased with the answers they received. He was
replying to the theories of the Sophist philosophers, demolishing them with
rational proofs. (Şahiner, 2011, p. 159-160; Vahide, 2005, p. 38).
A similar account was published in the Uhuvvet newspaper in 1964 related by
Seydişehirli Hasan Fehmi Efendi (1874-1964) who received his diploma and title of
Müderris (madrasa teacher) several months after Said’s arrival in Istanbul and who later
served as a teacher and as a consultant in various positions at different madrasas and
several administrative (mostly judicial) offices.
It was about the time of the second constitutional period. I was studying in the
Fatih Madrasa. I heard that a young man by the name of Bediuzzaman had
arrived in Istanbul that he hung the following sign on his door: “Here any
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problem is solved, all questions are answered. But no questions are asked.” I
thought someone that presumptuous could only be mad. As I began to hear of
the many flattering comments concerning him and the admiration expressed by
the community of believers and the ‘ulema and students, I was intrigued and
tried to get to know him better. I decided I would make up a list of questions
covering the most difficult and subtle problems of theology. I, too, was
considered quite an expert on such questions at the time. Finally, one day I went
to visit him. I presented him with my problems. The answers I received were
extremely original and showed great depth. He had answered the questions as if
he had been at my side when I prepared them on the preceding night. I was
completely satisfied with his performance. (Mardin, 1989, p. 79)
It seems that by posting such a note on his door and participating in scholarly
debates, Said Nursi was trying to prove himself to the intelligentsia and consequently to
reach out to the Sultan and convince him to financially support his project of
establishing a university (Madrasatu’z-Zahra) in the Eastern provinces. Indeed, Hasan
Fehmi Efendi described that after providing answers to his questions, Said Nursi started
talking about his proposals for educational reform in the Eastern Provinces (also known
as Kurdistan) where the vast majority of inhabitants were speaking Kurdish.
He got out a map, and explained the necessity of opening a university in the
Eastern Provinces, emphasizing its importance. At that time there were
Hamidiye Regiments in the Eastern Provinces. He explained to us convincingly
the deficiencies of this form of administration and said that the region had to be
developed through education, industry, and science. He explained that he had
come to Istanbul to realize this aim, and he said: “The conscience is illuminated
by the religious sciences, and the intellect is illuminated by the sciences of
civilization.” (Vahide, 2005, p. 40).
As I describe in more detail below, Said Nursi presented arguments in support
of his university project and as part of the solutions he proposed to prevent the decline
of Muslim societies. It seems at this point that Said Nursi did not imagine and present
his university project exclusively based on religious concerns. In other words, it was
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not a project by which he only aimed understanding and responding to the ideological
and philosophical challenges of the modern times primarily including the disconnection
between the traditional madrasas and modern schools. He also presented this university
project as a solution to immediate socioeconomic and sociopolitical challenges facing
the Kurdistan region..
Eventually Said Nursi was able to establish connections which would enable
him to submit his requests to the Sultan asking him to support the university project
(Mardin, 1989, p. 79). He submitted a petition shortly before the Young Turk
Revolution (24 July 1908) (Akgündüz, 2013, p. 385). Nonetheless, the petition was
rejected by the Palace.
According to Akgündüz (2013, p. 378-414), the petition was blocked in the
ranks of bureaucracy before it reached the Sultan. However, Said Nursi published an
article in a newspaper in January 1909 describing a conversation he had with Süleyman
Şefik Pasha, the Minister of Internal Security (Zabıta Nazırı), reveals that the Sultan
might be informed about the petition and the demands it contained. According to
Nursi’s account, Süleyman Şefik Pasha told him: “the Sultan [did not accept your
project but] sent his greetings and proposed [you] a salary of 1000 Kuruş [cents] which
will later be 20 to 30 Liras”. Said Nursi reported that he rejected the offer by saying: “I
am not a beggar of salary. I would not accept it even if it was 1000 Liras. [...] With
what purpose are you delaying education but hurrying about the salary?” (Said Nursi,
1909, December 2, p. 38-39). It is also documented in governmental archives (See
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Akgündüz, 2013, p. 406-407) that the Palace asked Said Nursi to go back to his
homeland and that he was offered help to pay travel expenses which he rejected.
We understand from an official telegram sent from Istanbul to the gubernatorial
administration in Van on 19 July 1908 that Said’s requests were received with
suspicion in the already volatile atmosphere in the eve of the Young Turks Revolution
24 July 1908.

Figure 19. Ottoman archival document recording the secret message (şifre) sent to the
authorities in Van (19 July 1908) (Courtesy of Ahmet Akgündüz).
A secret message to the gubernatorial office in Van,
Molla Said (of Bitlis), who was reported in the telegram [we received from you]
dated 21 March 1324 [3 April 1908] to be a notable man of good nature is about
to arrive [in your region]. However, some of his actions here aroused suspicions
that he might attempt at creating some problems there and being part of
conspiracies among the local tribes. It is imperative to [monitor his actions and]
report whether he is capable of causing such problems. [Published in Akgündüz
(2013, p. 405), Trans. ZN].
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Not complying with the requests of the palace, Said Nursi remained in Istanbul
and continued his activism mostly by publishing articles in support of constitutionalism
and the expansion of freedom from political absolutism and despotism. He championed
the Revolution of 1908 with the expectation that it would eliminate the obstacles
against the flourishing of the Muslim World. However, he was also concerned that the
revolution, if it did not go in the right direction, could marginalize religion. That is why
he was also publishing open letters to the members of the new parliament expressing
these concerns. Said Nursi was publishing some of these articles in the newspaper
Volkan (Volcano) which was associated with the society of İttihad-ı Muhammedi which
was established under the leadership of Derviş Vahdeti.
The newspaper Volkan was closed in the aftermath of 31 March incident which
was an unsuccessful countercoup attempt against the rule of the Committee of Union
and Progress in mid-April of 1909 which came to power after the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908. As I described in the previous chapter, a broad-based unorganized
frontier of opposition was being formed against the CUP as it was increasingly
becoming secularist and more authoritarian. Revolts in the form of mutinies against the
CUP broke out on the 31st of March (according to the Rumi calendar, which
corresponds to April 13, 1909 in the Gregorian calendar) and continued for about ten
days. Although the question of who initiated and instigated the revolts is still debated in
the academia (Kayalı, 2012, p. 29), it is reported that lower rank ulema, madrasa
students and Alaylı soldiers were among the crowd (Zürcher, 2010, p. 76; Hale, 2013,
p. 39) which demanded the institution of the Sharia and resignation of the CUP
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members from high ranking government positions. These uprisings were suppressed by
the Action Army which was formed with the help of the CUP in Rumelia.
A court martial was established to try those who were arrested by the Action
Army because of their involvement in the 31 March incident. Chief among them was
Derviş Vahdeti who was arrested on grounds that it was him and the society of İttihad-ı
Muhammedi under his leadership who instigated the uprising and motivated the crowd.
Said Nursi was arrested, too, with similar charges against him although he published
articles in several newspapers (Volkan, İkdam, Serbesti, Mizan) during the days of
uprisings urging soldiers to remain in their barracks and obey their commanders.
The court martial declared that it found Derviş Vahdeti (1869-1909), who was
turned into the scapegoat of the countercoup attempt, guilty and hung him. Said Nursi
presented a long defense to the court describing his activism in support of
constitutionalism and how he discouraged the people who knew from being involved in
the uprising. He also openly and sharply criticized the CUP for its corruption of
constitutionalism:
Pashas and officers! By way of introduction I say: the manly and brave do not
stoop to crime. And if they are accused of it, they do not fear the punishment. If
I am executed unjustly, I shall gain the reward of two martyrs. But if I remain in
prison, it is probably the most comfortable place when there’s a despotic
government and freedom consists only of the word. To die oppressed is better
than to live as oppressor. [...] I opposed this branch of despotism here, which
has destroyed everyone’s enthusiasm and extinguished their joy, awakened
feelings of hatred and partisanship, and given rise to the formation of racialist
societies, whose name is constitutionalism and meaning is despotism, and who
has besmirched the name of unity and progress. [...] I think the enemies of
constitutionalism are people who make others hostile to mutual consultation by
showing constitutional government to be tyrannical, ugly, and contrary to the
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Sharê‘ah. [...] If constitutionalism consists of one party’s despotism and it acts
contrary to the Sharê‘ah, let all the world, men and jinn, bear witness that I am a
reactionary! (Vahide, 2005, p. 78-79).
After staying in custody for 23 days (Yılmaz 2013, p.18) Said Nursi was
acquitted and released by the court martial on the 23rd of May 1909. A few months
later (September 1909) the defense he presented was published by Kurdizade Ahmet
Ramiz in Istanbul. Local authorities which were under the control of the CUP
confiscated some of its copies and requested the Action Army and the police
department of Istanbul to ban its publication declaring that “it contained some ideas and
description which have the potential of mobilizing the public opinion (efkar-ı
umumiyeyi tehyic edecek bir takim ibareyi havi …) (Akgündüz, 2013, p. 668-671).
One Step Closer to the University Dream
Following his release from the prison, Said Nursi went back to the East and
travelled among the local tribes woith the purpose of urging them to take active part in
the development of the constitutionalist system. He also traveled to Damascus and met
with the local ulema to duscuss the current state of affairs in the Muslim World.
During his travels among the Kurdish tribesmen and his visit to Damascus, Said
Nursi was convinced once more about the necessity of establishing a University in the
East which brought him back to Istanbul in the spring of 1911. Sultan Abdulhamid II
was already deposed by the CUP following the 31 Mart Incident and replaced by his
brother Sultan Mehmed Reşad (27 April 1909).
In June 1911, Sultan Mehmed Reşad set out for a well-organized trip to the
volatile Rumelian territories of Macedonia and Albania with a large retinue including
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dignitaries and delegations from different regions of the Empire. The convoy consisted
of several ships. The battleship Barbaros Hayrettin was carrying the Sultan and his
large personal entourage. Regional delegations were traveling aboard the steamer
Midhat Pasha (Zürcher, 2014, p. 86-87). Said Nursi was among the delegation of
Erzurum (Akgündüz, 2013, p. 792). The Sultan accepted regional delegations,
including the delegation from Erzurum, in the second day following the arrival of the
convoy in Salonica which was the first stop of the royal trip (Zürcher, 2014, p. 86-87).
The convoy boarded two trains for their next stop at Üsküp. Said Nursi was on
board as well. Upon arriving at Üsküp, the Sultan offered his special favors to the local
people and to the region. In addition to declaring amnesty to prisoners with the
exception of murderers and distributing 30,000 Liras to pay off local feuds, the Sultan
promised to financially support the establishment of a madrasa in Priştine (Zürcher,
2014, p. 90). It is reported by Nursi’s biographers that Said Nursi was present when the
local notables requested the Sultan to support this project and that he participated in the
conversation by claiming that the need for establishing a madrasa in the region of
Kurdistan was more urgent (Vahide, 2005, p. 102).
The Sultan pledged financial support of 20,000 gold pieces for the construction
of the Madrasa in Priştine. However, this project did not start because of the ensuing
turmoil in the region and the First Balkan War (1912). Said Nursi asked the palace to
provide the resources spared for this unrealized project to the establishment of the
Madrasatu-z Zahra. The capital accepted the request and pledged financial support.
Said Nursi returned to the province of Van and laid the foundations of his school in the

473
vicinity of the town Edremit with an official ceremony including Governor Tahsin
Pasha (Şahiner, 2013, p. 125, Duman, 2008; Mardin, 1989, p. 87). Nonetheless, the
Second Balkan War broke out soon after (1913) and made it more difficult for the
government to send the promised financial assistance. A year later, WWI began and as
a resultthe building of the university stopped and never started again (Mardin, 1989, p.
87). Remaining in Van, Said Nursi started teaching a group of students at a small
madrasa in the outskirts of the city until the invasion of the region by the Russians.
War, Captivity and Return to Istanbul
When the Russians, with Armenian militia forces on their side, invaded Eastern
Anatolia including the provinces of Van and Bitlis during WWI, Said Nursi started
serving as an imam in the army (Öztürkçü, 2008, p. 79). When he was requested to
form a militia force, he started fighting against the advancing Russian army and the
Armenian bands with his students (Vahide, 2005, p. 111).
Said Nursi was captured in March 1916 during the defense of Bitlis and spent
two years as a prisoner of war in the Russian city of Kostroma, 200 miles northwest of
Moscow. Escaping the prisoners’ camp in the spring of 1918, Nursi traveled through
Petersburg, Warsaw, Vienna and Sofia and finally arrived in Istanbul in June 1918
(Şahiner, 2013, p. 150-151).
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Figure 20. Said Nursi during WWI in Eastern Anatolia (1916)

Figure 21. Said Nursi’s picture taken by the German authorities en route from the war
camp in Kostroma (Russia) to Istanbul (1918).
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Figure 22. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (right) in Istanbul with his nephew Abdurrahman in
their traditional local dress (c. 1918-1919).

Life after the Establishment of the Turkish Republic
Said Nursi supported the independence movement against the invasion of
Anatolia by the Western powers. When the newly established Turkish government was
established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara after the success of the
independence movement, Said Nursi was invited to the new capital to be recognized for
his contributions to the war efforts against the Russians and for his support of the
independence movement. During his several months long stay in Ankara, he had
disagreements and arguments with the leaders of the independence movement primarily
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including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk about the character of the new system to be
established.
Said Nursi went back to the province of Van after his disappointment in Ankara.
He later wrote that his trip back to Van started a new chapter in his life as he went
through an intellectual transformation about the methodology of religious thinking and
about the methodology of religious revival. He called the first part of his life before this
intellectual transformation as “the Old Said” and the period after that as “the New
Said.” When he went back to Van during the emergence of the New Said, he secluded
himself from the society except for teaching religious sciences to a small group of
students in the outskirts of the city.
The establishment of the new Turkish Republic was formally announced in
1923 which was followed by top-down secularist and nationalist reforms including but
not limited to the abolishment of the caliphate (1924), banning religious schools (1924),
closing Sufi lodges (1925), outlawing religious dress in public (1925), adding laicism
(secularism) and nationalism as defining characteristic of the state to the constitution
(1927) and replacing the Arabic script with the Latin (1928).
A group of Kurds living in the Eastern provinces revolted against the newly
established secularist and nationalist Turkish State in 1925 under the leadership of a
local Kurdish leader named Şeyh Said. The revolt was suppressed by the Turkish army.
Şeyh Said was captured and executed. With the suspicion that they, too, could lead
similar uprisings, dozens of Kurdish intellectuals and notables were exiled to other of
parts of the country. Among them was Said Nursi who was exiled to the Western city of
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Burdur and eventually to Barla which was a remote village in the neighboring province
of Isparta. The rest of Said Nursi's life past in exiles, house arrests and in prisons. He
died in 1960.

Figure 23. Said Nursi with his followers in Ankara (1959)

Shortly after his exile into the Western provinces in 1926, Said Nursi started
writing treatises which included his criticisms of the philosophical foundations of
secularism. Although they were banned by the government, growing number of Nursi's
followers reproduced (mostly by hand), read and distributed these treatises around
Turkey.
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Under the pressure of the secularist authorities, Said Nursi’s followers also
started establishing dershanes (study houses) where they would come together to read
and discuss the treatises (The Risale-i Nur) written by Said Nursi (Yavuz, 2003).
Eventually, the following of Said Nursi (the Nur Movement) emerged as one of the
largest revivalist movements in the Muslim World.

APPENDIX B
AN EXCERPT FROM THE TENTH WORD (EVIDENCES FOR RESURRECTION
AND HEREAFTER)
BY
SAID NURSI

479

480
Sixth Truth
The Gate of Splendour and Eternity,
The Manifestation of the Names of Glorious and Eternal.
Is it at all possible that the splendour of Dominicality that subdues and commands all
beings, from suns and trees down to particles, just like obedient soldiers, should
concentrate its entire attention on the wretched and transient beings that pass a
temporary life in the hospice of this world, and not create an eternal and everlasting
sphere of splendour, an unending manifestation of Dominicality? The display of Divine
splendour in the changing of the seasons, the sublime motions of the planets in the
heavens as if they were aeroplanes, the subjugation of all things and the creation of the
earth as man's cradle and the sun as his lamp, vast transformations such as the reviving
and adornment of the dead and dry globe - all of this shows that behind the veil a
sublime Dominicality exists, that a splendid monarchy is at work.
Now such a Dominical kingdom requires subjects worthy of itself, as well as an
appropriate mode of manifestation. But look at this hospice of the world, and you will
see that the most significant class of its subjects, endowed with the most comprehensive
of functions, are gathered together only temporarily and that, in the most wretched of
states. The hospice fills and empties each day. All of the subjects stay only temporarily
in this abode of trial for the sake of being tested in service. The abode itself changes
each hour. Again, all of the monarch's subjects stay only for a few brief minutes in
order to behold the samples of the precious bounty of the Glorious Maker, to look on
His miraculous works of art in the exhibition of the world with the eye of a buyer. Then
they disappear. The exhibition itself changes every minute. Whoever leaves it, never
returns, and whoever comes to it, will ultimately depart.
Now this state and circumstance definitively shows that behind and beyond this
hospice, this testing-ground, this exhibition, there are permanent palaces and eternal
abodes that fully manifest and support God's everlasting sovereignty; there are gardens
and treasurehouses full of the pure and exalted originals of the forms and copies we see
in this world. If we strive here in this world, it is for the sake of what awaits us there.
We work here, and are rewarded there. Bliss awaits everyone there, in accordance with
his capacity, as long as he does not squander his share. Yes, it is impossible that such
eternal kingship should concentrate exclusively on these wretched transient beings.
Consider this truth through the telescope of the following comparison. You are
travelling along a road. You see a caravanserai ahead of you on the road, built by a
great personage for people coming to visit him. Millions are spent on the decoration of
the caravanserai so that guests should enjoy their one night's stay there, and for their
instruction. But the guests see very little of those decorations, look at them for a very
short time; briefly tasting the joys of what is offered them, they go on their way without
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being satiated. But each guest takes a photograph of the objects in the caravanserai by
means of his special camera. Also, the servants of that great personage record with
great care the conduct of all the guests and preserve the record. You see, too, that he
destroys every day most of the valuable decorations, and replaces them with fresh
decorations for the newly arriving guests. After seeing all this, will any doubt remain
that the personage who has constructed this caravanserai on the road has permanent and
exalted dwellings, inexhaustible and precious treasures, an uninterrupted flow of great
generosity? By means of the generosity displayed in the caravanserai, he intends merely
to whet the appetite of his guests for those things he keeps in his immediate presence;
to awaken their desire for the gifts he has prepared for them. So too, if you look upon
the state of the hospice of this world without falling into drunkenness, you will
understand the following nine principles:
First Principle: You will understand that this world does not exist for its own sake,
any more than does the caravanserai. It is impossible that it should assume this shape
by itself. Rather, it is a well-constructed hospice, wisely designed to receive the caravan
of beings that constantly arrive to alight before departing again.
Second Principle: You will understand, too, that those living within this hospice are
guests. They are invited by their Generous Sustainer to the Abode of Peace.
Third Principle: You will understand, further, that the adornments of this world are
not simply for the sake of enjoyment or admiration. For if they yield pleasure for a
time, they cause pain for a longer time with their cessation. They give you a taste and
whet your appetite, but never satiate you. For either the life of the pleasure is short, or
your life is short, too brief for you to become satiated. These adornments of high value
and brief duration must, then, be for the sake of instruction in wisdom, for arousing
gratitude, and for encouraging men to seek out the perpetual originals of which they are
copies. They are, then, for other exalted goals beyond themselves.
Fourth Principle: You will understand also that the adornments of this world19 are
like samples and forms of the blessings stored up in Paradise by the mercy of the
Compassionate One for the people of faith.
Fifth Principle: You will understand, too, that all of these transient objects have not
been created for the sake of annihilation, in order to appear briefly and then vanish. The
purpose for their creation is rather briefly to be assembled in existence and acquire the
desired form, so that these may be noted, their images preserved, their meanings
known, and their results recorded. This is so that, for example, everlasting spectacles
might be wrought for the people of eternity, and that they might serve other purposes in
the realm of eternity. You will understand that things have been created for eternity, not
for annihilation; and as for apparent annihilation, it has the sense of a completion of
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duty and a release from service, for every transient thing advances to annihilation with
one aspect, but remains eternally with numerous other aspects.
Look, for example, at the flower, a word of God's power; for a short time it smiles and
looks at us, and then hides behind the veil of annihilation. It departs just like a word
leaving your mouth. But it does so entrusting thousands of its fellows to men's ears. It
leaves behind meanings in men's minds as numerous as those minds. The flower, too,
expressing its meaning and thus fulfilling its function, goes and departs. But it goes
leaving its apparent form in the memory of everything that sees it, its inner essence in
every seed. It is as if each memory and seed were a camera to record the adornment of
the flower, or a means for its perpetuation. If such be the case with an object at the
simplest level of life, it can be readily understood how closely tied to eternity is man,
the highest form of life and the possessor of an eternal soul. Again, from the fact that
the laws - each resembling a spirit - according to which large flowering and fruit
bearing plants are formed and the representations of their forms are preserved and
perpetuated in most regular fashion in tiny seeds throughout tempestuous changes from this fact it can be easily understood how closely tied and related to eternity is the
spirit of man, which possesses an extremely exalted and comprehensive nature, and
which although clothed in a body, is a conscious and luminous law issuing from the
divine command.
Sixth Principle: You will also understand that man has not been left to graze where he
wills, with a halter loosely tied around his neck; on the contrary, the forms of all his
deeds are recorded and registered, and the results of all his acts are preserved for the
day when he shall be called to account.
Seventh Principle: You will understand, further, that the destruction visited upon the
beautiful creatures of summer and spring in the autumn is not for the sake of
annihilation. Instead, it is a form of dismissal after the completion of service.20 It is
also a form of emptying in order to clear a space for the new creation that is to come in
the following spring, of preparing the ground and making ready for the beings that are
to come and assume their functions. Finally, it is a form of Divine warning to conscious
beings to awake from the neglect that causes them to forget their duties, from the
drunken torpor that causes them to forget their obligation of offering thanks.
Eighth Principle: You will understand this, too, that the eternal Maker of this transient
world has another, everlasting world; it is to this that He urges and impels His servants.
Ninth Principle: You will understand, also, that so Compassionate a Being will bestow
upon His choice servants in that world such gifts as no eye has ever seen, no ear has
ever heard, nor has their image crossed the heart of any man. In this we believe. (W:8588)
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